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DEATH AND DIVINE JUDGEMENT IN ECCLESIASTES 
 
Abstract 
The current scholarly consensus places Ecclesiastes’ composition in the postexilic era, 
sometime between the late Persian and early Hellenistic periods, leaning towards the 
late fourth or early third centuries BCE. Premised on this consensus, this thesis 
proposes that the book of Ecclesiastes is making a case for posthumous divine 
judgement in order to rectify pre-mortem injustices. Specifically, this thesis contends 
that issues relating to death and injustice raised by Qohelet in the book of Ecclesiastes 
point to the necessity of post-mortem divine judgement. Judging from its implied 
social and historical context, the book of Ecclesiastes also may have served as perhaps 
a provocative voice for, or as a catalyst to, the emergence of apocalyptic eschatology 
and later sectarian conflicts within Judaism during the mid-Second Temple period.  
Some people in postexilic Israelite society began to raise questions about 
traditional views of death, Sheol, and divine judgement at a time when retributive 
justice appears not to be assured or to be absent. One may well ask: what is the book 
of Ecclesiastes doing, if it appeared on the cusp of the Persian-Hellenistic transition 
period when the traditional idea of theodicy was perhaps becoming a serious issue in 
Israelite society, before full-blown apocalyptic eschatology surfaced?  
The answer seems to be inseparable from questions of how best Ecclesiastes as a 
book is to be read. Contemporary approaches to reading the book as a unified whole 
are examined, and a “frame-narrative” reading is argued to be the best approach. The 
key to unravelling the book’s puzzle lies in realizing that the author probably intended 
the frame-narrator to have the last say. The role of this “third person” is pivotal for 
explaining the paradoxes within Qohelet’s monologue and its relationship to the 
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The book of Ecclesiastes1 has long been regarded as “an anomaly”2 or “the most 
obscure book”3 in canonical Scripture by both Jews and Christians.4 Words such as 
puzzling, enigmatic, paradoxical, contradictory, or subversive are what readers often 
ascribe to Ecclesiastes. Polar structures,5 irony,6 cynicism,7 and scepticism8 are also 
mentioned as characteristics of the book. Some call Ecclesiastes’ message radical or 
shocking, while others have tried to find more positive aspects in the book than are 
probably warranted.9 Ecclesiastes has frustrated and exasperated scholars attempting 
to make sense of its message, content, and purpose through the centuries. 
Nevertheless, the book at the same time captivates scholars and laity alike with its 
existential tone and enduring appeal to the reader through the ages, despite its 
complexities and lack of apparently logical structure.10 Many unanswered questions 
have been raised and debated concerning this little book in canonical Scripture.  
This thesis starts with a few key problems and issues that one needs to recognize 
before presenting the main theme in this research. 
                                                 
1 The terms Ecclesiastes and Qohelet are differentiated in this thesis, the former being the book’s name 
and the latter the persona who is the main speaker in the book. Scripture verse numbers are based on 
the Hebrew Bible (BHS) with the English version added as in 4:17 [ET 5:1] or 5:1 [ET 2] where the 
verse numbers are different in the English translation. English translations of the original texts are mine 
unless noted otherwise. 
2 Philip B. Helsel, “Warren Zevon’s The Wind and Ecclesiastes: Searching for Meaning at the 
Threshold of Death,” JRH 46 (2007): 206. 
3 Ernest Renan, “L’Ecclésiaste: traduit de l’hébreu:  étude sur l’age et le caractère du livre 1882,” in 
Oeuvres complètes de Ernest Renan, tome 7 (ed. Psichari; Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1955), 536; ET Ernest 
Renan, Cohelet, or, The Preacher. Translated from  the Hebrew. With a Study on the Age and 
Character of the Book (London: Mathieson, [n.d.]), 12. 
4 In this thesis the term “Scripture” is used to signify either Hebrew Bible or the Old Testament. 
5 J. A. Loader, Polar Structures in the Book of Qohelet (BZAW 152; [Berlin]: de Gruyter, 1979). 
6 Edwin M. Good, Irony in the Old Testament (Rev. ed.; BibLit; Sheffield: Almond, 1981). 
7 Morris Jastrow, A Gentle Cynic: Being a Translation of the Book of Koheleth (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, 1919). 
8 E. J. Dillon, The Sceptics of the Old Testament: Job, Koheleth, Agur: With English Text Translated 
for the First Time from the Primitive Hebrew as Restored on the Basis of Recent Philological 
Discoveries (London: Isbiser, 1895), 85 – 129; Martin A. Klopfenstein, “Die Skepsis des Qohelet,” TZ 
28 (1972): 97– 109; however, see Stuart Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism (LHBOTS 541; New 
York: T&T Clark International, 2012). 
9 R. N. Whybray, “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” JSOT 23 (1982): 87 – 98. 
10 For Ecclesiastes ’ reception history in both academic and cultural milieux, see Eric S. Christianson, 
Ecclesiastes through the Centuries (BBC; eds. Sawyer, et al.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).  
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0.1 Problems and Issues  
Strangely, what anyone actually knows about the formation of Ecclesiastes, its 
context of origin, and impact in ancient Israel is minimal or debatable. Almost from 
its inception serious readers have discovered that Ecclesiastes poses historical and 
interpretative problems when trying to understand its content or message. This section 
presents (1) The Problem of how best Ecclesiastes is to be read and issues relating to 
(2) Dating in relation to developing the thesis in this dissertation. 
0.1.1 The Problem of How Best Ecclesiastes Is to Be Read  
Although recent scholarship has moved towards reading Ecclesiastes as a unified 
whole, various approaches do not yet yield satisfactory answers to the problems with 
a number of incoherences in the main body of the text. The dynamics of the epilogue 
in relation to Qohelet’s monologue or the book’s overall purpose in such complexity 
remains elusive.  
The problem arises in reading Ecclesiastes itself as a book when one tries to 
interpret or understand it. More specifically, the problem that the book poses is how 
one is to understand many different and apparently inconsistent or contradictory 
statements in it. This general problem may be attributed to the following factors. 
Some of the most consistent differences in content relate to a difference in form: the 
difference between the “I” passages, in which Qohelet speaks, and the third person 
passages. Another issue is that the boundaries between the two narratives are not 
always clear. For example, some scholars interpret the first person passages starts 
with the explicit “I, Qohelet” statement in 1:12, while others think they start with his 
famous hebel statement in 1:2. The third person passages appear in 1:1-2, 7:27, and 
12:8–12. The distinction between the first and the third person narratives and that 
between Qohelet’s monologue (1:2– or 1:12–12:8) and the epilogue (12:9–14) in 
particular, presents a problem. Some scholars also think the epilogue may have been 
spoken by more than one person, which raises questions about the book’s 
composition. 
Another difficulty lies within Qohelet’s monologue, which occupies most of the 
book. Qohelet presents different topics in ways that often appear to be haphazard, 
inconherent or contradictory. A clear structure or organization of the content in 
Ecclesiastes is indiscernible or fragmentary at best. The next subsections will briefly 
describe how scholars have dealt with these problems in interpreting Ecclesiastes. 
12 
  
0.1.1.1  A Brief Summary of Historical Approaches 
Today there are very few scholars, even among the “conservative,” who still hold the 
traditional view of Solomon as the author of Ecclesiastes. The debate regarding the 
compositional unity of Ecclesiastes began when doubts were raised about Solomonic 
authorship and continues to rage today. The question of the book’s authorship 
apparently began to surface as early as the fourth century by Didymus the Blind.11 
Although Martin Luther is widely, but likely erroneously, held as the first person to 
challenge the Solomonic authorship of Ecclesiastes, it is Grotius’s work in 1644 
which began to make an impact.12 Before the rise of critical scholarship, however, the 
juxtaposition of “scepticism” in Qohelet’s monologue and “moralism” in the epilogue 
was not apparently felt to be particularly puzzling, or requiring explanation.13  
New critical views of the book as a sceptical work with many hands and 
glossatorial emendations came to the fore around the turn of the twentieth century.14 
For example, Siegfried identified as many as nine hands (5 compilers, 2 epilogists and 
2 editors) in the composition of Ecclesiastes,15 and Haupt treated less than half of the 
222 verses in the book as genuinely original.16 Those source-critical approaches based 
their interpretation on a reconstructed text rather than the final form of Ecclesiastes 
because of the inconsistencies and discrepancies that they observed in the main body 
of the text. They argued that a single hand could not have produced such a book that 
“so mixed radical scepticism with conventional aphorisms,” recognition of tensions 
within wisdom books in general notwithstanding.17 Such a radical source-critical 
approach to Ecclesiastes, however, eventually subsided as the twentieth century 
unfolded. Among others, McNeile, Barton, and Podechard took a more restrained 
                                                 
11 Christianson, ibid., 95. 
12 For detailed account and clarification of this historical development, see ibid., 95 – 98. 
13 John Barton, Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study (2nd ed.; London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 1996), 62. 
14 For a history of the source critical approach, see George A. Barton, A Critical and Exegetical 
Commentary on the Book of Ecclesiastes (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1908), 18 – 43; see also Michael 
A. Eaton, Ecclesiastes: An Introduction and Commentary (TOTC; Leicester: Inter-Versity Press, 
1983), 36 – 40 for a succinct account which includes later history of interpretations; Christianson, 
Ecclesiastes, for the most recent, comprehensive reception history in literature and arts. 
15 D. C. Siegfried, Prediger und Hoheslied (HAT 2; ed. Nowack; vol. 3/2; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1898), 2 – 12; see Barton, Ecclesiastes, 28, for a concise summary of Siegfried’s analysis. 
Barton remarks: “It is built upon the supposition that absolutely but one type of thought can be 
harbored by a human mind while it is composing a book .” 
16 Paul Haupt, The Book of Ecclesiastes: A New Metrical Translation with an Introduction and 
Explanatory Notes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1905). 
17 Barton, Method, 66. 
13 
  
source-critical approach to the text, and their views were taken more seriously18 than 
the earlier extreme redactional approach by their predecessors. Childs summarizes the 
trend:  
Increasingly, modern scholars have returned to the position of seeing the book as 
basically a unified composition of one author. The earlier theories of multiple 
authorship or of extensive interpolation have not been sustained. However, some 
editorial work is generally recognized in the prologue and epilogue.19 
0.1.1.2  Advance towards Reading Ecclesiastes as a Unified Whole 
Historically, most scholars interpreted the epilogue as a later editorial addition. Two 
approaches to cultivate reading Ecclesiastes as a unified whole independently 
appeared in the 1970s. One considers the book to be a type of editorial work, and the 
other the work of an author.  
Dissatisfied with restrictive historical-critical approaches to Scripture, Childs 
proposed a new approach for reading the final received form of Scripture for 
canonical shaping.20 Childs and his student Sheppard applied the canonical approach 
to Ecclesiastes with a canon-conscious reading of the epilogue.21 They believe 
canonical redactor(s) shaped the epilogue to hold the book together as part of 
canonical Scripture. 
Conversely, Michael Fox recognized Ecclesiastes as a “product not of editorship 
but of authorship” in his 1977 essay.22 He adduced a unity of the book with a frame-
narrative structure by the author. Fox has significantly influenced subsequent 
scholars’ view of the mainstream historical-critical consensus and their reading of 
Ecclesiastes.  
                                                 
18 Eaton, Ecclesiastes, 38; A. H. McNeile, An Introduction to Ecclesiastes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1904); Barton, Ecclesiastes; E. Podechard, L’Ecclésiaste (EBib; Paris: Gabalda, 
1912). 
19 Brevard S. Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 
582. See e.g., Robert Gordis, Koheleth–the Man and His World: A Study of Ecclesiastes (3rd aug. ed.; 
New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 73; R. N. Whybray, “The Social World of the Wisdom Writers,” 
in The World of Ancient Israel: Sociological, Anthropological and Political Perspectives (ed. 
Clements; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 242; and many others as most recently, 
Antoon Schoors, Ecclesiastes (HCOT; Leuven: Peeters, 2013), 828; for review and discussion on the 
subject, see Craig G. Bartholomew, Reading Ecclesiastes: Old Testament Exegesis and Hermeneutical 
Theory (AnBib 139; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1998), 44. 
20 Brevard S. Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1970); Childs, Intro to 
OT. 
21 Childs, Intro to OT, 580 –89; Gerald T. Sheppard, “Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theological 
Commentary,” CBQ 39 (1977): 182–89. 




The canonical approach by Childs and Sheppard is a significant development of 
the conventional appeal to editorial work, while Fox pioneered a new literary 
approach. These two distinctive approaches currently represent the main options 
available for best making sense of the book as a whole. This thesis will evaluate and 
determine which may be the best method. An alternative or modified approach for 
understanding the book’s overall message and its implication will be advanced in this 
dissertation.  
0.1.2 Historical and Social Contexts of Ecclesiastes 
0.1.2.1  Dating of Ecclesiastes 
The question of when Ecclesiastes was written is neither simple nor straightforward 
from either internal or external evidence because both the book’s author and the main 
character Qohelet are unidentifiable, and its message is universal and typical of 
wisdom literature, which often can fit into any age or era, even if many scholars view 
the content of Qohelet’s message as radical or enigmatic. The date of the composition 
of Ecclesiastes has eluded scholars since the case for traditional Solomonic authorship 
collapsed. Based on linguistic grounds, the majority of current scholarship places the 
book sometime during the postexilic period, with few dissenters. Granted that 
linguistic data are still insufficient to confirm the dating,23 coupled with scarce direct 
external evidence, linguistic analysis still seems to be the best tool currently available. 
With this caveat in mind, the current status of the dating will be examined. 
Since the 19th century many scholars have dated the book to the Persian period;24 
Hengstenberg, for instance, mentions that the internal and external conditions 
correspond to the Persian period from the descriptions given in the book.25 More 
recently Seow has analysed the Hebrew text and argued that it is coloured with many 
Aramaic features and Persian loanwords,26 further promoting a Persian dating.27 
                                                 
23 Eva Mroczek, “‘Aramaisms’ in Qohelet: Methodological Problems in Identification and 
Interpretation,” in The Words of the Wise Are Like Goads: Engaging Qohelet in the 21st Century (eds. 
Boda, et al.; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013), 343 – 63; Ian Young, et al., Linguistic Dating of 
Biblical Texts (BW; 2 vols.; London: Equinox, 2008); Ian Young, Diversity in Pre-Exilic Hebrew (FAT 
5; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993). 
24 Barton, Ecclesiastes, 22, lists fifteen scholars, e.g., Ewald, Knobel, De Wette, Ginsburg, Delitzsch, 
Wright, and Driver among others. 
25 E. W. Hengstenberg, Der Prediger Salomo (Berlin: Oehmigke, 1859), 6; ET E. W. Hengstenberg, 
Commentary on Ecclesiastes, with Other Treatises (CFTL 6; trans. Simon; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1860), 6. 
 Along with these words C. L. Seow, Ecclesiastes: A New Translation .(8:11) פתגם  and (2:5)  פרדס 26
with Introduction and Commentary (AB 18C; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 11– 36, places Aramaism 
15 
  
Another trend since the mid-19th century is to push down the dating of 
Ecclesiastes further to the Hellenistic,28 or more specifically the Ptolemaic29 period. 
The reason is that initially many, and still some, have argued for Greek influence, 
although this has been challenged.30 Barton and others have not observed either Greek 
philosophical or Greek linguistic influence on the writer of Ecclesiastes.31 The 
fragments of Ecclesiastes among the Dead Sea scrolls have rendered a terminus ante 
quem for the book’s composition based on the palaeographical dating of 4QQoha to 
175–150 BCE.32 Furthermore, Goff points out that “4Q109 and 4Q11033 comprise 
evidence that Jews in the late Second Temple period were reading and copying 
                                                                                                                                            
in Ecclesiastes to  Persian rather than the later period. Also in C. L. Seow, “The Socioeconomic Context 
of ‘The Preacher’s’ Hermeneutic,” PSB 17 (1996): 168 – 95, he regards many economic terms from 
Persian loan words flourished, owing to a lively commercial environment during the Persian period. 
27 C. L. Seow, “Linguistic Evidence and the Dating of Qohelet,” JBL 115 (1996): 643 – 66; C. L. Seow, 
“The Social World of Ecclesiastes,” in Scribes, Sages, and Seers: The Sage in the Eastern 
Mediterranean World (ed. Perdue; FRLANT 219; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 189 –
 217. Seow analyses and concludes that Qohelet’s language is postexilic but prehellenistic before Ben 
Sira and Qumran. He recognizes its affinities with Ezra, Nehemiah, Chronicles, and Esther and places 
the dating of the book around 450 – 350 BCE. Seow, “Socioeconomic,” 171; more recently, however, he 
feels his upper end at mid-5th century BCE is too early and modifies his dating to the 4th century BCE, 
still maintaining it within the Persian period (Seow, “Social,” 193). 
28 Rainer Braun, Kohelet und die frühhellenistische Popularphilosophie (ZAW 130; Berlin: de Gruyter, 
1973); Harry Ranston, Ecclesiastes and the Early Greek Wisdom Literature (London: Epworth, 1925); 
contra Barton, Ecclesiastes, 43; C. Robert Harrison, Qoheleth in Social-Historical Perspective (Ann 
Arbor: UMI, 1998), v. 
29 I.e., 301–200 BCE. James L. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes: A Commentary (OTL; London: SCM, 1988), 
50; Mark R. Sneed, “The Social Location of Qoheleth’s Thought: Anomie and Alienation in Ptolemaic 
Jerusalem” (PhD diss., Drew University, 1990); Mark R. Sneed, “The Social Location of the Book of 
Qoheleth,” HS 39 (1998): 41 – 51; W. E. Staples, “Vanity of Vanities,” CJT 1 (1955): 142; Stephan de 
Jong, “Qohelet and the Ambitious Spirit of the Ptolemaic Period,” JSOT 61 (1994): 85 – 96; Antoon 
Schoors, “Qoheleth: A Book in a Changing Society,” OTE 9 (1996): 68 – 87. 
30 E.g., Martin Hengel, Judentum und Hellenismus: Studien zu ihrer Begegnung unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung Palästinas bis zur Mitte des 2. Jh.s v.Chr. (2nd ed.; WUNT 10; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1973), 210 – 40; ET Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in Their Encounter in 
Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Period (1st Eng. ed.; trans. Bowden; 2 vols.; vol. 1; London: 
SCM, 1974), 115 – 30 ; more recently, Thomas Krüger, Kohelet (Prediger) (BKAT 19S; Neukirchen-
Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2000), 39; ET Thomas Krüger, Qoheleth: A Commentary (Hermeneia; 
trans. Dean; Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2004), 19; Norbert Lohfink, Qoheleth: A Continental 
Commentary (CC; Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2003), 4 – 6; Leo G. Perdue, The Sword and the 
Stylus: An Introduction to Wisdom in the Age of Empires (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 220 – 39. 
31 Barton, Ecclesiastes, 32 – 34, 38 – 39, 43; H. L. Ginsberg, “The Structure and Contents of the Book of 
Koheleth,” in Wisdom in Israel and in the Ancient Near East: Presented to Professor Harold Henry 
Rowley in Celebration of His Sixty-Fifth Birthday (eds. Noth and Thomas; Leiden: Brill, 1955), 147; 
Whybray, “Social World,” 243; Harrison, Qoheleth, v – vi, 343; Joseph Azize, “Considering the Book of 
Qohelet Afresh,” ANES 37 (2000): 184; Young, et al., Linguistic, 2:63, most recently summarizes 
as,  “it is increasingly recognized that Greek influence in the book’s thought and language is trivial at 
best . . . and perhaps completely absent” ; see also Weeks, Scepticism, 161. 
32 Eugene Ulrich, et al., Qumran Cave 4, XI: Psalms to Chronicles (DJD 16; Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), 
221 – 27, pls. XXV, XXVI; Stephen J. Pfann and Philip Alexander et al., Qumran Cave 4, XXVI: 
Cryptic Texts and Miscellanea, Part 1 (DJD 36; Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), 422, pl. XXIX. 
33 Namely, 4QQoha and 4QQohb. 
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Ecclesiastes.”34 A dating later than the first quarter of the second century BCE,35 
therefore, can no longer be supported. Ben Sira who apparently knew Ecclesiastes 
wrote his book in Jerusalem around 200–175 BCE, although some scholars argued 
that Sirach might be earlier than Ecclesiastes.36 The dating of Sirach is fairly reliable, 
which is estimated from its Greek translation by his grandson.37 The writers of 1 
Enoch and the Wisdom of Solomon also apparently knew Ecclesiastes (vide infra). 
0.1.2.2  Sitz im Leben 
Many things that Qohelet describes about his society can probably be observed in 
nearly any period, pre- or postexilic. His general description without specific names 
or places makes identification of its historical or social contexts very difficult. The 
whole tone of the book is a sombre and existential mood—if not pessimistic, 
sceptical, or ironic—and suggests that the writer may have lived in a world that was 
unstable politically, socio-economically, and perhaps in terms of a newly emerging 
religio-philosophical ideology. The mood of his society manifests itself in Qohelet’s 
own materialistic and individualistic outlook on life. I shall briefly probe these three 
areas of social background from Qohelet’s own words and observations.  
Politically, his society appears to be going through turbulent times by a broken 
and unstable political system. Prevalent wickedness, oppression, and lack of 
administrative and judicial competency (5:7 [ET 8]) manifest symptoms of a corrupt 
society. However, Qohelet’s description is too general and vague to point to any 
specific ruler of his day;38 neither is it clear whether Qohelet has in mind or is 
                                                 
34 Matthew Goff, “Wisdom, Apocalypticism and Intertextuality: The Book of Ecclesiastes and the 
Sociolect of the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Reading Ecclesiastes Intertextually (eds. Dell and Kynes; 
LHBOTS 587; London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 223. 
35 E.g., Charles F. Whitley, Koheleth: His Language and Thought (BZAW 148; Berlin: de Gruyter, 
1979), 148, places the book’s composition during 152 –145 BCE. 
36 E.g., Robert H. Pfeiffer, History of New Testament Times: With an Introduction to the Apocrypha 
(New York: Harper, 1949), 401 (n. 20); cf. F. J. Backhaus, “Qohelet und Sirach,” BN 69 (1993): 32 –
55; contra Gordis, Man, 46 – 48; David S. Margoliouth, “Ecclesiastes, Book Of,” The Jewish 
Encyclopedia: A Descriptive Record of the History, Religion, Literature, and Customs of the Jewish 
People from the Earliest Times to the Present Day 5:32, notes:  “Ben Sira declares himself a compiler 
from the Old Testament (xxiv. 28), whereas Ecclesiastes claims originality (xii. 9, 10), it seems certain, 
in the case of close agreement between the two  books, that Ben Sira must be the borrower.”  
37 See Sirach Prolog. Jonathan Klawans, “Josephus on Fate, Free Will, and Ancient Jewish Types of 
Compatibilism,” Numen 56 (2009): 51; Jeremy Corley, “Wisdom versus Apocalyptic and Science in 
Sirach 1,1 – 10,” in Wisdom and Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls and in the Biblical Tradition 
(ed. Martínez; Leuven: Peeters, 2003), 271. 
38 In spite of the very general descriptions of kings and political situations, Schoors and others are eager 
to assign specific names and periods, see Schoors, “Qoheleth,” 68 – 87; contra Whybray who is more 
cautious to warn that  “the saying no doubt reflects the times in which Qohelet lived, although it is not 
possible to identify the particular situations.” See Whybray, “Social World,” 156.  
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pointing to a specific political situation of the postexilic period. He describes the 
severity of oppression in comparison to the dead or the stillborn being better off than 
the oppressed. The powerful rulers have sought their wealth and comfort at the 
expense of powerless people. Qohelet’s warning to obey the king and not to curse the 
king and the rich even in private (10:20) may suggest that people are under a 
tyrannical regime in which the king has absolute power.39  
Socio-economically, people have become materialistic (4:8; 5:9–12 [ET 10–13]), 
and the society is obsessed with the acquisition of wealth and making commercial 
profits for surplus,40 as the wealth seems to have become the path to power and 
security. It is not surprising, then, that people have sought advantage in their labour 
and toil for economic success. It is clear that making profit (יתרון) in labour and trade 
for personal gain describes the chief motivation of the socio-economic world of 
Qohelet. Besides יתרון, Qohelet uses a significant number of terms which relate to 
economic investment and personal advantage such as כסף (silver, money; 5 times), 
 deficit, what is) חסר/חסרון  ,(riches, wealth; 5 times) עשר ,(skill, success; 2 times) כשרון
lacking; 3 times), נכסים (riches, wealth, assets; 2 times), ענין (business, task, 
investment; 8 times), עמל (toil, fruit of toil; 25 times) חלק (portion, lot, advantage; 8 
times),41 and סגלה (possession; once).42 These terms indicate that materialism and 
economic advantages may have become the focal point for securing one’s life and 
future. Qohelet asks at least six times: “What advantage/profit is there . . .?” (1:3, 3:9; 
5:10, 16 [ET 11, 15]; 6:8, 11). Seow remarks: “Indeed, at times Qohelet sounds like a 
pragmatic entrepreneur ever concerned with the ‘bottom line’.”43 However, such 
pursuit does not necessarily reflect an environment of healthy economic growth when 
all toil and skill in working are due to jealousy or rivalry between a man and his own 
neighbour (4:4). Materialism has pervaded the society (4:8; 5:9–10, 12–13 [ET 10–11, 
13–14]) where jealousy has become a driving force for mercenary success. 
Qohelet extensively lists his accomplishments early in his monologic discourse 
(2:4–10), knowing his audience’s deep anxiety and concern with economic advantage 
and security in the environment where they reside. By alluding to his 
                                                 
39 Elizabeth Stone, “Old Man Koheleth,” JBR 10 (1942): 101, summarizes and paraphrases Qohelet ’ s 
warning on the political situation as  “obey the powers that be, and not meddle in  politics.” 
40 Whybray, “Social World,” 243. 
41 Vide infra. 
42 Seow, “Socioeconomic,” 174.  
43 Ibid; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 22. 
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accomplishments as similar to those of Solomon—his wealth, luxury, and wisdom—
Qohelet establishes his credibility to address and give admonitions to his audience, 
not simply as a sage but also as a successful and wealthy entrepreneur. He knows that 
this is his ploy to capture the attention of his audience who otherwise would dismiss 
him, saying, “This fellow, who never owned two cents, presumes to despise all the 
good things of the world.”44 The unsuspected negative assessment of wealth, power, 
pleasure, or wisdom is all the more poignant when it comes out of a mouth of an 
astute and entrepreneurial “wise king” who apparently has achieved all that man could 
wish for. This signifies that there lies a deeper uncertainty among his audience 
underneath the hustle and bustle of selfish pursuit for commercial success and an 
emerging new attitude against the traditional Israelite wisdom and values that they 
once held, because an individual’s righteous deeds hardly seem to secure prosperity or 
a safe and long life in their society any longer. 
A newly emerging religio-philosophical ideology may perhaps most clearly be 
seen in Qohelet’s attitude of notable individualism.45 The sheer number of Qohelet’s 
uses of  י “my” (25 times), לי “for myself” (10 times), or emphatic אני “I” (29 times 
out of 88 “I” statements) not only betrays Qohelet’s ambition for his individual 
accomplishments and gains but also reflects a concern for his own profit and well-
being here and now in this life, which probably has become a prime importance to 
people in his society.46  
This whole tone of individualism sounds as though Israelites have lost their 
national identity, which is very different from their traditional view of themselves as 
the people of God, a chosen nation. There is no hint of national consciousness in 
Ecclesiastes despite the notion of kings and rulers and Qohelet’s own claim of having 
been a king. Kings and rulers in the book, including Qohelet himself, are no help to 
the oppressed and they are described with more negative tones and connotations than 
positive or constructive. People of Qohelet’s world may have lived in a volatile 
political world, and both their national identity and personal security may have been 
at stake under foreign powers. God is silent and His help or judgement has become 
                                                 
44 Gordis, Man, 40. See Midrash Koheleth Rabba 3:11 or Deut R. 1:5 for the primary source. 
45 Stone, “Old Man,” 101; Hengel, Judentum, 210 – 40 [esp. 215] ( ET 115 – 30 [esp. 116 – 17] ); Eric S. 
Christianson, A Time to Tell: Narrative Strategies in Ecclesiastes (JSOTSup 280; Sheffield: Sheffield, 
1998), 34. 
46 Christianson, Time, 33 – 42; Michael V. Fox, Ecclesiastes: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the New 
JPS Translation (JPSBC; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2004), 13. 
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non-existent in Qohelet’s society. But his observations do not indicate anything of a 
period of religious persecution because Israelites obviously have had religious 
freedom and the religious corruption appears to be of their own doing.  
The author of Ecclesiastes probably had to address his audience in a precarious 
situation, when they seriously began to question God’s retributive justice, and their 
primary concern became their individual gain, if they were fortunate enough, or their 
survival, if they fell victim to the severe oppression or misfortunes that were going 
around. He needed a clever device to catch their attention and provoke a drastic 
change in their deteriorated mind-set, if what is described in Qohelet’s monologue is 
any reflection of the social situation in which the author lived.  
0.1.2.3  Summary and Conclusion 
The above discussions indicate dating Ecclesiastes is hardly straightforward. 
Bartholomew cautions: “The state of the current debate favors a postexilic date for 
Ecclesiastes, but more precision will depend on one’s interpretation of Ecclesiastes as 
a whole and of its social setting.”47 Margoliouth pointed out over one hundred years 
ago: “whatever may be the date of Ecclesiastes, he is at the least pre-Maccabaean. 
More  than that—i.e. at what point of the Persian or Alexandrine [sic] period he is to 
be placed— will probably never be known.”48 Recently, Segal has placed the book in 
the middle of this period, saying that  
the book of Ecclesiastes dates to the end of the Persian or to the beginning of the 
Greek period in  Israelite history. No other explanation seems realistic, but neither is 
[sic] there adequate grounds for  more specificity .49  
This then places Ecclesiastes’ dating around 330 BCE.  
This thesis adopts as a working hypothesis that Ecclesiastes may have appeared 
sometime during the late fourth century BCE to the turn of the next century, in basic 
agreement with Segal. However, how widely the book may have been circulated is 
impossible to know. 
The Persian-Hellenistic period was the time when not only Israel but the entire 
ancient Near Eastern world basically came under the dominations of the Persian 
Empire and then of Alexander the Great with his generals, who divided his conquests 
                                                 
47 Craig G. Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes (BCOTWP; ed. Longman; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 
2009), 53. 
48 David S. Margoliouth, “Ecclesiastes and Ecclesiasticus,” Exp 7/5 (1908): 119.  
49 Alan F. Segal, Life after Death: A History of the Afterlife in the Religions of the West (New York: 
Doubleday, 2004), 250.  
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among themselves after his death. Nations in the ancient world most likely underwent 
some significant cultural changes under such dominance. Long-held concepts of 
death, afterlife or divine judgement in Egypt, Greece, and Israel among them 
apparently shifted from their ancient context to adjust to their new, changing 
environment. Contextualising this historical background may be needed for us. 
0.2 Thesis and Objectives 
0.2.1 Thesis 
It is widely supposed that uncertainties about traditional views of death, Sheol, and 
divine justice begin to arise in Israelite society during the mid-Second Temple period. 
One may well ask: What is the book of Ecclesiastes doing, if it appeared on the cusp 
of Persian-Hellenistic transition period when the traditional idea of theodicy was 
becoming a serious issue in Israelite society before full-blown apocalyptic 
eschatology surfaced? This thesis aims to probe this question.  
Premised on the current consensus as a working hypothesis, this thesis proposes 
that the book of Ecclesiastes is actually making a case for posthumous50 divine 
judgement. Qohelet speaks about many different things which happen in life, but he 
eventually sums them up by saying, “Everything is hebel.” Death apparently is the 
reason. Qohelet seems to assess every event in life in terms of death, which occasions 
injustice. Specifically, this thesis contends that issues relating to death and injustice 
raised by Qohelet in the book of Ecclesiastes point to the necessity of post-mortem 
divine judgement. Judging from its undercurrent social and external historical context, 
this thesis will then tentatively suggest that Ecclesiastes may have served as a catalyst 
to, or as a provocative voice for, the emergence of apocalyptic eschatology and later 
sectarian conflicts within Judaism during the mid-Second Temple period. 
0.2.2 Objectives 
There are three main objectives in developing the current thesis:  
1. To devise an alternative/modified approach for how best Ecclesiastes is to be 
read as a unity and to attempt to resolve incoherences in the book. 
2. To identify issues of death and divine judgement in Qohelet’s monologue. 
                                                 
50 The term is interchangeably used with post-mortem, literally meaning “after death” immediately or 
at some unknown later time. 
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3. To argue that Qohelet’s monologue points to a theological need for post-
mortem divine judgement and to suggest a likely role of Ecclesiastes in 
relation to the emergence of Jewish apocalyptic eschatology. 
In order to achieve these objectives, Chapter 1 will start with a survey of the wider 
ancient Near Eastern context for issues of death and divine judgment to contextualise 
the specific discussion of these issues in Ecclesiastes. I will analyse, propose, and 
argue for how best Ecclesiastes may be read as a unified whole, as compared to other 
approaches, in Chapter 2. I will then expound issues raised and problems arising in 
Qohelet’s monologue in the next two Chapters 3–4. Discussions for making sense of 
conflicts and inconsistencies within Qohelet’s monologic discourse and its 
relationship to the epilogue will follow in Chapter 5. Lastly I will suggest a plausible 
purpose and role of Ecclesiastes in relation to the emergence of a uniquely Jewish 







HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
Concerns related to death, to what happens after death, and to the question of injustice 
(or rather of divine justice) are uniquely human. Qohelet, the main character in the 
book of Ecclesiastes, confronts us with the problem of death and reminds us of a 
deeply acute human yearning for answers to those questions from ancient times, as 
will be seen in the ensuing chapters. Qohelet’s ambivalent attitude in his search for 
the answer to the meaning of human life leads us to wonder how people in the ancient 
world confronted and dealt with the issues of death, their curiosity of what happens 
after death, and where to turn for the answer.  
This chapter surveys concepts of death, afterlife, and divine judgement in the 
ancient Near East and Greece as well as in Israel to contextualise the specific 
discussion of issues that Qohelet raises regarding death and divine judgement in 
Ecclesiastes. The chapter will fairly widely cover how Israel’s surrounding world 
dealt with the problem of death and developed concepts of netherworld and afterlife 
in relation to divine judgement. The survey provides background information and 
raises the question of possible influences which may have affected Hebrew concepts 
of death, Sheol, and divine judgement. These in turn may have shaped and stimulated 
Qohelet’s particular view of them in his mid-Second Temple milieu. 
1.1 Death, Afterlife, and Divine Judgement in the Ancient Context 
History shows that humankind has an innate desire to live perpetually, despite the 
formidable odds against attaining such a goal. Humankind abhors and fears death and 
has consciously sought to prolong life. Although unavoidable and inevitable, 
humankind rarely seems to accept that death is the end of human existence. A survey 
of the concepts of death, afterlife, and divine judgement in the ancient world51 shows 
                                                 




a common thread of the human desire to make sense of death and to hope for an 
afterlife. Although ancient people had varied beliefs regarding death, afterlife, and 
divine roles, the cult of the dead and rituals surrounding it persisted within each 
culture across the ancient civilizations. The ancient funerary cults of the dead 
developed and were sustained by their enduring undercurrent belief that death cannot 
be extinction, the end of human existence. They believed in a post-mortem human 
existence, an “afterlife,” in some form. 
This section surveys how the ancients dealt with death and how they defined their 
belief in continual human existence through their funerary cult practices. The survey 
will also examine what circumstances may have influenced or led to questioning of 
traditional religious beliefs when it occurred. It will explore historical underpinnings 
which eventually led to a significant attitude change and modification to traditional 
beliefs among ancient people universally around the same period, which most notably 
manifested itself in the Hellenistic milieu. The background survey of ancient contexts 
will help clarify not only how the ancient concepts within and without Israel 
illuminate her religion, but also if and how they may have influenced and shaped it. It 
may also shed light on the specific historical context of the book of Ecclesiastes, 
should the book have been written when similar changes began to appear in the 
Israelite society. The survey will contribute to the interest of this thesis in the kind of 
impact that Ecclesiastes may have had in the changing world of postexilic Israelite 
society.   
The following subsections cover areas which seem relevant to Qohelet’s ideology 
or nations which have undergone more discernible changes in their religious attitude 
during the Persian-Hellenistic period. 
1.1.1 Egypt        
No other nation has left behind such ample evidence of its interest and concern with 
death and afterlife as ancient Egypt. The massive pyramids, hieroglyphic inscriptions 
on the walls of graves, coffins, and mummies, and numerous archaeological artefacts 
speak volumes to the extensive role of mortuary rituals and a cult of the dead in 
ancient Egyptian culture. Evidence show that Egyptian concepts of death and afterlife 
“date from the beginning of the fourth millennium BC” and lasted over 3,000 years.52 
                                                 
52 John H. Taylor, Death and the Afterlife in Ancient Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2001), 13. 
Emily Teeter, Religion and Ritual in Ancient Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
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Egyptian funerary books remarkably attest and maintain the Egyptian core beliefs and 
common concepts of death and the afterlife. Texts with colourful vignettes decorate 
and cover the walls inside tombs and burial sites over different periods of Egyptian 
dynastic history, and have resulted in the preservation of their funerary cults. Funerary 
texts are apparently composed according to the changing societal needs in each 
succeeding period, while relying and based on their predecessors. A new concept or 
different emphasis was simply added to older texts rather than rewriting, replacing, or 
(re)synthesizing the old with the new.53 Because their religion was not built on a 
specific dogma, ancient Egyptians saw no conflict or need to consolidate their cultic 
beliefs or practices.54 They developed various ways and means which were equally 
valid to accomplish their religious purposes. Flexibility and variability characterized 
their cultic practice. This highly characteristic Egyptian cultural approach cultivated 
and blended two main funerary cults: the one based on the solar god Re and the other 
based on the myth of Osiris. Both rituals were initially developed only for royal 
families and existed side by side, but later certain elements or functions of each 
practice were combined when the funerary cult gradually became democratized.55  
Egyptians believed in an afterlife—a transfiguration, not reincarnation or 
resurrection—after death to continue life in an “enhanced Egypt” called the Field of 
Reeds, which could be either subterranean or celestial.56 It was extremely important 
for Egyptians to keep the corpse, because the bɜ “soul”57 and the kɜ “spirit”58 of the 
deceased needed to be united in the body in order for one to exist post mortem. The 
mummified body (sɜḥ) was basically to house the kɜ and the bɜ, not expected to rise 
                                                                                                                                            
13, notes:  “For more than three thousand years, Egyptians maintained generally the same outlook on 
the  world, making theirs one of the most conservative and unchanging societies yet known.”  
53 Taylor, Death, 25. 
54 Teeter, Religion, 199.  
55 Taylor, Death, 25; William J. Murnane, “Taking It with You: The Problem of Death and Afterlife in 
Ancient Egypt,” in Death and Afterlife: Perspectives of World Religions (ed. Obayashi; CSR 33; 
Westport: Greenwood, 1992), 44; Leonard H. Lesko, “Death and the Afterlife in Ancient Egyptian 
Thought,” Civilizations of the Ancient Near East 3:1768, notes: “By the time of the Coffin Texts, the 
hereafter had been democratized, and any goal, including the solar  voyage, was considered attainable 
by all .” 
56 Salima Ikram, Death and Burial in Ancient Egypt (Harlow: Longman, 2003), 23. 
57 Not to be confused as the same concept as the “inner essential self” in Greek or Christian thoughts. 
bɜ means “manifestation” and is depicted as a human-headed bird in the Egyptian iconography. See 
James Hamilton-Paterson and Carol Andrews, Mummies: Death and Life in Ancient Egypt (London: 
Collins with British Museum, 1978), 18; S. G. F. Brandon, “Life after Death—IV: The After-Life in 
Ancient Egyptian Faith and Practice,” ExpTim 76 (1965): 219. 
58 Taylor, Death, 18 – 19, remarks,  “It came into existence at a person’s birth and was  sometimes 
depicted as an identical copy of the individual,” namely  “double.” It is  depicted with a hieroglyphic 
symbol of a pair of half-way upraised human arms.  
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for physical activity. The kɜ needed to be fed for the deceased’s post-mortem 
existence.59 To them, afterlife was a continuation of this life, still eating, drinking, 
working, and serving their gods. Such expectation is expressed in the title of Spell 110 
of the Book of the Dead: 
Here begin the spells of the Field of Offerings and spells of going forth into the day; 
of coming and going in the realm of the dead; of being provided for in the Field of 
Rushes which is in the Field of Offerings, the abode of the Great Goddess, the 
Mistress of Winds; having strength thereby, having power thereby, ploughing 
therein, reaping and eating therein, drinking therein, copulating therein, and doing 
everything that used to be done on earth . . .60 
Elaborate funerary rites, involving the mummification of the body, the 
construction of graves and coffins, and offerings of food and gifts to the dead, were 
all about preparing for the life which Egyptians expected to have after death as an ɜḫ, 
“a transfigured being.”61 Not everyone became ɜḫ. The fate of all non-royals for their 
final destination was determined at the post-mortem judgement in the netherworld, 
which was ruled and presided over by Osiris, the king of the netherworld.62 Kings 
were exempt from the post-mortem judgement because they were considered divine 
beings and would join their gods when they died.63 The early funerary rites relating to 
the sun god Re were designed for the king’s passage to heaven. 
The third millennium Pyramid Texts already attest the idea of the judgement of 
the dead,64 but it is during the Second Intermediate Period when the idea of post-
mortem judgement was fully established as the culminating passage of the deceased to 
the next world. Two chapters of the Book of the Dead, Spells 30 and 125, are most 
illustrative of the general post-mortem judgement scenes. According to Spell 125, the 
judgement takes place in the Hall of the Two Truths (mɜ‛ty), into which Anubis, who 
is responsible for mummification, escorts the deceased. Osiris usually presides over 
the judgement, along with his sisters Isis and Nephthys, and the Sons of Horus during 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 16, 19. 
60 Spell 110 in R. O. Faulkner, Book of the Dead: Vol 1 — The Texts (trans. Faulkner; New York: The 
Limited Editions Club, 1972), 82. Cf. Coffin Texts Spell 464 in R. O. Faulkner, The Ancient Egyptian 
Coffin Texts, Vol 2: Spells 355–787 (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1977), 90. 
61 Taylor, Death, 31. 
62 For a summary of Osiris myth, see, e.g., Segal, Life, 39 –41. 
63 See Pyramid Texts Utterance 486 , in R. O. Faulkner, The Ancient Egyptian Pyramid Texts: 
Translated into English (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969), 173; see also S. G. F. Brandon, Religion in Ancient 
History: Studies in Ideas, Men, and Events (New York: Scribner, 1969), 104. Brandon notes that “the 
dead king was magically assimilated to Osiris so as to partake in his resurrection, he also acquired 
thereby the Osirian title maa kheru.” 
64 For instance, see Utterance  270 in Faulkner, PT Trans., 78. 
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the New Kingdom, but Re takes Osiris’s place in the later periods.65 The judicial 
process appears presupposed in the scene, without codified laws upon which to base 
or determine the verdict.66 In contrast to the modern court, the deceased is presumed 
guilty and he has to declare his innocence before Osiris and the forty-two judges, who 
represent different aspects of mɜ‛t. The deceased has to meet forty-two gods, greets 
each one correctly by name, and gives negative confessions of approximately eighty 
forbidden acts during his life, enumerating them to claim that he did not commit any 
of those sins.67 He concludes his defence, confirming his innocence with positive 
aspects of his conduct in his life and pleads for justice.68 
In ancient Egypt mɜ‛t represented the fundamental law of the universe and the 
basis of social order which established truth, justice, and righteousness.69 The sun god 
Re ruled the universe, and the king, “Re’s incarnate son,” was responsible for the 
human maintenance of mɜ‛t on the land.70 The king dispensed the laws to his subjects 
as he saw fit.71 The king was the highest judge and “ex officio in harmony with 
ma’at.”72 The individual, however, somehow had to find ways to claim his innocence 
without written codified laws. This was done by not incurring any complaint from his 
neighbours73 or making the eighty-two transgressions listed in Spell 125 of the Book 
of the Dead his laws or guiding principles. For example, a stela of Baki from the 
fourteenth century BCE explicitly states: 
                                                 
65 Taylor, Death, 37. 
66 Jan Assmann, Death and Salvation in Ancient Egypt (trans. Lorton; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2005), 77. 
67 Book of the Dead Chapter 125, translation in Miriam Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature: A 
Book of Readings, Vol. 2: The New Kingdom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 124 – 32; 
or see Thomas G. Allen ed, The Egyptian Book of the Dead: Documents in the Oriental Institute 
Museum at the University of Chicago (UCOIP; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 196 – 207. 
68 Lichtheim, AEL2, 128; in Allen ed, BD, 200, translation is in the third person, starting with “Behold, 
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69 Taylor, Death, 36; S. G. F. Brandon, The Judgment of the Dead: An Historical and Comparative 
Study of the Idea of a Post-Mortem Judgment in the Major Religions (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicholson, 1967), 11. 
70 Brandon, Judgment, 11. 
71 Teeter, Religion, 4; Ronald J. Williams, “Theodicy in the Ancient Near East,” in Theodicy in the Old 
Testament (ed. Crenshaw; IRT 4; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 47. 
72 Alan B. Lloyd, “Nationalist Propaganda in Ptolemaic Egypt,” Historia 31 (1982): 43. 
73 E.g., see the complaints of The Eloquent Peasant, written in the Middle Kingdom, in Miriam 
Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature: A Book of Readings, Vol. 1: The Old and Middle Kingdoms 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 169 – 84; Jan Zandee, Death as an Enemy: According 
to Ancient Egyptian Conceptions (SHR 5; trans. Klasens; Leiden: Brill, 1960), 32; Brandon, Judgment, 
8. The underlying presumption is that the fate of the deceased will be well if there were no complaint 
against him in this life, or a complaint is lodged against him before a court of justice, and therefore the 
deceased has to prove his innocence. 
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I am a worthy who is fortunate because of maat, one who emulated the laws of the 
Hall of the Two Truths, for I intended to reach the realm of the dead without my 
name being attached to any meanness, without having done anything evil to any man, 
or anything that their gods censure.74 
The deceased’s innocence was confirmed by weighing his heart on a scale against 
a feather, the symbol of mɜ‛t. If the scale was balanced, the deceased was declared as 
mɜ‛-ɜḫrω75 and allowed to proceed and live with gods in the Field of Reeds.76 Thus 
“the righteous one” can join with Re or other gods in the heavenly realm. If the scale 
was unbalanced, namely, if the heart weighed heavier than the feather, the deceased’s 
heart would be given to Ammit77 who was waiting to devour it. But Ammit’s gulping 
the heart apparently did not destroy the deceased, since his kɜ, bɜ, and sɜḥ still 
remained, and the dead would be inflicted with punishment and confined in the 
netherworld forever.  
The Books of the Underworld, composed during New Kingdom, give the most 
detailed descriptions of the realm of the dead.78 The Egyptian netherworld is located 
in the West and is deep and dark beneath the earth. The netherworld is called “the 
land that loves silence” or “the beautiful West.”79 The realm of the dead in the West 
has gates—a gate which may lead to a passage heavenward, gate(s) to a passage 
below, and gates to various regions of the netherworld. So the West can be beautiful, 
as it is so called, but also can be a place of terror. Those who travel to the West do not 
return80 and the dead in the netherworld are called “the hidden ones”81 because they 
exist hidden from the living realm. It is a gloomy place where life activities cease and 
silence prevails, perhaps except a sound of agony and cries from torture.82 Ancient 
Egyptians have understood that the netherworld is “situated on the under-side of the  
disk of the earth,”83 and “the reverse of life” is what the dead experience.84 The dead 
                                                 
74 Turin stella 156 cited and translated in Assmann, Death, 80. 
75 Namely, translated “just voice,”  “righteous” or  “justified” in S. G. F. Brandon, “A Problem of the 
Osirian Judgement of the Dead,” Numen 5 (1958): 113.  
76 See, e.g., a reproduction of “Weighing of the heart of Hunefer in the Judgment Hall of Osiris” (the 
Papyrus of Hunefer) in the British Musium (No. 9901) in E. A. Wallis Budge, Osiris and the Egyptian 
Resurrection, Vol. 1 (2vols.; London: Warner, 1911), frontispiece; cf. Brandon, “Problem,” 112, notes 
that “in the Papyrus of Ani Osiris does not actually appear as presiding over the fateful weighing of  the 
heart, but there can be no doubt that he is conceived as the divine judge of the dead.”  
77 Or Ammut (“eater of the dead”) . Brandon, “Life,” 220.  
78 Mainly, Book of Amduat and Book of Gates. Taylor, Death, 33. 
79 Ibid., 12. 
80 PT Spell 2175, translation in Faulkner, PT Trans., 305. 
81 Zandee, Death, 97. 
82 Ibid., 88–93; Brandon, Judgment, 46. 
83 Zandee, Death, 73. Ensuing discussion on the netherworld in this section largely relies on Zandee, 
pp. 73 – 97. 
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walk upside down against the ceiling,85 are tortured by fire,86 destroyed, or 
annihilated.87 In other words, the dead are punished and get their just deserts 
according to their evil deeds during their life, which will be used against and inflicted 
on them in the underworld.88 The post-mortem judgement is considered final, 
irrevocable and everlasting. Sinners do not escape punishment or confinement in the 
netherworld.  
The Books of the Underworld also detail the sun god Re’s nightly journey through 
twelve regions of the subterranean underworld. The dead reside in every region, and 
Re visits each one of them for one hour during his twelve-hour journey through the 
night.89 Re’s rejuvenation also takes place during the journey through his union with 
Osiris90 and his rebirth by the sky goddess Nut at dawn.91  
Because justice was supposedly assured in the next life—if not in this life—in the 
Egyptian cult, premature death or death by violence or even suicide92 did not exclude 
anyone from a chance to obtain afterlife.93 Death by drowning was even considered a 
fortunate fate, probably owing to an Egyptian idea of water as a life-renewal medium 
or a belief in the immediate transit to the realm of the dead through water.94 On the 
other hand, Egyptians avoided death by burning or in a foreign land because of fear of 
losing the body, which precluded the proper funerary rites of mummification. They 
described death as being “at rest,” “weary,” or “weary of heart” and likened it to 
“sleep” or being “asleep,” probably with a view to being awakened into the next life.95 
Preparations for a proper burial in the traditional manner, which are in effect 
preparations for the next life, were of paramount importance to ancient Egyptians 
                                                                                                                                            
84 Ibid., 88.  
85 CT Spell I.188.d–189.b, translation: R. O. Faulkner, The Ancient Egyptian Coffin Texts, Vol 1: Spells 
1–354 (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1973), 36. 
86 PT Utterance 323.a–d, translation: Faulkner, PT Trans., 69. 
87 Zandee, Death, 40.  
88 See, e.g., the Instructions of Ptahhotep teaches, “Do not scheme against people, god punishes 
accordingly: If a man says: ‘I shall live by it,’ he will lack bread for his mouth,” in Lichtheim, AEL1, 
64.  
89 Taylor, Death, 33. 
90 Ibid., 198. 
91 Teeter, Religion, 11 – 12. 
92 The Dispute between a Man and His Ba about suicide from the Twelfth Dynasty (Middle Kingdom) 
did not seem to be considered immoral. Taylor, Death, 41; see Lichtheim, AEL1, 163 – 69 for a 
translated Egyptian text.  
93 Taylor, Death, 39. 
94 Ibid., 41. 
95 Ibid., 39. A similar  “sleep– awake” idea is also expressed in Israelite religion.  
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while on this side of the world.96 Their belief in the equitable post-mortem judgement 
undoubtedly shaped their lifestyle and conduct as well as their society. It would not be 
surprising, then, if they were preoccupied with preparations for the next life or if they 
did not consider suicide morally wrong, especially when they lived in misery in this 
life despite their good conduct: they expected a better life in the next. What Egyptians 
feared most was extinction (the second death) in the netherworld,97 because they 
considered extinction or non-existence worse than death.98 They would rather 
continue existing even in undesirable conditions of the netherworld.  
What is surprising in the seemingly highly ethical Egyptian society, then, is that 
their graves, coffins, and even mummies were constantly ransacked and robbed 
throughout their mortuary history. Warnings inscribed on the grave stone or gate 
against robbers and passers-by apparently had little effect as a deterrent. This suggests 
that the afterlife based on their funerary cults did not necessarily convince all 
Egyptians. Since there were few codified laws, Egyptians decided their conduct 
according to their own judgement. Moreover, tomb robbers probably were not always 
caught or punished for their crimes. Egyptian mortuary customs must also have had a 
lot to do with economic factors in both the individual’s ability for funerary 
preparations on the one hand, and funerary business enterprises on the other hand. 
These factors may have affected ancient Egyptian society and led an appreciable 
number of people to holding a sceptical view of post-mortem judgement or afterlife as 
a continuation of this life.  
Already in the Middle Kingdom period, one of the Harper’s Songs from the tomb 
of a King Intef eloquently expresses such scepticism against the traditional belief:99  
No one there is who returns from there to tell their condition, to tell their needs, and 
thus to heal our hearts, ere we hasten to the place they have gone. 
Be hale, while your heart (seeks the) self-forgetfulness that performs the sɜḥ-rites 
upon you. 
Follow your heart while you live: put myrrh on your head, dress in fine linen, anoint 
yourself with true wonders from the god’s property. 
Increase your pleasures greatly, let (not) your heart be weary, follow your heart and 
your pleasure, conduct your affairs on earth, let not your heart be sad. 
That day of lamentation shall come upon you—and the Weary of Heart heeds not 
their wailing: their weeping cannot save a man from the Netherworld.   
 
                                                 
96 Ibid., 39. 
97 For this concern, see Spell 176 for not dying again in Faulkner, BD, 143. 
98 Lesko, “Death,” CANE 3:1766. 




Spend a pleasant day!  
Weary not of it!  
None there is who can send his wealth with him.  
None there is who goes who can return again.100 
The song was popular in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties. Other harpers’ 
songs appear after Intef’s song either influenced by, or as a response to, it.101 Two 
harpers’ songs on the walls of the tomb of Neferhotep and the Song of Khai-Inheret 
from the time of Ramses III appear to be reactions to Intef’s song, expressing either 
an outright rejection or a toning down of its scepticism, just as there was probably a 
similar reaction to Qohelet’s monologic discourse later in Israel. Qohelet’s 
questioning of afterlife and his advice to enjoy life while one can (9:7-9) strikes a 
chord with Intef’s song, which is probably accidental, but still remarkable.  
The tenets of Egyptian concepts of life, death, and afterlife endured, nonetheless, 
so long as the king exerted his military power, protected the land, and maintained the 
social order. Traditionally the Egyptian king was “a god incarnate, the earthly 
embodiment of the god Horus and, as such, the champion of the cosmic order 
(mɜ‛t).”102 However, their traditional belief in the king’s absolute power crumbled and 
a shift to direct dependence on the divine power emerged, when invasions and 
dominations by foreign powers began to change the political landscape of Egypt from 
the seventh century BCE onward. It is probably no coincidence that demotic writings 
began to appear around the same period.  
Demotic writings exhibit reflection and response to cultural trauma caused by 
wars, invasions, and changing dynasties, while attempting to preserve traditional 
Egyptian ideology.103 The so-called Demotic Chronicle in the third century BCE104 is 
a collection of oracles with interpretations. Its main thrust is the ideological 
underpinning of the legitimate Egyptian kingship for cultural propaganda, as Lloyd 
remarks: “All the oracles refer to kings of Egypt ranging from Amyrtaeus (c. 404–
                                                 
100 Translation by Michael V. Fox, The Song of Songs and the Ancient Egyptian Love Songs (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 346 – 47; see also Lichtheim, AEL1, 195 – 97. 
101 See Miriam Lichtheim, “The Songs of the Harpers,” JNES 4 (1945): 178–212. 
102 Alan B. Lloyd, “The Late Period, 664– 323 BC,” in Ancient Egypt: A Social History (eds. Trigger, et 
al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 288. 
103 More elaborate treatment on this subject, see “Late Period Egypt: Historical and Intellectual 
Context” (Chapter 6) in Shannon Burkes, Death in Qoheleth and Egyptian Biographies of the Late 
Period (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999), 209 – 34.  
104 Probably early Ptolemaic period. Janet H. Johnson, “The Demotic Chronicle as a Statement of a 
Theory of Kingship,” JSSEA 13 (1983): 62 – 63. 
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398) to the last native Egyptian Pharaoh Nectanebo II (c. 358–41).”105 Meyer 
describes it as “an eschatological prophecy concerning the history of Egypt in the 
Persian and Greek eras”106 written post eventum. But the emphasis is shifted from the 
king being ex officio in accord with mɜ‛t in earlier texts to the point that only the king 
who lives according to the will of gods will endure—the fundamental theme in the 
Demotic Chronicle.107 The Chronicle attributes the past failure of native kings to their 
disloyalty to hp, “law,” the will or the law of god—“a late equivalent of mɜ‛t.”108 The 
Chronicle demolishes “the aura of godhead” surrounding kingship and depicts the 
king as a mortal who can “violate the divine order, incur divine wrath and be 
punished.”109 A good king depends on the gods and is judged by his actions, not by 
his ethnicity.110 Pragmatic and adaptive, ancient Egyptians have thus accepted and 
legitimized Persian and Macedonian rulers, who conquered Egypt, as their kings so 
long as those rulers fulfilled the Egyptian kingship role with all its obligations.111  
Thus the Egyptians’ dependence inevitably shifted more directly towards the 
power and authority of gods with the decline of the native king’s religious authority, 
and his military and political power. Demotic wisdom texts, The Instruction of 
Ankhsheshonqy112 and The Instruction of Papyrus Insinger (3rd–2nd century BCE),113 
not only indicate this shift, but also show their psychology under conditions of 
uncertainty in the changing world. Coming under direct divine authority, Egyptians 
find themselves not necessarily living in an orderly and just world, which was once 
kept under the king’s authority according to the universal order of mɜ‛t. Instead, they 
                                                 
105 Lloyd, “Nationalist,” 41, 55; Lloyd, “Late,” 296; Johnson, “Demotic,” 72. 
106 „Eine eschatologische Prophetie über die Geschichte Ägyptens in persischer und griechischer Zeit“ 
in Eduard Meyer, “Ägyptische Dokumente aus der Perserzeit,” SPAW 16 (1915): 287; cf. J. Gwyn 
Griffiths, “Apocalyptic in the Hellenistic Era,” in Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the 
Near East (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1983), 279. 
107 Lloyd, “Nationalist,” 41. 
108 Ibid., 43; Griffiths, “Apocalyptic,” 282. , Griffiths notes that “hp is often associated with god Thoth” 
and that “the idea of the ‘Law’ was elaborated in Egypt from the Twenty-sixth Dynasty onwards.” 
109 Lloyd, “Late,” 299. 
110 Burkes, Death, 214. 
111 Lloyd, “Late,” 297. 
112 Although the MS date on palaeographical grounds is late Ptolemaic, the composition itself is 
probably in fifth or fouth century BCE, notes S. R. K. Glanville, Catalogue of Demotic Papyri in the 
British Museum, Vol. 2: The Instructions of  ‘ Onchsheshonqy (British Museum Papyrus 10508) 
(London: The Trustees of the British Museum, 1955), xii, xiv; B. Gemser, “The Instructions 
of  ‘ Onchsheshonqy and Biblical Wisdom Literature,” in Congress Volume: Oxford, 1959 (ed. 
Quarterly; VTSup 7; Leiden: Brill, 1960), 106. 
113 Jack T. Sanders, Ben Sira and Demotic Wisdom (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983), 70; Johannes 
Marböck, Weisheit im Wandel: Untersuchungen zur Weisheitstheologie bei Ben Sira (BZAW 272; 
Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), 169.  
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often observe the reversal of order directly under the divine mɜ‛t: particularly, “the 
undeserved and unpredictable reversal of human fortune.”114 Both Ankhsheshonqy and 
Insinger recognize that events in life are beyond human control and nothing happens 
except what the god ordains. They warn of unpredictable outcomes for human plans 
and events. Ankhsheshonqy writes:  
Nothing occurs except what the god commands. (22,25) 
The plans of the god are one thing, the thoughts [of men] are another. (26,14)  
Man does not know the days of his misfortune. . . you do not know the length of your 
life” (12,3.5)115  
Similarly, Insinger notes: 
Death and the life of tomorrow, we do not know its <shape>.” (17,6) 
One does not understand the heart of the god until what he has decreed has come. 
(31,1).116  
There are also some notable similarities of thought between Ankhsheshonqy and 
Qohelet’s utterances in Ecclesiastes:117  
 
 Ankhsheshonqy (LEW)  Ecclesiastes (NASB) 
Every hand is stretched out to the god 
but he accepts only the hand of his 
beloved. (23,14)  
For to a person who is good in His sight He 
has given wisdom and knowledge and joy, 
while to the sinner He has given the task of 
gathering and collecting so that he may give 
to one who is good in God's sight. (2:26)  
If Pre is angry with a land, he makes 
great its small men and makes small its 
great men. If Pre is angry with a land, 
he sets the fools over the learned ones. 
(5,9.10) 
folly is set in many exalted places while rich 
men sit in humble places.  I have seen slaves 
riding on horses and princes walking like 
slaves on the land. (10:6-7)                                                                        
Woe to you, O land, whose king is a lad and 
whose princes feast in the morning. (10:16)                             
He who shakes the stone, upon his foot 
it falls (22,5) 
He who quarries stones may be hurt by them, 
and he who splits logs may be endangered by 
them. (10:9) 
                                                 
114 Miriam Lichtheim, “Observations on Papyrus Insinger,” in Studien zu altägyptischen Lebenslehren 
(eds. Hornung and Keel; OBO 28; Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1979), 295. 
115 Cf. Eccl 7:14; 9:12. Translation and citation of the texts of Ankhsheshonqy from Miriam Lichtheim, 
Late Egyptian Wisdom Literature in the International Context: A Study of Demotic Instructions (OBO 
52; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), 66–9 2. 
116 Translation and citation of the texts of Insinger from ibid., 197–234. 
117 Gemser, “Instructions,” 125– 26. 
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There is one who plows and does not 
[reap]. There is one who reaps and 
does not eat. (26,17.18) 
When there is a man who has labored with 
wisdom, knowledge and skill, then he gives 
his legacy to one who has not labored with 
them.  (2:21) 
I again saw under the sun that the race is not 
to the swift, and the battle is not to the 
warriors, and neither is bread to the wise, nor 
wealth to the discerning, nor favor to men of 
ability; for time and chance overtake them 
all. (9:11) 
Do a good deed and cast it in the flood; 
when it dries you will find it. (19,10) 
Cast your bread on the surface of the waters, 
for you will find it after many days. (11:1) 
And between Insinger and Qohelet: 
 
Insinger (LEW) Ecclesiastes (NASB) 
There is one who lives on little so as 
to save, yet he becomes poor.                                                          
There is one who does not know, yet 
the fate gives (him) wealth.                                                                     
It is not the wise man who saves who 
finds a reserve.                                                                          
Nor is it the one who spends who 
becomes poor. The god gives a 
wealth of provisions without an 
income.                                                                            
He also gives poverty in the purse 
without spending.                                                                      
The fate and the [fortune] that come, 
it is the god who sends them.                                                       
(7,13–19) 
When there is a man who has labored with 
wisdom, knowledge and skill, then he gives 
his legacy to one who has not labored with 
them. This too is vanity and a great evil. 
(2:21)    
For to a person who is good in His sight He 
has given wisdom and knowledge and joy, 
while to the sinner He has given the task of 
gathering and collecting so that he may give 
to one who is good in God's sight. This too is 
vanity and striving after wind. (2:26)                                                                       
a man to whom God has given riches and 
wealth and honor so that his soul lacks 
nothing of all that he desires, but God has not 
empowered him to eat from them, for a 
foreigner enjoys them. This is vanity and a 
severe affliction. (6:2)   
I again saw under the sun that the race is not 
to the swift, and the battle is not to the 
warriors, and neither is bread to the wise, nor 
wealth to the discerning, nor favor to men of 
ability; for time and chance overtake them 
all. (9:11) 
 
Money is the snare the god has 
placed on the earth for the impious 
man so that he should worry daily. 
(15,19-20) 
For what does a man get in all his labor and 
in his striving with which he labors under the 
sun? Because all his days his task is painful 
and grievous; even at night his mind does not 
rest. This too is vanity. (2:22-23)   
There was a certain man without a depend-
ent, having neither a son nor a brother, yet 
there was no end to all his labor. Indeed, his 
eyes were not satisfied with riches and he 
never asked, “And for whom am I laboring 
and depriving myself of pleasure?” This too 
is vanity and it is a grievous task. (4:8) 
Most notably, Insinger describes many examples of the reversal of right order and 
concludes nearly all chapters with the refrain: “The fate and the fortune that come, it 
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is the god who sends them.”118 Such repetition only buttresses a precarious sense of 
security in Egyptian society and reveals anxieties and perplexities regarding 
inscrutable divine freedom, which arose during the Late Period, in the Hellenistic 
milieu.119 Lichtheim writes: 
The autobiographical inscriptions of the Late Period reveal a mentality and a piety 
that are traditional and yet subtly different from the attitudes of the past. There is less 
optimism and more concern. It is no longer assumed that righteous living guarantees 
a successful life. Success and happiness are now thought to depend entirely on the 
grace of the gods. The individual can achieve nothing without their help; but the will 
of the gods is inscrutable. Yet life was not prized any less. Piety itself demanded that 
life should be enjoyed. Thus enjoyment of life is a basic theme of the 
autobiographies. And the exhortation to value life remains central to the moral code 
of the Instructions.120 
Such sentiment in demotic literature has emerged and becomes heightened under 
cultural trauma within Egypt, as the native king’s ineffable absolute power declined 
and eventually was lost through foreign invasions and defeats of the Egyptian 
dynasty.121 Similar sentiment in Qohelet’s monologue will be unmistakably seen later. 
It is noteworthy that this shift has taken place around the same period when Israel 
was experiencing her own cultural trauma under domination by foreign powers. As in 
the demotic wisdom literature, a similar but much more pessimistic view of 
inscrutable divine control and free will over human life is expressed in Ecclesiastes. 
1.1.2 Mesopotamia      
As in Egypt, Mesopotamia has a long history with literary sources on concepts of 
death and netherworld for a period of about 2000 years from the Old Sumerian to 
                                                 
118 Lichtheim, “Observations,” 297, 304. “The fate and the fortune that come, it is the god who 
sends/commands/determines them” is a refrain which ends nearly all chapters in The Instruction of 
Papyrus Insinger with “a line count, which totals the number of monostichs per chapter”: 2,20; 5,11; 
7,19; 8,20; 11,21; 13,7; 14,2; 15,6; 17,3; 19,5; 21,6; 22,6*; 23,19; 25,13, 27,21; 29,11; 30,16; 33,6* 
(*line counting missing). 
119 Matthew J. Goff, “Hellenistic Instruction in Palestine and Egypt: Ben Sira and Papyrus Insinger,” 
JSJ 36 (2005): 172; cf. Lichtheim, LEW, 138, appears downplaying the significance of Insinger’s 
repetition concerning fate and fortune, although she believes Hellenistic influence.  
120 Miriam Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature: A Book of Readings, Vol. 3: The Late Period 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 5. 
121 Johnson, “Demotic,” 72; Janet H. Johnson, “The Role of the Egyptian Priesthood in Ptolemaic 
Egypt,” in Egyptological Studies in Honor of Richard A. Parker (ed. Lesko; Hanover: University Press 
of New England, 1986), 71; Burkes, Death, 231; cf. Siegfried Morenz, Egyptian Religion (trans. Keep; 
London: Methuen, 1973), 57– 80; Marc J. Smith, “Weisheit, Demotische,” LÄ 6:1195; Richard Jasnow, 
A Late Period Hieratic Wisdom Text (P. Brooklyn 47.218.135) (SAOC 52; Chicago: Oriental Institute 
of the University of Chicago, 2003), 41– 42; contra Lichtheim, LEW, 11– 12, 65; Lichtheim, 
“Observations,” 302– 5, who ascribes demotic texts to foreign influence of the Hellenistic milieu. 
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Neo-Babylonian/Assyrian times.122 The main literary sources on Mesopotamian cults 
and practices are found in the Epic of Gilgamesh, Ishtar’s Descent to the 
Netherworld,123 and Nergal and Ereshikigal. Among the three, the Epic of Gilgamesh 
is the most famous and the oldest, with its earliest version probably dating back to 
3000 BCE. Its nearly complete text poignantly expresses ancient people’s views of 
life, death, and the netherworld in Mesopotamia.124 
People in Mesopotamia lived in a polytheistic society where numerous gods 
controlled or influenced human and natural worlds.125 Besides the principal gods, 
there were hundreds of gods who resided in three realms: three hundred each in 
heaven and on earth;126 and still more, the queen and her consort Ereshkigal and 
Nergal and seven judges, the Anunnaki, in the netherworld,127 where dreadful 
monsters, demons, and the dead were also present.128 According to the Babylonian 
creation epic Enūma Eliš, gods created humankind to serve the gods from clay and the 
blood of Qingu, who urged his mother goddess Tiāmat to rebel against Ea:  
“Qingu is the one who instigated warfare, 
Who made Tiāmat rebel and set battle in motion.”  
They bound him, holding him before Ea, 
They inflicted the penalty on him and severed his blood-vessels. 
From his blood, he (Ea) created mankind, 
On whom he imposed the service of the gods, and set the gods free. 
After the wise Ea had created mankind,  
And had imposed the service of the gods upon them—.129  
Only the divine Qingu possessed immortality. Gods could die and be resurrected 
but they withheld immortality from humankind because they created humans to serve 
                                                 
122 Charles Penglase, “Some Concepts of Afterlife in Mesopotamia and Greece,” in The Archaeology of 
Death in the Ancient Near East (eds. Campbell and Green; OM 51; Oxford: Oxbow, 1995), 192. 
123 The Neo-Assyrian: the Akkadian version of the Old Babylonian Sumerian (OBS) myth, lnana’s 
Descent to the Netherworld, and is much shorter than the OBS version. Ibid., 193; cf. Stephanie Dalley, 
Myths from Mesopotamia: Creation, the Flood, Gilgamesh, and Others (Rev. ed.; WC; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 154–62. 
124 Segal, Life, 83. 
125 Names of gods: Anu, Enlil, Marduk, Ea, and Shamash appear in the Prologue (P1– P3) in M. E. J. 
Richardson, Hammurabi’s Laws: Text, Translation and Glossary (BS/STS 73/2; Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic, 2000), 28–31; J. Gordon McConville, “The Judgment of God in the Old Testament,” ExAud 
2 (2004): 27; Hans H. Schmid, “Creation, Righteousness, and Salvation: ‘Creation Theology’ as the 
Broad Horizon of Biblical Theology,” in Creation in the Old Testament (ed. Anderson; IRT 6; 
Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 104.  
126 “The Epic of Creation,” Table VI, 39–46 (Standard Babylonian Version) in Dalley, Myths, 262; also 
W. G. Lambert, Babylonian Creation Myths (MC 16; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013), 112 – 13.  
127  “lnana’s Descent to the Nether World,” line 163, translation by S. N. Kramer  in James B. Pritchard, 
Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament (3rd with suppl. ed.; Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1969), 55. In later times Anunnakku appears to be a collective name of the 
underworld gods. Penglase, “Afterlife,” 192.  
128 Penglase, “Afterlife,” 192. 
129 “Enūma Eliš,” Tablet VI, lines 29 – 3 6 in Lambert, Babylonian, 110 – 13.  
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gods either in this world or in the underworld.130 Humans were expendable 
commodities to be used and, therefore, their life or death was of little concern to the 
gods. Such was the fate of human life which people in Mesopotamia embraced from 
ancient times.  
In his epic, for example, Gilgamesh speaks to his friend Enkidu: 
Who can go up to heaven, my friend?  
Only the gods dwell (?) with Shamash forever.  
Mankind can number his days.  
Whatever he may achieve, it is only wind.  
Do you fear death on this occasion?  
Where is the strength of your heroic nature? 
Let me go in front of you,  
And your voice call [sic] out: “Go close, don’t be afraid!”  
If I should fall, I shall have won fame.  
People will say, “Gilgamesh grappled in combat  
With Ferocious Huwawa.  
He was (nobly ?) born.”131 
Gilgamesh knows that only gods are immortal and recognizes both the fleeting nature 
of human life and the futility of human achievement. He does not seem to fear death 
but wishes to accomplish something great and win his fame to be remembered. 
Apparently, he thought that was enough. 
But the death of his friend Enkidu changes everything. The Epic of Gilgamesh 
vividly describes Gilgamesh’s heart-wrenching grief over Enkidu’s death, fear of his 
own death, and his search for immortality to bring Enkidu back as well as secure his 
own life.132 Gilgamesh seeks afterlife beyond death but eventually has to come to 
grips with the reality of death as human destiny. What he hears from Siduri is what 
Gilgamesh needs to content himself in the end: 
Gilgamesh, where do you roam?  
You will not find the eternal life you seek.  
When the gods created mankind  
They appointed death for mankind, 
Kept eternal life in their own hands. 
So, Gilgamesh, let your stomach be full,  
Day and night enjoy yourself in every way, 
Every day arrange for pleasures. 
Day and night, dance and play, 
Wear fresh clothes.  
                                                 
130 E.g., see  “The Epic of Gilgamesh” Table VII. iv.39 – 43: Enkidu saw (in his dream) even the kings 
no longer wearing  their crowns but serving and waiting on tables in the netherworld. Dalley, Myths, 89; 
Alexander Heidel, The Gilgamesh Epic and Old Testament Parallels (2nd ed.; Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1949), 193.  
131  “The Epic of Gilgamesh,” Tablet III. iv (Old Babylonian Version; Yale Tablet) in Dalley, Myths, 
144. 
132 Heidel, Gilgamesh, 1 – 101; Dalley, Myths, 39 – 153.  
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Keep your head washed, bathe in water, 
Appreciate the child who holds your hand,  
Let your wife enjoy herself in your lap.  
This is the work [  ].133 
The Gilgamesh myth expresses a much more negative view of life and death without 
afterlife than in Egypt. Similarities are found in Qohelet’s view of life and death and 
his advice which echoes what Gilgamesh and Siduri expressed above: that the days of 
human life are numbered and human achievement is but wind; that humans are 
destined to death and therefore all that humans can, or should, do is eat and enjoy life. 
Cooper writes: 
Occupying the surface of the earth, humankind filled the space between the divine 
realms of heaven and the netherworld, and served both. But a human’s actual sphere 
was properly the netherworld; the same word in both Sumerian (ki) and Akkadian 
(ersetu) signifies both the earth’s surface and the netherworld beneath it. Like the 
gods and demons of the netherworld, a human is destined to spend an eternity there; 
unlike them a human has a brief opportunity to enjoy earthly pleasures.134  
The netherworld in ancient Mesopotamia is the realm of the queen Ereshkigal and 
her consort Nergal.135 It has several names or descriptive designations. The most 
common name is “earth” or “great earth.” Other names include “desert,” “steppe,” 
“the great city,”136 “a city with many walls,”137 “the great below,”138 and probably the 
most important, the “land of no return.”139 It is a city filled with the dead below the 
earth. It is “a dark, gloomy, dusty unattractive place.”140 Both Ishtar and Enkidu 
describe what they saw in the netherworld: 
To Kurnugi, land of [no return],  
Ishtar daughter of Sin was [determined] to go;  
The daughter of Sin was [determined] to go  
To the dark house, the dwelling of Erkalla’s god,141  
To the house which those who enter cannot leave,  
On the road where travelling is one-way only, 
To the house where those who enter are deprived of light,  
                                                 
133 Tablet X. iii (OBV), in Dalley, Myths, 150. A similar sentiment is expressed in Eccl 9:7–10 (vide 
infra). 
134 Jerrold S. Cooper, “The Fate of Mankind: Death and Afterlife in Ancient Mesopotamia,” in Death 
and Afterlife: Perspectives of World Religions (ed. Obayashi; Westport: Greenwood, 1992), 30.  
135 Penglase, “Afterlife,” 192. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Klaas Spronk, Beatific Afterlife in Ancient Israel and in the Ancient Near East (AOAT 219; 
Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker, 1986), 100; cf.  “Descent of  Ishtar to the Underworld” in Dalley, Myths, 
159.  
138 Edwin M. Yamauchi, “Life, Death, and Afterlife in the Ancient Near East,” in Life in the Face of 
Death: The Resurrection Message of the New Testament (ed. Longenecker; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1998), 33. 
139 Namely, “Kurnugi — ‘land of no return,’ a Sumerian term for the Underworld.” Dalley, Myths, 324. 
140 Penglase, “Afterlife,” 193.  
141 Ereshkigal, the queen of the netherworld and the goddess of death. 
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Where dust is their food, clay their bread. 
They see no light, they dwell in darkness, 
They are clothed like birds, with feathers, 
Over the door and the bolt, dust has settled.142 
Enkidu also calls the netherworld “the House of Darkness” and “the House of 
Dust.”143 Even gods cannot leave the netherworld unless they first take a hostage, so 
the netherworld can be likened to “a prison city.”144 Ghosts, however, are allowed to 
return to the realm of the living for short, temporal visits145 to haunt the living who do 
not remember the dead with food and offerings,146 or to be called up by 
necromancers.147 Ancient people in Mesopotamia appear to have conceived the 
netherworld as functionally consisting of three-tiered levels: (1) the lowest: the court 
of the Annunaki; (2) the middle: the domain of Apsû, the god of fresh water; and (3) 
the upper level under the surface of the earth: the residence of eṭemmi “the spirits of 
the dead.”148 There were many entrances or gates to the netherworld. One of its gates 
is located in the far west and the sun god Shamash travels through the netherworld 
each night just as the sun god Re in Egypt does.149 
In Mesopotamia, “to dwell there in ‘the land of no-return’ was the common lot of 
all. Rich and poor, king and slave, all were in a like state of wretchedness. This post-
mortem equality seems to be symbolized in the myth of the Descent of Ishtar into the 
Underworld,” notes Brandon.150 An existence in the netherworld was nothing to look 
forward to, because it was under worse and more fearful conditions, even if it was 
perceived a continuation of this life.  
A decent burial, followed by funerary offerings and memorial rites, was also 
important to the people in Mesopotamia, as in Egypt, but for different reasons. When 
a person died, the deceased remained as bones and “ghost” (eṭemmu) after the body 
decayed.151 It was the eṭemmu, the insubstantial ghost of the spirit of the dead, which 
continued in existence and even returned to the earth to haunt the living if the 
                                                 
142 “Descent of Ishtar to the Underworld,” lines 1–11, of which 4ff. are parallel to  “The Epic of 
Gilgamesh,” Tablet VII. iv.34 – 41. See Dalley, Myths, 155 and 89. 
143 “The Epic of Gilgamesh,” Tablet VII. iii, lines 33, 40, 45 in Pritchard, ANET, 87. 
144 Alluded in Inanna’s Decent to the Netherworld. Segal, Life, 99. 
145 Jo Ann Scurlock, “Death and the Afterlife in Ancient Mesopotamian Thought,” Civilizations of the 
Ancient Near East 3:1889. 
146 Penglase, “Afterlife,” 193; Cooper, “Fate,” 27. 
147 Yamauchi, “Life,” 34. 
148 Ibid., 33 – 34. 
149 Penglase, “Afterlife,” 193. 
150 Brandon, Judgment, 51. 
151 Cooper, “Fate,” 27, 32 (n. 33) notes that “The Akkadian word eṭemmu is translated  ‘ghost,’ and 
not  ‘spirit’ or  ‘soul,’ intentionally. . . . The word is borrowed from the Sumerian gidim.” 
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deceased were not properly buried, fed, or remembered.152 “Burial and the correct 
rites were required for the eṭemmu to be allowed to enter the netherworld,”153 and 
therefore to be left unburied was considered the worst fate possible.154 For this reason 
the burial was an important part of the funerary rites, but not for the care or 
preservation of the body such as mummification in Egypt. It was the responsibility of 
the heir to provide a so-called kispu ritual, the Mesopotamian memorial rites for the 
dead.155 It is “through the memorial rites the deceased remained integrated in the 
living family, and the position of a new head of the family was reinforced by his 
performance of the rites.”156 Remembrance by their descendants or by fame was the 
way to secure their existence after death. Memorial rites were an important part of the 
funerary cult for individuals as well as royal dynasties in Mesopotamia.157 Here the 
bones of the deceased played an important role because the memorial rites could not 
be performed if the bones were disturbed in the burial site. Both deprivation and 
disruption of burial were great offence to the eṭemmu.158 People lived in fear of the 
eṭemmu returning to haunt or retaliate, unless they continued remembering the 
deceased by their funerary offerings. 
There was no post-mortem judgement of the dead in Mesopotamian cults as in 
Egypt. The ancient Mesopotamian texts mention judges in the netherworld,159 but 
their function seems to have very little, if anything, to do with justice for human 
                                                 
152 Severino Croatto, “The Hope of Immortality in the Main Cosmologies of the East,” in Immortality 
and Resurrection (eds. Benoit and Murphy; Concilium 60; New York: Herder & Herder, 1970), 22; 
Heidel, Gilgamesh, 155. 
153 Penglase, “Afterlife,” 193. 
154 Yamauchi, “Life,” 34 – 35; see, e.g., an exchange between Gilgamesh and Enkidu describes the 
unburied dead in “ The  Epic of Gilgamesh,” Tablet XII. vi (SBV) in Dalley, Myths, 124 – 25 : 
 
I saw him, whose corpse you saw abandoned in the open country: 
His ghost does not sleep in the Earth. 
I saw him whom you saw, whose ghost has nobody to supply it: 
He feeds on dregs from dishes, and bits of bread that lie abandoned in the streets. 
 
155 Wayne T. Pitard, “The Ugaritic Funerary Text RS 34.126,” BASOR 232 (1978): 67. 
156 Cooper, “Fate,” 29. 
157 Ibid., 29– 30; Miranda Bayliss, “Cult of Dead Kin in Assyria and Babylonia,” Iraq 35 (1973): 115–
 25.  
158 Cooper, “Fate,”  27–28, cites that Ashurbanipal of Assyria demolished Elamite royal tombs for their 
eternal curse and  Merodachbaladan fled with his ancestor’s bones when Sennacherib defeated him to 
avoid such a curse,  both in the seventh century BCE. See Elena Cassin, “Le mort: valeur et 
représentation en Mésopotamie ancienne,” in La Mort, les morts dans les sociétés anciennes (eds. 
Gnoli and Vernant; Paris: Maison des sciences de l’homme, 1982), 362, 365. 
159 There were the court of the Annunaki, the little known court presided over by Gilgamesh, and 
the  court of Shamash, “whose daily circuit gave him jurisdiction in both the upper and lower  world,”  in 
the ancient Mesopotamian netherworld. Scurlock, “Death,” CANE 3:1888. 
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conduct while people were on the earth. These lesser underworld gods appear to have 
functioned as “authorities” assigned to the dead according to their status, or even as 
“police” of the netherworld, rather than as “judges” for judicial decisions.160 There 
was no hope or better world for the ancient people in Mesopotamia once they died. 
They were destined to the netherworld where they had to serve the underworld gods, 
regardless of their status or under which dynasty they lived.  
The pessimistic view of death and afterlife remained in Mesopotamia throughout 
their history and probably was unchanged even during the Persian period.161 Stolper 
remarks: “Little can be said of changes in Babylonian religion under Achaemenid 
influence.”162  
1.1.3 Levant: Israel’s Neighbours    
As in Egypt and Mesopotamia, the religions of ancient Israel’s neighbours in the 
Levant had many of their characteristics rooted in natural phenomena. Their deities 
were associated with the sun, the earth, storm, wind, water, thunder and lightning. 
Theirs were polytheistic religions with a hierarchical structure among their deities.163 
The Israelites’ closest neighbours, Syro-Palestinians, were worshippers of “Baal,” 
although Baal was not the supreme deity among many gods in a divine hierarchy of 
“Baal religion.” Localized forms of deity with the title Baal spread and represented 
the single defined storm-god figure over the whole region of Syria and Palestine far 
beyond its original home. “Baal religion” may date back as early as the eighteenth 
century BCE in northern Mesopotamia or northern Syria.164  
Like Mesopotamians, Syro-Palestinians also seem to have held a view that only 
gods can live perpetually but humans are destined to die. Young Aqhat’s response to 
Anat expresses realistic scepticism in the Aqhat epic, when she entices him to give 
her his bow in exchange for immortality:  
                                                 
160 Brandon, Judgment, 52; Penglase, “Afterlife,” 193. 
161 Tammi J. Schneider, “Assyrian and Babylonian Religions,” in The Cambridge History of Religions 
in the Ancient World, Vol. 1: From the Bronze Age to the Hellenistic Age (eds. Salzman and Sweeney; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 54 – 55.  
162 Matthew W. Stolper, “Mesopotamia, 482 – 330 B.C.,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. 6: 
The Fourth Century B.C. (eds. Lewis, et al.; CAH 6; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
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Do not lie, O Virgin, because to a hero your lying is rubbish!  
What does a man get as (his) fate?  
What does a man get as (his) final lot?  
Glaze will be set near my head, potash on the top of my skull!  
The Death of every man I too shall die, even I shall certainly die!165 
This is reminiscent of what Gilgamesh in Mesopotamia found. Similarly, death as an 
unavoidable human fate is a theme of Qohelet in Ecclesiastes. Nevertheless, Ugaritic 
people also appear to have believed that life is not completely extinguished after death 
but that a vital element survives and separates from the body after death. What 
survived was called rpu “the spirit of the dead,”166 but there was no revivification or 
beatific afterlife of the dead.167 At Ugarit there was apparently no post-mortem or 
eschatological divine judgement of the dead.168 
The god of the underworld Mot was a personification of death, who had a 
ravenous appetite for swallowing up all the living, and even consumed gods without 
discrimination at their predetermined term;169 but how Mot ruled his kingdom is 
absent from the Ugaritic texts. Being swallowed up by Mot apparently means going 
down to the netherworld.170 What happens after descending to the netherworld is not 
at all clear because Ugaritic texts do not describe any activity by Mot or the spirits of 
the dead, as do Egyptian and Mesopotamian texts. The texts do not elaborate on the 
netherworld, either, but call it “the Earth” (KTU 1.5.V.6), “the Pit,” the “town/city” of 
Mot, or the “House of Freedom” (KTU 1.5.II.14; 1.5.V.14). The netherworld is 
“located deep underground, like a vast cave, and is covered with dust.”171 
The only universally recognized extant funerary ritual text, KTU 1.161, seems to 
indicate that the people of Ugarit may have held a view of post-mortem existence 
through ancestral worship as a continuation of family, although it is the only text to 
                                                 
165 KTU 1.17.VI.34 – 38,  English translation by G. Faith Richardson  from Xella’s Italian text in Paolo 
Xella, “Death and the Afterlife in Canaanite and Hebrew Thought,” Civilizations of the Ancient Near 
East 3:2063 [Note: Xella’s inaccurte line numbering 34– 48 is corrected]. 
166 Rephaim (rp’im or rp’um) is the plural form of the term. Some scholars interpret that rp’im in 
Ugarit may refer only to the royal ancestors (KTU 1.161), but the only one evidence is not a strong 
support for such reality. See John Day, “Ugarit and the Bible: Do They Presuppose the Same Canaanite 
Mythology and Religion?,” in Ugarit and the Bible: Proceedings of the International Symposium on 
Ugarit and the Bible, Manchester, September 1992 (eds. Brooke, et al.; UBL 11; Münster: Ugarit-
Verlag, 1994), 48. 
167 Karel van der Toorn, “Funerary Rituals and Beatific Afterlife in Ugaritic Texts and in the Bible,” 
BO 48 (1991): 63 – 65; contra Spronk, Beatific, 142 – 213. 
168 Xella, “Death,” CANE 3:2063. 
169 KTU 1.5.I.14 – 22. Umberto Cassuto, “Baal and Mot in the Ugaritic Texts,” IEJ 12 (1962): 80 – 85. 
170 Ibid., 82. 
171 Michael C. Astour, “The Nether World and Its Denizens at Ugarit,” in Death in Mesopotamia (ed. 
Alster; MCSA 8; Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1980), 228. Cf. KTU 1.161.20– 26. 
42 
  
support such a possibility.172 The text describes the royal funerary ritual for a dead 
king Niqmaddu III (late-13th century BCE) in ancient Ugarit. The sun goddess Shapsh 
plays the central role in the mythical ritual. The text describes a scene, in which 
Shapsh is about to bring down Niqmaddu to the underworld where he meets the spirits 
of dead ancestors as they are invoked, suggesting an ancestor worship of the royal 
family.173 Due to the difficulties in transcribing and reading the original text on the 
tablet, its translations and interpretations by scholars vary. Lewis summarizes the 
content of KTU 1.161 as follows: 
The so-called Ugaritic Funerary Text (KTU 1.161 = RS 34.126) is, without doubt, the 
most important text for understanding the cult of the dead at Ugarit. The ritual, which 
seems to be Niqmaddu's funerary liturgy, was undertaken by Ammurapi, the reigning 
king, in order to provide essential services to the deceased (invoking their names, 
presenting offerings) and to secure the well-being for his own reign and kingdom. 
The long dead (rp’m) and the recently dead (mlkm) were invoked to take an active 
part in the ritual which seems to have lasted for seven days. It is clear from this text 
that the dead were not utterly cut off from the living and could be beseeched to grant 
favors for the present life.174 
The rp’m are usually interpreted as long-dead (royal) ancestors175 and mlkm are the 
recently dead rulers.176 The text is apparently a funerary liturgy to mourn and honour 
the deceased king and to secure favours for the newly enthroned king, summoning 
                                                 
172 Also RS 34.126. The text has imposed a number of interpretative challenges due to the epigraphical 
difficulties, coupled with Claude Schaeffer's erroneous interpretations of his famous archaeological 
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Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 164 and 175 (nn. 203 and 204); Pitard, “Voices,” 265. 
174 Lewis, Cults, 171. 
175 A dead ancestor is also called an ilu (the Ugaritic king list in KTU 1.113). A king may have simply 
“become an ilu” upon death, which “need not mean anything more than that the dead joined the 
illustrious company of the rp’m. . . . The dead, though called ilu’s, were not ‘deified’ in the sense that 
they became like the high gods of the pantheon” (note that rp’m, ilnym, ilm, and mtm are parallel 
terms). Ibid., 96, 171. 
176 Ibid., 95. 
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both the long-dead ancestors and the succeeding living king. The funerary ritual thus 
seemed to ensure “the dynastic continuity between the deceased and living kings.”177  
Another passage known as “The Duties of an Ideal Son” in the Aqhat epic (KTU 
1.17.I.26–34)178 has been interpreted by many to be an instruction to a son about his 
duty to provide for the spirit of his dead father. But the text with its surrounding 
context also suggests a son’s duty to his father while the latter is still alive rather than 
after his death.179 Perhaps it may have meant both: it is the son’s duty to take care of 
his father’s well-being both while the father is alive and after his death. There is not 
enough evidence to know if ancestor worship was common among Ugaritic people or 
restricted only to the privileged royal family. 
Unambiguous literary or archaeological evidence for cultic rituals and beliefs 
concerning death and afterlife at Ugarit are scarce according to more recent studies. 
Pitard cautions that the early misidentification of the harbour town as a cemetery at 
Ras Shamra has coloured and compromised the basic and subsequent interpretations 
of both the textual and archaeological evidence, which apparently need to be re-
evaluated.180 
1.1.4 Greece         
Greek religious culture is rich and diverse in literature, arts, and architecture. But it 
lasted nearly 1000 years with arguably little change, and with great continuity amidst 
other changes, from the archaic period through the Greco-Roman era.181 It is far 
beyond the scope of this thesis to consult the many resources available, and the 
present purpose is briefly to describe a general overarching Greek religious attitude 
towards death, afterlife, and divine judgement, which manifested itself in their cultic 
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rituals and festivals. We will probe if and what role Greek philosophy played in the 
religious formation of ancient Greece, and more importantly if Greek philosophy 
exerted any influence on the wider ancient world, particularly Israel.  
The Greeks are people of Indo-European descent who migrated into the non-Indo-
European coastal regions of the Aegean basin. Amalgamation of the indigenous cultic 
practices and the religions of surrounding advanced civilizations shaped Greek 
religion.182 In Greece, city-states governed each territory with no dominant central 
government, and the Greeks built temples and organized their cult rituals and festivals 
within a city-state government boundary. Greek religion by definition is public 
religion, being bound to πόλις: it is what the city defines and decrees for its citizens to 
participate in.183 Politics and social activities such as festivals and athletic events were 
meshed together with cultic rituals in Greek public life. Participation in public 
(religious) events guaranteed the integration of an individual into the community, and 
it was regarded as a civic duty of a citizen’s life.184 Piety (εὐσέβεια) meant 
participation, a matter of observing public rituals and offering sacrifices, and of 
showing respect towards the gods.185 It never meant “devotion to only one god,” and 
had little to do with individual belief or ideology.186 The refusal to take part meant 
impiety (ἀσέβεια).  
In ancient Greek society there was no single “established” religious institution, 
sacred texts, or professional priests.187 “The important quality of piety was to keep the 
ancestral customs”; this the Greeks adapted according to the changing social 
conditions.188 Flexibility and innovation characterized Greek communal life and 
religion, while living with neighbours of different cultures thanks to wars, commerce, 
and politics.189 Greeks were polytheists in a true sense of the word:190 individual 
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communities selected and paid homage to particular gods, but “not to the exclusion of 
others.”191 Gould states:  
Greek religion is not theologically fixed and stable, and it has no tradition of 
exclusion or finality: it is an open, not a closed system. There are no true gods and 
false, merely powers known and acknowledged since time immemorial, and new 
powers, newly experienced as active among men and newly acknowledged in 
worship.192  
Because the Greek had no “authorized” sacred text, it was poets and tragedians, 
and their literary works, particularly Homer and Hesiod among them, which shaped 
overall Greek religion.193 Homer’s Iliad, Odyssey, Hymn to Demeter and Hesiod’s 
Theogony, all probably written during the eighth–seventh centuries BCE, are the most 
relevant literature.194 They not only reveal early historical Greek customs and beliefs, 
but also reflect cults in the preceding Greek Dark Age from 1100 to 900 BCE. After 
the fall of the Bronze-Age Mycenaean civilisation, they even included some 
Mycenaean cults.195 Herodotus, a Greek historian in the fifth century BCE, writes:  
It was Homer and Hesiod who created a theogony for the Greeks, gave the gods their 
epithets, divided out offices and functions among them, and described their 
appearance (2.53).196 
In the portrayals by Homer and Hesiod, Greek gods and their activities appear quite 
anthropomorphic and mischievous; nonetheless, there is a clear divide between the 
divine and human realms in their descriptions. Although Greek gods can look and 
behave like humans, gods (and a limited number of demi-gods) are “deathless” or 
“undying.” In contrast, humans are destined to die, and their dilemma is neither 
comprehensible nor of concern to the gods.197 The ancient Greek hero cult manifests 
human desires to live long, be strong like gods, and keep their memory in perpetuity.  
Ancient Greeks believed that the gods were interested in the lives and affairs of 
the human world, and they sought divine favours by offering gifts and sacrifices 
according to the vicissitudes of life.198 But once they died, there was nothing more to 
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expect from gods, since death terminated the relationship with the Olympian gods.199 
Greek views on their post-mortem destiny widely varied from extinction to a beatific 
afterlife of the ψυχή—the two extremes and somewhere in-between.200 Greek burial 
and mourning rituals hardly changed throughout their history but beliefs about what 
happened to an individual at death and afterwards were never settled and continually 
debated.201 
In early Greek ideas, a human being was composed of three entities: body (σῶµα), 
θυµός, and ψυχή. The θυµός is the “most important word for the seat of emotions, 
such as friendship, anger, joy and grief, as well as  emotion itself .”202 The ψυχή is not 
recognizable when one is alive, but is released and separated from the body when one 
dies. It is “a shadowy replica of the living person”203 and is often called εἴδωλον “a 
phantom image.”204 The ψυχή is a kind of “shade,” which resembles the living image 
of the deceased but cannot be grasped if one tries to touch it.205 It is without vital 
force and even lacks consciousness unless it first drinks the blood of a sacrificed 
animal.206 It is the ψυχή which journeys to Hades, the Land of the Dead,207 after the 
deceased receives a proper burial. In rare instances, such as of heroes, the ψυχή may 
reach the Islands of the Blessed.208 A proper burial is an important funerary rite for 
the ψυχή to reach Hades, otherwise it is not allowed to cross to Hades and wanders 
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over the earth.209 The ψυχή must be released from the corpse, because death itself is 
considered pollution.210 The Greeks have concurrently practised both cremation and 
inhumation of the corpse.211 Both methods were used throughout Greek history, 
although cremation might have been preferred at times because it was thought to 
release the ψυχή from the body more rapidly.212 What really matters was, however, 
that the dead received proper burial rites with either method. 
The ψυχή thus released can easily reach the kingdom of Hades by crossing the 
river Styx,213 which is one of the five rivers flowing around Hades and is the main 
boundary of Hades.214 The kingdom of Hades is neither Hell, nor a place of 
punishment (or reward), but simply a destination of all mortals:215 it is a place where 
every ψυχή of the dead is expected to go and stay. Greek Hades is also 
a gloomy realm at the outermost reaches of the world surrounded by the River Styx, 
peopled by insubstantial ghosts or psychai that [are] bereft of the power of 
communication with the upper world.216  
Once anyone enters the House of Hades,217 no one can leave, even a god. Thus 
Persephone, whom Hades kidnaps and makes his wife, must stay in Hades for at least 
part of a year even after she is rescued by her mother Demeter with Zeus’ 
intervention. Hades’ main job as the ruler of Greek netherworld is to ensure that the 
living and the dead stay in their appropriate places: the living do not enter and the 
dead do not leave Hades.218 A few heroes—Heracles, Theseus, Orpheus and 
Odysseus—still manage to return to earth after their descent to Hades,219 even though 
it is “guarded by monstrous creatures.”220 In the earliest account, Homer describes 
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Hades as located not underground but at the edge of the earth, across the ocean 
(Odyssey 11.13–22), but writers regularly describe Hades as underground by the sixth 
century BCE.221  
Ancient Greeks believed there were divine law and justice. Felton notes: “Greek 
literature as early as Homer included the concept of punishment and honor after death, 
depending on whether one had offended gods or led a pious life.”222 The important 
point to note here is that reward or punishment was not for personal belief or morality, 
since the pious life was defined by participation in public rituals. As Elysium was 
moved and became a part of Hades, the ψυχαί of the dead faced judgement once they 
reached Hades. Over time there were three judges in the underworld: Minos, the 
earliest judge (Odyssey 1.568–571); Rhadamanthys, who ruled Elysium (Odyssey 
4.561–565) and eventually became another judge; and Aeacus, whom Plato added in 
the fourth century (Apology 41a; Gorgias 523c–524a).223 All three were well-known 
law-givers during their lifetime. After their death, they became judges of the 
underworld to punish or reward the descended ψυχαί and assign them to appropriate 
places within Hades (Gorgias 524).224 The wicked ψυχή was sent and punished in 
Tartarus, a dungeon of torment and suffering,225 located in the deepest part of 
Hades.226 The pious ψυχή was rewarded to move into Elysium for an enjoyable 
afterlife. In the Homeric Odyssey the writer describes the place as:  
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Elysian plain . . . where life is easiest for men. No snow is there, nor heavy storm, nor 
ever rain, but ever does Ocean send up blasts of the shrill-blowing West Wind that 
they may give cooling to men.227 
The desire to have a better afterlife in Hades and a possibility for preparing for it 
is also realized through the Eleusinian mysteries depicted in the Homeric Hymn to 
Demeter (480–482).228 The rituals of the mystery cult, undisclosed due to its strict 
secrecy, become available to all who speak Greek without discrimination. Male and 
female, free and even slave can be initiated in the cult to reach Elysium after death. 
The mystery cult may date back to the Mycenaean period.229 
Two strands of religious movement emerged around the same period during the 
sixth century BCE in another sphere concerning the destiny of a human soul after 
death: Orphism and Pythagoreanism. The two are parallel in their beliefs, although 
which movement has appeared first or influenced the other remains unclear. They 
both believe in metempsychosis, namely, transmigration and incarnation of the ψυχή 
in a cyclic pattern.230 Orphic religion was cultivated by Orpheus’ legendary descent to 
Hades. It held a view that the ψυχή was basically divine in origin and should be freed 
from contamination by the body through strict rules and purification rituals. After 
undergoing a series of incarnations and purgations in the underworld, the ψυχή could 
return to its original divine state.231 The Pythagorean doctrine created a new concept 
of ψυχή: the essential part of human ἔµψυχον (the ψυχή within) was immortal, was 
imprisoned in the body, and therefore was separable from the body.232 In addition, the 
ψυχή could “enter another body after death and retain its original identity.”233  
The concept that the human ψυχή is immortal and can go through a series of 
incarnations in a circular succession presupposes dualism: body and ψυχή are two 
independent and different entities.234 This eventually leads to Plato’s concept of an 
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immortal soul, very different from the insubstantial ψυχή of the traditional Greek 
view which had changed very little from the archaic period; thus, Plato’s ideas appear 
to have had little popular support.235 In Plato’s Phaedo Socrates says: 
The soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intelligible, and 
uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and the body is in the very likeness of 
the human, and mortal, and unintelligible, and multi-form, and dissoluble, and 
changeable. . . . The soul which is pure at parting draws after her no bodily taint, 
having never voluntarily had connection with the body, which she is ever avoiding.236 
What Socrates and Plato distinguish237 in their definition of ψυχή (soul) is that it is 
divine and immortal, the very essence of human being—“a person” or one’s true 
“self”—which survives death and separates from the body, not merely a shadowy 
existence. Rohde explicates: 
If the soul is immortal, it must be in its essential nature like God; it must itself be a 
creature of the realm of Gods. When a Greek says “immortal” he says “God”; they 
are interchangeable ideas. But the real first principle of the religion of the Greek 
people is this—that in the divine ordering of the world, humanity and divinity are 
absolutely divided in place and nature, and so they must ever remain.238 
Namely, by saying that the soul is immortal, Plato has basically elevated the status of 
ψυχή into the realm of God,239 which is significantly different from traditional Greek 
beliefs. Moreover, distinguishing intellectuals from the average populace, Socrates 
and Plato have often emphasized and claimed that it is the philosophers who are not 
afraid of death because their soul not only survives but will be released from the 
bodily prison.240 It is understandable if the Greek general public did not accept their 
claim. 
Greek literature shows that pre-Socratic philosophers questioned the validity of 
Greek poets’ depiction of gods long before Plato. Xenophanes and Ionian 
philosophers in the sixth century BCE criticized the anthropomorphic depiction of 
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gods and proposed a new idea of god(s).241 Thus a possible decisive turn for re-
defining Greek concepts of god, death, and afterlife by the challenges of philosophers 
and poets existed from the beginning. But in reality, criticism by the intellectuals had 
little influence upon ancient Greek religion and their practice.242 Xenophanes and 
other philosophers were not punished for their criticism of the religious system, but 
neither did their criticism change that system. By and large people ignored “ideas” 
contradicting their traditional cults and established community rituals.243 Impiety was 
judged by actions, not by ideas, and, in point of fact, those philosophers participated 
in the city rituals, while ridiculing the old ideas and proposing the new at the same 
time. A poet, critic, and scholar Callimachus wrote in the third century BCE: 
there is a theology of the poets which need not be believed, and at the same time a 
theology of  the polis which is very much a civic duty . (Aet. 1.6.9)244 
Burkert remarks: “Xenophanes’ criticism of Homeric religion could not be outdone, 
and it was never refuted. . . . And yet . . . Xenophanes found listeners but no adherents 
or disciples.”245 
It is therefore doubtful if the philosophical ideas were widely circulated or 
accepted among Greeks in terms of availability and transmission of such treatises. 
Endsjø points out that “Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Plato, and the Orphics all remained 
essentially marginal figures connected to the limited circles of educated men who 
pledged their allegiance to philosophy and religious innovation.”246 He substantiates 
this by noting: 
As firsthand witnesses of the intellectual milieu of the early Christian era, some 
philosophically inclined men deplored the fact that their own beloved Plato was not 
widely read. While referring to how both Homer and the tragedians were perused 
extensively all over the Hellenistic realm, and “hundreds of thousands . . . continue to 
use” the laws of Alexander the Great, Plutarch admitted in the first century A.D. that 
only “few of us read Plato’s Laws.” About the same time, Strabo simply stated as a 
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fact that “philosophy is for the few, whereas poetry is more useful to the people at 
large.”247  
It was on the outskirts of the Greek world where the ideological movements by 
philosophers attracted their adherents, but they remained marginal phenomena 
without any influence upon the cultic life and practice of ancient Greek society.248 It 
is noteworthy that Socrates was charged with two accounts of impiety against him (1) 
“not recognizing the gods that the city recognizes” and (2) introducing new gods and 
corrupting the youth.249 Socrates was tried for political reasons, but his foes cunningly 
brought official charges relating to the city’s religious practice against Socrates, 
which condemned him to death.250 Socrates and Plato actually participated in the 
city’s cultic rituals, while criticizing traditional mythology and cult.251 Such were the 
stronghold and grip of traditional Greek religion on Greek society. Plato’s concept of 
the immortality of the soul was rejected by the Epicureans and Stoics not long after 
Plato. The epitaphs on the graves in the Greco-Roman period (2nd century BCE) are 
often characterized by an emphasis on the finality of death: οὐδεὶς ἀθάνατος “No one 
is immortal.”252 For whatever reason, most ancient Greeks were not initiated into 
mystery cults, either.253 Epicurean pragmatism rather than Plato’s intellectual idea of 
the immortality of the soul apparently had a more lasting effect on Greeks in 
Hellenistic society.254 
1.2 Death, Afterlife, and Divine Judgement in Israel 
By the time the nation of Israel was born, people in the surrounding nations of the 
ancient Near East already had a long history of their own concepts and beliefs 
regarding god, death, and the afterlife. A plethora of literature, remains of temples, 
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burial sites, monuments, inscriptions, and archaeological artefacts attest how deeply 
rituals and the cult of the dead and afterlife shaped and permeated lives and societies 
of the ancient world, as seen in the previous section. Finding similar information in 
Israel other than from the Old Testament (OT) is complicated. Although 
archaeological findings and the publications on them offer an important resource,255 
identification or verification of Israelite archaeological data remains difficult, 
susceptible to error, and often inconclusive.256 The major challenge lies in sorting out 
coexisting remains of the pre-existent inhabitants and other ethnic groups who were 
stationed in or passed through Palestine and the whole Canaanite region thanks to 
commerce, occupation, wars, political conflicts, and changing rulers. Different ethnic 
groups in Palestine held and practised a long tradition of their own mortuary cults 
throughout, before and after Israelite presence in Canaan. Moreover, there is a paucity 
of verifiable data concerning mortuary rituals or practices for the Israelite dead. 
Whatever the interpretative difficulties, the OT still remains the prime resource for 
exploration of Hebrew concepts of death, afterlife, and divine judgement. The 
following discussion will seek to present a synthetic overview of characteristic 
understandings and practices within the OT. 
1.2.1 Biblical Concepts of Life, Death, and Divine Judgement 
According to Genesis, Yahweh, the God of Israel, has created the universe and all the 
living things in the world, and no living creatures can live without a life-breath from 
Yahweh. The text specifically recounts that the first human becomes a living being 
after Yahweh has formed his body from dust and breathed His breath into his nostrils 
(2:7); humankind as created in God’s image, whatever it may mean, is distinguished 
from animals.  
God places humankind in the Garden of Eden with a specific purpose: Adam is to 
cultivate (עבד) and keep ( מרש ) the Garden, while he can freely eat from any tree ( מכל
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 except one in the Garden. God commands Adam not to eat from the tree of the (עץ
knowledge of good and evil, because in the day (ביום) he eats from it he shall surely 
die (Gen 2:15–17). Since the interpretation of this famous story is greatly contested, a 
few brief comments on a possible reading will be offered below. 
The Genesis text does not indicate up to this point that the first human is destined 
to death or if his life span is fixed, but it does specify that he will lose his life if he 
disobeys God.257 When Adam and Eve disobey God’s command, they are expelled 
from the Garden of Eden where the tree of life is located; they are denied access to the 
tree of life (any longer),258 with whose fruit they could have lived forever (Gen 3:22–
24). What seems odd in Yahweh’s pronouncement of a guilty verdict on Adam and 
Eve in Gen 3:16–19 is that they do not die immediately, when He caught their 
disobedience. Yahweh declares that Adam will toil for food all his life on the now-
cursed ground because of his disobedience, until he dies, while Eve will bear children 
in pain and be subjected to her husband. Thus Yahweh allows them to live but makes 
clear that they will die and return to dust, from which they are created (v. 19b). Death 
was a possibility (Gen 2:17), but it became a reality when Adam and Eve disobeyed 
God, even if they did not die immediately. Hamilton notes: “The verse is 
underscoring the certainty of death, not its chronology” on the meaning and 
implication of ביום in Gen 2:17.259   
Gen 3:17–19 antithetically parallels 2:15–17. Everything changes in Adam’s life 
after his disobedience: from cultivating and keeping the Garden of Eden to labouring 
with pain and sweat on the cursed ground; from eating fruit from any tree (save one) 
in the Garden to eating plants of the field which needs to be separated from thorns and 
thistles; and from the day when one eats the forbidden fruit and will die to all the days 
of life eating with pain and sweat until one dies.260 Yahweh says, “Because . . . you 
have eaten from the tree which I commanded you, saying ‘You shall not eat from it’” 
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in 3:17, and He explicates what happens to Adam’s life in 3:17–19, which includes 
death. Gen 3:17–19 thus appears as an elaboration of what the content of Yahweh’s 
verdict in 2:17 entails. Logically, the text in 3:17–19 assumes details of Yahweh’s 
punishment in 2:17. This reading of the text indicates that death is the result of 
Adam’s disobedience.261 Yahweh then clothes the first couple, expels them from the 
Garden, and stations the cherubim and the flaming sword to guard the way to the tree 
of life (Gen 3:21–24). The verdict is complete as far as Yahweh is concerned. The 
biblical writer seems to imply that God did not destine humankind to death, unlike the 
gods of ancient Near Eastern world, but humans chose and brought death to 
themselves.262  
Death as punishment by God stems from the claim that Yahweh is the king and 
the legislator who has established the nation of Israel and her law, according to 
Deuteronomy. Israelite kings did judge, but basically according to the laws given and 
promulgated by Yahweh.263 This is an essential difference from other ancient Near 
Eastern nations, whose kings usually legislated justice, often with a claim that God 
has entrusted it to them: e.g., it is Hammurabi, the king of Babylon, who wrote his 
code and expressly described himself as the lawgiver in Mesopotamia, although he 
claimed to have acted by divine commission. Nevertheless, many ancient nations, 
most famously Egypt among them, had no law codes. 
The developed Israelite concept of משפט is built on the premise that (1) Yahweh is 
the Creator and the Judge of all the earth; (2) Israel is Yahweh’s chosen nation; and 
(3) Yahweh has established His covenant with Israel.264 According to the Genesis 
account, the Israelites did not form their nation, but Yahweh called Abraham out of 
the land of Chaldeans and established the nation of Israel based on the covenant that 
                                                 
261 For more elaborate treatment of the controversial issue of “the Fall” in Genesis 2– 3, see R. W. L. 
Moberly, The Theology of the Book of Genesis (OTT; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
70– 87, who also responds to Barr's view; Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1 – 15 (WBC 1; Waco: Word, 
1987), 82– 83; contra James Barr, The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality (London: SCM, 
1992), esp. 1– 56; Hamilton, Genesis 1-17, 202– 4, thinks the punishment is the expulsion from the 
Garden, not the death. But the expulsion results in death, while in the Garden they could live forever by 
eating the fruit of the tree of life (Gen 3:22).  
262 Cf. Jacques B. Doukhan, “‘When Death Was Not Yet’: The Testimony of Biblical Creation,” in The 
Genesis Creation Account and Its Reverberations in the Old Testament (ed. Klingbeil; Berrien Springs, 
MI: Andrews University Press, 2015), 337–40. 
263 Hans J. Boecker, Recht und Gesetz im Alten Testament und im Alten Orient (Neukirchen-Vluyn: 
Neukirchener Verlag, 1976), 33; ET Hans J. Boecker, Law and the Administration of Justice in the Old 
Testament and Ancient East (trans. Moisesr; London: Augsburg, 1980), 41, points out “the OT 
nowhere refers to legislation on the part of the king”: neither the  king nor the state  promulgated OT 
laws in the OT’s presentation. 
264 Anders Runesson, “Judgment,” NIDB 3:461. 
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He had made with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Because of the covenant, Israelites are 
to serve only Yahweh, who enacted the Law (Torah) to govern Israel as their Ruler. 
Runesson writes: 
The single most important concept for understanding judgment in the Bible is 
covenant. . . . While God is presented as the judge of the whole world (Ps 98), the 
relationship between Israel and God is defined by the idea of a covenant that sets 
conditions for the relationship (Exod 19:5). The Law (TORAH) was given within this 
conceptual context, delineating what are acceptable and unacceptable behaviors and 
attitudes on the part of Israel; the Law, including a commitment to worship the God 
of Israel only, represents the primary criterion of judgment, and it was used as a basis 
for the judicial system as well as a foundation for ideas about divine judgment 
generally (Exod 19–20, 24; Ps 119; compare Deut 30; Dan 9:11–14).265 
According to the OT, the existence of Israel is defined and can be understood only 
against the background of relationality between Yahweh and His people Israel. The 
book of Deuteronomy spells out that Israelite covenantal relationship with Yahweh 
entails a choice between life and death. To Israelites, “life and death stand face to face 
like good and evil . . . like a blessing and a curse,” and between the two is laid a 
choice to be made (Deut 30:15, 19): obedience or disobedience to the divine 
commandments.266 Obedience to Yahweh means maintaining a relationship with the 
God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob intact, and to live the length of one’s life (Deut 
30:20). Moses exhorts Israelites to “choose life,” the life which God has allotted, that 
is. Living to a ripe old age means a blessing of God (cf. Prov 3:2), whereas premature, 
sudden death which cuts short divine blessing, is understood as a punishment from 
God.267 It means that one has somehow offended God, wilfully or unwittingly, and 
ending life by such a death can be anything but desirable.  
Therefore, Israelites seem to have taken issue with death only when it was sudden 
and unexpected, because it was not death itself but the manner or kind of death that 
one died that mattered to them. On the one hand, the biblical writers knew and 
accepted death as an unavoidable reality, but they generally did not hold a pessimistic 
or negative view of life because of the inevitability of death. They regarded living to a 
ripe old age and dying in peace to be gathered to their ancestors as the fulfilment of 
their life as God’s people, so long as they had legitimate heir(s) to continue their 
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generativity.268 People apparently considered dying in such a way as natural and 
satisfactory.269 “When a ripe old age is reached, then it is time to die. It then becomes 
clear that dying is the way of all the earth” (Josh 23:14; 1 Kgs 2:2; Num 16:29)—the 
culmination of a good life: man can live and die in this way, and it is understood to be 
intended and natural.270 
On the other hand, Israelites in the OT abhor premature death. For example, Jacob 
may have envisaged that Joseph, the older son of his beloved wife Rachel, was to 
succeed him as his heir to receive God’s promise, but he unexpectedly faces Joseph’s 
presumed sudden death by a wild animal. He tears his clothes, mourns for days, and 
refuses to be comforted. Such death is a “total breach with the world of the living,” 
notes Martin-Achard.271 It cuts off a life yet to flourish or to be fulfilled because it 
also cuts one off from God’s blessing. The most tragic of all is the death of a first-
born or only son (Jer 6:26; Amos 8:10; Zech 12:10), or of a man without an heir (cf. 
Eccl 4:8), in whom one holds a hope of family generativity. Without a descendent, he 
is essentially cut off from God’s promise and blessing for ever. Israelites interpret 
these “unnatural” deaths as punitive, a form of punishment or curse, for which an evil 
force is at work as the underlying cause. It is a deliberate death that God inflicts on 
sinful human race, a result of divine judgement.272  
That death leads to a complete isolation from the sphere of Yahweh’s influence 
(Ps 88:6 [ET 5]) also signifies His abhorrence of death and its defilement.273 Yahweh 
shuns death not only because it is a manifestation of human sin—His punishment—
but also because His holiness demands it. He treats remains of the dead as defilement 
and uncleanness (Lev. 21:1; Num 19:13, 16; Deut 21:23). The OT prescribes 
meticulous purification procedures from the defilement acquired by touching a 
                                                 
268 See, e.g., Abraham ’ s concern without an heir appears early in Genesis 15. Wendell W. Frerichs, 
“Death and Resurrection in the Old Testament,” WW 11 (1991): 18; Jon D. Levenson, Resurrection 
and the Restoration of Israel: The Ultimate Victory of the God of Life (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2006), 73 – 81. 
269 Hans W. Wolff, Anthropology of the Old Testament (trans. Kohl; London: SCM, 1974), 112. 
270 Jüngel, Death, 67. 
271 Robert Martin-Achard, From Death to Life: A Study of the Development of the Doctrine of the 
Resurrection in the Old Testament (trans. Smith; Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1960), 46; E. W. Marter, 
“The Hebrew Concept of ‘Soul’ in Pre-Exilic Writings,” AUSS 2 (1964): 98, 107. 
272 See, e.g., Gen 6:5–7; 7:4, 22f.; 19:13, 24f.; 20:3, 7; 38:7, 10; Exod 12:29; 22:21–23 [ET 22–24]; 
32:27f.; Num 11:l, 33; 16:26, 30–33; 21:6; 25:8f., 18; Deut. 32:22–25; Josh 5:4–6; 7:25; Judg 9:54–56; 
1 Sam 2:25, 33f.; 12:25; 26:10; 2 Sam 12:14, 18; 21:1, 8f; 24:10, 15. Wolfram Herrmann, “Human 
Mortality as a Problem in Ancient Israel,” in Religious Encounters with Death: Insights from the 
History and Anthropology of Religions (eds. Reynolds and Waugh; University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1977), 162.  
273 Jüngel, Death, 72; Wolff, Anthropology, 106 – 7.  
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corpse, a bone or a grave, entering a tent where a person died (Num 19:11–22), or 
even touching the carcass of dead animal (Lev 5:2–3).  
For the same reason, Yahweh outlaws necromancy and divination (Lev 19:31; 
Deut 18:9–12) and adamantly prohibits Israelites from practising any cult of the dead, 
like the practices in their neighbouring nations (Lev 19:28; 21:5; Deut 14:1; 26:14). 
Consequently, descriptions of death in the OT, when they occur, are brief and matter-
of-fact like a simple report: “and so-and-so died,” in passing. Then the text moves on 
to the next subject matter in the narrative, although deaths are recorded in numerous 
places literally by 1,000 occurrences of the root word מות “die/death.” No detailed 
description of burial, mourning and lamentation for the dead is found in the biblical 
texts even when Israelite kings or leaders die. Where they are recorded,274 they do not 
have “a religious content” of a cult such as worshipping or deifying the dead.275 One 
is hard-pressed to find anything other than brief descriptions of death, but cannot help 
recognizing strict prohibitions of the cult of the dead, which repeatedly appear in the 
OT.  
Yahweh’s constant reminder and warning against any form of idol worship, 
including a funerary cult of the dead, can be interpreted as: either (1) Israelites 
practised a similar cult like their neighbours276 or (2) practices of the cult of the dead 
by other ethnic groups in Palestine were so prevalent that Israelites had to be 
constantly reminded of the prohibition. In either case, the prohibition appears as “the 
Biblical polemic against its environment.”277 Whichever the case, the OT seems to 
imply that Yahweh has no business with the dead and completely shuts out death and 
the netherworld. Yahweh demythologizes and denies any notion of magical or divine 
power, or influence, of the dead on the living, in contrast to denizens of the ancient 
Near Eastern netherworld. Yahweh is not the God of the dead like the gods of ancient 
Near Eastern nations, who can die and rule the underworld:278 Nobody becomes 
                                                 
274 In comparison to 1,000 of מות, the cognate of קבר (bury, burial) occurs 200 times (only one-fifth of 
 ;even though death without burial apparently is a disgrace in Scripture (e.g., 2 Kgs 9:10; Ps 79:3 ,(מות
Jer 14:16). Funerary languages are even far less: the cognates of ספד (“mourn, lament”; 30 times), of 
 chant a dirge”; 8 times) sometimes appear twice for“) קין dirge, lamentation”; 18 times), and of“) קינה
the same dead, or are not always associated with the dead, especially verses in Prophets. 
275 Roland de Vaux, Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions (trans. McHugh; London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 1961), 61. 
276 For recent studies on this possibility, see Bloch-Smith, Judahite; Stavrakopoulou, Land. 
277 Spronk, Beatific, 30; Segal, Life, 121. Cf. Num 25:3–5; Deut 16:21; Judg 2:13–14; 6:25–26; 1 Kgs 
11:5–7; 15: 11–13. 
278 Cf. Helmer Ringgren, “ יָהחָ  ,” TDOT 4:338 – 39. 
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divine and is worshipped by virtue of death in the OT. Biblical writers make a 
definitive distinction between the realm of the dead and the divine: Yahweh and death 
are mutually exclusive and do not relate to each other. Martin-Achard aptly describes 
death in the OT as: 
an absolute separation from the Living God, an apparently total breach with the 
world of the living, and moreover a terrible and constant threat to human existence; it 
intrudes upon man everywhere; life finds itself continually disturbed, reduced to 
inexistence, and emptied of all meaning by death; the creature then becomes the prey 
of Sheol, and falls into a sort of nothingness, over which Yahweh is certainly 
sovereign, but in which He seems, in the last resort, to be disinterested.279 
Sheol (שאול, f. noun)—a unique Hebrew name for the netherworld280—overall 
occurs rarely in the OT, as compared to the occurrences of deaths. The term שאול 
almost always appears with negative connotation in all sixty-six uses,281 and they 
occur more often in Psalms and Wisdom literature than in the other books.282 Sheol 
almost always implies or is associated with unnatural, premature death.283 This means 
that Sheol is more to do with punitive death, namely, with God’s curse: a place where 
they could expect neither God’s presence nor His blessings. This is probably one of 
the reasons why the biblical texts do not often mention Sheol, which becomes more 
obvious as one closely looks at a few passages in the narrative texts. 
In canonical sequence the term “Sheol” first appears in Genesis 37, a story of 
jealous brothers selling Joseph to Ishmaelites, in the narrative of Jacob’s genealogy: 
Instead of telling the truth, they mislead Jacob to believe that his favourite son Joseph 
was killed by a wild animal. Jacob is inconsolable and refuses to be comforted, 
saying, “Indeed I will go down in mourning to my son, to Sheol,” assuming that 
                                                 
279 Martin-Achard, Death, 46. 
280 Ludwig Köhler, “Alttestamentliche Wortforschung: Scheʼōl,” TZ 2 (1946): 71 – 74; Ludwig Köhler, 
“Problems in the Study of the Language of the Old Testament,” JSS 1 (1956): 9, 19 – 20; Philip S. 
Johnston, Shades of Sheol: Death and Afterlife in the Old Testament (Downers Grove: InterVarsity 
Press, 2002), 71, 79. Johnston points out that the term never appears with a definite article; i.e., it is a 
proper noun. 
281 Ruth Rosenberg, “The Concept of Biblical Sheol within the Context of Ancient Near Eastern 
Beliefs” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1981), 2. 
282 Sixteen (16) times in Psalms, 18 times in Wisdom literature, 10 times in Isaiah, and the rest (22) 
infrequently appear from Genesis through Habakkuk . Outside the OT the word appears only once in 
Aramaic with exact Hebrew letters. A. E. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1923), 180 – 181 (No. 71:15), translates it as “the grave” but it is most likely a loan word 
from Hebrew “Sheol.” For detailed analysis and description of Sheol as a place, see also Johnston, 
Shades,  70 – 79; Rosenberg, “Sheol,” 161 – 72 . 
283 Johnston, Shades, 80 – 81, notes that half of all the occurrences of Sheol point to the destination of 
the ungodly, although  “scholars often portray Sheol as the destiny of all, without qualification”; 
Levenson, Resurrection, 35 – 81, for detailed studies on Sheol as destination of the ungodly; Rosenberg, 
“Sheol,” 2, 174 – 75, interestingly points out that “the semantic equivalents of Sheo1,  שחת and  בור [are] 
also associated with premature death, . . . This, then, is not the common fate of all mankind .”  
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Joseph’s unexpected violent death sent him to Sheol (Gen 37:35). A similar 
expression by Jacob appears three more times, when Jacob faces a possibility of 
losing Benjamin, yet another son by his favourite wife Rachel: He tells his sons that 
they will bring his grey hair down to Sheol in sorrow (Gen 42:38; 44:29, 31). 
However, when Jacob is about to die after seeing Joseph alive and his family securely 
reunited and preserved, there is no mention of Sheol (49:28–33). Jacob expresses that 
he will go down to Sheol in bitter sorrow when premature, violent death must have 
sent or will send his sons there, but he says that he is about to be gathered to his 
people and wishes to be buried in his family grave, when he anticipates his peaceful 
death. In Gen 46:30 Jacob simply says, “Let me die” rather than “Let me go to 
Sheol.”   
The second place where the term Sheol occurs is the most dramatic example in 
Scripture: Korah and his company go down alive to Sheol when they have rebelled 
against Moses who says, 
“If these [men] die like death of every man, or if the fate (284(פקדה of every man visit 
upon them, [then] Yahweh has not sent me. But if Yahweh creates a new thing 
 and the ground opens its mouth and swallows them up with all that is 285(בריאה)
theirs, and they descend alive into Sheol, then you shall know that these men have 
spurned Yahweh.” Then it happened as he finished speaking all these words, that the 
ground that was underneath them was ripped open; and the earth opened its mouth 
and swallowed them up, and with their households and with all the men who 
belonged to Korah, and with their possessions. So they and all that belonged to them 
went down alive to Sheol; and the earth closed over them, and they perished from the 
midst of the assembly. (Num 16:29–33)286 
This is the one and only incident in the entire Scripture which records someone 
actually going down to Sheol, dead or alive. The scene is dramatic as the earth splits 
open and swallows up Korah and his company in front of the Israelite assembly which 
was separated from them (Num 16:26–27). The significance of the episode is evident 
by the appearance of references to it three more times elsewhere.287 Those texts 
(except Deut 11:6) repeatedly state that their descent to Sheol is God’s punishment 
upon their rebellion. The event implies that those who openly rebel against Yahweh or 
                                                 
284 A feminine noun form of פקד “oversee, visit, punish” and thus meaning “oversight” or (the day of) 
“visitation, punishment” (for the latter use, see, e.g., Isa 10:3; Jer 8:12 and passim; Hos 9:7). Here 
follows ESV/NASB translation: fate= the visitation to everyone. 
285 Literally, “a creation, thing created, as preternatural, unparalleled.” Francis Brown, et al., BDB:135. 
286 Interestingly, David C. Mitchell, “‘God Will Redeem My Soul from Sheol’: The Psalms of the Sons 
of Korah,” JSOT 30 (2006): 376, points out the frequent appearance of the term “Sheol” in Psalms 42 –
 49, 84 – 89 ascribed to the sons of Korah, who escaped the plight, saying, “a few statistics confirm the 
Korah Psalms ’ obsession with the underworld.” His analysis shows that “it contains more than a third 
of Psalms references to Sheol,” although the collection itself is less than 10% of the Psalter.  
287 Num 26:9–10; Deut 11:6; Ps 106:16–18. 
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His spokesperson will be directly sent alive to Sheol.288 Furthermore, Moses 
apparently makes a distinction that natural death is not necessarily God’s punishment: 
he discriminates the manner of death between the righteous and the wicked, 
describing the latter’s perishing as a “new” thing that Yahweh brings about by His 
anger against their rebellion. The text also implies that Sheol is located deep beneath 
the earth.  
In the third text Yahweh declares that a fire kindled in His anger will burn even to 
the lowest part of Sheol against idolaters, who incite His jealousy (Deut 32:22). This 
text conveys that Sheol is the place where Yahweh’s curse can be intensified.  
The above three examples clearly associate Sheol with untimely, unnatural, 
unexpected, or sinful death, all ascribing negative connotations to Sheol. Other texts 
in Scripture describe Sheol as a place of descent only,289 of no return (Job 7:9),290 of 
silence (Ps 94:17), of no power (Isa 14:10), of darkness (Job 17:13), of no activity, 
reckoning, knowledge or wisdom (Eccl 9:10),291 of no habitation (Ps 49:15 [ET 14]), 
and of terrors (Ps 116:3). Psalmists often depict Sheol as a “place of complete 
isolation from God,” where there is no mention of Yahweh, no work of His wonder, 
and no giving of thanks or praise to Him.292 Silence in Sheol suggests a denial of 
communication or relationship, especially with God.293 Johnston notes, “It always 
means the realm of the dead located deep in the earth, unlike other terms which can 
mean both ‘pit’ and ‘underworld.’”294 
Occurrences of Sheol in poetic expressions and prophetic utterances often reveal 
metaphorical uses of the term, expressing fear from an imminent danger, death, or 
anguish in a horrific situation. Hebrew poets express a life-threatening condition by 
an “undesirable” cause such as severe suffering, illness, oppression, or pursuit by an 
enemy as being under the clutch of Sheol. Such a circumstance or situation can be 
                                                 
288 “Swallowed by or go down alive to Sheol” seems intended to convey a sheer terror of Sheol (Prov 
1:12; Ps 55:15). 
289 Note the description “go down/descend to Sheol” in Gen 37:35; Num 16:30, 33; 1Kgs 2:6; Job 7:9; 
17:16; 21:13; Ps 55:16 [ET 15]; Isa 57:9; Ezek 31:15–17, 27. Also “deep as/depth(s) of Sheol” in Ps 
86:13; Prov 9:18; Isa 7:11; Jona 2:3 [ET 2] or “Sheol from beneath” (Isa 14:9). 
290 John Hick, Death and Eternal Life (London: Collins, 1976), 59. 
291 Vide infra. 
292 Ps 6:6 [ET 5]; 88:10; 115:17; Isa 38:18.  H. H. Rowley, The Faith of Israel: Aspects of Old 
Testament Thought; the James Sprunt Lectures Delivered at Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, 
Virginia,1955. (London: SCM, 1961), 159; Martin-Achard, Death, 42, notes that death itself effects an 
“absolute separation from the Living God.”  
293 Tony Wright, “Death, the Dead and the Underworld in Biblical Theology. Part 1,” Chm 122 (2008): 
17. 
294 Johnston, Shades, 71, 83– 85, referring to terms באר  , בור , and  שחת ,  all usually mean “pit.” 
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deadly and is described as if one is already in Sheol. Psalmists often equate their 
adversity with falling into or being thrown into Sheol, but clearly they desire not to be 
left in Sheol, but to be delivered from there.295 They also describe Sheol as the 
destination of sinners296 or the place where they wish the wicked perish.297 In contrast, 
no passage indicates that the righteous have gone down and remained in Sheol; rather 
pious psalmists affirm their faith, through which Yahweh has delivered or will deliver 
their soul from Sheol.298 They do not expect their God to abandon them forever in 
Sheol. Cook explains: 
The biblical texts neither equate the afterlife with Sheol nor consign souls to Sheol in 
a haphazard manner. Rather, they tend to reserve the language of Sheol for 
describing the fate of lives gone horribly awry. Sinister people have Sheol as their 
fate, not the godly, though when in dire peril the latter may feel Sheol-bound.299 
“Hence Sheol is a fitting place for the wicked who forget God (Ps 9:17; 31:17; 55:15), 
but one which the righteous dread (Ps16:10; 30:3; 49:15; 86:13),” notes Johnston.300 
He further elaborates that the use of the term conveys “personal emotional 
involvement, in apprehension of one’s own destiny or anticipation of one’s enemies’ 
fate” and defines Sheol as “a term of personal engagement” in a negative sense.301 
Martin-Achard describes Sheol as an abode of the dead, which “does not denote a 
mere place; rather it stands for a state, a condition in which life ceases to be liveable 
for man.”302 The Israelites’ metaphorical use of שאול connotes more than the inactive 
dead state, but rather an active force of the invisible world, into which they abhor 
falling or being thrown.303 Metaphorical expressions that Sheol has a “mouth” (Ps 
141:7), “throat” (Isa 5:14), “cords” (2 Sam 22:6), or “hand” (Ps 49:16 [ET 15]; 89:49 
[ET 48]), and that she uses them, amply convey Israelites’ fear of Sheol, depicting it 
as a dreadful place with its active force.  
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296 Num 16:30–33; Job 24:29; Ps 9:18 [ET 17]; 49:15 [ET 14]; Isa 14:5–15; Ezek 32:21. Job describes 
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Israelites speak of Sheol when facing a dire calamity of death, and it seems that 
they deliberately avoid associating the term with natural death in a ripe old age. 
Biblical writers do not mention Sheol when they report the deaths of Abraham, 
Ishmael, Isaac, and Jacob (Gen 25:8, 17; 35:29; 49:33), Aaron and Moses (Num 
20:24–29; 27:13; Deut 32:50), Joshua and his generation (Judg 2:8–10), or Josiah (2 
Kg 22:20).304 The texts simply state that these men are all gathered to their fathers. 
Sheol is never associated or “portrayed as a peaceful ancestral gathering place” in all 
its occurrences.305 The texts simply narrate that those men slept with their fathers and 
were buried (with them) in the family grave306—“a burial chamber dug out of soft 
rock, or . . . a natural cave.”307 Israelites consider not only a proper burial important, 
as did people in the wider ancient Near East, but also an improper burial is a 
punishment from God.308 Yahweh makes clear that the wicked do not deserve a 
proper burial in other biblical passages: an implication that Yahweh Himself 
considers the burial proper for the righteous and rites of mourning for the dead to be a 
legitimate part of a funeral309 whilst prohibiting certain pagan practices.310 
Remarkably, Deut 34:6 states that Yahweh buried Moses in the valley when he died 
in the land of Moab. 
Biblical writers stop short of saying anything about conditions beyond the grave 
when the righteous die, but there is one case where a writer depicts the righteous dead 
appearing in 1 Sam 28:7–19 (the En-dor episode). When a woman medium of En-dor 
conjures up the dead Samuel at King Saul’s request, she sees Samuel coming up from 
                                                 
304 On this point see e.g., Levenson, Resurrection, 67 – 81. 
305 Rosenberg, “Sheol,” 193. 
306 See, e.g., 1Kgs 2:10; 11:43; 14:31; 15:24; 22:50; 2 Kgs 8:24; 15:7, 38. 
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23:2), tearing one’s garments, putting on sackcloth (Gen 37:34), wallowing in ashes (Jer 6:26), fasting 
(1 Sam 31:13), and chanting dirges (2 Sam 1:17). Cf. Vaux, Ancient, 56 – 61, for enumeration of ancient 
Israelite funerary rites in the OT/Apocrypha. Note, however, de Vaux covers mournings for all 
occasions, not limiting to funeral. 
310 E.g., self-mutilation (Lev. 19:27 – 28; 21:5; Deut 14:1) and divination (Lev 19:26; Deut 18:10; cf. 1 
Sam 28:3, 9 vide infra). Brian B. Schmidt, “Memory as Immortality: Countering the Dreaded ‘Death 
after Death’ in Ancient Israelite Society,” in Judaism in Late Antiquity Part 4, Death, Life-after-Death, 
Resurrection and the World-to-Come in the Judaisms of Antiquity (eds. Avery-Peck and Neusner; 
Leiden: Brill, 2000), 98 – 99. 
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the earth (v. 13). The story makes two things clear: (1) Samuel did not cease to exist 
after death; and (2) he was somewhere in the underground. It is noteworthy that the 
terms רפאים (vide infra) and שאול do not appear in the episode. The woman is startled 
by Samuel’s appearance and likens him to אלהים—not רפאים (vv. 12–13).311 Saul 
recognizes the dead Samuel, an old man wrapped in a robe, regardless what Samuel’s 
state might have been before he came up.312 His complaint of the disturbance by 
conjuration suggests that he might have been asleep (v. 15).313 Samuel converses with 
Saul but does not give any new information other than what he had already 
prophesied to Saul while he was still alive (vv. 17–18).314 He knew, however, what 
would happen to Saul, his sons, and his army the very next day (v. 19). The writer 
does not disclose how Samuel knew the timing of Saul’s death or the exact location of 
Samuel’s abode, if he had known them. Whether the abode of the righteous dead is 
part of, or apart from, Sheol is anyone’s guess.  
Given the divine and legal prohibition of necromancy,315 indeed being combatted 
by Saul himself (vv. 3 and 9), it is noteworthy that the biblical author neither 
suppressed the story, nor discredited the efficacy of necromancy. Instead, he has kept 
the En-dor episode intact.316 What the story in 1 Samuel makes clear is that death is 
not extinction and that the idea of post-mortem existence in Israel can be found quite 
early in its history.317 A question still lingers, however, whether the righteous dead 
indeed go to Sheol or what happens to them in Sheol, if they did. It is possible, but not 
certain, that Samuel came up from Sheol.  
In a well-known passage about dry bones in Ezekiel’s vision (Ezek 37:1-14), 
Yahweh’s words to Ezekiel may shed light on this point. The writer reports Yahweh 
saying twice: “I (will) open your graves (קברותיכם) and cause you to come up from 
your graves, My people” (vv. 12 – 13). Yahweh does not say that He will open the 
                                                 
311 David T. Tsumura, The First Book of Samuel (NICOT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 623 – 24, 
notes that the woman was startled (v. 12a) because  אלהים of Samuel “might not have appeared or acted 
like the spirit(s)  of the dead, like  אוב or  רפאים , which she was comfortable handling as a necromancer .” 
312 H. C. Thomson, “Old Testament Ideas on Life after Death,” in Glasgow University Oriental 
Society: Transactions, Vol 22 (ed. McKane; Glasgow: Glasgow University Oriental Society, 1970), 48. 
313 Cf. 1 En. 91:10; 100:5 which indicate that the righteous are asleep (in a long sleep) after death. 
314 Cf. 1 Sam 15:18–23, 35. It is interesting to note that Samuel describes Saul’s disobedience to 
Yahweh is like the sin of divination in v. 23. Yahweh’s punishment for divination is death, and 
therefore the text in chapter 28 seems to imply that Saul dies for two accounts of his deadly sin. 
315 Deut 18:10, 14. 
316 Lewis, Cults, 117. 
317 Thomson, “OT Ideas,” 48 – 49. 
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gates of Sheol (318(שערי שאול or bring them out of Sheol, but He will open and cause 
them to come out from their graves. According to Yahweh, His people are not in 
Sheol, but in their graves,319 perhaps signifying the importance of proper burial. 
When Samuel died, all Israel gathered together, mourned for Samuel, and buried him 
in his house in Ramah, his home town (1 Sam 25:1), before his after-death appearance 
at En-dor.  
It is true that these texts surveyed here are not fully conclusive about the ultimate 
destiny of the righteous dead. Simply put, however, Sheol seems to be assumed to be 
the place where everyone goes after death, by modern readers and perhaps even by 
ancient Israelites, because no other place is mentioned as an alternative abode of the 
righteous dead in the OT, like the Egyptian Field of Reeds or the Greek Elysium. 
Even if Israelites believed that all would go to Sheol, it appears that they also believed 
that the righteous would not stay in Sheol forever. Psalmists certainly have expressed 
such hope and faith, as noted above. Israelites generally viewed Sheol as a place 
where sinners deserve to go, the wicked will be taken alive, and into which some 
whose life has horribly gone awry can fall. Ninety-seven percent of the texts where 
Sheol occurs in the OT apparently testify to that effect.  
Sheol is the Israelite’s undesirable destination after death, although they do not 
know what alternative there is, when faced with death. Descent to Sheol provides no 
better alternative to this life but a shadowy existence which is depicted as 
“miserable,”320 “disgusting, hopeless, and gloomy,”321 a “drear [sic], joyless”322 kind 
of continuation of the human personality,323 but not a new start of life after death.324 
Barr comments that “Sheol is a blind alley. It does not constitute immortality, and it 
does not really lead towards resurrection either.”325 Murphy states that existence in 
                                                 
318 The phrase appears in Hezekiah’s writing about Yahweh’s pronouncement of his unexpected death 
(Isa 38:10). 
319 Cf. Ezek 32:17–32, the judgement oracle on Egypt’s descent to Sheol where other nations (the 
uncircumcised, slain by the sword) lie. Daniel I. Block, “Beyond the Grave: Ezekiel’s Vision of Death 
and Afterlife,” BBR 2 (1992): 132 [esp. n. 112], notes: “None of the technical terms relating to Sheol 
that occur in 32 17-32 is found in 37 1-14.”  
320 Ben C. Ollenburger, “If Mortals Die, Will They Live Again? The Old Testament and Resurrection,” 
ExAud 9 (1993): 33. 
321 Harris Birkeland, “Belief in the Resurrection of the Dead in the Old Testament,” ST 3 (1950): 63. 
322 Ovid R. Sellers, “Israelite Belief in Immortality,” BA 8 (1945): 3. 
323 Cook, “Funerary,” 661; see also Edmund B. Keller, “Hebrew Thoughts on Immortality and 
Resurrection,” IJPR 5 (1974): 21. 
324 Birkeland, “Belief,” 63. 
325 Barr, Garden, 29. 
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Sheol cannot be called “Afterlife” but rather it is “non-life.”326 Everything to do with 
death and Sheol is negative throughout Scripture327—it is the result of disobedience to 
God. Alexander stresses: “The belief that Sheol was the final abode of the wicked is in 
keeping with the idea . . . that the Hebrews perceived death as punitive rather than as 
natural.”328 Sheol is clearly more to do with unexpected death, which is construed as a 
divine judgment (Job 24:19).329 It is such a loathsome realm that the Israelites imagine 
it as a place suited for the wicked for retribution.330 Key remarks that “existence in 
Sheol is not denied, but it is not to be desired.”331  
Descent to Sheol is therefore not a “life after death but is part of the reality of 
death itself . . . Its value seems to lie in its negativity, which is thought to prove that 
existence without bodily life is no life at all,” comments Barr.332 In other words, when 
one dies, the body obviously decays and the bones remain; but the bodiless “dead 
soul” (333(נפש מת may go down to Sheol. Sheol is a place for some reduced being of 
the dead. The Israelites appropriately call those who reside in Sheol by a collective 
name 334,רפאים which is often translated as “shades” (RSV),335 evoking the meaning of 
“the shadowy, insubstantial existence.”336 Sheol is not a place of continuance in a 
mirror image of this life after death, where chthonic gods reside and rule as elsewhere 
in the ancient Near Eastern world. No god or ruler is in the Hebrew Sheol, neither do 
                                                 
326 Roland E. Murphy, “Death and Afterlife in the Wisdom Literature,” in Judaism in Late Antiquity 
Part 4, Death, Life-after-Death, Resurrection and the World-to-Come in the Judaisms of Antiquity (eds. 
Avery-Peck and Neusner; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 102. Author’s emphasis. 
327 Wright, “Death Pt.1,” 28. 
328 Desmond Alexander, “The Old Testament View of Life after Death,” Them 11 (1986): 44. Author’s 
emphasis. 
329 Johnston, Shades, 80 – 81; Cook, “Funerary,” 669; Barr, Garden, 29; Levenson, Resurrection, 82. 
330 Ps 9:18 [ET 17]; 49:15 [ET 14]; 55:16 [ET 15]. Brandon, Judgment, 59. However, it should be 
clarified that “the biblical Sheol is not the same as the Christian hell or the rabbinic 
Gehinnom  (Gehenna), the condign post-mortem destination of sinners, whether permanent 
or  temporary.” Johnston, Shades, 73; Levenson, Resurrection, 82. 
331 Andrew F. Key, “The Concept of Death in Early Israelite Religion,” JBR 32 (1964): 246. 
332 Barr, Garden, 29 – 30. Emphasis added. 
333 The phrase נפש מת appears in Num 6:6; cf. הנפש חי  in Gen 2:7. Gen 35:18 where it says, “Her soul 
 was departing for she died,” and 1 Kgs 17:21–22 where Elijah prays to God, “Let this child’s soul (נפש)
 separates נפש return into him” and it returns to the child and he revives. The passages imply that (נפש)
from the body when one dies.  
334 Amazingly, the term appears only 8 times in the OT, all in poetic passages: Job 26:5; Ps 88:11 [ET 
10]; Prov 2:18; 9:18; 21:16; Isa 14:9; 26:14, 19. Rephaim with the same spelling, a collective name of 
possibly pre-Israelite inhabitants of  Palestine, appears 19 times in mostly historical narratives. John F. 
Healey, “The Last of the Rephaim,” in Back to the Sources: Biblical and Near Eastern Studies in 
Honour of Dermot Ryan (eds. Cathcart and Healey; Dublin: Glendale, 1989), 33 – 44. 
335 Also as “spirits of the dead,” “departed spirits” or simply “the dead” (NASB) or “ghosts of the 
dead” (CJB). “In the hymn in KTU 1.6 VI the following terms are found in parallel with each other: 
rp’im/’ilnym/’ilm/mtm. . . . repā’īm and metīm are found parallel to each other in Hebrew (Ps 88:11; Isa 
26:14; 26:19),” notes Healey, ibid., 37. 
336 Johnston, Shades, 128. 
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the ghosts of the dead return and haunt the living unless they were continually fed and 
remembered as in Mesopotamia. The dead in Israel neither continue their life nor face 
an impending judgement in Sheol as in Egypt. No judgement takes place in Sheol, 
even though Sheol is under Yahweh’s power and jurisdiction. Its function therefore is 
distinctively different from the netherworld of the ancient world, some similar 
characteristics such as its location and conditions for existence notwithstanding. 
In spite of the negative depictions in almost all its appearances, as shown above, a 
common view of Sheol among biblical scholars seems to be as how Gray depicts it: 
“Sheol is the shadowy, insubstantial underworld, the destination of all, good and bad 
without discrimination, where existence is wholly undesirable,”337 although not 
without dispute more recently.338 Gray’s notion of “the destination of all, good and 
bad without discrimination” may be an overstatement when compared with what the 
biblical texts actually say, as surveyed above and reported elsewhere.339 This leads us 
to examine whether or not there are biblical texts which support Gray’s depiction of 
Sheol. Two poetic texts, Ps 89:49 [ET 48] and Eccl 9:10, imply that Sheol is the 
destination of all the dead.340 Ecclesiastes’ passage will be discussed later in detail, 
but briefly Qohelet’s view almost equates Sheol with the grave, which would not 
wholly support Gray’s definition. In the Psalm text: 
מיד־שאול סלה341מי גבר יחיה ולא יראה־מות ימלט נפשו    
 
What man shall live and not see death? Shall he deliver his soul from the power of 
Sheol? Selah,  
death and Sheol appear in parallel. “The power of Sheol” is used most likely for a 
poetic expression to mean “the power of death.” Here, the emphasis is probably death, 
not Sheol (the place of destination), from which no man can escape; thus the text is 
not fully supportive of Gray’s definition.   
Nevertheless, one of the reasons that death and Sheol often seem to be equated or 
expressed in parallel may be because both cause an ultimate separation from Yahweh, 
                                                 
337 John Gray, I & II Kings: A Commentary (2nd fully rev. ed.; OTL; London: SCM, 1970), 102. 
Emphasis added. 
338 See Levenson, Resurrection, 35–81 [esp. 35 –36, 71–73]; and Rosenberg, “Sheol,” 173, who rejects 
Gray’s description as normative; also Johnston, Shades, 79 – 83. 
339 See, e.g.,  Rosenberg, “Sheol,” 173, points out that such a premise is based on poetic sections (e.g., 
Ps 89:49 [ET 48]) where death  and Sheol are in parallel. She criticizes Gray ’ s view that has become a 
norm, and  vehemently disagrees: “Considering the fact that Sheol is mentioned far more often in other 
contexts with more  specific intent, such generalization is not justified.”  
340 Cf. Johnston, Shades, 82–83. 
341 Literally, “from the hand of Sheol”: metaphorically, יד signifies “power.” 
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which basically amounts to divine judgement in the biblical writers’ understanding. 
Johnston emphasizes that Sheol is “almost exclusively reserved for those under divine 
judgment, whether the wicked, the afflicted righteous, or all sinners,”342 thus it is the 
most undesirable place to be, as has already been seen. Since there is no judgement in 
Sheol, ancient Israelites may have assumed that divine justice must be executed in this 
life: either the reward of a blessing with a long life or punishment by death and Sheol, 
especially by untimely violent death. Such a death which led to Sheol was probably 
viewed more or less as an exception rather than a rule in normal circumstances—
perhaps a reason for the limited number of the term’s occurrences in the OT. The 
concept of Sheol in Israel is an early indication that ancient Israelites did not believe 
in death as extinction. God promises life, yet humans still die, even the righteous.343 
Sheol is not a suitable place for the righteous dead, where they will be completely cut 
off from Yahweh. Another solution is needed for the righteous to keep relationship 
with Yahweh. In a way this may be one of the factors why some biblical writers 
eventually embrace post-mortem divine judgement and resurrection. 
In Israel Yahweh is the King (344(המלך and the ultimate legislator and executor of 
 Yahweh’s ultimate responsibility is then to fight and 345.(השפט) the Judge ,משפט
punish the rebellious people within and without the Israelite nation. Divine judgement 
in this context functions on a national level for the security of Israel’s existence 
among the nations. Accordingly, Israelites including their kings relied on and 
expected Yahweh’s protection as a nation, and therefore divine justice for individuals 
was not emphasized. After the Exile without their own ruler or land, Israelites lost 
such national security under Yahweh’s protection. Israelites individually had to turn 
and seek divine justice and favour for their own survival, just as Egyptians had to turn 
directly to their god(s) when their king lost the aura of godhead and could no longer 
protect them.  
A next step is to discuss the development of Israelite belief in a beatific afterlife, 
namely, resurrection, which emerged during the postexilic era. 
                                                 
342 Johnston, Shades, 83. 
343 Cf. Ezek 37:25. 
344 Ps 98:6; Isa 6:5; Jer 46:18; 48:15; 51:57. 
345 Gen 18:25; Judg 11:27; Isa 33:22. 
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1.2.2 Development of Belief in the Resurrection of the Dead in Israel 
Belief in a discrete beatific afterlife, namely, the resurrection of the dead, in Israel is 
often characterized as a late development, mainly because the phenomena of 
apocalyptic eschatological belief did not surface until at least the 3rd century BCE. 
Naturally, a question may be raised concerning the background which led up to what 
would become the ultimate hope in Israelite religion.  
A concept of “afterlife” or more accurately a belief in a possibility of “life beyond 
death” appears to have germinated and become known quite early among individuals 
in Israel. The OT contains records that at least two men neither died nor went to Sheol 
when they disappeared from the earth. Genesis very briefly recounts the first instance 
that Enoch walked with God and he disappeared because God took (לקח) him (5:24). 
This is generally interpreted that Enoch was taken up alive to heaven.346 In the second 
instance Elisha witnesses Elijah being taken up alive into heaven, which Elijah 
himself, Elisha, and over fifty prophets knew would happen; they knew beforehand 
that Yahweh would take (לקח) Elijah, and Elisha saw it happen (2 Kgs 2:3 – 17).  
According to the biblical records, Elijah and Elisha independently raise a dead 
child through their intercession to Yahweh (1 Kgs 17:17 – 22; 2 Kgs 4:32 – 32). In both 
instances the texts say that a young boy was dead347 and was revived through 
prophet’s intercession.348 What happened to the boys or how long they lived after 
resuscitation is not recorded. The key emphasis of both texts is that the young boys 
were apparently dead but were made alive through intervention by the men of God. In 
another instance, even Elisha’s bones after his death revived a dead man (2 Kgs 
13:20–21). Setzer stresses: “The three resuscitation stories . . . indicate that death may 
be reversed, or overcome.”349 The point of these stories is that people witnessed that 
Yahweh could give back life to the dead. The story of the Shunammite’s son in 2 Kgs 
4:8–37 is the clearest account in the OT that Yahweh gives life, takes it away, and 
                                                 
346 Later, one of the Jewish apocalypses is written and named after Enoch because it is understood that 
Enoch “went to heaven and received revelation.” 
347 The child’s condition was explicitly expressed with the verb    מות “die ” in both 1 Kgs 17:18, 20  and 
2 Kgs 4:32.  Cf. Shaul Bar, I Deal Death and Give Life: Biblical Perspectives on Death (Piscataway: 
Gorgias, 2010), 392.  
348 Some argue that these are not genuine resurrection because those children were probably not dead or 
that they eventually died, even if they had been raised from the dead. 
349 Claudia Setzer, “Resurrection of the Body in Early Judaism and Christianity,” in The Human Body 
in Death and Resurrection (eds. Nicklas, et al.; DCLY 2009; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2009), 2. 
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gives it back. The story implies that it is all Yahweh’s doing: He gives a child,350 who 
dies in sickness, and brings him back to life. 
All these accounts can signal that death is not the end or extinction and that 
Yahweh spares some lives from death and He also has the power to revive the dead, 
however small the numbers or however temporary those examples may be. Hannah 
can sing, “Yahweh kills and makes alive; He brings down to Sheol and raises up” (1 
Sam 2:6), because she was barren, but Yahweh caused her dead womb to bring forth a 
new life. Indeed the bicolon is preceded by “even the barren gives birth to seven” 
(v.5). A barren womb is likened to Sheol in Proverbs: it is never satisfied because it 
cannot fulfil its desire (30:16). Hannah comes to believe that Yahweh can make 
whatever the dead object—womb or corpse—come alive as she shares her affirmation 
and joy with her foremothers, Sarah, Rebekah, Rachel, and Manoah’s wife, who were 
all barren but whom Yahweh enabled to bear children.351 A belief in Yahweh’s power 
to create and give life even to the dead, therefore, was already embedded in the 
Israelite cultic concept and belief.  
Passages generally dated late, such as Dan 12:1 – 2 and Isa 25:8 – 9; 26:19 which 
prophesy eschatological judgement and reward, also portray a late development of 
apocalyptic eschatology, particularly of its bodily resurrection concept.352 John Day, 
however, argues in detail that Isaiah 26 – 27 echoes Hosea 6 and 13 – 14, and Daniel 12, 
in turn, is influenced by Isaiah 26, 52:13 – 53:12, in which parallel texts use the same 
vocabularies, phrases, imageries,353 and the “resurrection locutions” such as קיץ ,עור 
“be awakened,” קום “raise, rise” and חיה “revive, make alive.”354 Elsewhere Sawyer 
                                                 
350 The text makes a point that the Shunammite’s husband was old (v.14) and that the Shunammite 
accuses Elijah of the death of the child that she did not ask for (v.28). 
351 A psalmist sings: “He causes the barren woman dwell in the house as a joyful mother of children. 
Hallelujah!” (Ps 113:9). 
352 This was initially reinforced with the story of the famous martyrdoms of a mother and her seven 
sons in Chapter 7 of 2 Maccabees, dated in the 2nd century BCE but apocalyptic texts of 1 Enoch now 
can be safely dated in the 3rd century BCE by the discovery of Dead Sea scrolls. James C. VanderKam, 
Enoch and the Growth of an Apocalyptic Tradition (CBQMS 16; Washington, DC: The Catholic 
Biblical Association of America, 1984), 79– 88, 111– 14. 
353 E.g., Hos 6:2 – 3 // Isa 26:19 (raise/rise, dawn, dew/rain); Hos 13:4 // Isa 26:13 (know no other gods 
but Yahweh); Hos 13:13 // Isa 26:17 – 18 (labour pains); Hos 13:14 // Isa 26:19 (deliverance from 
Sheol/death); Hos 13:15 // Isa 27:8 (east wind); Hos 14:6 – 8 [ET 5 – 7] // Isa 26:19 and 27:2 – 6 (dew, 
blossom like the vine); Hos 14:10 [ET 9] // Isa 27:11 (discernment) and Isa 26:19 // Dan 12:2 (lie/sleep 
in the dust, awake); Isa 52:13 // Dan 12:3 (prosper/prudent, שכל); Isa 53:11 // Dan 12:3 (justify the 
many/lead the many to righteousness); Isa 66:24 // Dan 12:2 (abhorrence, דראון; appears only in these 
two verses in the OT). 
354 John Day, “Resurrection Imagery from Baal to the Book of Daniel,” in Congress Volume: 
Cambridge 1995 (ed. Emerton; VTSup 66; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 125 – 33; John Day, “The Development 
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lists eight verbs ( יהח  and nineteen passages  “which, in (צוץ ,עלה ,שוב ,עור ,קיץ ,עמד ,קום ,
the final form of the text as it was probably understood in the context             
described . . . ,  refer to or describe the resurrection of the dead.”355 
The resurrection motif, therefore, is not a totally foreign or new concept, but 
appears also in what are probably earlier texts such as Psalms 49, 73, 88, and Ezekiel 
37. In particular, Ezekiel’s vision (37:1 – 14) depicts dry bones coming to life when the 
life -breath (הרוח) was breathed into them after the bones were reconnected by sinews 
and covered with flesh and skin (vv. 10, 14). The story indicates that all is done by 
Yahweh, probably assimilating with the Creation story of the first human (אדם, Gen 
2:7).356 The vision symbolizes an Israelite national restoration but the resurrection 
imagery is astonishingly vivid. 
The emergence of apocalyptic eschatology, a belief in discrete beatific afterlife 
(resurrection) in Israel, thus appears to be a culmination of beliefs in both post-
mortem existence and a possibility of “life beyond death,” which eventually 
coalesced, rather than solely a late theological development.  
The eschatological judgement is distinct from post-mortem scenarios in the 
netherworld of the wider ancient Near East. In the latter, judgement, if it happens, 
seems to occur immediately after each individual death or possibly after burial. The 
former is the general judgement of both the living and the dead, both the righteous 
and the wicked. It is a universal judgement which is expected to take place at the end 
of the age when Yahweh judges every individual and every nation according to each 
of their deeds. It is the day of retribution when the righteous will be rewarded with a 
resurrection body and eternal life, while the wicked get their just deserts. It is the day 
of judgement on a cosmic scale. Early or late, a belief in the eschatological judgment 
                                                                                                                                            
of Belief in Life after Death in Ancient Israel,” in After the Exile: Essays in Honour of Rex Mason (eds. 
Barton and Reimer; Macon: Mercer University Press, 1996), 248 – 57.  
355 John F. A. Sawyer, “Hebrew Words for the Resurrection of the Dead,” VT 23 (1973): 218 – 34 [esp. 
230]. The passages are: Deut 32:39; 1 Sam 2:6; 1 Kgs 17:22; Isa 26:14, 19; 53:11; 66:24; Ezek 37:10; 
Hos  6:2; Ps 1:5; 16:10 – 11 (org. 16:19); 17:15; 49:16 [ET 15]; 72:16; 73:24; 88:11 [ET 10]; Job 14:12; 
19:25 – 27; Dan 12:2 [Note: An error in the original paper was corrected and ET verse numbers added to 
the citation].  
356 N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (London: SPCK, 2003), 120. 
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has uniquely emerged within Israelite history.357 It is the ultimate hope in Israel’s cult, 
and lacks any precise parallel in other ancient Near Eastern religions.358 
Apocalyptic literature probably began to flourish sometime in the third century 
BCE. The belief in eschatological judgement, a central doctrine of apocalyptic 
literature, was most notably exhibited during the religious persecution by Antiochus 
IV. Both came to the fore in the Hellenistic milieu in a context that is not long after 
the likely composition of Ecclesiastes.  
1.3  Summary and Conclusions 
Davidson writes: 
Death is the god-decreed and inevitable lot of mankind, one of the most important 
factors which differentiate man from the gods.359 
The preceding brief survey of the concepts of death, afterlife, and divine judgement in 
the ancient world shows a common thread: the cult of the dead and afterlife die hard. 
Ancient civilizations have somehow recognized that divine beings exist, often through 
nature, and that there is a clear divide between divine and human since the earliest 
times: gods are immortal but humans are destined to die. The ancient people 
nonetheless regularly refused to accept extinction as their ultimate fate and sought 
ways of continuing life after death. They sometimes believed that their “soul” or 
“spirit” in some form would survive death, and that the “afterlife” would be a 
continuation of this life in the netherworld. Although manners and ways to deal with 
death varied among the peoples, a common thread runs through the ancient concept: 
after death the “shades” or the “ghost” of the dead can exist in a deep, dark, gloomy 
netherworld, from which none return to the living world, with few exceptions. The 
continuing being of the deceased lacks a body or vitality; it is nothing like the living 
being but an insubstantial shadowy existence. A similar concept of post-mortem 
existence in Sheol also develops early in Israel. 
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The above survey suggests that there is some evidence that people begin to 
question their traditional beliefs and search for new ideas when they find their 
tradition has become unsatisfactory or questionable, perhaps especially when 
extensive changes in their society begin to threaten their individual security and 
future. This is clearly seen in the case of Egypt. When foreign invasion and 
dominance demolished the native king’s status as “god incarnate” and social order 
was disrupted, Egyptians began to seek directly divine mɜ‛t (truth, justice, order). 
They sought gods directly when reliance on the king became no longer tenable. This 
shift from the traditional belief became apparent especially during the Hellenistic 
period. But being directly under divine rule also brought new questions. Egyptian 
demotic wisdom literature expresses puzzlement over fate and fortune which are 
controlled by inscrutable divine freedom.  
In Greece there were always philosophers who tried to challenge traditional 
religious beliefs with new ideas from the sixth century BCE onward. Plato was 
“highly critical of traditional mythology and, to a lesser degree, of traditional cult”360 
and tried to spread the idea of an independent, immortal soul, although it is 
questionable if the general populace in the Greek world accepted or believed Plato’s 
teaching. Alexander’s conquests brought a new era, but his death shortly thereafter 
brought major political and social upheavals, which also prompted changes in 
“philosophical theology”: namely, the development of scepticism, Epicureanism and 
Stoicism in reaction to Platonism.361 
The cultic practices of neighbours in the Levant affected Israelite religious life. 
Especially after the Exile some seem to have thought that Yahweh no longer 
intervened for Israel because of their sin and rebellion, and He seemed to have 
become distant and silent. Some began to question their traditional beliefs in 
retributive justice and Sheol and seek individual security and survival during the 
Second Temple period. 
Dominance by the Persian Empire followed by the conquests and death of 
Alexander of Macedon brought consecutive political upheavals and social changes in 
the entire ancient Near Eastern world. Nations in the region were ushered together 
into the Hellenistic period. Reassessment of traditional beliefs and values among 
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people in those nations was likely. It is no coincidence that Israel, a nation much 
affected by foreign domination, experienced this impact. Ecclesiastes seems to have 








  HOW SHOULD WE READ ECCLESIASTES? 
In an attempt to make sense of conflicts and contradictions that are found in the book, 
this chapter explores how best Ecclesiastes is to be read. The chapter begins with a 
brief survey and assessment of two main approaches to reading Ecclesiastes as a 
whole, and then devises a modified alternative reading of Ecclesiastes by analysing its 
literary characteristics. The final section of the chapter will expand how the proposed 
reading may shed a new light on Qohelet’s inconsistencies to bring the epilogue and 
Qohelet’s monologic discourse into a coherent whole.   
2.1 Reading Ecclesiastes as a Unity 
Unsatisfied with conventional critical approaches, modern scholars have gradually 
revived reading Ecclesiastes as a unity. An unresolved main issue has been how the 
epilogue is to be read and related to the main body of the text. Two approaches which 
deserve attention arose in the 1970s for reading Ecclesiastes as a unified whole. One 
is Michael V. Fox’s “Frame-Narrative” reading362 and the other is the canonical 
approach by Sheppard and Childs.363 This section will review and assess the two 
approaches as I seek how Ecclesiastes should be read. 
2.1.1 Canonical Approach by Brevard Childs  
The canonical approach that Childs initiated in the ’70s is often connected with the 
canonical criticism that James A. Sanders coined and developed as a biblical critical 
method subsequent to form and redaction criticism.364 Although they share common 
concerns regarding the nature, function, and authority of canon, and particularly the 
meaning of the text within its canonical context, their approaches and emphases are 
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not identical. While Sanders seeks to determine the hermeneutics employed in the 
canonical process, Childs focuses on the shape and function of the final received form 
of the canonical text. Childs disavows the term canonical criticism and calls his 
approach a “canonical approach.” He dislikes for his approach to be considered 
another historical-critical technique alongside source, form, and rhetorical criticism, 
or the like.  
This short discussion briefly touches on Childs’ canonical approach in 
Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (IOTS) and his student Gerald 
Sheppard’s approach in Wisdom as a Hermeneutical Construct: A Study of the 
Sapientializing of the Old Testament (WHC). As it is focused mostly on Childs’ 
description of a “canonical approach,” I will let his own words outline the nature of 
his approach. A brief comparison is also made between Childs and Sheppard for their 
particular emphases or differences. The comparison is limited to their overall 
approach and its application to Ecclesiastes in contrast to Fox’s approach to 
Ecclesiastes in his 1977 essay, which will be discussed in the next section. 
Childs states early in his book concerning the growth or formation of canon: 
Essential to understanding the growth of the canon is to see this interaction between a 
developing corpus of authoritative literature and the community which treasured it. 
The authoritative Word gave the community its form and content in obedience to the 
divine imperative, yet conversely the reception of the authoritative tradition by its 
hearers gave shape to the same writings through a historical and theological process 
of selecting, collecting, and ordering. The formation of the canon was not a late 
extrinsic validation of a corpus of writings, but involved a series of decisions deeply 
affecting the shape of the books. Although it is possible to distinguish different 
phases within the canonical process—the term canonization would then be reserved 
for the final fixing of the limits of scripture—the earlier decisions were not 
qualitatively different from the later.365 
He explains what is involved in the canonical process: 
The heart of the canonical process lay in transmitting and ordering the authoritative 
tradition in a form which was compatible to function as scripture for a generation 
which had not participated in the original events of revelation. The ordering of the 
tradition for this new function involved a profoundly hermeneutical activity, the 
effects of which are now built into the structure of the canonical text. For this reason 
an adequate interpretation of the biblical text, both in terms of history and theology, 
depends on taking the canonical shape with great seriousness. When seen in this 
light, the usual practice of the historical-critical Introduction of relegating a treatment 
of the canon to the final chapter is entirely misleading and deficient.366 
Childs notes the goal of the canonical approach is “to take seriously the 
significance of the canon as a crucial element in understanding the Hebrew scriptures 
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and yet to understand the canon in its true historical and theological dimensions” (p. 
71). Its major task is “descriptive” and “seeks to understand the peculiar shape and 
special function of these texts which comprise the Hebrew canon.” He says such an 
approach “does not assume a particular stance or faith commitment on the part of the 
reader because the subject of the investigation is the literature of Israel’s faith, not that 
of the reader” (p. 72). 
The canonical approach focuses on “the final form of the text itself” and “treats 
the literature in its own integrity.” Its concern lies in studying the features of the 
peculiar set of religious texts in relation to their usage within the historical 
community. It “studies them as historically and theologically conditioned writings” 
and seeks to “do justice to a literature which Israel transmitted as a record of God’s 
revelation to his people along with Israel’s response,” but it “does not make any 
dogmatic claims for the literature apart from the literature itself.” It seeks to “work 
within that interpretative structure which the biblical text has received from those who 
formed and used it as sacred scripture”367 (p. 73). Childs clarifies that “the canonical 
approach differs from a strictly literal approach by interpreting the biblical text in 
relation to a community of faith and practice for whom it served a particular role as 
possessing divine authority” (p. 74). He further notes: 
to take the canon seriously is also to take seriously the critical function which it 
exercises in respect to the earlier states of the literature’s formation. A critical 
judgment is evidenced in the way in which these earlier states are handled. At times 
the material is passed on unchanged; at other times tradents select, rearrange, or 
expand the received tradition. The purpose of insisting on the authority of the final 
canonical form is to defend its role of providing this critical norm. To work with the 
final state of the text is not to lose the historical dimension, but it is rather to make a 
critical, theological judgment regarding the process. The depth dimension aids in 
understanding the interpreted text, and does not function independently of it.368 
He emphasizes “to work from the final form is to resist any method which seeks 
critically to shift the canonical ordering,” such as overarching Heilsgeschichte or a 
historical-critical reconstruction attempt (p. 77). Childs remarks that “those 
responsible for the actual editing of the text did their best to obscure their own 
identity” and the “canon formed the decisive Sitz im Leben for the Jewish 
community’s life, thus blurring the sociological evidence most sought after by the 
modern historian” (p. 78). He claims that the canonical shaping serves “to chart the 
boundaries within which the exegetical task is to be carried out” (p. 83). 
                                                 
367 Emphasis added. 
368 Childs, Intro to OT, 74. Emphasis added. 
78 
  
In sum Soulen captures Childs’ canonical approach as a critical response to the 
biblical theology movement369: 
Contrary to Sanders . . . the stance developed by Childs focuses on the shape and 
function of the final canonical text. Childs carefully describes and analyses the final 
received form of the OT books. His primary concern is not with any particular 
editorial layer but rather with the final resultant product. According to Childs this 
final shape is of special significance because (1) it alone displays the full history of 
revelation witnessed to by scripture; (2) in it the community has exercised its critical 
judgment on the received traditions and modified them accordingly; and (3) by 
showing how the texts were actualized by generations removed from the original 
event and composition of the writings, the canonical shape may provide a 
hermeneutical key as to how we may actualize the text in our day.370  
Childs applies his method to show an overall canonical shape of the final received 
form of each OT book in his IOTS.  
Applying Childs’ canonical approach, his former student Gerald Sheppard focuses 
on and defines his approach as “canon conscious redactions”: 
strictly the attempts by editors to relate one canonical book or a part of a book to 
some other canonical book or collection of books. These redactions reflect occasional 
efforts to overcome at points the apparent independence of biblical traditions by 
introducing an overt literary link between them, one which exceeds the actual 
historical connections original to the different literatures.371 
He qualifies by saying, “Canon conscious redactions do not succeed in harmonizing 
the diverse and even contradictory traditions within the Bible. However, they do 
enhance the presumption of biblical unity by creating explicit interpretive contexts 
between books or groups of books.”372 Sheppard specifically demonstrates his 
approach to wisdom’s role in the OT in the postexilic period and describes it in WHC 
(1980).  
In his book Sheppard first analyses three select passages in Sirach (24:3–29; 
16:24–17:14) and Baruch (3:9–4:4) to show and claim their “canon conscious” 
interpretation of Torah. Then he applies a similar analysis to select passages in the OT 
(prologue of the first two Psalms and epilogue of Ecclesiastes, Hosea, and 2 Samuel) 
to present a similar tendency for the canonical shaping of OT books. Through his 
analysis of a series of presumptive secondary redactions, Sheppard identifies wisdom 
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as a hermeneutical construct of the non-wisdom tradition, more specifically Torah, in 
the canonical context of the OT books in the second century BCE.  
Both Childs and Sheppard focus on “understanding the theological implications of 
the present shape of the canon”373 in their method. They work from and analyse the 
final form of the received texts “to understand the nature of the theological shape of 
the text rather than to recover an original literary or aesthetic unity” (p. 74). They 
presume that the canonical redactors have edited the received texts for the final shape 
and function, although Childs appears to reckon with continual editorial activities—
sometimes unchanged and other times selected, rearranged, or expanded—throughout 
the history of canon formation. Childs apparently considers that each OT book 
contains its canonical shape with theological and hermeneutical implications. 
Sheppard concentrates on the postexilic canonical editors’ attempts to relate one 
canonical book or a part of a book to other canonical books for biblical unity by 
creating explicit interpretive contexts particularly through prologue or epilogue. 
Sheppard usefully applies his approach to explain an implication of the epilogue 
in the book of Ecclesiastes from a broader canonical perspective,374 which Childs 
fully supports as saying, “Few passages in the Old Testament reflect a more overt 
consciousness of the canon than does this epilogue” (p. 585). In the next subsections, 
I will outline the canonical approach to Ecclesiastes by Childs and Sheppard.  
2.1.1.1  Childs’ Interpretation of Ecclesiastes375 
At the beginning of his canonical reading of Ecclesiastes, Childs sets out with a 
concise summary of a number of historical-critical problems associated with (a) 
authorship, (b) date, (c) composition, (d) structure, (e) theological contribution, and 
(f) discerning the book’s canonical role.376 He observes the overall canonical shaping 
of Ecclesiastes in the superscription (1:1, 12), in Qohelet’s sayings (the main body of 
the book), and in the epilogue (12:9–14).  
As for the superscription, he writes regarding how Qohelet is portrayed as 
Solomon: 
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In its canonical form the identification assures the reader that the attack on wisdom 
which Ecclesiastes contains is not to be regarded as the personal idiosyncrasy of a 
nameless teacher.377 Rather, by his speaking in the guise of Solomon, whose own 
history now formed part of the community’s common memory, his attack on wisdom 
was assigned an authoritative role as the final reflection of Solomon. As the source of 
Israel’s wisdom, his words serve as an official corrective from within the wisdom 
tradition itself. Once this point was made, the literary fiction of Solomon was 
dropped.378 
Childs has little to say about Qohelet’s monologue, the main body of Ecclesiastes. 
He interprets Qohelet’s sayings as having arisen “in reaction to an assumed body of 
wisdom tradition. Therefore, almost every topic within the traditional teachings of the 
sages is touched upon in Ecclesiastes” (p. 587). He notes that “Qohelet’s sayings do 
not have an independent status, but function as a critical corrective, much as the book 
of James serves in the New Testament as an essential corrective to misunderstanding 
the Pauline letters” (p. 588). 
Not surprisingly, Childs views the epilogue as “[t]he most obvious sign of 
canonical shaping” (p. 584). In a historical-critical approach the epilogue is generally 
considered a work of two or more editors (or redactors) and has been downplayed in 
relation to the rest of the book. In the canonical approach the editorial layers do not 
make any difference as the focus is on the epilogue’s effect on the interpretation of 
the book in its final received form. Childs remarks that in vv. 9–10 Qohelet is  
characterized as ‘wise.’ His sayings are not just pessimistic emotions, but designated 
as part of Israel’s wisdom. Moreover, his words are put into the larger context of his 
teaching ministry. He had an office or at least a function within the community. His 
use of wisdom was not just a private affair, hence the name Koheleth.379  
Childs views the nature of Qohelet’s crucial role in the wisdom collection especially 
in terms of his critical judgement. Childs sees vv. 11ff as setting Qohelet’s work into 
the larger context, legitimating Ecclesiastes as divine wisdom and warning against 
other books, “which the writer explicitly excludes from the community as a 
distraction from the canonical collection,” although such indication is not quite clear 
from the text (p. 586). Childs surmises that a final summary and particularly the final 
instruction to fear God and keep His commandments in v. 13 “could only have been 
heard in the broadest context of the Jewish faith,” and thus he concludes:  
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The epilogue offers an overarching theological rubric under which all human 
behaviour was to be viewed, namely, the judgment of God. God’s hidden wisdom 
penetrates the secret things of this world and thus relativizes all human strivings by 
his final act of distinguishing the good from the evil. In the present form of the book 
this eschatological motif finds its confirmation in such verses as 3.17, 8.11f., and 
11.9.380 
2.1.1.2  Sheppard’s Interpretation of the Epilogue in Ecclesiastes (12:9–14)381 
Sheppard starts with an assumption that the epilogue of Ecclesiastes (12:9–14) is a 
“canonical” redactor’s work. He rejects a direct redactional relationship between the 
epilogue and Proverbs, saying that “the purpose of wisdom in vv. 13-14 cannot be 
seen simply as a corrective to the skepticism of Qoheleth measured against the more 
optimistic teaching of Proverbs. A number of features weigh against such a 
conclusion” (p. 184). He first claims, “The specific combination ‘fear God and 
observe his commandments’ does not occur elsewhere in a similar formula either in 
Proverbs or in Qoheleth” (pp. 184–85). He then remarks, “The parallels in vocabulary 
and content between the epilogue and the body of Qoheleth vastly excel 
correspondences with Proverbs . . . the potential redactional links are shared even 
better within Qoheleth. Moreover, the content of Qoheleth is in even greater 
continuity with the epilogue” (p. 185). Nonetheless, Sheppard has not entertained a 
possibility of the book by a single author. Instead, he identifies two separate efforts of 
a “thematizing of the book”: first in 1:2 and 12:8, and the second in the depiction of 
wisdom in the epilogue. He remarks without detailed exegesis of the first: 
Each thematizing has seized upon a particular dimension within the plastic structure 
of sayings and responses which cluster together in loose units throughout the book. 
Each is an oversimplification and a selective contextualizing of all the diverse forces 
latent in the previous literature. Certainly, the presence of two such divergent 
orientations for Qoheleth's contents must witness strongly against a reduction of the 
book as literature to any single, harmonized intention in the mind of the original 
anonymous sage.382  
Sheppard interprets the difficult verses 9–12 in the epilogue without detailed 
exegetical discussion as follows: 
The description of Qoheleth in vv 9-10 is followed by a māšāl governing the activity 
of wisdom collections in general. The next verse (12) warns against any attention 
beyond “these” (מהמה). If  בעלי אספות is taken to signify “overseers of the collections,” 
then the antecedent to “these” must be those same collections or “the words of the 
wise,” that is, a reference to a set of existent collections or books inclusive of, but 
larger than, Qoheleth. Hence, the particularity of focus on Qoheleth is loosened by 
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the generalization of wisdom collections in the māšāl of v 11 and this broader 
category of literature, of which Qoheleth is presumed to be a part, is evaluated. The 
admonition of v 12 has “books” for its concern and warns against the production of 
more. The force of the argument is that “these” are sufficient to communicate the 
goal of wisdom as given in vv 13-14. Other wisdom books would only weary their 
readers when the purpose of sacred wisdom is already achieved through “these.”383 
He compares his analysis particularly of Sirach with vv. 13–14 and claims, “only 
Sirach has exactly the same ideology as Qoh 12:13-14, a perspective not expressed in 
the body of Qoheleth itself. We must conclude that the redactor of Qoh 12:13-14 
either knew of Sirach or shared fully in a similar, pervasive estimate of sacred 
wisdom” (p. 187). He then concludes: 
With its epilogue Qoheleth has been overtly thematized by a particular theological 
understanding of wisdom which closely resembles that in Sirach and Bar 3:9-4:4. 
Therefore, the epilogue provides a rare glimpse into a comprehensive, canon-
conscious formulation of what the purpose of biblical wisdom is. When the 
ideological coherency of the wisdom collection is clarified along these lines, the 
complementarity in perspective between the wisdom collection and certain inner-
biblical sapientializing redactions becomes all the more obvious and compelling. . . . 
[W]e find a similar theological view of wisdom at the dawn of canon-consciousness, 
a perspective that offers an inner-biblical perception of wisdom with an important 
hermeneutical function for interpreting canonically non-wisdom traditions.384 
By “at the dawn of canon-consciousness” it appears that Sheppard means, without 
discussion, postexilic redactors at ca. 200 BCE or later. It is not clear whether he 
applies this only to wisdom redactors or other OT redactors as a whole. He claims that 
wisdom as a hermeneutical construct appears also in non-wisdom OT books in certain 
limited ways (i.e., prologue and epilogue of texts), as already noted. 
In sum, a canonical approach by Childs or Sheppard identifies the epilogue as the 
key passage which shapes and explains how Ecclesiastes is to be read as part of 
canonical Scripture. Thus they privilege the epilogue as integral to the whole of the 
book, in contrast to many historical-critical approaches which treat it as a secondary 
addition merely to correct Qohelet’s unorthodox stance. 
2.1.2 Frame-Narrative Reading by Fox
385
 
In 1977 Fox broke off from the traditional historical-critical assessment of 
Ecclesiastes as a multi-editorial work, and pioneered to propose and define the 
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composition of Ecclesiastes with a “frame-narrative” structure by a single hand.386 He 
“defended the epilogue as part of the original work”387 and argued that  
the Book of Qoheleth is to be taken as a whole, as a single, well-integrated 
composition, the product not of editorship but of authorship, which uses interplay of 
voice as a deliberate literary device for rhetorical and artistic purposes.388  
Fox identifies the literary characteristics of Ecclesiastes as narrative, in which 
there are two voices speaking: Qohelet’s and another voice which, first of all, speaks 
“in the phrase ’āmar (haq)qōhelet, in 1:2, 7:27, and 12:8,” although “certain 
presuppositions of modern biblical scholarship have kept it from being listened to 
carefully enough” (pp. 83–84).389 He notes: 
Many commentators have connected the speakers of these three phrases with the 
speakers of the epilogue. This is reasonable, since if we hear Qohelet spoken about at 
the beginning, middle, and end of his words as well as afterwards in a postscript, it is 
natural to hear the same voice in all these places.390  
Fox points out that “a third-person quoting-phrase in the middle of a first-person 
sentence” in 7:27 in particular indicates another person speaking in these verses. He 
then looks for signs of editing in the book, namely if the speaker(s) of the epilogue 
can be called an editor (pp. 84–85). Fox considers three types of editors are possible, 
“ranging along the scale of scope of involvement in the formation of the finished 
book: (1) a passive editor, (2) a rearranger, and (3) a compiler and arranger of small 
units” (p. 85) but rejects them all by his argument as follows. 
Fox starts by saying, “An author might identify the speaker however often he 
wishes, but an editor would interrupt the author’s words to do so only if he felt a lack 
of clarity. . . . [W]hoever is responsible for ’āmar haqqōhelet in 7:27 is far more 
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active than a mere phrase-inserter. He is active on the level of the composition of 
individual sentences” (p. 86). The same is true of 1:2 and 12:8. 
Concerning the epilogue, Fox states: 
The epilogue . . . begins with a phrase of continuation, as if someone had been 
speaking and is following up with a few words of summary retrospect. In 12:12 the 
speaker suddenly addresses benî “my son.” This address creates an epic situation (the 
setting, implied or explicit, in which a first-person narrator is speaking), one familiar 
to the ancient reader — the father-son instruction situation of all didactic wisdom 
literature. Why would an editor whose editorial activity was restricted to insertion of 
phrases and addition of an epilogue create for himself a fictitious epic situation?391 
He identifies Ellermeier as the only scholar who attempts a thorough investigation of 
hypothetical editor’s works in the book and finds Ellermeier’s argument unconvincing 
(pp. 88–90).392 He argues that “the epilogue and the other third-person phrases are 
integrally connected with Qohelet’s words” and that “certain words are in a different 
voice does not mean that they are by a different hand.”393 He then suggests that “all of 
1:2–12:14 is by the same hand—not that the epilogue is by Qohelet, but that Qohelet 
is ‘by’ the epilogist,” namely, the epilogist is a frame-narrator who tells the story of 
Qohelet, simply the transmitter, not the creator, of Qohelet’s words (p. 91). Fox then 
discusses several examples of “an anonymous third-person retrospective frame-
narrative encompassing a first-person narrative or monologue,” a well-known 
narrative technique in Egypt (The Instruction for Kagemeni, The Prophecy of Neferti, 
The Complaint of Ipuwer, and The Instructions of cOnchsheshonqy) and in Israel 
(Deuteronomy and Tobit). Fox illustrates his thesis of Ecclesiastes as a frame-
narrative by an analogy from modern literature, J. C. Harris’s Uncle Remus (pp. 92–
94).  
Fox explores the meaning of the epilogue, the frame-narrator’s most clear voice, 
in 12:9–14 in terms of its relationship to the first-person narrative, the main body of 
Ecclesiastes (pp. 96–104). The didactic tone of the father-son situation in the 
customary wisdom fashion is easily recognizable to the early readers of Ecclesiastes. 
Thus the epilogist implicitly identifies himself as a wisdom teacher. His first function 
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as the frame-narrator is to testify to the reality and credibility of Qohelet and his 
voice: 
The epilogist of Qohelet succeeded in convincing many readers that he had an 
intimate familiarity with Qohelet, and it is clear that this is one of the epilogue's 
purposes. The reader is to look upon Qohelet as a real individual in order to feel the 
full force of the crisis he is undergoing.394 
The frame-narrator’s second function relates to his stance, showing respect for 
Qohelet as a sage but keeping a certain distance from him. The epilogist tells that 
Qohelet is a public figure who taught people wisdom and knowledge, dedicated to 
seek to find, arrange, and write wise sayings and words of truth (vv. 9–10). Fox 
perceives a reserved attitude in the frame-narrator’s praise of Qohelet which lacks 
affirmation of success in Qohelet’s search. Fox interprets the analogy of the words of 
the wise with goads/nails in v. 11 negatively as something dangerous to prick and 
hurt, rather than as something immovable to prod one on to better actions. The reserve 
in the epilogist manifests itself as a note of caution in v. 12, “where he warns his son 
against excessive writing and speaking as wearisome, pointless activities, . . . the very 
activities to which Qohelet dedicated himself” (p. 101). In his final charge to his son, 
“the epilogist relegates all the words of the wise, Qohelet’s in particular, to a place of 
secondary importance by summing up the essence of human knowledge: Fear God 
and keep his commandments, for his judgment is thorough and ineluctable” (p. 103). 
Fox agrees with a commonly held view of a strong opposition between wisdom and 
law in the epilogue.  
Finally, Fox discusses an implied author—the voice behind the voices in every 
work of literature—in relation to the frame-narrator, the epilogist. Fox reminds the 
reader that the frame-narrator is also a literary persona, not necessarily being 
identified with the implied author, and therefore his view is not necessarily the 
implied author’s whole view. The frame-narrator’s orthodox tone may be assuring, 
but it neither dominates the book nor cancels out Qohelet’s view. The author has 
created a certain ambiguity between the two radically different views and thus has 
allowed the reader to choose which voice has more affinity to him (namely, to the 
implied author), Qohelet’s or the epilogist’s. Fox notes: 
The use of a frame-narrative in itself puts a certain protective distance between the 
author and the views expressed in his work. This distance may be important even 
when the author is anonymous, because it may prevent the book as a whole from 
                                                 
394 Fox, “Frame-Narrative,” 100. 
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being violently rejected. The author blunts objections to the book as a whole by 
implying through use of a frame-narrator that he is just reporting what Qohelet said, 
without actually rejecting the latter’s ideas.395 
Fox goes on to explain that 
the epilogist too is a literary creation, not to be simply identified with the implied 
author. The author has given him a conventional—and fictional—epic situation. He 
is a type-character, speaking in a typical style. In a book where the author shows 
himself capable of diverging radically from the conventional and effectively 
attacking orthodox ideas, a conventional character is not likely to be the closest 
representation of the author's viewpoint.396 
He in effect implies that Qohelet’s voice is the author’s view, which he confirms 
in his 1989 commentary, saying, “Qohelet is a persona: it is the author’s voice we 
hear speaking through the mask.”397 Thus he makes unclear where exactly the implied 
author stands in his relation to the frame-narrator who affirms the orthodox wisdom 
teaching in the epilogue. Weeks writes that  
the presentation of ideas through speeches and narrative offers writers an opportunity 
to air views which are not their own. This is most obvious in dialogues, where the 
author may espouse radically different views through the words of different 
characters—and none of these views need correspond to his own opinions.398  
He even criticizes Fox’s view, saying, “Fox does not go far enough . . . Qoheleth may 
be something quite different from a mere disguise, and . . . this book may be one in 
which the author and his character stand some way apart.”399 
2.1.3 Summary and Assessment 
In contrast to many conventional historical-critical approaches which treat the 
epilogue as an addition of secondary importance, Bartholomew observes that the 
canonical approach by Childs and Sheppard “privileges the epilogue as the major sign 
of canonical shaping. This reverses the general value judgement of the epilogue and 
foregrounds it as the key to the canonical interpretation of the book.”400 Conversely, 
Qohelet’s monologic discourse which occupies the most of the book is given less 
detailed attention than it might deserve, although Qohelet’s voice seems to be 
                                                 
395 Ibid., 103. 
396 Ibid., 104–5.  
397 Fox, Contradictions, 316. Emphasis added; cf. Fox, “Frame-Narrative,” 105, n. 46.  
398 Stuart Weeks, “Whose Words: Qoheleth, Hosea and Attribution in Biblical Literature,” in New 
Heaven and New Earth—Prophecy and the Millennium (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 157 – 58. Interestingly, in 
the Introduction of his latest JPS commentary, Fox, Ecclesiastes, xiii, states,  “We cannot  assume that 
any one statement of Koheleth’s expresses the book’s teaching,” without changing his original  reading 
strategy. 
399 Weeks, “Whose Words,” 159. 
400 Bartholomew, Reading, 106. Author’s emphasis. 
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affirmed as one to which attention must also be paid. The canonical approach to 
Ecclesiastes by Childs and Sheppard has enjoyed little reception as of date.401 What is 
perhaps most strange and conspicuous in their treatment of Ecclesiastes is the absence 
of a discussion of, or even reference to, Fox’s 1977 seminal essay on the unity of 
Ecclesiastes by authorship rather than by editorship, which in principle was available 
to both Childs and Sheppard.402 This was a missed opportunity for them to compare 
their premise of the redactor’s work for the book’s canonical shaping to a significant 
alternative. 
Fox’s thesis on the single authorship of Ecclesiastes has caught the attention of 
scholars and has influenced subsequent studies of the book as a unified whole.403 
However, Fox also seems to have missed an opportunity to reassess his analysis on 
the types of editors, overlooking another type of editor: a canon-conscious redactor 
proposed by Childs and Sheppard. Moreover, Fox’s view of the relationship between 
the frame-narrator and the implied author and his choice of the reliable narrator404 in 
the canonical form of Ecclesiastes are contestable and need further examination (vide 
infra).  Bartholomew evaluates Fox’s reading of epilogue and summarizes: 
                                                 
401 Several scholars have critically discussed Sheppard’s 1977 article: Krüger, Kohelet, 372–75 [ET 
213–15]; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 395–96; Andrew G. Shead, “Reading Ecclesiastes ‘Epilogically’,” 
TynBul 48 (1997): 87–88; Gerald H. Wilson, “‘The Words of the Wise’: The Intent and Significance of 
Qohelet 12:9–14,” JBL 103 (1984): 181, n. 14; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 853; Fox, Contradictions, 320–
21; Michael V. Fox, A Time to Tear down and a Time to Build up: A Rereading of Ecclesiastes (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 375–76. In both of his 1989 and 1999 commentaries Fox gives essentially 
the same criticism of Sheppard’s approach. Fox disagrees with Sheppard’s claim that Ben Sira has 
“exactly the same ideology as Qoh 12:13–14.” Fox states: “Unlike Sir 1:26, the postscript does not say 
that obedience to God’s commandments produces wisdom, nor does it bring wisdom under the aegis of 
Torah or identify the two, which is Sira’s great contribution in chapter 24. On the contrary, the 
postscript implies a distinction between the words of the sages on the one hand and pious obedience on 
the other. Neither part of Qohelet’s ending reveals any “canon-consciousness” (1999, pp. 375–76. 
Author’s emphasis). The last criticism by Fox stems from their different interpretations of difficult 
phrases:  בעלי אספות in 12:11 and ויתר מהמה in 12:12a: Sheppard interprets from the two phrases “these 
collections” to mean a “broader category of literature,” i.e., canon, of which Qohelet is a part (1977, p. 
187), whereas Fox contends: “‘These’ in v. 12a are the words of the wise whatever they may be” 
(1999, p. 376). Seow holds a similar objection against Sheppard’s argument, even though Seow 
considers 12:13b–14 as a redactor’s addition. 
402 Childs cites a 1978 commentary in his book in 1979 and Sheppard likely had an opportunity to 
include Fox in the publication of his dissertation in 1980. 
403 E.g., Seow, Ecclesiastes, 111, 113; Andrew G. Shead, “Ecclesiastes from the Outside In,” RTR 55 
(1996): 24–37; Krüger, Kohelet, 19 [ET 5]; Tremper Longman, III, The Book of Ecclesiastes (NICOT; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 21; Leo G. Perdue, Wisdom & Creation: The Theology of Wisdom 
Literature (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), 202; Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 74; Agustinus Gianto, 
“Ecclesiastes,” NIDB 2:179; Lohfink, Qoheleth, 8. 
404 On the reliability of the biblical narrator, see Meir Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: 
Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985); 
Yairah Amit, “‘The Glory of Israel Does Not Deceive or Change His Mind ’: On the Reliability of 
Narrator and Speakers in Biblical Narrative,” Proof 12 (1992): 201 – 12. 
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In his view the narrator affirms an orthodox perspective but the implied author 
wishes to create room for Qoheleth’s type of view to be heard. One is thus left 
uncertain as to precisely where the implied author stands, the implications being, 
especially when one considers the large amount of space given to Qoheleth, that he is 
sympathetic to Qoheleth’s affirmations of life as absurd! This makes Fox’s position 
very similar to the major historical critical readings in which an orthodox editor has 
added an appendix to a radical text in order to make it more acceptable, and certainly 
undermines the notion of foolproof composition in Ecclesiastes.405 
In sum, both the canonical approach and reading Ecclesiastes as a frame-narrative 
recognize the inner coherence of the book: Childs and Sheppard by canonical 
redaction and Fox by authorship. Nonetheless, both approaches summarized above 
seem to need further modification or refinement to tighten their arguments. What 
follows is a brief assessment and my preference between the two methods with a 
modification to read Ecclesiastes as a literary unity. 
Childs in his canonical approach interprets Qohelet’s sayings as a critical 
corrective in reaction to wisdom tradition. He does not elaborate how exactly or what 
misunderstanding Qohelet’s monologue is correcting, which supposedly parallels the 
Epistle of James countering the misunderstanding of Pauline teaching in the NT.406 
No specific example of Qohelet’s sayings for such analysis in their work may be one 
of the reasons which keep some readers unpersuaded by Childs’ and Sheppard’s 
canonical approach.407 A canonical approach to read Ecclesiastes as a unity is 
attractive. The approach is probably viable for “a theological decision about what the 
proper parameters for interpretation are.”408 But it remains fundamentally no less 
conjectural than any other account of redactional purposes in antiquity.  
This thesis will explore a possible significance in the likely historical 
underpinnings of Ecclesiastes’ context. Qohelet’s preoccupation with death is extreme 
and extraordinary among all the biblical texts. Qohelet not only observes what death 
does to human existence, but also arguably assesses everything based on death’s 
reality. Death and the absence of divine judgement in his society are huge issues to 
Qohelet. Sombre and pessimistic tones in his monologue convey helplessness and 
uncertainty about the future under the oppressive regime(s) in which he lives. No 
other biblical writers express such borderline heretical sentiments while still clinging 
to some of the traditional wisdom teaching as Qohelet does. The epilogue may then be 
                                                 
405 Bartholomew, Reading, 168– 69. 
406 Childs, Intro to OT, 588. 
407 Although their critics listed above seem to be unpersuaded by their analysis of the epilogue itself or 
its larger canonical context (vide supra). 
408 DTIB:101; contra Barton, Method, 95. 
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a response to Qohelet’s agonizing observations which may also be a reflection of the 
topsy-turvy world of postexilic Israelite society in the early Hellenistic milieu.  
I will argue the thesis that the extremely unconventional content of Qohelet’s 
monologue (and its retention) perhaps bears a certain historical significance in 
postexilic Israel at the time of Ecclesiastes’ composition. A more integrated approach 
to study the complicated texts within Qohelet’s monologue and the epilogue may be 
warranted. This leads me to side with Fox’s approach, with its need for some 
modification notwithstanding, to explore the inner coherence of Ecclesiastes as a 
crafted literary composition, whose distinct voices enable the issues of Qohelet’s day 
to be probed in a fresh way. 
2.2 How Should We Read Ecclesiastes?  
2.2.1 Re-Defining the Frame-Narrative: Towards a Modification of Fox’s 
Approach 
In the canonical form of the text, there are two voices speaking in Ecclesiastes. The 
dominant voice is Qohelet who mostly speaks in the first person “I” about his 
experience, observation and knowledge. Qohelet’s voice first appears in 1:2, 
pronouncing his famous motto which is interrupted by another voice in the middle. 
His final voice repeats his motto verbatim, although not repeating the second  הבל
 in 1:2, again interrupted by the third person in 12:8. The two verses הבלים
unmistakably form an inclusio, implying not only that  הבל הבלים הכל הבל is the key 
statement of Qohelet, but also his monologue likely starts at 1:2 rather than 1:12 
where Qohelet’s actual “I” statement appears.409 The latter implication may also be 
supported by parallels in vocabulary and content between the two poems in 1:2–11 
and 12:1–8 which seem to be wittingly contrasted, as we shall see. The inclusio also 
suggests that Qohelet’s monologic discourse may be a framed story narrated by 
another voice. 
The second voice apparently introduces the main character Qohelet, navigates 
Qohelet’s monologic discourse, and closes the book with a closing statement. We hear 
this “third person” voice introducing the main character Qohelet in 1:1, interrupting 
his monologue in a phrase “says Qohelet” in 1:2, 7:27, and closing Qohelet’s 
monologue by the same phrase in 12:8. This voice then proceeds to summarize 
                                                 
409 Cf. Seow, Ecclesiastes, 113. 
90 
  
Qohelet’s activity as of the wise and warns his “son,” to whom the story of Qohelet is 
apparently told, with a conclusive final instruction (12:9–14). The close examination 
of the two voices which speak in Ecclesiastes seems to show continuity and 
interrelatedness.  
 Based on a literary analysis, this thesis reads Ecclesiastes in the canonical form as 
written by an author with a “frame-narrative” structure as Fox does: namely, the first 
person monologic discourse which is narrated by the third person, a “frame-narrator.” 
A “frame-narrative” naturally consists of a framed story, by inclusio in the case of 
Ecclesiastes, within which a character appears, and his story is transmitted by the 
frame-narrator. In such a setting, a space between the frame-narrator and the character 
becomes more distinctive than in a simple narrative, because the character’s speech is 
essentially confined in an “inner frame” (1:2–12:8) and controlled by the frame-
narrator.410 The frame-narrative structure creates even more distance between the 
author and the character if the whole narrative is framed by an outer frame (1:1–12:9–
14):411  
 
¦ 1:1        1:2            12:8   12:9–14  ¦ 
  ¦            inner frame (Qohelet)        ¦ 
 ¦_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _outer frame (Frame-narrator)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ¦ 
  
Fox assumes that both Qohelet and the frame-narrator are a literary persona. He then 
postulates an implied author behind the frame-narrator, based on Wayne Booth’s 
work.412 The outer frame can be formed but is not necessary (thus shown by the 
dotted line in the above scheme) because there is in effect only one framed story in 
Ecclesiastes. The frame-narrator in Ecclesiastes is in effect a narrator who framed 
Qohelet’s discourse by the inclusio. Thus he may be named a “frame-narrator,” but he 
is simply the narrator of Qohelet’s story. Fox has created a complicated relationship 
between the implied author and the frame-narrator to interpret Ecclesiastes, because 
he has to explain the frame-narrator’s role as a less reliable literary persona than 
Qohelet. The implied author then is less likely the author’s guise.  
                                                 
410 But the frame-narrator may enter into the inner frame as in 7:27, of which importance will be 
elaborated in the ensuing discussion. 
411 Cf. Shead, “Reading,” 68; Shead, “Ecclesiastes,” 24 – 37, for his analysis of a double frame structure 
in Ecclesiastes. Shead treats the frame-narrator as the narrator of the book, not a fictional persona.  
412 Fox, “Frame-Narrative,” 104 [esp. nn. 43 & 44]; see Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (2nd 
ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 76– 77 for definition and literary implication of 
an  “implied author.” 
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Regardless, a distance between the character and the frame-narrator, most likely, 
is intentionally created by the author who wishes to communicate his message in 
certain fashion for his advantage.413 There are two advantages that the “frame-
narrative” affords the author: (1) he can place a distance between himself and the 
character(s); and (2) he can agree, disagree, or stay neutral with any or all of the 
characters in the narrative plot.414 The key to understanding the frame-narrative is, 
then, to assess the interrelationship and distance between the author, the frame-
narrator, and the character(s).415 What needs to be clarified for Ecclesiastes is how the 
frame-narrator and Qohelet, the book’s single character and main speaker, interrelate 
to each other, but more importantly how they are positioned in their relative 
importance in the overall scheme for the author’s purposes.  
2.2.2 The Frame-Narrator’s Role 
What is the frame-narrator’s role? In his analysis of the literary characteristics of 
Ecclesiastes, Fox has made the point that a presupposition of the epilogue as a later 
addition has inhibited scholars from carefully listening to the third person’s voice in 
the book, as if the epilogue is the only time that the third person speaks. Many 
scholars likewise have treated the small phrase הלת ק  in other parts of the book אמר (ה)
as also a later addition or a gloss. In the literary structure of the book as a frame-
narrative, one needs to examine what the frame-narrator is doing. The following 
outline may clarify the frame-narrator’s role and responsibility in the book: 
1:1    Introduce the character Qohelet in the framed story – Frame-narrator 
1:2    Open Qohelet’s monologue: “הבל הבלים,” says Qohelet        Framed story narrated      
7:27  Interrupt Qohelet’s discourse in the middle: says Qohelet    –by Frame-narrator  
12:8  Close Qohelet’s monologue: “הבל הבלים,” says Qohelet       (forming inclusio) 
12:9-14   Finish with Closing remark and Conclusion – Frame-narrator 
                                                 
413 The author may be male or female. One gender pronoun (m.) is used for the third person designation 
throughout in this thesis for simplicity. 
414 E.g., Galileo employed this strategy in his Dialogue (1632) to convey his new scientific view of the 
cosmos “through the mouths of dramatis personae” in order to distance himself. Dava Sobel, Galileo’s 
Daughter: A Historical Memoir of Science, Faith, and Love (New York: Walker, 1999), 144. 
415 Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 122, notes that  “a key element in the . . . interpretation of Ecclesiastes is 
to be aware of the  different voices and to inquire about their interrelationship.” 
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The above outline illustrates that it is the frame-narrator who may own or at least be 
responsible for narrating the entire discourse.416 What the outline makes clear is that 
the third person narrative is an integral part of the entire book, be it a short phrase or a 
longer statement. The frame-narrator introduces Qohelet, the main character (1:1), 
transmits Qohelet’s monologic discourse (1:2–12:8), commends Qohelet’s work as a 
sage and a teacher, and presents the ultimate wisdom instruction of an Israelite sage in 
conclusion (12:9–14).417 The frame-narrator does not interact with or correct Qohelet 
during the latter’s discourse. As such, it appears that the author has entrusted 
Qohelet’s story to the frame-narrator as a reliably accurate presenter and transmitter 
of Qohelet’s monologue. 
In other words, the plot in Ecclesiastes appears to be that: (a) the frame-narrator 
sets the tone of Qohelet’s monologic discourse at the beginning and starts narrating 
(1:1–2); more importantly, (b) the frame-narrator interrupts in the middle of Qohelet’s 
discourse to remind the audience that he is still in control, while navigating Qohelet’s 
monologue (7:27); and most importantly, (c) the frame-narrator wraps up Qohelet’s 
story (12:8–12) and gives the final word at the end (12:13–14). Thus it appears: “It is 
the frame narrator who thereby gains the final word, and who is depicted as having 
ultimate control not only over the canonical form, but at least partly over the book’s 
overall ideology,” as Christianson puts it.418 The ensuing discussion will engage in a 
detailed analysis of how the frame-narrator’s role unfolds in those passages, 
especially in 7:27, but let us first examine the relationship between the frame-narrator 
and the character Qohelet of the framed story.  
The name of the frame-narrator is unknown but he appears to be very familiar 
with Qohelet’s profession.419 He identifies Qohelet as a sage,420 who teaches people 
knowledge, weighs, searches out, and carefully arranges many proverbs (12:9), and 
                                                 
416 Naoto Kamano, Cosmology and Character: Qoheleth’s Pedagogy from a Rhetorical-Critical 
Perspective (BZAW 312; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002), 247, points out that  “the frame-narrator, not 
Qoheleth, is the actual teller of the discourse — the frame-narrator never speaks with first-person 
speech. Instead, Ecclesiastes is a treatise in which the frame-narrator makes use of Qohelet’s first-
person speeches, reporting these speeches and persuading the audience by means of them.” 
417 Detailed exegesis of the passage, see chapter 5. 
418 Christianson, Time, 61 – 62, makes this statement in his biblical frame-narrative analysis of 
Deuteronomy, which this thesis regards as aptly applicable to Ecclesiastes. 
419  “The epilogist of Qohelet succeeded in convincing many readers that he was intimately familiar 
with Qohelet, ” says Fox, Contradictions, 317. 
420 Roland E. Murphy, “The Sage in Ecclesiastes and Qoheleth the Sage,” in Sage in Israel and the 
Ancient Near East (eds. Gammie and Perdue; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 263 – 71; see Fox, 
Contradictions, 330 – 32 for detailed analysis of  “sage” as profession in Wisdom literature; cf. Weeks, 
Scepticism, 38 – 39. 
93 
  
sometimes calls him “the Gatherer” (421.(הקהלת The frame-narrator’s familiarity with 
Qohelet’s work suggests that they are probably in the same professional circle.422 His 
ultimate admonition: “Fear God and keep His commandments”—an orthodox wisdom 
teaching—to his son (or pupil) regardless of what he has heard (12:13) identifies the 
frame-narrator likely as an orthodox Judahite wisdom teacher who has probably lived 
in Jerusalem.423 His primary audience is most likely Israelites.  
The question may be raised what role the frame-narrator plays in the overall 
scheme, because he hardly speaks anything but the concluding remark at the end in 
Ecclesiastes. In other words, the reader may need to ask how each speaker may be 
positioned and related to each other, and ultimately how the first-person narrative 
(Qohelet’s monologue) and the third person narrative (the epilogue) may be brought 
together to cohere as a literary whole. It now calls for a closer examination of the 
third person narrative sections, especially 7:27. 
Scholars have noticed this particular insertion not because of its role or 
significance, but because of the two possible word divisions for אמרה קהלת :אמרהקהלת 
(MT) or אמר הקהלת (preferable emendation), as Fox already noted. He brings the 
importance of 7:27 to attention as “a delicate reminder of the presence of a frame-
narrator’s voice in the background.”424  
Although one may not be persuaded by Fox’s conjecture for the role of 7:27 and 
especially the resultant shaping and interpretation of the whole book of Ecclesiastes, 
neither can one too quickly dismiss the insertion by the frame-narrator as an 
accidental addition or gloss by a later editor or copyist.425 An addition or gloss may be 
possible, especially if the book contained later editorial work, but it would be unlikely 
if the book were surrounded by a “frame-narrative” by a single hand. It is unclear why 
a copyist should have made the addition or gloss at such a point where it would 
appear to make no difference. The text reads well without the insertion if it were not 
                                                 
421 Vide infra. 
422 Fox, Contradictions, 311. 
423 Ernest Lucas, Exploring the Old Testament, Vol. 3: The Psalms and Wisdom Literature (London: 
SPCK, 2003), 148, writes: “What little evidence there is in the book points to Jerusalem as its place 
of  origin. There are references to local conditions such as the rain (Eccl. 11:3; 12:2), the changes of the 
wind (1:6; 11:4), the use of wells and cisterns for water storage (12:6) and the almond tree (12:5), 
which are, in fact, not compatible with an Egyptian setting for the book [re theory of Alexandrian 
origin] but are characteristic of Judea. Most significantly there are the references to the temple and 
sacrifice (5:1; 9:2).” See also Seow, Ecclesiastes, 37– 38. 
424 Fox, “Frame-Narrative,” 86. 
425 E.g., David Castelli, Il Libro del Cohelet, Volgarmente detto Ecclesiaste. Tradotto dal Testo 
Ebraico con Introduzione critica e Note (Pisa: Tipografia Nistri, 1866), 268. 
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there to start with.426 However, “Says Qohelet” in 7:27 is perfectly in line with 1:2 
and 12:8 within the “frame-narrative” structure. Bartholomew points out: “7:27 in 
particular indicates that the frame cannot be regarded as just a frame put on a 
complete first-person narration. The evidence points to deliberate shaping”;427 but he 
does not explain how exactly 7:27 is functioning in the frame-narrative. This thesis 
proposes two or possibly three functions that the author may have had in mind for the 
frame-narrator’s interruption in 7:27 to shape the book for his purpose.  
The first possible function of 7:27 is a “reminder of the presence of the frame-
narrator’s voice” in the middle of Qohelet’s discourse to distance himself from 
Qohelet, as Fox suggests.428 The frame-narrator is reminding the audience that what 
they are hearing is Qohelet’s view, not his. The insertion clarifies that the frame-
narrator is simply reporting or transmitting what Qohelet says, and enforces the fact 
that the frame-narrator/author may or may not agree with Qohelet or may even have a 
different view. 
More importantly, it can also serve as “a reminder of the presence of the frame-
narrator’s voice” in the foreground, not necessarily “in the background” as Fox has 
it,429 for the second but more significant function. The insertion “says Qohelet” in 
7:27 signals to the audience of Ecclesiastes that the frame-narrator has not 
disappeared after his introduction of Qohelet only to reappear in the epilogue, while 
Qohelet has his free rein to take control. It is a reminder that the frame-narrator is 
telling the story of Qohelet and the entire discourse is of the frame-narrator, not of 
Qohelet. The frame-narrator is the one who is actually presenting and in control of 
Qohelet’s discourse.  
The third function of 7:27 may be incidental but may further strengthen and 
confirm that the book is composed by one hand, especially if the first two functions as 
described above were correct. To the reader of Ecclesiastes the epilogue (12:9–14) 
often appears drastically different from Qohelet’s monologue: the main reason that 
the epilogue is often treated as a later addition or by other hand(s) to this day. Such an 
assumption can easily be made if the reader did not understand the significance or 
                                                 
426 F. J. Backhaus, “Der Weisheit letzter Schluß! Qoh 12:9 – 14 im Kontext von Traditionsgeschichte 
und beginnender Kanonisierung,” BN 72 (1994): 43; Bo Isaksson, Studies on the Language of Qoheleth 
with Special Emphasis on the Verbal System (SSU; Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1987), 107; Schoors, 
Ecclesiastes, 580–81. 
427 Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 70. 
428 Fox, “Frame-Narrative,” 95. 
429 Ibid., 86. Emphasis added. 
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purpose of the frame-narrator’s interruption in 7:27, which seems often to be the case. 
The assumption probably becomes even easier to make, if the frame-narrator’s 
insertion in 7:27 was not there, which gives an impression that the entire book, except 
the epilogue, is controlled by Qohelet. The difference of the epilogue from Qohelet’s 
monologic discourse can then be even more pronounced. The author may have 
realized that his work could be open to misunderstanding because of the difference 
between Qohelet’s monologue and the epilogue, and thus added the frame-narrator’s 
interruption in the middle of Qohelet’s utterance to remind the reader who was 
delivering and navigating Qohelet’s monologue.  
2.2.3 Qohelet and His Role 
Who is Qohelet? The book of Ecclesiastes opens with: “The words of קהלת, the son of 
David, king in Jerusalem” (1:1). At first glance, קהלת “Qohelet” looks like a proper 
noun and it appears as though the author uses a pseudonym, because there has been no 
known king in Jerusalem by that name. But the definite article attached to the noun in 
12:8 and probably in 7:27 is also suggestive of an appellative.430 From early times the 
term has generally been identified as a title or an office, denoting assembler, gatherer, 
convener, convoker, collector, etc., which is derived from the root קהל “gather, 
assemble.”431 Moreover, one may recognize that the two occasions where הקהלת is 
used are by the frame-narrator of the book. The frame-narrator’s use of הקהלת “the 
Gatherer” in his narration may be deliberate432 for later describing Qohelet as a sage-
teacher in his epilogue (12:9–10).  
In the opening of the book, the frame-narrator introduces the character “Qohelet” 
(1:1). Interestingly, the case has been made that Qohelet is not really presented as a 
                                                 
430 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 96; and Podechard, L’Ecclésiaste, 128 –34 suggest that an epithet or a common 
name was in transition to become or has become a proper name; but Weeks, Scepticism, 180 – 96, points 
out an inconsistent use of the article in LXX, which may suggest a confusion during the text 
transmission. He suggests after his extensive analysis that Qohelet is most likely the proper name of the 
character. Both arguments seem plausible. LXX translates ה/קהלת with a definite masculine article in all 
three places (1:2; 7:27; 12:8) where the frame-narrator narrates: εἶπεν ὁ Ἐκκλησιαστής “said the 
Ecclesiast” (NETS), including 1:2 which does not have an article in MT. In 12:9, 10 he uses the term 
without an article maybe because Qohelet is the familiar name known in his circle including his son 
(12:12), so in the introduction (1:1) and in Qohelet’s self-introduction. Thus Qohelet may be a 
nickname rather than a proper name, see Krüger, Kohelet, 98 [ET 40]. 
431 Barton, Ecclesiastes, 68. Other examples of feminine ending (proper) names, which probably were 
all originally epithets: ספרת  “scribe ” (Ezra 2:55; Neh 7:57 and פכרת הּצביים  “binder of the gazelles ” 
(Ezra 2:57; Neh 7:59); See also Seow, Ecclesiastes, 96 – 97. 
432 Possibly an allusion to 1 Kgs 8:1 (?). The verb קהל is used only relating to people, not to animals or 
things. H.-J. Fabry, et al., “ָקָהל,” TDOT 12:550; Paul Joüon, “Sur le Nom de Qoheleth,” Bib 2 (1921): 
53 – 54. 
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king, even though the frame-narrator introduces Qohelet as “the son of David, king in 
Jerusalem,” and the main character also claims it in his self-introduction: “I am 
Qohelet. I have been king over Israel in Jerusalem” in 1:12. Traditionally, this 
introduction along with his description of possessing massive wealth, wisdom, and 
power; his interests in international trade, building operation, forestry and gardening; 
and his sensual pleasures that he has pursued in 2:4–10ab, has been interpreted as a 
claim of King Solomon.433 In spite of such allusions to Solomon, however, the 
argument that Qohelet is not a king appeals to the fact that the main character calls 
himself Qohelet, and the name Solomon never appears in the book. The kingship role 
completely disappears after chapter 2 in the book, and it can be argued that the author 
could not have written the criticism of kings in 4:13 and 10:16, if the character of 
Qohelet had been Solomon or even any other king, although this argument is 
unpersuasive.434 The epilogue does not recapitulate that Qohelet is the “king of Israel 
in Jerusalem” in the important concluding section, although it does reiterate that 
Qohelet is a wise man and adds that he is a teacher.435  
Despite these silences, a possible interpretation of Qohelet as “Solomon”—
fictional or otherwise—remains strong as the current consensus shows,436 because the 
author in certain ways does depict Qohelet as a Solomon-like king. The author does 
                                                 
433 E.g., Timothy Walton, “Reading Qohelet as Text, Author, and Reader,” in Tradition and Innovation 
in Biblical Interpretation: Studies Presented to Professor Eep Talstra on the Occasion of His Sixty-
Fifth Birthday (eds. Peursen and Dyk; SSN 57; Leiden: Brill, 2011), 123, notes:  “The king ’ s activities 
described in 2:4 – 9 can be understood as allusions to various aspects of Solomon ’ s reign found in 1 
Kings 5 – 11”; also Tremper Longman, III, “Qoheleth as Solomon ‘For What Can Anyone Who Comes 
after the King Do?’ (Ecclesiastes 2:12),” in Reading Ecclesiastes Intertextually (eds. Dell and Kynes; 
LHBOTS 587; London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 42–56.  
434 It is possible that Qohelet criticizes those in power if he is no longer a king (cf. הייתי מלך  in 1:12: 
perfect tense), and especially if they were foreign ruler(s).  Cf. Christianson, Time, 141. At any rate, his 
criticism of the king and warning against unwise kings are general without targeting any one specific 
ruler. 
435 In his recent monograph Weeks seriously doubts Qohelet is a Solomonic persona or a king, owing to 
the weakness of allusions to Solomon in his view and the lack of kingly role of Qohelet. Instead he 
proposes a portrait of  Qohelet as businessman because of his familiarity with business terms: Weeks, 
Scepticism, 12 – 43 and passim. However, there is no surprise if a king is familiar with economic and 
business terms; in fact, he should be acting as an administrator of his kingdom. Besides, the author’s 
purpose is unlikely to present Qohelet's  “kingship” but to show a human struggle for finding the 
meaning of life in the face of unavoidable death, even by someone like Solomon with all his  “wealth 
and wisdom. ” 
436 See Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 30 – 37; Walton, “Reading,” 123; Christianson, Time, 147; C. L. Seow, 
“Qohelet’s Autobiography,” in Fortunate the Eyes That See: Essays in Honor of David Noel Freedman 
in Celebration of His Seventieth Birthday (eds. Beck, et al.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 275 – 87; 
Tremper Longman, III, Fictional Akkadian Autobiography: A Generic and Comparative Study 
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1991), 120 – 23; Longman, Ecclesiastes, 17 – 20; and R. N. Whybray, 
Ecclesiastes (OTG; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989), 46, remarks:  “The reflections attributed to Qoheleth-
Solomon are not peculiar to him but are echoed throughout the book.” 
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not imply that Qohelet must be Solomon but only someone like Solomon so that the 
audience would think, or be reminded, of Solomon.437 That may be the reason why 
the author’s allusion is not so precise, simply letting Qohelet claim to be king and 
leading his audience to believe that Qohelet is or was a Solomon-like king.438 In such 
a scenario, Qohelet may be regarded as a fictional Solomonic persona created by the 
author.439 The author may have hoped to evoke the memory of Solomon immediately 
in the mind of Israelites “in a manner reminiscent of other superscriptions in the 
wisdom literature (Prov 1:1; 10:1; 25:1).”440 Solomon’s kingship or rule is not 
obviously the focal point of the author’s purpose, but he may be attaching to Qohelet 
the kingly credentials of Solomon’s wealth, wisdom, and reputation. Qohelet’s 
kingship, particularly as a wise king like “Solomon,” would capture the attention of 
his Jewish hearers who seek answers to the harsh realities of their life and injustice in 
their society.441 If anyone has an answer, surely it must be “Solomon” who has 
achieved all that man would desire for: power, fame, wealth, and wisdom for success 
above all. Astoundingly, what the hearers find in Solomonic utterances is their own 
crying, frustration, and powerlessness. 
Once the audience find that life’s enigma is no respecter of persons, and that even 
“Solomon” faces life’s challenges and his struggle is no different from their own 
“under the sun,” Qohelet’s status as a king does not need further mention, and the 
description of his kingship completely disappears from the book. The author then lets 
Qohelet delve into issues that people face in their lives and in the society in which 
they live—work, wealth, pleasure, power, wisdom, greed, rivalry, oppression, 
corruption, nature, time, God, and above all human fate of death—to reveal that even 
the wisest, the richest, and possibly the most powerful king in Israel (2:9–11) does not 
                                                 
437 Hengstenberg, Prediger, 43 [ET 44]. Miller notes,  “We may surmise that the figure of Solomon had 
become symbolic by the time Ecclesiastes was written ” in Douglas B. Miller, “What the Preacher 
Forgot: The Rhetoric of Ecclesiastes,” CBQ 62 (2000): 229 – 30. The author might have thought that a 
mention of  “son of David ” would immediately conjure up the image of Solomon in the mind of 
Israelites. Just hearing בן־דוד, therefore, may have been enough to convince audience with Qohelet’s 
high status, reinforcing it with the description that he was wiser than all, successful in all his 
undertakings, and enjoyed all pleasures of men like Solomon. 
438 Cf. Isaksson, Language, 190, notes: “The narrative of the thread is of the résumé type, . . . the events 
[in chapter 2] . . . are picked out as important single events and then juxtaposed.” 
439 Christianson, Time, 148; Fox, Ecclesiastes, xxxiii; Yee V. Koh, Royal Autobiography in the Book of 
Qoheleth (BZAW 369; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006); Seow, Ecclesiastes, 97; Sneed, “Social Location,” 
47. 
440 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 97. 
441 Solomon’s wise administration of justice is recorded in 1Kgs 3:16–28 and probably was known 
widely among Israelites (see v. 28). 
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have answers to the life’s mystery, dichotomies, and injustice “under the sun.” The 
author perhaps has desired to evoke reactions and provoke responses in the mind of 
his audience by deliberately placing the Solomonic persona, King Qohelet, with 
whose views and opinions they should wrestle. Thiselton notes: 
Such texts as Job, Ecclesiastes, and the parables do not function primarily as raw-
material for Christian [or Jewish] doctrine. . . . Their primary function is to invite or 
to provoke the reader to wrestle actively with the issues, in ways that may involve 
adopting a series of comparative angles of vision.442  
2.2.4 Which Voice—Qohelet’s or the Frame-Narrator’s? 
In contrast to the conventional interpretation that the author expresses his view of life 
and of God through Qohelet as his mouthpiece, this thesis contends that Qohelet’s 
voice may reflect the Israelite outcry in an unjust society “under the sun” that the 
author has observed.443 The author probably discerned that his audience might 
acknowledge his message as that of a wise man but would not necessarily respond to 
it unless they could identify its content as corresponding to their own life experiences. 
This thesis therefore disagrees with Fox’s literary ploy, and proposes that the 
frame-narrator (i.e., the epilogist), rather than Qohelet, is most likely the reliable 
narrator and navigator in Ecclesiastes. In essence, therefore, the frame-narrator and 
the implied author are one and the same (i.e., the author’s disguise) as Sternberg 
suggests.444  
In the “frame-narrative” structure, the author has a purpose for confining 
Qohelet’s monologue in a frame: namely, the frame-narrator has a role to play. 
Positioning his voice at the beginning, middle, and end of Qohelet’s monologue, 
followed with a conclusion, appears as a literary device which signals the frame-
narrator’s full participation, arguably with very limited but effective interruptions 
during the whole discourse. Consequently, the audience may become aware in the end 
that the author has allowed the frame-narrator to “exert control over the narrative 
perspective throughout while lending the book his own stamp of authority.”445   
                                                 
442 Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics (London: HarperCollins, 1992), 65 – 66. [or 
Jewish] added for relevance; cf. Weeks, “Whose Words,” 165. 
443 Contra Sneed, “Social Location,” 47, who contends that Qohelet “is not reporting as some 
eyewitness, but rather, in general terms, he relates what is typical and timeless”; see also Weeks, 
“Whose Words,” 164. Such a view is possible, but reporting as a personal observation seems to go 
beyond describing something in general terms. It may not be Qohelet’s experience but what the author 
may have observed in his society and put into Qohelet’s mouth. 
444 Sternberg, Poetics, 74 – 75, maintains that the narrator and the implied author are the same in a 
biblical narrative,  which may likewise  apply to Ecclesiastes; also Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 79. 
445 Christianson, Time, 61. 
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This scenario of the relationship between Qohelet and the frame-narrator can also 
explain the apparent contradictions, disjunctive phrases, and enigmatic schemes in 
Ecclesiastes. Ambiguities in Qohelet’s vocabulary, statements, and questions are 
probably not intended to have a single, clear-cut meaning, but rather to reflect 
concurrently two different thoughts: Qohelet’s and the author’s.446 The author may 
have deliberately chosen and put in Qohelet’s mouth specific words,447 expressions,448 
and rhetorical questions in particular,449 which can convey more than one implication 
or cast a range of connotations. The manner or tone of voice that the frame-narrator 
may project in his transmission of Qohelet’s message can provoke reactions and 
responses in the hearer’s mind, especially if the book were orally communicated 
(which was likely in the ancient world) or perhaps even performed.450 Qohelet’s 
language is “colloquial or dialectal Hebrew” and is fitting for oral presentation.451 The 
author cleverly employs a poetic prose style which can also serve such purposes, 
because poetic expressions often contain more than one meaning which the author 
may wish to convey, even if Qohelet’s monologue were not orally delivered.452 
It may also be a reflection of the author’s particular pedagogic style, somewhat 
reminiscent of an oriental sapiential/philosophical approach, in which a teacher does 
not plainly express or quickly provide a straight answer to his pupils, much less to his 
                                                 
446 Cf. Thomas Krüger, “Meaningful Ambiguities in the Book of Qoheleth,” in The Language of 
Qohelet in Its Context: Essays in Honour of Prof. A. Schoors on the Occasion of His Seventieth 
Birthday (eds. Berlejung and Hecke; OLA 164; Leuven: Peeters, 2007), 63 – 74; Doug Ingram, 
Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes (LHBOTS 431; New York: T&T Clark, 2006). 
447 Such as חלק ,אחרי ,עולם ,רוח ,הבל, and שאול. 
448 E.g., פטעת ומש ,רעות/רעיון רוח , or   . ומר מצוהש
449 E.g., see 3:17, 21, 22b; 6:12b; 9:10b; 11:9; 12:7. 
450 For a recent major work on oral transmission of biblical literature, see David M. Carr, Writing on 
the Tablet of the Heart: Origins of Scripture and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), esp. 111– 73; see also Frank H. Polak, “Book, Scribe, and Bard: Oral Discourse and Written 
Text in Recent Biblical Scholarship,” Proof 31 (2011): 118– 40; Michael V. Fox, “Wisdom and the 
Self-Presentation of Wisdom Literature,” in Reading from Right to Left: Essays on the Hebrew Bible in 
Honour of David J. A. Clines (eds. Exum and Williamson; JSOTSup 373; London: Sheffield 
Academic, 2003), 153– 72. Fox notes: “The Wisdom books are to be read to oneself and studied, but 
they are also to be read aloud (that is, to others) and taught from” (p. 165, Author’s emphasis) and “the 
teachings of Wisdom . . . are given a performance setting, namely, a teaching event with a complex 
nexus of speakers, audiences, media and purposes” (p. 169). 
451 David M. Carr, The Formation of the Hebrew Bible (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 453–
44; cf. Antony F. Campbell, “The Reported Story: Midway between Oral Performance and Literary 
Art,” Semeia 46 (1989): 77– 85; Antony F. Campbell, “The Storyteller’s Role: Reported Story and 
Biblical Text,” CBQ 64 (2002): 427– 41. 
452 Robert Alter, The Wisdom Books: Job, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes: A Translation with Commentary 
(New York: Norton, 2010), 339; Cf. Joseph Azize, “The Genre of Qohelet,” DL 2 (2003): 123 – 38 [esp. 
133]; John F. Genung, Ecclesiastes: Words of Koheleth Son of  David, King in Jerusalem (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1904), 198. 
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general audience, although subtle hints may be embedded all along in his discourse.453 
In the case of Ecclesiastes, Qohelet’s long monologue may be serving essentially as a 
prelude to the frame-narrator’s final word to attain the acme of his message. In other 
words, the character Qohelet may be positioned to play a role of antagonist (like a 
“hostile witness”), rather than of protagonist (the author’s mouthpiece), against the 
real message by the author454 who plays an “engaged outsider” through the frame-
narrator’s role.455 The frame-narrator does not deny the reality of death and injustice 
that Qohelet observes in his society, but his epilogue stands as the final word of a 
wisdom teacher. The author’s pedagogical style and literary device, the “frame-
narrative,” controls the entire discourse. Interestingly, Qohelet warns against much 
talk and many words as folly (5:1, 2, 6 [ET 2, 3, 7]; 6:1; 10:12–13, 14, 20), while he is 
the main speaker in the book. The statement about a proper time to speak or to be 
silent (3:7) and that “the words of the wise heard in quietness are better than the 
shouting of a ruler among fools” (9:17) may arguably resonate with the author’s 
philosophical wisdom and oriental pedagogy rather than Qohelet’s. Thus the audience 
may realize that Qohelet might have had to bite his tongue, realizing his folly, if he 
could hear the frame-narrator’s conclusion in 12:13–14. 
The contention here is that the author had a consistent strategy throughout, when 
he penned Ecclesiastes. He caps all that Qohelet decries within the inclusio formed by 
the infamous motto: “Futile, utterly futile, everything is futile” (הבל הבלים הכל הבל) at 
the beginning and at the end of Qohelet’s discourse (1:2: 12:8), and then attaches his 
conclusion in the frame-narrator’s voice (12:9–14). Indeed, he may have written the 
inclusio and the conclusion first as the framework of Ecclesiastes; and the rest may 
have been just “filling in the blanks,” while adding the introduction (1:1) at the end of 
the process. Qohelet’s monologue concentrates on death and injustice as life’s 
                                                 
453 Staples, “Vanity,” 142, warns against the reader’s tendency to take the words of the Bible and 
endow them with concepts of the present Western world instead of the Semitic world of the author’s 
time. 
454 Contra Fox, Contradictions; For author–character relationship of the literary device, see H. Porter 
Abbott, The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative (2nd ed.; CIL; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). According to Porter, Qohelet may be called an unreliable or discordant narrator (p. 76); 
Booth, Rhetoric, see especially  “The Uses of Authorial Silence,” 271 – 310; M. M. Bakhtin, Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics (THL 8; trans. Emerson; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 51, 
on the distance between the hero and the author; cf. Alan Holmes, Robert Musil, “Der Mann ohne 
Eigenschaften”: An Examination of the Relationship between Author, Narrator and Protagonist 
(AKMLW 259; Bonn: Bouvier, 1978), 191 – 205 (The Narrator and His Role), 289 – 97. 
455 Barbara Green, Mikhail Bakhtin and Biblical Scholarship: An Introduction (SBLSemS 38; Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2000), 36.  
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realities, which all humans face under the sun but are unsolvable on this side of death, 
while the frame-narrator’s final conclusion points to a solution which still lies ahead 
(12:14). It is debated on which side of death God’s judgement will occur in 
Ecclesiastes, but the inclusion of every deed and every hidden thing, whether good or 
evil (12:14), is more suggestive of the eschatological judgement, which can occur on 
the other side of death.456 This interpretation is reasonable if the frame-narrator does 
not share Qohelet’s view. Qohelet’s advice for life is “enjoy it while you can,” 
whereas the frame-narrator’s is “fear God and keep His commandments.” The frame-
narrator neither rejects nor approves Qohelet’s resolution. A choice seems to be left to 
the audience for whichever they prefer, with a reminder of the consequences.457 The 
author’s final counsel seems simply to remind Qohelet’s (and his) wider audience of 
the basic tenets of Israelite faith: Fear God, for He holds the key to solve the 
unsolvable under the sun. Qohelet exhausts his wisdom in his search but does not find 
the answer for life’s enigma. Fisch summarizes, by saying that the creator of 
Qohelet never quite says, like the author of Psalm 111, that the beginning of ḥokmā is 
the fear of the Lord but his final statement seems to say that the end point of ḥokmā is 
the fear of God! “The end of the matter, when all is said and done: Fear God and 
keep his commandments, for that is the whole of Man.”458 
The book’s overall scheme for the authorial purpose seems to lie in the frame-
narrator’s role as the presenter and transmitter of Qohelet’s monologic discourse in 
order to present these two potential answers to life’s most difficult questions. Having 
identified that the frame-narrator plays the key role, it is now time to visit Qohelet’s 
monologue and investigate how the frame-narrator navigates and shapes the narrative 
discourse of Ecclesiastes.   
                                                 
456 Further discussion vide infra. 
457 Cf. Fox, “Frame-Narrative,” 105, expresses a similar opinion but from a different angle (due to 
ambiguity in the implied author’s position). 
458 Harold Fisch, Poetry with a Purpose: Biblical Poetics and Interpretation (ISBI; Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1988), 175. Author’s emphasis. More succinctly Kidner sums up:  “The Alpha 
of Proverbs has become the Omega of Ecclesiastes ” in Derek Kidner, Wisdom to Live By: An 
Introduction to the Old Testament’s Wisdom Books of Proverbs, Job and Ecclesiastes, with Some Notes 
on the Teachings of Israel’s Neighbours and of the Old Testament Apocrypha (Leicester: Inter-Varsity 







ISSUES OF DEATH AND INJUSTICE IN QOHELET’S 
MONOLOGUE 
Qohelet’s monologic discourse, the majority of Ecclesiastes, baffles the reader with 
its enigmatic language and the message, especially in contrast to the book’s 
conclusion. Qohelet sums up his observations on life: הבל הבלים הכל הבל, “Vanity of 
vanities! All is vanity” (a still familiar translation).459 This chapter probes what has 
caused or driven him to draw such a caustic maxim on life.   
Before starting a discussion, one may note, however, Qohelet does not appear 
recklessly stating life’s reality with the drastic ultimatum, saying, “Everything is 
hebel.” His reflection on life reveals his serious attempt to understand and reconcile 
his observations which conflict with traditional Jewish beliefs, while confronting the 
reality of death with its implications. Within the inclusio of 1:2 and 12:8, there seems 
to be two frames of reference which dictate Qohelet’s maxim in his monologic 
discourse: (1) under the sun and (2) the reality of death.   
First of all, everything that Qohelet observes happens “under the sun” (תחת השמש). 
The phrase תחת השמש is unique to Qohelet and occurs twenty-nine times only in 
Ecclesiastes.460 His use of the phrase appears deliberate. A few times Qohelet also 
uses another phrase תחת השמים “under the heavens,”461 which distinguishes between 
                                                 
459 On the issue of this English translation for modern readers and an analysis of the meaning of הבל 
will be discussed in due course. 
460 The phrase “under the sun” also appears in two Phoenician tablets dated early 5th century BCE (KAI 
13:7–8; 14:11–12) and in The Epic of Gilgamesh (Tablet III.iv.6–8, ANET, p. 79). It is, therefore, 
probably not a loan phrase from Greek ὑφ᾽ ἡλίῳ as some suggest. See Ranston, Ecclesiastes, 55; contra 
E. H. Plumptre, Ecclesiastes; or, the Preacher, with Notes  and Introduction (CBSC; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1881), 104.  
461 In 1:13; 2:3; 3:1. Similar expressions 8) מתחת השמים times), 7) תחת כל־השמים times) and Aramaic 
 once in Jer 10:11) appear elsewhere in the OT. Most scholars do not see any difference) תחות שמיא
between “under the sun” and “under heaven” in their meaning, but a few scholars think that there is a 
subtle difference and nuance in each phrase. E.g., Seow notes, relating to the Phoenician tablets 
mentioned above, that “the expression ‘under the sun’ is associated with the realm of the living and 
contrasted with ‘a resting place with the shades.’ . . . Thus, ‘under the sun’ is simply the realm of the 
living—‘this world’ as opposed to the netherworld (which is without the sun). . . . In other words, 
‘under the heavens’ simply means the cosmos (a term of universality), whereas ‘under the sun’ is a 
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divine and human domains in 5:1 [ET 2]: God is in heaven, but humans are on earth, 
namely, under heaven. Qohelet predominantly and emphatically uses his unique 
phrase תחת השמש along with the virtually synonymous ארץעל־ה  “on the earth.”462 It is 
clear that Qohelet’s main concern and focus lie in the sphere of the human domain: 
their existence, activities, and things of this world,463 namely all things sublunary, 
whether he uses תחת השמים ,תחת השמש, or על־הארץ.  
Secondly, Qohelet cannot but help reflecting on one fact of life, “death,” in all his 
activities and observations. No one can escape death, and all die on this planet. What 
people generally prefer to do is avoid the subject of death altogether in thoughts or 
words, if at all possible, and focus on life’s necessities and activities in normal 
circumstances. To Qohelet, however, “death” seems to be not a simple, matter-of-
course, happenstance (464(מקרה that he can easily accept, lightly brush aside, or forget 
about. Qohelet brings this uncomfortable subject to the forefront in his monologic 
discourse as if to impress upon his listener that one must think and face death’s reality 
at all times in everything one does. Qohelet has a lot to say about death, but he does 
not offer any new solution to the problem of death and its unwanted effects on human 
life. After all is said and done, his utterance—“Eat, drink, and enjoy yourself”—is 
almost an absurdly mundane commendation. The subject of death itself or Qohelet’s 
resolution to enjoy life while one can is nothing new. What seems extreme or 
shocking to many people when they read Ecclesiastes is probably not so much to do 
with the content of Qohelet’s monologue but the fact that Qohelet so brazenly and 
squarely faces death and openly expresses his view of it and its consequences. This 
may be one of the reasons scholars tend to focus on probing the enigmatic character 
rather than on investigating the what and why of death in Qohelet’s monologic 
discourse. But a key to understanding Qohelet and therefore Ecclesiastes’ message 
                                                                                                                                            
term for ‘this world’ as opposed to the netherworld (see 9:6).” One should note, however, that Qohelet 
does not make the contrast as Phoenicians do but his contrast is realms of between God (in heaven) and 
humans (on earth), and that the netherworld or Sheol is also under the sun. See Seow, Ecclesiastes, 
105; for a helpful discussion on this subject, see Ingram, Ambiguity, 253 – 57. 
462 Seven times in 5:1 [Et 2]; 8:14, 16: 10:7; 11:2, 3; 12:7. See Qohelet’s use of the phrase  “on the 
earth” in parallel with  “under the sun” in his monologue, e.g., in 8:14 – 17. Ranston, Ecclesiastes, 55; 
Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 156; Eaton, Ecclesiastes, 44; Longman, Ecclesiastes, 220. 
463 Cf. Ps 115:16. Ingram, Ambiguity, 254 – 55; J. Stafford Wright, “The Interpretation of Ecclesiastes,” 
in Reflecting with Solomon. Selected Essays on the Book of Ecclesiastes (ed. Zuck; Grand Rapids: 
Baker Books, 1994 [originally published in Evangelical Quarterly 18 (1946), 18 – 34]), 19; Azize, 
“Considering,” 190 – 92; S. Sims, “Problems with Ecclesiastes . . . ?,” KTR 12 (1989): 50. Sims notes 
that Targum prefixes the phrase  “under the sun” with another phrase  “in this world” to imply the 
existence of another life.  
464 Cf. Ruth 2:3; 1 Sam 6:9; 20:26. On מקרה in Ecclesiastes, vide infra. 
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may lie in closer attention to the content of Qohelet’s utterance of, and his obsession 
with, death. 
3.1 Qohelet’s View of Death       
Qohelet is obsessed with death—the crux and the archenemy of life on earth. The root 
word מות “death/die” appears fifteen times in Ecclesiastes,465 admittedly not as many 
as other favourite terms that Qohelet uses.466 However, Schoors rightly notes: 
“Although in all these instances these lexemes simply refer to the fact of dying or the 
state of death, from the contexts in which they occur, it appears that ‘death’ plays a 
major role in Qoh.”467 This is apparent from references to death in almost every 
chapter in Ecclesiastes, although the term death itself may not appear: for example, 
1:4, 11; 5:15–16; 6:3–6; 9:10, 11:8–12:7,468 besides those direct references to מות 
listed above. No one in the OT so poignantly and acutely feels and expresses the sting 
of death as Qohelet does. Incredibly, death constantly preoccupies Qohelet’s mind 
while he is not even dying as he speaks about it. “Nowhere else is death the 
theological problem that it is for Qoheleth,” notes Burkes.469 What makes Qohelet’s 
view of death unique also has to do with his use of certain terms such as הבל ,מקרה, or  
 in association to express what death is or does, as will soon become apparent in הכל
the following discussion. Context-rich language characterizes Qohelet’s monologue. 
This section analyses why Qohelet is so obsessed with death and how his view of 
death influences and shapes his attitude towards life and his view of divine justice. 
3.1.1 One Fate for All 
Qohelet makes Ecclesiastes unique among all other books in the OT with three 
aspects by: (a) his character; (b) his message; and (c) his language. It is the last of the 
three which makes an accurate interpretation of the book most challenging. Qohelet 
                                                 
465 Nine times as verb: 2:16; 3:2; 4:2 [bis]; 7:17; 9:3, 4, 5 [bis]; and six times as noun: 3:19 [bis]; 7:1, 
26; 8:8; 10:1.  
466 For a simple list of some recurring and important lexemes, see Peter Enns, “Ecclesiastes 1: Book 
Of,” DOTWPW:130–31; for a more comprehensive and thorough treatise, see Antoon Schoors, The 
Preacher Sought to Find Pleasing Words: A Study of the Language of Qoheleth. Part II, Vocabulary 
(OLA 143; Leuven: Peeters, 2004). 
467 Schoors, Preacher II, 205. 
468 Slightly different from the list of Burkes, Death, in n. 100, p. 59. She writes that chapter 10 is 
without even one verse on death. Obviously she does not count זבובי מות in 10:1, referring to death. 
469 Ibid., 74; the most recent treatment of the subject of death in Ecclesiastes, see Christoph Berner, 
“Evil and Death in the Book of Qohelet,” in Evil and Death: Conceptions of the Human in Biblical, 
Early Jewish, Greco-Roman and Egyptian Literature (eds. Ego and Mittmann; DCLS 18; Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 2015), 57-73. 
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uses a number of terms which are peculiar to him in their own right along with known 
words in his own idiosyncratic meaning.470 One of the words which Qohelet 
specifically uses in relation to death is מקרה “accident, chance, happenstance,” 
namely, “what happens” by chance. Qohelet’s use of the term מקרה therefore needs to 
be clearly understood before one can discuss Qohelet’s view of death in his 
monologue.471 
The term מקרה is a known word but rarely occurs in the OT,472 of which seven 
occurrences are in Ecclesiastes (2:14, 15; 3:19 [tris]; 9:2, 3) and the other three in 
Ruth 2:3; 1 Sam 6:9; 20:26. The term מקרה conveys an unexpected occurrence that 
one can neither foresee, nor control, nor frequently understand the reason for it at the 
time of occurrence. It usually happens “by itself w/o any assistance or wish of person 
involved, w/o any known originator”473 to a person. This is how the term is used in 
Ruth and 1 Samuel: that is, by chance Ruth happened (474(ויקר מקרה to come to the 
portion of the field belonging to Boaz (Ruth 2:3b). In 1 Sam 6:9, the Philistine 
diviners tried to determine whether their recent national disasters happened by 
Yahweh’s hand or by chance (מקרה הוא “it is a chance”). Similarly, Saul attributed 
David’s first absence from a cultic meal to an accident (מקרה הוא) in 1 Sam 20:26.   
The term מקרה in Ecclesiastes is often translated as “fate,” rather than a “chance” 
or a simple “happening” in the English Bibles. The precise term “fate,” however, does 
not appear to exist in Hebrew.475 How then does the term carry this connotation in 
Qohelet’s use? When Qohelet uses מקרה specifically related to death, he attaches a 
modifier אחד to mean “same,” the commonality, not the singularity, of event476 that 
                                                 
470 Schoors lists sixty-one words which are idiosyncratic (29) or typical of Qohelet (32) and forty words 
which appear only in Ecclesiastes in Schoors, Preacher II, 3– 196, 197– 260, and 423– 70. 
471 See Peter Machinist, “Fate, miqreh, and Reason: Some Reflections on Qohelet and Biblical 
Thought,” in Solving Riddles and Untying Knots: Biblical, Epigraphic, and Semitic Studies in Honor of 
Jonas C. Greenfield (eds. Zevit, et al.; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1995), 159 – 75 for Qohelet’s 
unique use of the term. 
472 Ten occurrences in total. The verb קרה occurs three times in 2:14, 15, and 9:11 with another word 
 ”.for “chance פגע
473 William L. Holladay, CHALOT:213; see also Machinist, “Fate,” 169. 
 ;literally means “her chance happened”: Robert L. Hubbard, Jr., The Book of Ruth (NICOT ויקר מקרה 474
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 140 – 41, paraphrases it “as luck would have it.” Without Ruth’s 
knowledge she happened to step in to Boaz’s field by lucky chance. In Ecclesiastes figura etymologica 
appears in 2:14 (שמקרה אחד יקרה) and 2:15 (כמקרה הכסיל גם־אני יקרני); cf. 9:11 (ופגע יקרה). Vide infra. 
475 Another Hebrew term פקדה (Num 16:29) which is translated “fate” in ESV/NASB, is derived from 
its meaning “visitation, punishment” (vide infra). 
476 Of 19 occurrences of אחד (including two f. form), 7 relates to death or life breath and means “same”: 
;(3 ,9:2 ;3:19 ;2:14) מקרה אחד מקום אחד   (3:20; 6:6); רוח אחד   (3:19). All other occurrences not relating to 
death has the meaning “one.” 
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happens to all human beings (477.(מקרה אחד לכל Numerous events can happen to 
humankind. Some among them may be the same event that happens to different 
people. The same event, however, may or may not happen to everyone. But one event 
which happens unequivocally without fail to all living beings is none other than death, 
and only death among all events befalls all. It is the “fate” of all the living—humans, 
animals, and plants. Even if Qohelet does not use the term מות itself, he means death 
by מקרה אחד because only death is truly common human experience. Therefore, in 
Ecclesiastes Qohelet apparently uses מקרה, especially מקרה אחד, connoting “death,”478 
while drawing on its semantically traditional meaning. 
Qohelet probably labels death מקרה because it is an occurrence that happens 
beyond human control or understanding; it can occur unexpectedly, and happens “by 
itself without any assistance or wish of person involved,” just as the term מקרה 
normally means. In a strict sense, however, death is not an unexpected occurrence, 
because it befalls all living beings and every person knows that he will die someday. 
Death in Qohelet’s view certainly is not “the example par excellence for everything 
‘contingent’ and ‘not at one’s disposal’ that a person can ‘encounter’ (479”.(קרה 
Qohelet does not say by מקרה that death is simply a chance happening that can occur. 
Instead, he reinforces his view by מקרה אחד, saying that death is the “common event” 
that does happen to all without exception, and thus rightly connotes “fate.” 
Qohelet uses another term פגע “occurrence, chance” when the matter is not related 
to death (9:11), which may or may not happen, clearly making a distinction between 
death by מקרה and other chance happenings by 480:פגע  
א לגבורים המלחמה וגם לא כי לא לקלים המרוץ ול 481שבתי וראה תחת־השמש
  ׃482לחכמים לחם וגם לא לנבנים עשר וגם לא לידעים חן כי־עת ופגע יקרה את־כלם
 
                                                 
477 Vide infra specifically in 9:2–3; also see 2:14 (שמקרה אחד יקרה את־כלם).  
478 Machinist, “Fate,” 170; Hengel, Judentum, 220 [ET 119]. 
479 „Vielmehr ist der Tod das Beispiel par excellence für alles ››Kontingente‹‹ und ››Unverfügbare‹‹, 
das den Menshcen ››treffen‹‹ kann“. Krüger, Kohelet, 144 [ET 69]. Emphasis in English translation 
added. 
480 LXX translates פגע: ἀπάντηµα; מקרה: συνάντηµα (all in Eccl), περίπτωµα (Ruth 2:3), σύµπτωµα 
(1Sa 6:9; 20:26); קרה: περιπίπτω (Ruth), συναντάω (Eccl). It is extraordinary both מקרה and קרה are 
translated differently in the three books where they occur. 
481 Literally, “I turned so to see under the sun that.” The translation shown in the text is preferable. 
Gordis, Man, 308, notes that “  השמשתחת  is an instance of ‘anticipation, ’ the phrase being   drawn from 
the subordinate to the main clause, שבתי וראה תחת השמש כי לא לקלים המרוץ .”  
 ,here probably points to every category of people, but could also be every event/thing את־כלם 482
mentioned in the verse. Cf. Schoors, Preacher II, 7. 
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Again I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, and the battle is not to the 
mighty, and neither is bread to the wise, nor wealth to the discerning, nor favour to 
the knowledgeable; for time and chance befall them all. (9:11)  
He makes a point that the swift, the strong, the wise, the intelligent or the 
knowledgeable do not always win the race, battle, bread, wealth, or favour as 
expected, but rather their success or failure depends on chance and time.483 He seems 
to say that (mis)fortunes484 in human life are governed by time and sheer chance, but 
humans do not know when they happen: 
וכצפרים האחזות  487נאחזים במצודה רעהשכדגים  486לא־ידע האדם את־עתו 485כי גם
  תפול עליהם פתאם׃ רעה כש לעת 488בפח כהם יוקשים בני האדם
 
For humans do not even know their time: like fish which are caught in a bad net, and 
like birds trapped in a bird trap, so489 humans are ensnared at a bad time when it 
suddenly falls on them. (9:12) 
Those (mis)fortunes may or may not occur to everyone. In contrast, Qohelet uses מקרה 
as saying it happens to all and emphasizes it with אחד, the “same, common” event 
                                                 
483 Cf. Prov 13:15a; 14:24; 21:20. Interesting to note here is that participants in each activity is in plural 
but the desired result is in a single form. It seems to imply that many can strive for a reward, but it is 
available only to one winner, and Qohelet here alludes the winning is up to time and chance, not to 
their ability or merit. 
484 One other occurrence of the noun פגע (with רע) in 1 Kgs 5:18 denotes misfortune. Schoors, Preacher 
II, 410, notes “the root פגע, ‘meet, encounter, reach’, is neutral, and that is the case for ֶפגַע, as well as 
for its Greek equivalent in the LXX, ἀπάντηµα.” However, it tends to carry negative connotations in 
Postbiblical Hebrew, see Marcus Jastrow, DTTBYML:1135. 
485 For emphatic גם with כי here, see Antoon Schoors, The Preacher Sought to Find Pleasing Words: A 
Study of the Language of Qoheleth. Part I, Grammar (OLA 41; Leuven: Peeters, 1992), 133 – 34. 
486 Kamano, Cosmology, 207, notes: If 9:12 is explaining the preceding verse, the suffix of עתו may 
refer to עת רעה .פגע “evil time,” or more likely “the time of misfortune,” which does not necessarily 
signify death as v. 11 indicates, and 9:12b gives further examples of fish and birds caught by a 
net/snare.  However פגע in v. 11 points back to every event described in the verse (כלם) which is a 
much closer antecedent of  עתו than פגע and makes sense: “its/their time.” 
 here does not have an ethical connotation of “evil”: i.e., “grievous” or “bad, unpleasant, giving רע 487
pain, unhappiness, misery,” BDB:948. The term רע/ה appears 32 times in both masculine 15) רע) and 
feminine 3) רעה) adjective forms as well as feminine (13) and masculine (1) nouns in the book. Qohelet 
utters all but one (12:14) of their occurrences with both ethical and non-ethical meanings. Ten of them 
have a clear ethical/moral meaning (7:15; 8:6, 8:11 with רעה [n. f.]; 4:3, 17; 8:3, 11, 12; 9:3; 12:14 with 
 appears in רע and רעה m. adj.], and the context of 8:5, 9 connotes an ethical/moral meaning. Both] רע
8:11 with an ethical/moral meaning. Reason for using both forms in the same sentence without any 
difference in meaning or function is not clear. Timothy K. Beal, “C(ha)osmopolis: Qohelet’s Last 
Words,” in God in the Fray: A Tribute to Walter Brueggemann (eds. Linafelt and Beal; Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1998), 295;  Schoors, Preacher II, 77, 145 – 52 ( 1.15  ָרָעה   , ַרע), notes that  “עשה רע always has an 
ethical connotation.” In contrast, the term טוב/ה appears 45 times in both masculine  29) טוב) and 
feminine  3) טובה)  adjective forms and masculine noun (13);   טוב and  רע appear in the same  sentence for 
only two times (8:12; 12:14) in Ecclesiastes.  
488 Literally, “the sons of man.” Interestingly, in Ecclesiastes ה)אדם) appears 49 times, of which 10 
times are without an article, and occurs predominantly with a general sense of “human being, man.” 
For those cases, both ה)אדם) and בני האדם will be translated as “human(s), human being(s)” or 
collectively “humankind” in this thesis. 
489 Literally, כהם “like them.” Some emend כהם יוקשים as כה מיוקשים (Podechard, Hertzberg, Gordis), see 
Seow, Ecclesiastes, 308. 
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connoting death, which is not a sheer “chance happening.”490 Rudman describes the 
difference as: “If such events which determine the outcome of one's efforts are not 
coordinated, then they may be denoted by the term ‘chance’. If they are coordinated in 
some way, then the outcome of one’s actions are [sic] subject to Fate.”491 Rudman 
maintains that פגע is still divinely predetermined because he presupposes Qohelet’s 
determinism. Rather, the difference seems that death is a sure thing, but a misfortune 
does not always happen. Death is fate because it does occur to everyone regardless. 
Qohelet, for example, pronounces that the same event befalls all humans, be they 
wise or foolish, righteous or wicked, pious or impious (2:14; 9:2, 3); and humans 
share the same fate even with animals (3:19).492 An unmistakable reference to death 
as the common event מקרה which happens to both the wise and the fool in 2:14 is 
explained by the following vv. 16–17; both alike die and are forgotten: 
 שמקרה אחד יקרה את־כלם׃ 493החכם עיניו בראשו והכסיל בחשך הולך וידעתי גם־אני
יותר ודברתי  494ואמרתי אני בלבי כמקרה הכסיל גם־אני יקרני ולמה חכמתי אני אז
הימים  497בשכבר 496לעולם 495כי אין זכרון לחכם עם־הכסיל בלבי שגם־זה הבל׃
ושנאתי את־החיים כי רע עלי  נשכח ואיך ימות החכם עם־הכסיל׃ 499הכל 498הבאים
  500המעשה שנעשה תחת השמש כי־הכל הבל ורעות רוח׃
                                                 
490 Schoors, Preacher II, 204, although some biblical texts seem to describe exceptions, as already 
noted. 
491 See Dominic Rudman, Determinism in the Book of Ecclesiastes (JSOTSup 316; Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic, 2001), 34–40, for his analysis of מקרה and  פגע . 
492 Schoors, Preacher II, 276. 
 here is often translated in an adversative sense as “yet.” Barton, Ecclesiastes, 93, notes that it גם 493
should come at the beginning of the sentence, if it were adversative, but not always, see 4:8. Of 28 
occurrences of the phrase גם־אני in the OT, in almost all instances גם modifies אני and is translated “I 
also,” “even I,” or “I myself,” with a possible exception of Job 7:11. In the verse here ו of וידעתי 
logically serves as adversative and the phrase may be translated as “I also” or “I myself.” Seow, 
Ecclesiastes, 134–35, unnecessarily interprets both ו and גם as adversative. 
494 Logical “then” with a conclusive force. See Barton, Ecclesiastes, 93–94; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 185. 
Some MSS of LXX omit the word according to different division of the passage, but it is confirmed by 
Jerome in his commentary (tunc). Historically scholars found difficulty with it but it seems 
straightforward for interpretation if אז and יותר   are treated separately rather than as connected to each 
other. יותר: adv. “exceedingly, extremely,” modifying חכמתי. Cf. 7:16. For other use of יותר (noun) in 
Ecclesiastes vide infra. 
 ”(compared) with = as well as, just as much as (Gen 18:23) = like (Ps 73:5 Job 9:26)“ :עם 495
CHALOT:275. 
496 The term עולם occurs seven times in Qohelet’s monologue (1:4, 10; 2:16; 3:11, 14; 9:6; 12:5). 
Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 61, notes: “It does never mean ‘eternity’ in the traditional philosophical sense, 
but it rather refers to the remote ages in the past as well as in the future, a connotation that may include 
the sense of an unlimited duration and of invariabilty [sic].” Qohelet’s use of עולם is always temporal in 
meaning and is suggestive of the time span of “existence” (or non-existence if in a negative statement). 
Antoon Schoors, “Theodicy in Qohelet,” in Theodicy in the World of the Bible (eds. Moor and Laato; 
Leiden: Brill, 2003), 382. 
= בש .ב + ש + כבר 497 באשר   (7:2; 8:4) “inasmuch . . . already” or “because . . . already.” 
498 Many interpret הימים הבאים “the coming days” or “the days to come,” pointing to the future. Qohelet 
puts himself at a point in the future and looks back (McNeile, Ecclesiastes, 60); thus the pf. verb may 
be used as future perfect: “will have been forgotten” (Barton, Ecclesiastes, 94). If the tense of הבאים is 
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The eyes of the wise are in his head, but the fool walks in darkness; and yet I know 
that one fate befalls both of them. Then I said in my heart, “As (is) the fate of the 
fool, it will also befall me. Why then have I been extremely wise?” So I said in my 
heart that this too is futility. For there is no lasting remembrance of the wise as well 
as the fool, because already the days have come when all have been forgotten; and 
how the wise dies just like the fool! So I hated life, because the work which has been 
done under the sun is grievous to me, for everything is futility and chasing after 
wind. (2:14–17) 
Death as the same fate of all human beings regardless of their moral/ethical or 
religious conducts is inferred in 9:2–3 “for all have the same fate . . . and after that 
(after their life) they go to the dead”:  
מקרה אחד לצדיק ולרשע לטוב ולטהור ולטמא ולזבח ולאשר איננו  501להכל כאשר לכ
זה רע בכל אשר־נעשה תחת השמש כי־ זבח כטוב כחטא הנשבע כאשר שבועה ירא׃
מקרה אחד לכל וגם לב בני־האדם מלא־רע והוללות בלבבם בחייהם ואחריו אל־
  ׃502המתים
 
It is the same for all. There is one fate for the righteous and for the wicked, for the 
good, and for the clean and for the unclean, for him who sacrifices and for him who 
does not sacrifice. As is the good, so is the sinner; one who swears is as one who is 
afraid of an oath. This is an evil in all that is done under the sun that there is one fate 
for all. Moreover, the heart of humans is full of evil and madness is in their hearts 
during their lives; and after that—they go to the dead! (9:2–3)  
Death as the common fate between humans and animals is defined by the clause כמות  
 as one dies so dies the other” in 3:19b and by 3:20 “All go to the same“ זה כן מות זה 
place. All are from the dust and all return to the dust,” meaning they all alike die:  
                                                                                                                                            
dictated by נשכח, it translates to “because already the days have come when all (or both: the wise and 
the fool) have been forgotten,” which may be more straightforward. 
499 A small word כל “all, every, each, the whole” is Qohelet’s favourite word, by far the most frequently 
used among all other terms. Total occurrences of  כל in Ecclesiastes are ninety-one, and appear in three 
forms: כלם ,הכל, and כל. Qohelet often uses הכל to mean “both” after he compares or contrasts two 
distinct, often antithetical, entities, which come to naught by the same מקרה, i.e., death. Cf. Schoors, 
Preacher II, 3 – 10. 
500 The term רוח appears 24 times in Ecclesiastes, of which 13 times Qohelet apparently utters רוח to 
mean “wind” and 11 times as “breath” or “spirit” (3:19, 21 [bis]; 7:8 [bis], 9; 8:8 [bis]; 10:4; 11:5; 
12:7), although meanings may be interchangeable according to how one interprets each text. Cf. 
Schoors, ibid., 161, counts 16 occurrences as  “wind ” and 8 instances as  “breath/spirit.” Twenty-one 
occurrences of רוח in Ecclesiastes are f. noun, but in 1:6 [bis] and 3:19, m. noun; the usage seems to be 
arbitrary. The meaning of רוח “wind, breath, spirit, or life” comes from its primary meaning “air” and 
secondarily derived from “air in motion.” S. Tengström and H.-J. Fabry, “ ּוחַ ר ,” TDOT 13:365 – 402 
[esp. 368]. On רעות רוח, vide infra. 
501 Literally, “everything is as that is to everyone.” 
 literally ,אחריו ”.Literally, “and after that to the dead” or “and to the dead after that :ואחריו אל־המתים 502
“after him” or “after that.” The 3m./sg. suffix does not agree with בחייהם, is thus considered a fossilized 
suffix like יחדיו and interpreted as “afterwards” (Ehrlich, Levy, Gordis, Schoors), but this is not 
convincing because “afterward(s)” is usually expressed by אחר or אחרי־כן in the OT. Krüger, Kohelet, 
299 [ET 166–67], interprets “each one of the previously named ‘human beings’.” Rather it may be each 
one of their lives (בחייהם). 
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 503ח אחדכי מקרה בני־האדם ומקרה הבהמה ומקרה אחד להם כמות זה כן מות זה ורו
 507הכל הולך אל־מקום אחד ׃506האדם מן־הבהמה אין כי הכל הבל 505ומותר 504לכל
  ׃508הכל היה מן־העפר והכל שב אל־העפר
For the fate of humans and the fate of the animal—they have the same (one) fate. As 
one dies so dies the other, for all have the same breath, and there is no advantage for 
humankind over the animal; indeed, all are fleeting. All go to the same place: all are 
from the dust and all return to the dust. (3:19–20)509 
Qohelet says that there is an appropriate or appointed time to die: עת ללדת ועת למות 
“A time to give birth and a time to die” (3:2) but it is not clear whether or not he 
means it to be “predetermined,” as many scholars presume. Qohelet never says that 
death is a 510,מתת אלהים something that God has ordained or allotted to humans as he 
indicates that life and לקח  “portion” is a gift of God. He does not call death לקח  or מתת 
from God. An implication that human wickedness brings death to humans can be 
traced in his utterances (7:16–17, 20, 29), the last of which may be an allusion to 
Genesis 3 (vide infra). Moreover, he seems to mean in 7:17 that human behaviours 
affect or change the actual timing of one’s death:  
 ואל־תהי סכל למה תמות בלא עתך׃ 511ע הרבהאל־תרש
Do not be too wicked, and do not be a fool. Why die before your time?512 
Qohelet believes that God sets an appointed time for every event (3:1–8, 11, 17; 8:6). 
The question: “Why die before your time?” (17c) presupposes that time of one’s death 
                                                 
 Literally, “one spirit” or “one breath.” It is the life-giving breath that God breathes or :ורוח אחד 503
places into His creatures so that they become living beings. It is the same רוח in 12:7b. 
 .in this verse probably means “both” human and animal כל 504
505 Noun from יתר “remain over”, thus related to יותר and יתרון. LXX read מותר as מה יתר, a question to 
which the answer is אין “nothing, nought” and very frequently as particle of negation “not.” אין appears 
44 times in Eccl, a sign of Qohelet’s negativism. Here at the final position of the clause is for emphasis: 
“The advantage of human over the animal there is not” (Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 305). 
506 Graham S. Ogden, Qoheleth (2nd ed.; RNBC; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2007), 61–62. כי הכל הבל 
here is most likely indicating brevity of life, both human and animal. Qohelet’s acute sense for the 
brevity of life is expressed in 2:3; 5:17 [ET 18]; 6:12; 9:9. Qohelet most likely does not mean that life 
itself is הבל. More on הבל, vide infra. כי is asseverative here, rather than causal, a concluding statement.  
 here denotes the earth, “which, as in ch. 66, is conceived as the great cemetery” says מקום אחד 507
Barton, Ecclesiastes, 109. Clearly it is not Sheol from the immediate explanation followed, thus 
Podechard, L’Ecclésiaste, 311, is correct; contra Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 306. Qohelet here seems 
speaking about the destination of both human and animal corpses: the earth, because both are made 
from the dust of the earth. 
508 Cf. Gen 3:19: ובעפר אתה ואל־עפר תש . 
509 Cf. Ps 49:11 – 13, 21 [ET 10 – 12, 20]: “Man cannot abide in his pomp, he is like the beasts that 
perish” (RSV). 
510 See 3:13; 5:18 [ET 19]. מתת: a noun form of נתן. The term מתת means  “gift” or  “reward” of God 
(BDB:682), but Qohelet may mean  “allotment” or "appropriation" by this rare noun; cf. Schoors, 
Ecclesiastes, 21; Schoors, Preacher II,  93– 98. Qohelet almost equates מתת with חלק . More on מתת and 
 .vide infra נתן
511 An adverb: “much, too much, excessively.” 
 ”.literally, “when not your time :בלא עתך 512
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may already be prescribed but can be altered. The warning not to be too wicked in v. 
17 implies excessive wickedness can hasten one’s death—to premature or untimely 
death. It is then a kind of death that one can avoid (by will/choice). There is a time to 
die, but Qohelet apparently supposes that God can change it according to how humans 
behave.513 These verses indicate that Qohelet does not deny freedom of human will or 
choice to be too righteous or too wicked, which is contrary to determinism. He 
apparently recognizes God’s sovereign power over His creation and an appropriate 
time for every event, but he does not say whether or not the appropriate time is 
predetermined. What is clear is that humans do not know their time. Qohelet probably 
calls death מקרה “what happens” to all the living under the sun, also because its timing 
is unpredictable and may be changeable. He is certain that death is a human “fate” but 
seems not sure if its actual timing is predetermined. Qohelet’s מקרה has deterministic 
undertones but his view of death (and God’s sovereignty) is probably more of 
“absolutism” rather than “determinism”—in the sense of “certainty,” but not 
necessarily “predetermined” especially with regard to time. 
Qohelet’s label of מקרה on death, however, does not appear to be a resignation but 
more a frustration, or perhaps a protestation, because Qohelet apparently values life 
but loathes death: In his comment on 11:7, “The light is sweet, and it is good for the 
eyes to see the sun” ( 514ות את־השמשומתוק האור וטוב לעינים לרא ), Barton notes:  
The pessimistic mood of ch. 43, which had passed away from Qoheleth when he 
wrote 94 has not returned. He recognizes in this verse the primal delight of mere 
living.515  
Gordis describes Qohelet as a man with  “a passionate love of life.”516 In fact, the term 
 death/die” in Qohelet’s monologic“ מות alive, living” (21 times) appears more than“ חי
discourse, even if the ever-present threat of death overshadows his view of everything 
in life. Qohelet does not seem to do anything halfway or half-heartedly but with zest 
for life. He is not a reclusive philosopher or merely a wise man who did not engage in 
active affairs, but simply observed the world around him, before he reached his view 
of life and death. Qohelet claims to have engaged in many activities and excelled in 
                                                 
513 See, e.g., Exod 32:14; Amos 7:3; Jon 3:9–10; cf. Isa 37: 1-5; however, Num 23:19; 1 Sam 15:29. 
See also R. W. L. Moberly, Old Testament Theology: Reading the Hebrew Bible as Christian Scripture 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 107–43 , for a thoughtful treatment on נחם in chapter 4: “Does 
God Change?”  
 ,Schoors .(חזו שמש ,[to see the sun” means “to live” (also cf. 6:5; 7:11; Ps 58:9 [ET 8“ ראה השמש 514
Preacher II, 59–60. 
515 Barton, Ecclesiastes, 184. Emphasis added. On 4:3 and 9:4 vide infra. 
516 Gordis, Man, 78. 
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whatever he did (2:3–10). He has set out to gain far more surplus than required for his 
present necessity so that he may have no want in any area of his life and perpetually 
enjoy all the good that life offers materially or otherwise. His well-versed familiarity 
with economic terms betrays his motivation and pursuit, as if being an astute 
“entrepreneur.”517 Energy and vigour in his activities manifest his love of life and 
seem unrivalled by his contemporaries.518 Qohelet has succeeded in all kinds of 
enterprises that he undertook, most astonishingly for a king, with his own hands and 
for his own benefits.519 He has sought pleasures that his heart and eyes desired and did 
not deny himself anything as a reward for all his labour (2:1, 10). Qohelet was driven 
to work and did not seem to know any other way to achieve life’s satisfaction than to 
accumulate surpluses from his toil.  
After all his toil and endeavours, however, it dawns on this high achiever that 
there is one formidable obstacle in the way of all his accomplishment: death (2:18–
20). No matter what things, wisdom, or knowledge Qohelet acquires, his destiny is no 
different from any other, having no more advantage than anyone else against death. 
Death waits for him just as it does for everyone else in its own time, and Qohelet has 
no power or means to circumvent or swerve from it. His wealth, power, or wisdom 
guarantees nothing and comes to naught when death knocks at his door. He has no 
control over his destiny because there is no exception to death’s rule. In desperation 
Qohelet cries out, “I hated life” (2:17), not because he does not wish to live, but 
because he will die sooner or later and be forgotten just like the fool. He realizes that 
there is no reason to work harder or be wiser than anybody else for that matter. There 
is no difference between the wise like himself and the fool he despises, since death 
catches up with both of them (2:14–16). Wright is surely correct when he says: 
“Death can make a man hate life not because he wants to die, but because it renders 
life so futile.”520 Neither life nor death is under one’s own jurisdiction. 
In another instance Qohelet utters, “I hated all my toil” (2:18), but Qohelet also 
exhorts his audience to enjoy their toil, the simple act of eating or drinking, and life 
with their spouses (5:17 [ET 18]; 9:9). He even urges: “Everything that your hand 
finds to do, do it with all your might (9:10) ”(בכחךa). Qohelet never discounts the 
                                                 
517 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 22. 
518 1:16; 2:9; cf. 1 Kgs 10:7. 
519 In 2:4–9 Qohelet uses the phrase לי “for myself” nine times: 2:4 [bis], 5, 6, 7 [bis], 8 [bis], 9. 
520 Wright, “Ecclesiastes,” 25; Jastrow, Cynic, 137, notes:  “Koheleth may talk about hating life . . . but 
he does not really think this.” 
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value of labour; neither does he deny the wealth of all that he has acquired. In fact, he 
very much wishes to keep what he has acquired with his toil. What Qohelet hates is 
not his toil or its fruit, but the cruel reality of death which terminates his control and 
ownership of all that he has gained, while passing his possessions to whoever comes 
after him. His expressions of “hate” are likely his exasperation over the futility that 
death brings into his life and toil. 
However short or fleeting life may be, Qohelet affirms that life is better than 
death. Even the lowest of the low, a live dog is better than a dead lion, he declares: 
  כי־לכלב חי הוא טוב מן־האריה המת׃  522אל כל־החיים יש בטחון 521כי־מי אשר יבחר
For whoever is joined with all the living, there is hope; surely a live dog is better than 
a dead lion. (9:4)523  
The living still has hope, even if one may hate his toil because what he gets is more 
often pain, grief, and restless night than the reward that he should enjoy (2:22–23), 
and even wisdom does not bring the desired result, because the more wisdom, the 
more aggravation it brings, and the more knowledge, the more pain (1:17–18). After 
all, life is where the action is, whereas there is no activity in death (cf. 9:10); 
therefore, he never says, “I want to die” or “I would rather be dead.” In Qohelet’s 
mind suicide never seems an option for anyone even in despair or in a horrific life 
situation. Qohelet congratulates the one who is already dead or a miscarried infant 
only under a specific circumstance such as severely undue oppression (4:2 – 3),524 but 
never hints at suicide.525 On the contrary, Qohelet exhorts his audience to enjoy what 
                                                 
521 Qere יחבר has many versions support: Heb. MSS, LXX, and Syr. 
522 Only two other occurrences in OT: 2 Kgs 18:19; Isa 36:4 “trust, confidence”; here most translate 
“hope.” 
523 In spite of the textual difficulty (K/Q: יחבר/יבחר; and a question of לכלב as subject, although ל of לכלב 
is most likely emphatic as “even a dog”), the gist of the message is clear: what is alive is better than 
what is dead—a contrast between life and death. The dog was always despised in the OT (Deut 23:19 
[ET 18]; 1 Sam 17:43; 24:14; 2 Sam 3:8; 9:8; 16:9; Job 30:1; Prov 26:11), whereas the lion was 
considered kingly and was feared (Gen 49:9; 2 Sam 17:10; Job 4:10 – 11; Amos 3:8; Mic 5:7). Cf. 
Gordis, Man, 305; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 662– 64; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 300. See E. Kautzsch ed, 
Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar (2nd ed., GKC; Oxford: Clarendon, 1910. Repr., Mineola, NY: Dover, 
2006), §143e for emphatic ל . 
524 However, not in 6:3–4. 
525 Charles Colson, The Faith (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2008),  193, notes:  “The philosopher Albert 
Camus faced life’s possible absurdity without God and determined  that the first philosophical question 
anyone should ask is whether to commit suicide,” but certainly not Qohelet. Cf. Joseph Blenkinsopp, 
“Ecclesiastes 3:1 – 15: Another Interpretation,” JSOT 20 (1995): 55 – 64, in which Blenkinsopp interprets 
 in 3:2a as “a time to give birth and a time to put an end to one’s life,” thus hinting a עת ללדת ועת למות
suicide by a Stoic influence (B. thinks 3:2–8 is not authored by Qohelet but a quotation from a 
stoicizing Jewish sage). If the writer meant as ‘to put to death” or “kill,” he should have used the verb 
 ,as in 3:3. Many scholars, therefore להרוג in Hiphil or Hophal rather than Qal form, or another verb מות
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God has allotted to humankind: toil during fleeting life.526 He even declares it good 
and fitting in 5:17 [ET 18], as if finding enjoyment in toil should be the purpose of 
living, for what else is there for people to do (cf. Gen 3:17b)? What one can enjoy 
now has become far more important to Qohelet than what one wishes to continue after 
death with no guarantee, because life now is all that one has in Qohelet’s view.  
Qohelet’s concern over death seems to have foreshadowed his dismal view of the 
traditional Israelite belief for what “good life” constitutes, such as death in ripe old 
age with a proper burial, continuance of one’s life through descendants, or 
remembrance by later generations.527 Israelites regarded being able to keep their 
family name and property through descendants as a sign of God’s blessing and a 
reward for the righteous. Having riches and wealth but not having an heir is basically 
a curse and a disgrace in ancient Israelite society.528 Qohelet argues, however, saying: 
שיהיו ימי־שניו ונפשו לא־תשבע מן־ 529אם־יוליד איש מאה ושנים רבות יחיה ורב
בא ובחשך  533כי־בהבל ׃532אמרתי טוב ממנו הנפל 531לא־היתה לו 530הטובה וגם־קבורה
                                                                                                                                            
take ללדת as intransitive and passive in meaning (“to be born”). It is not necessary, however: The 
phrase 2a may mean “a time to give birth (give a [new] life) and a time to die (give up life)”; and 
giving up life can involuntarily occur through sickness, old age, accident, war, or God’s punishment; it 
does not have to be voluntary such as through suicide. It is a God-ordained appropriate time for one to 
die. Humans do not have control over time of birth or death: they may approximate, set, or guess such a 
time but can never control the exact timing and make such event happen at one’s disposal including 
suicide. James L. Crenshaw, “The Shadow of Death in Qoheleth,” in Israelite Wisdom: Theological 
and Literary Essays in Honor of Samuel Terrien (ed. Gammie; Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), 
216 (n. 36), notes that, outside Israel, suicide was endorsed by pessimists in the ancient Near East; see, 
e.g., “The Dispute Between a Man and His Ba” in Lichtheim, AEL1, 163 – 69. See also Seow, 
Ecclesiastes, 160; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 236–37. 
526 Possible allusion to Gen 3:17: The human will toil in all his life which God has allotted. 
527 Qohelet thinks there is no longevity in human remembrance. See 1:11; 2:16; 9:5; 9:15.  
528 See Gen 30:1, 23; 1 Sam 1:1–20; 2 Sam 6:13 – 23; 2 Kgs 4:8 – 17; Isa 47:8 – 9; Hos 9:11 – 16. Krüger, 
Kohelet, 236 [ET 125]. 
529 Defective concord between ורב (sg.) and שיהיו ימי־שניו (pl.), although not unusual in Qohelet’s 
monologue. 
 ,grave” (Gordis, Man, 258); but Seow“ קבר means “proper, dignified burial” rather than קבורה 530
Ecclesiastes, 211, objects the connotation for the burial rite and interprets it as the place of burial, 
“burial site.” However, the importance of proper burial has been well attested in the OT. 
 It can ?הנפל or איש ,refers here לו a difficult clause. The question is to whom :וגם־קבורה לא־היתה לו 531
refer to הנפל (n.m.) “miscarriage, stillborn” as well as to איש. Most scholars interpret the clause in the 
difficult v. 3 as referring to a man (איש), thus translate it “and also he has no burial.” The commentators 
have been perplexed with it because they think Qohelet seemingly puts an unusual emphasis on the 
proper burial. But Qohelet is taking burial seriously also in 8:10. He does not undermine the 
significance of proper burial in Israelite society as prescribed in the OT. More perplexing is why the 
man has no burial if he had הטובה   “good things” which should have afforded him to have his burial. 
Schoors, Preacher I, 173, notes that “the perfect היתה follows after a series of imperfect forms in a 
conditional clause. It seems to express a definitive and lasting fact, after a series of facts that are 
transitory.” Actually, the verb היתה (pf.) should be תהיה (impf.) if לו refers to the man because his burial 
is still a future event, not past; but it makes perfect sense if לו refers to הנפל, for which there was most 
likely no proper burial in ancient Israel. וגם may be taken as a concessive clause (e.g., Jer 36:25; Ps 
95:9; Neh 6:1), and v. 3c can be translated as shown (cf. NAB, 2nd rev). This makes the contrast 
between a man and a stillborn much more striking: A stillborn with no length of life without burial is 
115 
  
ואלו חיה אלף  לא־ראה ולא ידע נחת לזה מזה׃ 534גם־שמש ילך ובחשך שמו יכסה׃
  ׃שנים פעמים וטובה לא ראה הלא אל־מקום אחד הכל הולך
If a man begets a hundred children and lives many years however many the days of 
his years may be, but his soul is not satisfied from the good things, then, even if it 
had no burial, I say the stillborn is better [off] than he, though it comes in hebel and 
goes in darkness; and its name is covered in darkness. Although it has neither seen 
the sun nor known anything, this one has more rest than the other. Even if he535 lives 
a thousand years twice but has not enjoyed good things536–do not all537 go to one 
place? (6:3–6) 
Thus he disputes traditional values of a long life and many children. Moreover, 
Qohelet considers human memory fleeting and short-lived even with a proper burial 
(cf. 8:10).538 All that humans can hope for is enjoyment of good things while they are 
alive. So Qohelet declares that the stillborn even without burial is better off than a 
man who enjoys none of the good things of life, because the former may have a better 
rest without knowing or seeing any evil in life than the latter who sees and 
experiences evil without enjoying life’s good things. The ultimate question that 
matters to Qohelet is, though, “Do not both (or all) go to the same place?” To 
Qohelet, living two thousand years or zero makes no difference when both come to an 
end (6:4). 
What counts to Qohelet, therefore, is a life that he lives now, because he can keep 
working and enjoy the fruit of all his toil under the sun. Qohelet says that he hates 
life, probably because what is so precious does not last and is taken away from him. 
That is what is at stake, and he knows that he will lose it, because he believes that all 
die and go to the same place, which he will say more about later in 9:10. Qohelet 
finds his total inability to change his מקרה, “what happens” to his life or to his 
possessions, because neither his wealth nor his wisdom can ransom or redeem his 
                                                                                                                                            
better off than a man who lives many years with many children but with no enjoyment in life. 
Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 120, 126– 27; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 467; cf. Walther Zimmerli, “Das Buch des 
Predigers Salomo,” in Sprüche/Prediger/Das Hohe Lied/Klagelieder/Das Buch Esther (eds. Ringgren, 
et al.; ATD 16; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 196; and Whitley, Koheleth, 57 – 58, who 
places the וגם clause after ולא ידע in v. 5; for a concessive clause with  גם , see  Kautzsch ed, GKC, §160b.  
532 Cf. Ps 58:9 [ET 8]; Job 3:16. 
533 Concessive כי, rather than causal which does not make sense of v. 3c–4: “I say the stillborn is better 
[off] than he, because it comes in vain and goes in darkness; and its name is covered in darkness” 
(causal). H. L. Ginsberg, “Supplementary Studies in Koheleth,” PAAJR 21 (1952): 44; Gordis, Man, 
259, says “ִּכי is adversative = ‘though’,” but  probably meant concessive. 
534 Concessive גם as in 6:3c. Cf. 2:23.   
535 Contextually, a man with a long life and a stillborn is compared through 6:3–6, and therefore a man 
in v. 3 and here may be the same person. 
536 Literally, “has not seen good” (וטובה לא ראה). LXX rendering: ἀγαθωσύνην οὐκ εἶδεν, or do not 
enjoy good things in 6:6b.  
537 Or “both” a man and the stillborn here, although it may also mean inclusive of “all” humans. 
538 See also 1:11; 2:16; 9:5; 9:15. 
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life.539 What he has gained or accumulated is totally worthless and useless when faced 
with death.540 Exactly as he is born, so will he die without being able to take anything 
with him (5:14 [ET 15]).541 One fate to all without exception: Everyone is destined to 
die. 
3.1.2 Death, a Leveller      
Not only does Qohelet underscore that death is the inescapable fate of humankind, but 
he also characterizes death as a leveller. In the midst of all the inequities and iniquities 
due to a huge divide between the oppressors and the oppressed (4:1–3; 8:9) and a 
disintegration of social order (3:16; 5:7 [ET 8]; 8:10–11),542 Qohelet ironically finds 
equality for all the living under the sun in an uncanny twist: death levels and nullifies 
all distinctions. Not only is death the fate of all on the earth, but it is also non-
discriminatory, disregarding every moral, ethical, educational, or material distinction 
that one may achieve (9:2). All such advantages make no difference: everyone faces 
death and none is exempted from this equal fate. According to Qohelet, death 
predicates equality for all to be indistinguishable even between humans and animals 
(3:18): 
האלהים ולראות שהם־בהמה המה  543אמרתי אני בלבי על־דברת בני האדם לברם
 ׃ 544להם
 
I said in my heart concerning humans, “God has surely made clear that they see for 
themselves that they are animal(s).”545                                     
                                                 
539 Cf. Ps 49:8 – 11 [ET 7 – 10]; Mitchell, “God,” 374 – 75. 
540 Edward Noort, “Death and Justice: Shifting Paradigms in the Hebrew Bible and Early Judaism,” in 
Ethical and Unethical in the Old Testament (ed. Dell; New York: T&T Clark, 2010), 267. 
541 Echo of Job 1:21. 
542 For more on this issue, vide infra. 
543 The verb is Qal inf. const. with 3m./pl. suffix of √ברר, “purify, select.” In the difficult text,  לברם is 
translated “to test” specifically for this verse, which is neither attested anywhere else in BH, nor 
makes  good sense in the context. Some scholars emend it to לבראם. In DTTBYML:197, one finds ברר 
meaning “to make clear, prove, ascertain”;  Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 297– 99, suggests the MH meaning 
of  “make clear, bring to light” (e.g., Sabb, 74a; Keth. 46a) for interpreting it here, which perfectly fits 
the context and makes sense. This thesis concurs, and follows his suggestion, while preserving the MT, 
interpreting it as Qal pf. with an emphatic ל and God as subject. 
 Qal inf. const., used as a finite verb ולראות .([cf. Ps 49:13, 21 [ET 12, 20) ולראות שהם־בהמה המה להם 544
with בני האדם) המה) as subject; ש-clause is probably moved to front for emphasis. By changing its 
vocalization, Hiphil inf. (ולהראות) “to show” with God as subject is also possible, so interprets LXX. 
Others interpret ולראות as a consec. inf. used for a finite verb in continuation with אמרתי: “and I saw” 
(Whitley, Koheleth, 37; Y. A. P. Goldman, “Qoheleth,” in General Introduction and Megilloth (eds. 
Waard, et al.; BHQ 18; Stüttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2004), 77*; F. J. Backhaus, “Den Zeit 
und Zufall trifft sie alle”: Studien zur Komposition und zum Gottesbild im Buch Qohelet (BBB 83; 
Frankfurt am Main: Anton Hain, 1993), 137–38), but it is unlikely due to the distance between the two 
verbs; cf. Gordis, Man, 237. 
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Qohelet observes and realizes first-hand how any distinction comes to naught by 
death which levels and nullifies all differences between right and wrong, between 
good and bad, or between the wise and a fool. Most disturbing to Qohelet is that 
everything for which one has laboured does not stay with him but goes to an 
undeserving other: death unjustly equalizes and razes haves and have-nots.  
Qohelet has also increased wisdom (1:16) and has set his mind to know and 
distinguish wisdom from madness and folly. He has wisely used his mind to seek his 
pleasure (2:3) and endeavoured to build his fortunes by wisdom (2:4–9). He is 
convinced that wisdom excels folly (2:13), yet he cannot help but admit that there is 
one fate that befalls all, regardless of one’s intelligence or wisdom. The wise cannot 
avoid death any more than a fool can. His wisdom becomes as powerless and useless 
as folly in the face of death. “As is the fate of the fool, it will also befall me,” says 
Qohelet and realizes that there is no point of being exceedingly wise (2:15). Wisdom 
and folly are levelled and nullified. Moreover, his wisdom tells him that eventually no 
one remembers the wise or a fool, especially when he sees how much alike both 
actually die (2:16). It is not just the fool who will be forgotten, but also the wise, once 
they die (9:5). 
Moreover Qohelet observes that death occasions an unjustifiable effect even 
before it befalls everyone. He has seen that there is a righteous person perishing in his 
righteousness and the wicked prolonging his life in his evil doing (7:15): there are 
righteous people to whom it happens according to the deeds of the wicked and there 
are wicked people to whom it happens according to the deeds of the righteous (8:14). 
It makes no difference whether one is rich or poor, wise or foolish, just or unjust, 
king or subject, ruler or peasant, oppressor or oppressed. All die regardless, whether 
their heart is filled with righteous motivation or full of evil and madness (9:3). There 
seems no consequence if one loves, hates, or lives with passion, because all that one 
has cherished will be left behind, while the memories of the dead fade into obscurity 
(9:5–6). Death visits every person and negates whatever is done on this earth to an 
absurd equality. 
                                                                                                                                            
545 3:18 is a difficult verse due to interpretive complexities of the two infinitives (לברם and לראות) and 
their subject (God or human). Various interpretations have been proposed (see Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 
295–301, for a summary). For the purpose of this discussion all the details aside, what Qohelet 
basically conveys here is that humans and animals are the same with reasons followed in vv. 19–21.  
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Qohelet also observes the levelling effect of death reaches beyond the human 
realm. While alive, humans and animals lead totally different lives. Humans aspire to 
make their life better, richer, and longer with their intelligence, wisdom, and skills, 
whereas animals merely live with instinct to survive each day without future 
consciousness. And yet humans have no more advantage than animals in the face of 
death. All apparent advantages cease at death which abases both to the same 
degradation.546 Avery-Peck aptly notes that  “live, a person is recognized as human. 
But dead, the body has no humanity, so that it is unable  even to command the respect 
of animals.”547 Qohelet has observed wickedness being carried out in the places where 
it is not expected to take place (3:16). It seems humans are just as animals (cf. 3:18). 
Indeed he can perceive no difference between humans and animals, since both die and 
become the dust of the earth (3:19–20). Death levels and nullifies all the meaning of 
human activities, equalizing all human life to absurdity, if death is final as Qohelet 
presumes. Basically human beings cease to be human at death. Qohelet apparently has 
more to say about the true implication of death when he considers what it does to 
humankind. What Qohelet really thinks of death is the next topic to follow. 
3.1.3 Death Is Evil       
What is death? It is the destination of all the living on the earth (3:20). Death comes to 
everyone, and it is not something that ancient Israelites disputed or questioned. When 
it occurred unexpectedly, suddenly, or prematurely, then they feared and considered it 
to be God’s punishment.548 If one may generalize from the survey of the historical 
context in the first chapter, Qohelet’s Israelite forefathers apparently accepted death 
as a natural course of human life at the end of a ripe old age. They were not 
preoccupied with death like the people in the ancient Near East whose elaborate 
funerary cults indicated their fear and preoccupation with death, especially among the 
elite in Egypt and Mesopotamia. Death was not something that Israelites focused their 
minds on in normal circumstances, although in what manner one should die mattered 
to them. What concerned them most was unexpected, violent, or premature death: that 
                                                 
546 Cf. Ps 146:4: “His spirit departs, he returns to the earth; on that very day his thoughts [or plans] 
perish.” 
547 Alan J. Avery-Peck, “Death and Afterlife in the Early Rabbinic Sources: The Mishnah, Tosefta, and 
Early Midrash Compilations,” in Judaism in Late Antiquity Part 4, Death, Life-after-Death, 
Resurrection and the World-to-Come in the Judaisms of Antiquity (eds. Avery-Peck and Neusner; 
Leiden: Brill, 2000), 246.  
548 Knibb, “Life,” 403. 
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was altogether another matter. In general, however, they held no pessimistic or 
negative view of life due to the inevitability of death. Rather, they desired and 
maintained a posture to live a full life with God’s blessing because life was God’s 
gift549 and reward to them.550 Living to a full old age and dying in peace to be 
gathered to their ancestors was satisfactory to them as the fulfilment of life as God 
intended.   
Qohelet stands out among the Israelites in this regard, even though he agrees that 
life is God’s gift (8:15). In his view life seems to be too short and is fleeting (6:12).551 
It is just a “portion” (חלק) that God grants to humans (5:17–18 [ET 18–19]).552 
Qohelet evaluates and assesses everything from the perspective of death because he 
recognizes that death can override everything that humans do. The reality of death is 
apparently a constant reminder in all that Qohelet does and observes. Death seems to 
preoccupy Qohelet’s mind, even when he himself does not appear to have been in 
grave danger of adversaries, illness, or misfortunes in his own life. On the contrary, he 
has amassed a great fortune, increased wisdom, and sought all kinds of pleasure in 
life. Yet he has found all his riches and accomplishments wanting, unsatisfactory, or 
meaningless (2:11). No amount of money, power, or wisdom secures life for its 
lasting fulfilment and enjoyment. No scheme of precaution or prevention avoids 
death’s intrusion, which brings every activity in one’s life to a screeching halt. 
Against such anticipation and realization Qohelet cries out, “Everything is hebel.” 
Qohelet probably does not mean that life itself is hebel even when he labels human 
life as “one’s hebel life ('553.(חיי הבל But death seems to deprive a human not only of 
all his possessions but also of all the meaning or value of what he has done or 
                                                 
549 Job 12:10; 33:4; 34:14–15; Eccl 12:7; Isa 57:16; Zech 12:1. 
550 Ps 127:3; Pro 22:4; cf. Eccl 5:17 [ET 18] . See Martin-Achard, Death, 6, 8. 
551 The phrase מספר ימי־חיי הבלו “the few days of his fleeting life” in 6:12 expresses both short and 
fleeting nature of human life. ימספר ימי־ח  occurs elsewhere in 2:3; 5:17 [ET 18], and 9:9 חיי הבלך [bis]. 
The second occurrence in 9:9 is considered dittography, but possibly Qohelet's emphasis? Qohelet also 
says one’s young and prime life is also fleeting (הבל) in 11:10. Cf. McNeile, Ecclesiastes, 150; Seow, 
Ecclesiastes, 302. As already noted, Qohelet likely means by these phrases that human life on earth is 
“fleeing” or “ephemeral,” not necessarily  “futile” or “meaningless,” as his many  טוב sayings indicate to 
encourage his audience with “Enjoy” while they can. 
552 The term חלק literally means “portion, share” in an inheritance (e.g., land). BDB:324; Rudman, 
Determinism, 55 – 60, notes translating חלק “reward” (e.g., NKJV, NRSV, NASB) may be imprecise, 
except “in the sense of the rightful reward for one ’s labour (2:10; 3:22; 5:17 [ET 18], . . .; 9:9),” 
because the term itself is morally neutral. One may call God ’ s allotment of חלק as “reward,” but LXX ’ s 
rendering of חלק with µερίς/µέρος, which are theologically neutral. He adds 5:18 [ET 19]; 9:6 in the 
above list but חלק in those instances cannot be called “reward”; cf. Fox, Time, 109 – 11. NASB 
translates חלק as “reward,” namely “all the days of your fleeting life” in themselves are a reward or a 
portion which God has allotted to humans in Qohelet’s view. 
553 Supra.  
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achieved. It is an unseen destructive force behind every activity in life, a threat which 
strips off much of energy and one’s meaningful existence that humans strive with 
their activities. It also ruins every plan and activity for the future, and converts all 
human striving, toil, or effort into something totally meaningless, futile, or useless. To 
Qohelet it seems that death “barricades the future against all human wishes and 
desires.”554 He seems to be particularly annoyed that one who toiled is deprived of 
and must leave all its benefit and enjoyment to someone else. He calls the situation 
both hebel and evil (2:21; 4:8; 6:2). Qohelet is acutely cognizant of death’s 
unwelcome intrusion into human life, which humans cannot predict or prevent. Death 
creeps into his evaluation of everything and forces him to face its ultimatum. Death 
incessantly reminds Qohelet of its upper hand and seems to haunt him.  
However, realization of the worst predicament is reserved for the end of all affairs 
and activities. “It is the same for all” (9:2a), says Qohelet. Whatever Qohelet 
observes, in the end it is the same: one and the same fate to all the living. What galls 
Qohelet most of all is that death neither differentiates nor discriminates with respect 
to person. There is no qualification or privilege in death: not only do both the wise 
and the fool die but the wise dies just like the fool; and not only do both the righteous 
and the wicked die but the righteous also suffer and die like the wicked. Being pious 
or impious does not make any difference. Human hearts can become full of evil and 
madness during their lives and die just like everybody else. Qohelet reminds himself 
and lays it to heart that the righteous, the wise, and their deeds are in God’s hand 
(9:1); nevertheless, he can draw only one conclusion from what he has seen. He 
declares, “This is an evil among all that is done under the sun: that is, one fate for all” 
(9:3a). Qohelet’s emphasis here can formulate an equation: an evil among all 
happenings (רע בכל) = one fate for all (מקרה אחד לכל) = death unto all. Death is the 
equal fate for all, unequal lives notwithstanding. Qohelet seems to mean it basically 
amounts to the greatest evil of all on the earth.555 Fox comments: “A superlative does 
seem required here, for the universality of death is not a misfortune or evil in all 
events; it is rather the worst of all that happens, for it is a fundamental and irreparable 
                                                 
554 H. N. Bream, “Life without Resurrection: Two Perspectives from Qoheleth,” in A Light unto My 
Path: Old Testament Studies in Honor of Jacob M. Myers (eds. Bream, et al.; Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1974), 55. 
555 Cf. John P. Weisengoff, “Death and Immortality in the Book of Wisdom,” CBQ 3 (1941): 107. 
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inequity.”556 Gordis calls it “the root of the evil.”557 Moreover, it is the same fate (אחד 
המקר ) that befalls all the living, not just humans: “universal death” that results in every 
created being,558 regardless of differences in species, life styles, behaviours, or 
choices that one makes. Death is totally amoral, irreligious, and irrespective of all 
concerned. This sounds as though death acts neutrally and fairly at first glance, 
equally treating everyone. Scholars often characterize death in Ecclesiastes as “a great 
equalizer”559 or “the great leveller of humanity.”560 In Qohelet’s view death is evil. 
Death spoils intention, purpose, and goal of all human activities because it invalidates 
them all. Death nullifies what makes humans human and denies human uniqueness, 
according to Qohelet’s logic. 
If Qohelet’s reflection on death were any sign of sentiment in his society, then it 
would be no surprise that he found evil prevailing in his society, as he alludes in 9:3. 
Qohelet witnesses wickedness, unjust gains and losses increasing among people in his 
society. In the next section inequities and injustice that Qohelet has observed will be 
traced in view of how death plays out in his society.   
But before discussing injustice, Qohelet’s view of justice (משפט), namely, divine 
judgement against human iniquities, needs to be analysed, because of his firm stance 
on his belief in divine judgement. It is then followed by injustice observed and 
Qohelet’s view of Sheol, the Israelite abode of the dead, in relation to his view of 
death and divine judgement.  
3.2 Qohelet’s View of Divine Judgement  
   in Ecclesiastes משפט 3.2.1
The Hebrew concept of משפט is developed and shaped by Yahweh’s instructions as 
described in the Pentateuch and handed down through generations of Israelites. 
According to Booth, the semantic range and meaning of משפט within the human 
sphere may be developed in three stages (more or less in a chronological order) as 
                                                 
556 Fox, Time, 292. Author’s emphasis. He suggests reading זה רע as  זה הרע. 
557 Gordis, Man, 186. 
558 Denis Buzy, “L’Ecclésiaste,” in La Sainte Bible, VI (eds. Pirot and Clamer; Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 
1941), 256: “mal universel.” 
559 Lisa M. Wolfe, “Seeing Gives Rise to Disbelieving: Qohelet’s ‘Absurd’ (הבל) Search for Divine 
Justice,” Proceedings: EGL & MWHS 24 (2004): 35. 
560 Mark K. George, “Death as the Beginning of Life in the Book of Ecclesiastes,” in Strange Fire: 
Reading the Bible after the Holocaust (BS 71; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2000), 287. 
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follows.561 The earliest meaning is “manner” or “custom,” based on the criterion 
“what is the customary thing”; but it is seldom used in this sense in later periods. The 
meaning in the second stage of development includes judicial decision, 
commandment of God or of man, and administration of law by God or by human 
judges, based on a “promulgated body of law.” The third stage of development is 
“rightful due,” “that which should be,” or “proper administration of law by people,” 
based on the idea of “the right” of individuals.562 Not surprisingly, Qohelet’s use of 
the term משפט falls in the third stage, and Booth identifies four categories of possible 
meanings in his classification: rightful due (once); that which should be (3 times); 
administration of law by man (2 times) or by God (4  times).563 
The term משפט appears six times in Ecclesiastes (3:16; 5:7 [ET 8]; 8:5, 6; 11:9; 
12:14) along with one use of the verb 3:17) שפט), and all but 12:14 are used by 
Qohelet. In the first instance: 
   ועוד ראיתי תחת השמש מקום המשפט שמה הרשע ומקום הצדק שמה הרשע׃
 
Furthermore, I have seen under the sun, in the place of judgement there is 
wickedness, and in the place of righteousness there is wickedness. (3:16)564 
Qohelet uses the term in a phrase מקום המשפט  “the place of justice/judgement,” 
namely, “the place of the administration of justice”565 located under the sun: a human 
                                                 
561 Osborne Booth, “The Semantic Development of the Term ִמְׁשָּפט in the Old Testament,” JBL 61 
(1942): 105 – 10 [see esp. 107 – 8]; cf. B Johnson, “ִמְׁשּפט,” TDOT 9:86– 98. 
562 Booth, “Semantic,” 108, explains that  “there are evidently three basic factors underlying the 
fundamental conception of  מ׳ : the custom, the law,  and the right. Of these groups the first, based upon 
custom, seems the original. As custom does not develop from law, but law from custom, it is probable 
that the meaning of this word  travelled in the same direction.” 
563 Ibid., 106 (chart). Obviously Booth identifies  משפט in some instances containing more than one 
possible meaning  since the term appears only six times in Ecclesiastes.  
564 LXX slightly differs: εἶδον ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον τόπον τῆς κρίσεως ἐκεῖ ὁ ἀσεβής καὶ τόπον τοῦ δικαίου 
ἐκεῖ ὁ ἀσεβής “I saw under the sun in the place of judgement there the ungodly, and in the place of the 
righteous there the ungodly.” Goldman, “Qoheleth,” 76*, suggests that the first part should be read 
with MT and the second with LXX, basically replacing  הצדק in MT with  הצדיק and translating it as  “I 
saw under the sun: in the place of the judgment, there the wickedness and in the place of the 
righteous,  there the wicked.” With either MT or Goldman, the essence of  text’s meaning would not 
change: In the place where justice and  righteousness should prevail, there  was wickedness (by the 
wicked people, because it would not happen by the righteous people). Cf. Schoors, Preacher I, 25; 
Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 285–86, in the earlier ref. Schoors supports MT rendering, while in the latter he 
agrees with Goldman. 
565 Barton, Ecclesiastes, 108; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 287; however, cf. Aarre Lauha, Kohelet (BKAT 
19; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1978), 74, notes that “the place of justice” means not 
only the official site of jurisdiction, but all sectors of society in which justice should be implemented 
(»die Stätte des Rechts« meint nicht nur den offiziellen Ort der Gerichtsbarkeit, sondern alle 
Gesellschaftsbereiche, in denen Gerechtigkeit verwirklicht sein sollte). מקום means a standing place, a 
(certain) place/location. But the two occurrences in 3:16 could also mean “in place of” (like  תחת ) 
without reference to a particular place, giving a broader scope of all social situations as Lauha suggests; 
but BDB: 879–80, notes that מקום functioning like  תחת is rare and peculiar (e.g., Hos 2:1; Isa 33:21); cf. 
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judicial court where the judge should uphold the law, punishing the wicked, 
protecting the innocent, and granting the rightful due to the powerless and the 
oppressed, all based on the divine mandate in the Torah. What Qohelet observes, 
however, is the corruption of the human law court violating the individual rights of 
the powerless, perhaps due to favouritism, bribery, or political pressure (7:7).566 In 5:7 
[ET 8] Qohelet warns people not to be surprised at the oppression of the poor and 
denial of משפט וצדק in the province:  
 569תראה במדינה אל־תתמה על־החפץ כי גבה 568משפט וצדק 567אם־עשק רש וגזל
  מעל גבה שמר וגבהים עליהם׃
 
If you see oppression of the poor and deprivation of justice and righteousness in the 
province, do not be astonished at the matter, for a high one from above watches over 
another high one, and there are higher ones above them.  
The only place where the verb שפט appears is often construed as a later addition, 
mainly because Qohelet’s statement in 3:17 agrees with an orthodox view of divine 
judgement that the epilogist concludes in 12:14: 
אמרתי אני בלבי את־הצדיק ואת־הרשע ישפט האלהים כי־עת לכל־חפץ ועל כל־
  ׃ 570המעשה שם
 
I said in my heart: God will judge the righteous and the wicked, because a time (עת) 
for every matter (לכל־חפץ) and upon every work is there (3:17) .(שם) 
                                                                                                                                            
Schoors, Preacher II, 294. The definite construct state seems to indicate the place rather than the 
abstract concept, which is reinforced by שמה. Thus the term in 3:16 is taken as an adverbial accusative 
and translated as “in the place of,” indicating a place (cf. 11:3). All other occurrences in Ecclesistes 
(l:5, 7; 3:20; 6:6; 8:10; 10:4) also denote a place. משפט here denotes “justice, the right order or an 
administration of justice,” as parallel to צדק and opposed to רשע. 
566 Fox, Ecclesiastes, 25. 
567 Literally, “robbery.” 
568 Literally, “justice and righteousness,” or “justice and right,” namely, a fundamental right of the 
people to have. Cf. Deut 10:18; Isa 10:2. Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 407; Fox interprets the phrase 
hendiadys, namely, “righteous judgement.” However, he translates it “justice and right” in Fox, Time, 
52 , 233–34; and “right and justice,” in Fox, Ecclesiastes, 25, as both terms have these meanings. 
Notably, combination of (משפט וצדק(ה  or צדק(ה) ומשפט appears 36 times in the OT (mostly in  Wisdom 
literature and Prophets), indicating that justice and righteousness often go hand in hand. On this 
subject, see also R. W. L. Moberly, “Whose Justice? Which Righteousness? The Interpretation of 
Isaiah V 16,” VT 51 (2001): 55–68; Moshe Weinfeld, “ ‘Justice and Righteousness’—מׁשפט וצדקה—the 
Expression and Its Meaning,” in Justice and Righteousness (eds. Reventlow and Hoffman; JSOTSup 
137; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992), 228 – 46. 
569 “High, exalted, haughty,” probably meaning official, but the כי phrase is difficult, and variously 
interpreted. Seow, Ecclesiastes, 203– 4.  
 there” or “name, designation,” or as verb“ ׁשם is regarded a crux interpretum. Hebrew is read as שם 570
 put, set.” LXX ἐκεῖ “there”; Vulg. tunc “then, thereupon;” both supporting MT, but it is not clear“ ׂשם
what “there” or “then” refers to. שם perhaps refers back to שמה and the context to the court of law in v. 
16. Fox, Time, 215; cf. Fox, Ecclesiastes, 25; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 166– 67; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 293–
 94.  
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However, 3:17 can be read in line with the context of 3:16 where Qohelet states his 
appalling observation that wickedness, instead of justice, prevailed in the human court 
of law. He then utters v. 17 in his heart. When Qohelet says, “God will judge,” he 
never affixes his favourite criterion “under the sun” in his statement; in other words, 
he never specifies when or where God will judge but only that God will judge both the 
righteous and the wicked according to every deed that they have committed under the 
sun (3:17; 11:9; cf. 12:14). Qohelet’s phrase “under the sun” emphatically frames the 
work and activities that human beings perform during their life on the earth. God’s 
work and activities have no boundary as such. The latter half of 3:17 lexically 
connects to, and echoes, 3:1 where he says:571  
תחת השמים׃ 573לכל־חפץ 572לכל זמן ועת  
 
For everything there is an appointed time (זמן); and an appropriate time (עת) for every 
matter (חפץ) under the heavens. 
Since a time for wickedness exists and seems to be ripe in his society, it is reasonable 
to expect that there is a time for judgement as well. 
The next two appearances of משפט occur with עת as a phrase עת ומשפט in 8:5–6, 
the interpretation of which has not attained a consensus among scholars or the Bible 
translators:574  
 (v. 5)חכם׃   ידע לב עת ומשפטשומר מצוה לא ידע דבר רע ו
  (v. 6)  עליו׃    כי־רעת האדם רבה עת ומשפטכי לכל־חפץ יש 
Some scholars even consider 8:5–6 is a gloss or a redactor’s addition.575 Most 
commentators understand עת as functioning the same way as an “appropriate or 
appointed time” and “recognize some form of relationship between 8:5–7 and 3:1–8 
and/or 3:17.”576 The term משפט, however, seems to pose a problem and is translated 
                                                 
571 Cf. Rudman, Determinism, 52. 
572 Both זמן and עת mean “an appointed time.” An Aramaic loan word and only in late texts, זמן always 
means a  “predetermined or appointed time, ” see Seow, Ecclesiastes, 159; Anthony Tomasino, “זמן,” 
NIDOTTE 1:1114; עת means a  “point of time ” or a  “lapse of time,” and is  “usually associated with 
specific events and their occurrence,” not cyclical or linear within the continuous cycle as viewed in the 
ancient world. Anthony Tomasino, “עת,” NIDOTTE 3:56 – 64; CHALOT:287. Qohelet uses עת to mean 
an appointed or appropriate time. 
573 Usually חפץ means  “delight, pleasure ”; but here and in 3:17; 5:7 [ET 8]; 8:6, the word means  “affair, 
matter, event or activity.” BDB:343; Schoors, Preacher II, 211– 14. 
574 Other issues also exist with these texts, but the relevant focus here is mainly on the use and 
interpretation of משפט. 
575 Lauha, Kohelet, 149; Kurt Galling, “Der Prediger,” in Die fünf Megilloth (eds. Würthwein, et al.; 
HAT 1/18; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1969), 110. 
576 Rudman, Determinism, 52. 
125 
  
either “procedure,”577 “way,”578 or “judgement.”579 The LXX translates the phrase 
differently between v. 5 and v. 6: the former καιρὸν κρίσεως “time of judgement” 
without the conjunction 580ו  or as hendiadys; and the latter καιρὸς καὶ κρίσις “time 
and judgement,” as the phrase cannot be a hendiadys in v. 6, since not every matter 
has a time of judgement:  
ὁ φυλάσσων ἐντολὴν οὐ γνώσεται ῥῆµα πονηρόν καὶ καιρὸν κρίσεως 
(tempus et responsionem) γινώσκει καρδία σοφοῦ (v. 5) 
ὅτι παντὶ πράγµατι ἔστιν καιρὸς καὶ κρίσις (tempus est et oportunitas) ὅτι 
γνῶσις581 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πολλὴ ἐπ᾽ αὐτόν (v. 6) 
Those who follow LXX for v. 6 as in v. 5, therefore, are forced to remove ומשפט in v. 
6 as gloss.582 The Vulgate (shown in parentheses) differently translates the phrase in 
the two verses: tempus et responsionem “time and response” in v. 5 and tempus est et 
oportunitas “time and procedure” in v. 6 for its coherent exegesis to be maintained.583 
Schoors translates משפט with an obscure use of “destiny” in both verses, but is 
unlikely the correct meaning in the context.584  
Difficulties associated with all the above interpretations are: Firstly, the use of 
 to mean “manner, custom, procedure or way” which was a usage in much earlier משפט
times, as already mentioned; and it is doubtful if such use was common during the 
Second Temple period, even if it was not extinct.585 Secondly, an obscure translation 
of משפט as “destiny” has not been observed anywhere else in the Bible. Thirdly, the 
term always means “justice” or “judgement” in all other places in Ecclesiastes 
including 11:9 and 12:14;586 and fourthly, LXX translates all the occurrences of משפט 
in Ecclesiastes as “judgement” (κρίσις or κρίµα).587 
                                                 
577 E.g., NIV, NASB, and NET. 
578 E.g., ESV and N/RSV. 
579 E.g., N/KJV and JPS. 
580 Rudman, Determinism, 51, recognizes that  “it suggests that the LXX translator used a variant 
manuscript in which the conjunction on  מׁשפט was deficient  (15 Hebrew MSS contain this particular 
reading) .” 
581 LXX also misreads רעת as דעת, i.e., γνῶσις “knowledge”; Qohelet denies any such knowledge in v. 
7, even if the LXX reading were right. 
582 E.g., Fox, Contradictions, 248; contra Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 151; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 605; cf. 
Rudman, Determinism, 50– 51. 
583 Rudman, Determinism, 52. 
584 Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 605– 6; Schoors, Preacher II, 233– 34. His citation of OT and Qumran texts 
containing משפט are all relating to “manner, custom,” and never meant “destiny.” His notion: “It is 
clear that here, does not have the legal force of ‘judgment, lawsuit, justice, right, ordinance’,” is 
incorrect.  
585 Rudman, Determinism, 50; Booth, “Semantic,” 107–8; contra Johnson, TDOT 9:88.  
586 12:13–14, a traditional view of divine judgement, is often considered a later editorial work. Similar 
phraseology in 12:14: “God will bring every work into judgement (כל־מעשה האלהים יבא במשפט)” and 
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Qohelet amply expresses his distress over the absence or delay of justice in his 
society, and his belief in God’s judgement appears firm. Therefore his use of the term 
 to mean “judgement” is not unreasonable. A decisive test then may be whether משפט
the text of 8:5–6 reflects Qohelet’s overall thought and concern, and whether it is also 
relevant to the immediate context.  
Firstly, the text 8:5–6 echoes Qohelet’s utterance in 3:17 lexically and in content 
when compared in parallel:  
He who keeps a commandment will know no evil thing, and a heart of the wise (  לב
 (לכל־חפץ) for every matter 589,(כי) and mišpāṭ. Indeed (עת) will know time 588(חכם
there is time (עת) and mišpāṭ, because (כי) the evil of mankind is great upon them.590 
(8:5–6) 
  
I said in my heart (בלבי): God will judge (ישפט) the righteous and the wicked, because 
 (3:17) .(שם) and upon every work is there (לכל־חפץ) for every matter (עת) time (כי)
The words חפץ ,עת ,לב, and cognates מ)שפט) appear in both passages, which indicate 
that in 8:5–6 Qohelet is apparently referring back to his conviction in 3:17 that every 
work (or deed) will eventually be judged, namely, at an appropriate time, since there 
is a time for every matter.591 This then leads משפט in 8:5–6 to be understood as 
“judgement.” Rudman is surely correct, saying, “the context provided by the use of 
 in 3.16–17 is a strong indicator that it should be interpreted with its usual sense ׁשפט√
of (legal) judgment in 8.5–6.”592  
Secondly, one may examine whether the immediate contexts before and after also 
illuminate משפט in 8:5–6 relevant to Qohelet’s concern for judgement. The first 
comparison of the immediate context is between 8:2–4 and 8:5:  
                                                                                                                                            
11:9: “against all these God will bring you into judgement (כל־אלה יביאך האלהים במשפט)” has led some 
scholars to interpret 11:9b as a gloss by the same editorial hand. Contra Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 791–92, 
who translates  במשפט “in that condition,” which is unlikely. A list of those who consider 11:9b an 
editorial gloss can be found  on p. 792 (n. 9) in Schoors.  
587 κρίσις (f. noun) in 3:16; 8:5, 6, 11:9; 12:14 and κρίµα (neut. noun) in 5:7 [ET 8], both cognates of 
κρινῶ “judge, decide” in  3:17. LXX’s standard translation of  משפט is used for Ecclesiastes. Johnson, 
TDOT 9:97.   
 means the mind, i.e., “the mind of a wise person” (cf. RSV); may ידע heart” as the subject of“ לב 588
also be translated “a wise heart” (NASB; cf. 1Kgs 3:12) or “the wise mind” (NRSV). Cf. Schoors, 
Preacher II, 89–90. Probably referring back to כהחכם in 8:1.  
589 Antoon Schoors, “Emphatic and Asseverative kî in Koheleth,” in Scripta Signa Vocis: Studies about 
Scripts, Scriptures, Scribes and Languages in the Near East Presented to J. H. Hospers (eds. 
Vanstiphout, et al.; Groningen: Forsten, 1986), 211; or Schoors, Preacher I, 106–7. 
590 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 281. The similarity of the phrase כי־רעת האדם רבה עליו with כי רבה רעת האדם בארץ 
“the evil of mankind was great on the earth” in Gen 6:5a is striking and most likely Qohelet’s allusion 
to the Genesis text, as his reflection shortly later in 8:11b also echoes Gen 6:5b. Seow is correct in that 
the האדם in 8:6 should be taken as a subjective genitive, namely רעת is the evil that the mankind do, not 
simply a misfortune, misery, or trouble of man, interpreting it as an objective genitive. 
591 Rudman, Determinism, 53. 
592 Ibid., 52. 
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[I say]593 keep (שמור) the king’s command (594,(פי־מלך and (that) because of the oath 
of God.595 Do not hurry to go from his presence. Do not stand in an evil matter ( בדבר
 for he will do whatever596 he pleases. Since the word of the king is authority, so ,(רע
who will say to him, “what are you doing?” (8:2–4) 
 
He who keeps (שומר) a commandment (מצוה) will know no evil thing (דבר רע), and a 
heart of the wise will know time and judgement. (8:5) 
The gist of the difficult text in 8:2–4 is that Qohelet exhorts his audience to obey the 
king’s command, not to offend the king or conspire to do evil against him. Because 
the king will do whatever he pleases, he may punish whoever offends him regardless 
of the seriousness of offences: a trivial offence by leaving his presence too quickly on 
the one hand, or a grave offence by joining in to do evil against him on the other hand. 
No one can oppose the king, once he makes a decision (against any offence), even if it 
may be unreasonable or wrong. One can lose his own life by offending the king.597 
Keeping the king’s command circumvents such calamity, on account of one’s oath of 
allegiance to the king that one made before God. Since the king is also under God’s 
authority, God will either protect the king’s subject from his despotic decision, or will 
eventually punish the king for his recklessness. The text 8:5 then picks this up to 
affirm that he who keeps a command598 will face no calamity because his wise heart 
will know that there is time and משפט “judgement” (by God). In 8:6 Qohelet reaffirms 
that there is a time and judgement for every matter,599 meaning that every matter 
                                                 
593 Literally, אני. Scholars either delete it as a gloss or add אמרתי as is done here. 
594 Literally, “the mouth of the king,” namely, king’s word/command. Cf. פי יהוה “the command of 
Yahweh” (e.g., 1 Sam 12:14) 
595 The oath of God can be either an oath by God, the king, or the  subject, but the most likelihood is 
“the oath of fidelity and allegiance to the king which they had  taken in the name of God.”  Ralph 
Wardlaw, Lectures on the Book of Ecclesiastes (Philadelphia: Woodward, 1822), 358. Wardlaw 
translate ועל דברת  “and (that) in regard of. ” The ו here is probably functioning as explicative or 
emphatic as it is done here; see Kautzsch ed, GKC, §154.a (n. 1(b). Qohelet has already made clear that 
once one made a vow (or oath) before God, one should keep it in 5:3 – 4 [ET 4 – 5]. Translating  על דברת 
as “according to the manner of” is also possible, interpreting the phrase as modal rather  than causal; cf. 
Ps 110:4, see Meir Zlotowitz and Nosson Scherman, Koheles: Ecclesiastes: A New Translation with a 
Commentary Anthologised from Talmudic, Midrashic and Rabbinic Sources (2nd, rev. and corr. ed.; 
ATS; eds. Scherman and Zlotowitz; Brooklyn: Mesorah, 1977), 147; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 279; 
Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 278.  
596 Literally, כל־אשר “all that.” 
597 A record of such an example is found in Gen 40:20–22 where a king of Egypt restores the chief 
cupbearer to his office but hangs the chief baker when both offend him, probably owing to their poor 
food/drink services to the king: Likely similar offences but different verdicts on them by the king. 
598 According to Lange מצוה in 8:5 cannot be the king’s command (vide infra). The term without an 
article or a pronominal suffix makes ambiguous whose command it is.  
599 Note here that עת ומשפט cannot be a hendiadys because not everything has a time of judgement as 
already pointed out above.  Fox, Contradictions, 248; Rudman, Determinism, 53. 
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includes even the king’s conduct, because the evil of mankind is great.600 The same 
verb (שמר) and the phrase (דבר רע) both in 8:2–3 and 8:5 connect the two texts in that 
one who keeps a command would not engage in an evil matter (דבר רע in 8:3) or 
experience a calamity (דבר רע in 8:5), for a wise heart knows time and judgement.  
The second comparison of the immediate context is between 8:6 and 8:7: 
Indeed, for every matter there is time and judgement, because the evil of mankind is 
great upon them. (8:6) 
 
But he does not know what will happen. Indeed who tells him when it will happen? 
(8:7) 
Here in 8:6 Qohelet reaffirms that there is time and judgement, but the problem is that 
Qohelet, or anyone else for that matter, does not know when the appropriate time for 
God’s action is, because such time and judgement are in God’s hand. Qohelet 
expresses the frustration of not knowing in 8:7, which he already alluded to in 3:11b 
and which he would reiterate in 8:17,601 and the connection between the two verses 
8:6 and 8:7 makes perfect sense. 
Furthermore, Qohelet reminds his audience that humans do not have authority to 
retain הרוח with 602הרוח or authority over the day of death; . . . and wickedness will not 
deliver its owners603 (8:8), again emphasizing that it is God, not the king, who has the 
ultimate authority over every matter. Thus, Rudman captures 8:1–6 as:  
The wise man knows that ‘God will judge the righteous and the wicked’ (3.17) and 
will obey the king's orders, biding his time in the sure knowledge that his master will 
be punished.604  
In summary, in Qohelet’s thought it is God who will judge both the righteous and 
the wicked, because there is a time for every matter under heaven: namely, for 
everything there is an appropriate time, and for every deed there is משפט under God’s 
jurisdiction. When Qohelet uses the term משפט, he means judgement; more probably, 
divine judgement. Qohelet is apparently a firm believer in God’s judgement. For a 
man of such conviction, his admonition and reminder to a youth that God will judge 
                                                 
 here could be subtly pointing to the king: the evil of the ruler is usually considered greater than האדם 600
his followers’, and the punishment against him will be severer in the OT (see, e.g., 2 Sam 12:11–12). 
601 More on this complicated text, vide infra. 
602 “The wind” or “the spirit.”  
603 Or “its lords” ( בעליו ), i.e., those who practise wickedness—may be implying the king by the term 
 :See Franz Delitzsch, Hoheslied und Koheleth (BCAT 4; eds. Keil and Delitzsch; Leipzig .(?) בעל
Dörffling & Franke, 1875), 337; ET Franz Delitzsch, Commentary on the Song of Songs and 
Ecclesiastes (CFTL Fourth Series; trans. Easton; vol. 54; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1891), 344. 
604 Rudman, Determinism, 54. 
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him according to his deeds even during his youth in 11:9 is a logical step.605 Qohelet 
could certainly have given such a warning, and there should be no need to treat the 
verse as gloss.  
3.2.2 Injustice Observed   
Although Qohelet recognizes God’s presence in the cosmos as its Creator and Ruler, 
his interest lies in what goes on in the earth with both human and divine activities. 
Whatever he speaks about is within the domain of the world of the living, where he 
can observe and evaluate all the works and deeds in human affairs.606 It defines a 
frame of reference on which Qohelet’s focus is fixed: on “matters and events which 
happen in this world,”607 and how the reality of death plays out in that context. As 
already noted, keeping the relevance of these frameworks in mind is important when 
one examines what Qohelet says. It is now time to discuss what Qohelet has observed 
under the sun with regard to justice. 
Justice must be served in a divinely ordered world (3:14–17), but what Qohelet 
observes and can discern from reality is that justice is often absent and is delayed at 
best (8:11): in effect, justice is not always executed in this world. Qohelet’s utterance 
of “Hebel, utterly hebel, everything is hebel” undoubtedly manifests his exasperation, 
frustration, and acute sense of indignation against the unfairness and injustice which 
cripples one’s effort in life. Qohelet’s despair rings and echoes all around in what he 
discovers from his own experiences and observations. His is a particularly poignant 
assessment of life because it is not the utterance of an unsuccessful or foolish 
individual without talent or skill, but of one who has built his wealth, luxury, and 
possessions through his work with much wisdom and entrepreneurial skills.  
Israelite traditional wisdom says that the righteous are blessed and prosper, but the 
wicked will be punished and live only a short time. What Qohelet observes and 
experiences in his society, however, contradicts God’s retributive justice which the 
Israelite people have taken for granted in times past. Qohelet is a realist. He does not 
rationalize what he no longer sees, just because he may wish or expect it to happen. 
                                                 
605 Exegetical discussion in Chapter 5. 
606 Ingram, Ambiguity, 257. 
607 Wright, “Ecclesiastes,” 19; L. Mazzinghi, “The Verbs  מצא ‘to Find’ and בקׁש ‘to Search’ in the 
Language of Qohelet: An Exegetical Study ,” in The Language of Qohelet in Its Context. Essays in 
Honour of Prof. A. Schoors on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday (eds. Berlejung and Hecke; 
OLA 164; Louvain: Peeters, 2007), 109, notes that  “Qohelet always starts from an experiential point of 
view; certainly he is speaking about reality  but only that reality which mankind can experience under 
the sun.” Author’s emphasis. 
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He avoids conjecture or hearsay but relies on his first-hand information—what he 
observes and experiences—before he expresses his opinion or makes his judgment 
call on the matters which concern him. He claims that he “has seen everything”: he is 
an observer. In his monologic discourse Qohelet uses the verb ראה “see, observe, 
perceive” forty-seven times, half of which are with respect to his own observation or 
seeing.608 The verb appears fairly evenly throughout the book and more than once in 
every chapter except chapter 12 (where it appears only once). Qohelet is also a doer. 
He seeks, explores, toils, and labours in all his undertakings. Qohelet is earth-bound. 
He is interested in what happens around him in his society and gives more weight to 
what he sees as facts and truths than what traditional or conventional wisdom tells 
him. He gives credit to what he sees, and what he observes he tells them as it is. 
Qohelet portrays himself as a king who actively engaged in all kinds of mental 
and physical activities in pursuit of every aspect of fulfilment in life. He has sought 
wisdom, built his house, planted vineyards, made gardens and parks, planted all kinds 
of fruit trees, irrigated a forest, acquired flocks and herds, bought male and female 
slaves, collected king’s treasures, and sought all kinds of pleasure (1:12–2:10). 
Qohelet’s zest for life and pleasure had no bounds:609 he has toiled and exerted 
himself in all his works (to accumulate surpluses) and has regarded pleasure from all 
his toil as his חלק “portion” (2:10). He repeatedly describes his personal efforts by 
saying, “all my toil (עמלי) I myself have toiled (עמלתי or 610”.(אני עמל Qohelet has 
achieved everything that a man could ask for. He is a man of enviable position in all 
aspects of riches and pleasures that others could only dream of.  
 Having toiled much to fulfil his ambition, Qohelet discovers all the fruit of his 
labour still wanting and unsatisfying, because he realizes that he not only cannot keep 
                                                 
608 H. F. Fuhs, “ָרָאה,” TDOT 13:208 – 42; Antoon Schoors, “The Verb ראה in the Book of Qoheleth,” 
in  “Jedes Ding hat seine Zeit. . . ” : Studien zur israelitischen und altorientalischen Weisheit: Diethelm 
Michel zum 65. Geburtstag (eds. Diesel, et al.; BZAW 241; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1996), 227 – 41, 
explains that Qohelet uses ראה to express his experience, his examination, or the knowledge he draws 
from his observation, depending on the context; Ogden, Qoheleth, 43, notes that it is  “one of Qohelet’s 
key words, and regularly applies to his observation of life. It speaks of more than casting a casual eye 
over things; it connotes a scientific and empirical examination of the realities of human life.”  
609 Qohelet says he did not restrain himself from any pleasure that his eyes and heart desired 
(2:10).  Longman, Ecclesiastes, 93. 
610 The importance of active engagement in his work is obvious, expressed in emphatic figura 
etymologica: “my toil for which I have laboured” (2:11, 18, 19, 20). Qohelet uses the same phraseology 
in the work of others as well (1:3; 5:17 [ET 18]; 9:9). Qohelet uses 35 עמל times (8 verbs and 27 nouns) 
in his monologue out of 76 usages in the OT. The term עמל is never used with God in contrast to מ)עשה) 
which is used with both God and humans in the OT. For further discussion vide infra. Cf. Ingram, 
Ambiguity, 150– 68, for his detailed analysis on the use of עמל and עשה in Ecclesiastes.   
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what he has earned but also has to leave it to whomever comes after him (2:17–19). 
His heart sinks and he exclaims that all his toil is futile and it is a great evil (רעה רבה, 
2:20–21). He is entitled to keep his portion and profit (611(יתרון from his toil, but he 
realizes that death cancels out all the credit due him without his consent. Moreover, 
even when one is blessed by God with all that he desires and his soul lacks nothing, 
there is no guarantee that he can enjoy all the blessings. Unless God also empowers 
him to enjoy them, a stranger (612(נכרי gets the benefit and enjoys them. “This is futile 
and is sickly evil,” declares Qohelet (6:1–2).  
Blatant wickedness and evil deeds are not uncommon in his society as Qohelet 
looks around and observes: injustice (613(הרשע in the place of judgement and 
wickedness (הרשע) in the place of righteousness (3:16). The place of judgement is the 
human law court as already noted above; and the place of righteousness is likely “the 
place where the pious people gather,” the temple.614 Qohelet seems to preface what he 
is about to expose from his observation of society by saying that wickedness prevails 
even in the places where justice and right conduct are expected. Qohelet then 
proceeds to describe kinds of wickedness and injustice that he has witnessed, starting 
in 4:1:  
אשר נעשים תחת השמש והנה דמעת העשקים  616את־כל־העשקים 615ושבתי אני ואראה
ושבח אני את־המתים שכבר מתו  ואין להם מנחם ומיד עשקיהם כח ואין להם מנחם׃
                                                 
 literally “that which remains” with a commercial meaning: “advantage, profit, gain.” The term ,יתרון 611
appears ten times only in Eccl (1:3; 2:11 [bis]; 3:9; 5:8, 15 [ET 9, 16]; 7:12; 10:10, 11), probably 
reflecting the socio-economic situation in which the book is written (near the 3rd century BCE, cf. 
Schwienhorst, 2004, 151). 
612 The term usually means  “foreigner, alien” and implies non-Israelite in most cases, but it is not clear 
here if it means non-Israelite. Most scholars interpret the term here as a stranger, a man outside of 
one’s family— “not a regular heir.” See Barton, Ecclesiastes, 134; and Robert B. Salters, “Notes on the 
Interpretation of Qoh 6:2,” ZAW 91 (1979): 282 – 89 [esp. 286 – 89], although non-Israelite would 
perfectly fit in the context as well and Qohelet’s disgust saying, “it is sickly evil,” would also make 
more sense if so. The same phrase איש נכרי appears once in Deut 17:15 where it clearly indicates non-
Israelite. Cf. 1Kgs 8:41. Stuart Weeks, Instruction and Imagery in Proverbs 1 – 9 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 130 – 31, points out that the term “has no obvious moral implication in itself.”  
613 Schoors, “Qoheleth,” 82, points out, “As the opposite of justice, ֶרַׁשע,  ‘wickedness ’ can also mean 
injustice.” רשע is tied to a place of justice ( טהמשפ  ) in 3:16, thus meaning “violation of justice.” The root 
עָרׁשָ  appears twelve times in Ecclesiastes: seven times as adjective רשע  (3:17; 7:15; 8:10, 13, 14 [bis]; 
9:2), four times as noun  ֶרַׁשע (3:16 [bis]; 7:25; 8:8), and once as verb 7:17) ָרַׁשע). In Ecclesiastes, “the 
root רׁשע refers to evil in the moral sense, be it evil acts, the persons who do evil, or the abstract evil 
quality of persons and their acts. This is in complete agreement with the common use in the Hebrew 
Bible.” Schoors, Preacher II, 188–90. 
614 Barton, Ecclesiastes, 108. When Qohelet  talks about the wicked going in and out of the holy place 
in 8:10, he may be referring back to  3:16.   
615 Literally, “I turned back, and I saw”; namely, “I again saw,” indicating the return to the subject 
matter of הרש ע  (wickedness/injustice) with specific examples.  Ginsburg, Coheleth, 320; contra 
Longman, Ecclesiastes, 133; Avi Hurvitz, “The Language of Qoheleth and Its Historical Setting within 
Biblical Hebrew,” in The Language of Qohelet in Its Context: Essays in Honour of Prof. A. Schoors on 
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וטוב משניהם את אשר־עדן לא היה אשר לא־ראה  מן־החיים אשר המה חיים עדנה׃
  את־המעשה הרע אשר נעשה תחת השמש׃
  
And again I looked at all the oppression which were done under the sun; and behold 
the tears of the oppressed, and they had no one to comfort them; and from the hand of 
their oppressors was power, but they had no one to comfort them. So I congratulated 
the dead who have already died more than the living who are still alive. But better 
than those two is the one who has not yet been, who has not seen the evil activity that 
is done under the sun. (4:1–3) 
Qohelet returns to the subject matter (ושבתי אני ואראה) of violation and perversion of 
justice, to which he alluded in 3:16, after a short but important continuation of his 
thought on divine judgement and human fate in vv.17–22 (which shall be elaborated 
on in the next section). 
Firstly, Qohelet has seen all (kinds of) oppression,617 which are done under the 
sun, and the tears of the oppressed. But they have no one to comfort them; power is in 
the hand of their oppressors, and there is none to comfort the oppressed (4:1). Qohelet 
neither identifies the oppressors, be they foreign rulers or Israelite officials, nor does 
he indicate if he himself had any status or influence to intervene: his position may 
have been “a former ruling aristocracy displaced by foreign rule.”618 One thing is 
clear: the oppression is so horrendous that Qohelet dares to say that the dead are more 
fortunate than those who are still alive under the circumstance, and that even better 
off than both is the one who is never to exist (stillborn), because he does not have to 
see such evil (4:2–3).619 Oppression of the poor, distortion of justice, and violation of 
the rights of individuals are so rampant that no one should be shocked in Qohelet’s 
society. The absence of social justice is exacerbated by corruption in the system, in 
which those who are in power watch over one another at each higher level, thus 
leaving the situation unchecked (5:7 [ET 8]). As power is on the side of the 
                                                                                                                                            
the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday (eds. Berlejung and Van Hecke; OLA 164; Leuven: Peeters, 
2007), 216; however, cf. Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 320–21. The modal function of שוב serves well and 
makes good sense in the context here, although it is not a typical modal verb like יסף. Qohelet uses יסף 
with its meaning  “to add, increase ” only. See also 4:7; 9:11 for his use of שוב with a modal function; 
Fox, Contradictions, 201, and others who oppose this view, interpret שוב as a signal for turning to a 
new topic rather than having a modal function.  
616 Three different forms and meanings of עשק   need to be recognized for interpreting the difficult text. 
The first העשקים “oppression, extortion” in plural is an abstract noun (see also Amos 3:9; Job 35:19); 
the second העשקים “ones who are oppressed” is a Qal passive ptc.; and the third עשקיהם “ones who 
oppress them” is a Qal ptc. BDB:798–99; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 321–23. 
617 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 186.  
618 Leo G. Perdue, “Cosmology and the Social Order in the Wisdom Tradition,” in Sage in Israel and 
the Ancient Near East (eds. Gammie and Perdue; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 477. 
619 This echoes Job 3:11 – 19 and Jer 20:14 – 18. See David L. Smith, “The Concept of Death in Job and 
Ecclesiastes,” Did 4 (1992): 9. 
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oppressors, they may even have controlled the judicial procedure within the court to 
pervert justice for their advantage instead of doing what is right and lawful (cf. 3:16). 
One can understand why Qohelet bewails that the dead may be better off than the 
oppressed in such a society. Qohelet observes that a person exercises authority over 
another to hurt him in everything that is done under the sun: 
 620את־כל־זה ראיתי ונתון את־לבי לכל־מעשה אשר נעשה תחת השמש עת אשר שלט
  ׃ 621האדם באדם לרע לו
 
All this I have seen and applied my heart to every deed that has been done under the 
sun when a man had power over a(nother) man to his hurt. (8:9) 
Basically, those who are in power to govern and administer justice do not execute 
justice, thus helping wickedness to prevail in Qohelet’s society.  
He then observes another enigma in human life: one’s skill, strength, wisdom, 
intelligence, or ability does not guarantee anything, but sheer luck at the right moment 
grants success (9:11). What one deserves or what can reasonably be expected to occur 
does not always happen in reality: Qohelet ascribes such mishaps to time and chance 
 not blaming anyone but being perturbed nonetheless (Why should he mention it ,(פגע)
otherwise?). However, he also observes that things go wrong by human hands when 
he says, “There is an evil which I have seen under the sun, indeed an error (622(כשגגה 
which is proceeding from the ruler623” (10:5). Such errors are: that the fool624 is set in 
many high places, but the rich sit in a low place;625 and that slaves are riding on 
horses, but princes walking like slaves on the land (10:5–7). Tamez correctly states:  
                                                 
620 Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 618, notes:  “The verb [שלט] here denotes moral power of a person over 
another even as far as to do him harm (לרע לו): it is more an unjustified use of power than a legal one .” 
 is ambiguous, and can mean either one with power or the one under the power was hurt, but the latter לו
is  more likely from Qohelet’s earlier observation of the oppressed as the victim under power. See also 
the work cited therein. Cf. Seow, Ecclesiastes, 284, takes  שלט as a legal-economic term and interprets it 
as economic oppression (usury/slavery). 
 over (another) man to his (the (שלט) man has power (עת אשר) When“ :עת אשר שלט האדם באדם לרע לו 621
latter’s) harm.” The accusative of time and dependent clause עת אשר suggests that the context of 
Qohelet’s observation is the period in which Qohelet, or likely the writer, and his audience have lived. 
An independent unspecified time is possible but unlikely, because people are always under a ruler of 
sort. Emendation of עת to את is unnecessary. Kautzsch ed, GKC, §118.i; Longman, Ecclesiastes, 215; 
Krüger, Kohelet, 282–83 [ET 157]. 
622 The כ in כשגגה is an “asseverative particle,” not to be taken as similarity or a lack of reality, 
translating it “as” or “like.” It should be taken as the kaph veritatis. Gordis, Man, 319; cf. Kautzsch ed, 
GKC, §118.x; also Seow, Ecclesiastes, 314; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 716–17. 
623 Likely referring to המושל “ruler” in 10:4; cf. 9:17. 
624 Literally, “the folly” (הסכל)—an abstract noun or possibly a pointing problem in MT. 
625 A contrast between fool and rich, rather than the usual fool and wise, here is acceptable: cf. 9:11 
(the wise or the discerning is expected to be rich). 
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Verses 5–7 reflect the order of Qoheleth's world: the authorities are set up to do good 
and administer justice. What happens under the sun, which he sees as a calamity, is 
that inept and corrupt people are placed in important leadership positions, while those 
who are competent to hold those positions, people of noble origin, have been pushed 
aside.626 
Qohelet seems to reiterate this in 10:16–17 by indirectly condemning their deeds, 
saying that woe is the land whose king is a lad627 and whose princes feast in the 
morning (i.e., at an inappropriate time),628 for they do not know how to rule, whereas 
the land governed by a king of noble origin and whose princes know when to feast for 
strength, and not for drunkenness, is blessed. The poetic expression is proverbial and 
general but may be a reflection of a chaotic and oppressive regime,629 under which 
Israelite society may well have existed.630 It appears a carefully-crafted indirect 
criticism, indicative of reality nonetheless, because Qohelet warns his audience not to 
curse the king even in their thought or the wealthy in their bedroom, because a bird of 
the air will carry the sound and make the matter known (10:20).631 Qohelet says a lot 
about kings and rulers generally in a negative tone, despite the fact that he himself has 
been a king, without ever referring to his own kingship. It is interesting to note that 
terms such as “king” 10) מלךx), “ruler” 2) מושלx) or 2) שליטx), and “high official” גבה 
(3x) appear seventeen times in all, excluding his own designation as king, in 
Qohelet’s monologic discourse, perhaps reflecting frequent turnover of rulers. 
Qohelet relates the passages in 8:2–5 and 10:4–7, 20 as to how one should behave 
before a king and for his command, while he relates 2:12; 4:13–16; 5:8 [ET 9]; 7:19; 
9:14–15, 17; 10:16–17 to wisdom and folly of a king or rulers. Expecting execution of 
justice by a foolish king and corrupt officials is a far cry in such a society, if these 
notions were meant at all to be a reflection of the Israelite community, in which the 
author lived.  
                                                 
626 Elsa Tamez, When the Horizons Close: Rereading Ecclesiastes (trans. Wilde; Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 2000), 123. 
627 The term נער “boy, youth, or servant,” is used to mean a young person for a wide ranges of age and 
experience in the Bible. Here with a special stress on youthfulness, probably connoting “inability” (cf. 
1 Sam 1:22–24), “inexperienced” (1 Sam 3:7–8), or “ignorant” (1Kgs 3:7). The term also means a 
“household servant” or “personal attendant” in other instances (e.g., Gen 18:7; 2 Kgs 4:12). See 
BDB:654–55. 
628 Cf. Isa 5:11.  
629 Rampant oppression is already noted (4:1–3; 5:7 [ET 8]).  
630 Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 747. 
631 The interpretative difficulty with במדעך literally “in your thought” is noted. The verb ידע sometimes 
means an intimacy of sexual relation. Thus “in your bedchamber” (NASB) or “in your intimacy” 
(Seow, Ecclesiastes, 333–34, 341). Seow suggests a connotation “in the know.” The point of current 
discussion relates more to the action “curse” in Qohelet’s societal situation rather “where,” however. 
Cf. Lohfink, Qoheleth, 118–19; contra Krüger, “Ambiguities,” 71. 
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Secondly, the problem in Qohelet’s society is that not only the powerful who have 
the upper hand oppress and deny due justice to the poor, but also those who practise 
evil seem to get away with their wickedness and even to be rewarded. Qohelet has 
already observed that death does not play fair in human life. Now he finds the 
righteous perishing in his righteousness and the wicked prolonging his life in his evil 
doing (7:15). The implication here seems to be that the righteous die prematurely but 
the wicked enjoy living to an old age. The wicked, who even desecrate the temple by 
going in and out from the holy sanctuary, receive a decent burial when they die, and 
before long the wicked and their deeds are forgotten like anything else as human 
memories quickly fade away (8:10).632 The death of the wicked appears exactly like 
that of the righteous, if there were no punishment against them before their death; if a 
proper burial were afforded to the wicked; or if their wicked deeds were quickly 
forgotten. That is exactly what Qohelet sees happening. Even if the court may 
undertake a proper procedure, the hearts of people are fully set to do evil, because 
 against an evil deed is not swiftly executed (8:11). In 634(פתגם) the sentence 633(אשר)
fact, a sinner does evil numerous times and may still lengthen his life (8:12a). Qohelet 
observes an untenable disparity in the life of the righteous and the wicked: on the one 
hand, righteous people suffer from what the wicked should face because of their evil 
deeds; on the other hand, wicked people benefit from what the righteous should 
deserve for their good deeds (8:14)—bad things are happening to good people, but 
bad people are bestowed with good things. Astonishingly, the righteous are being 
punished without cause for their good conduct, while the wicked not only escape 
punishment but also enjoy good things in their wrongdoing. The traditionally held 
view of retribution—that the righteous are blessed and live long but the wicked are 
punished and perish635—apparently is no longer at work. Qohelet’s society seems to 
have been lop-sided towards injustice, in either punishing or rewarding those who do 
not deserve. 
Thirdly, what troubles Qohelet most of all in such a social condition is that death 
not only cancels out all deeds and activities—good or bad—on the earth, but also 
                                                 
632 Cf. Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 622 –26, who notes various vocalizations and emendations of the difficult 
text due to text corruption. This thesis follows the MT reading as it fits in the context of 8:10–14 where 
“Qohelet relativizes the traditional dogma on the retribution of the wicked and the righteous,” as 
Schoors notes in p. 626.  
633 Gordis, Man, 296. 
634 Cf. Esth 1:20 (“edict, decree”); a Persian loanword, see Seow, Ecclesiastes, 286.  
635 See, e.g., Prov 3:33; 10:16. 
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leaves justice undone for moral and ethical human conduct. Qohelet is often falsely 
accused of not being concerned about ethics or moral issues, or it is said that the terms 
he uses such as רע/ה and טוב/ה do not connote ethical meaning. This is contestable. 
What happens to the righteous or the wicked mentioned above should not concern 
him if he had no moral or ethical concerns. Injustice he observes should not bother 
him. Qohelet’s admonition to fear God or his warning of God’s judgement especially 
after he talks about the deeds of wicked people (e.g., 3:16–17; 8:12–13) is a clear sign 
of his concern with ethical and moral issues in human life. Qohelet cannot talk about 
God, fear of God, or God’s judgement, if he did not concern himself with the 
consequences of human behaviour in this world, which he actually does.636 His 
warning to a youth that God will judge him according to all his deeds in 11:9 
presupposes that the youth has a choice for his behaviour. In this regard, Qohelet is 
not an authentic determinist, because he knows that humans can make a choice for 
moral/ethical behaviour and exhorts his audience to shun evil (8:2–5) and do good 
(3:12; 4:17–5:6 [ET 5:1–7]).  
In effect, Qohelet must be concerned and deeply disturbed with the death of the 
righteous without reward or justice, as he repeatedly brings up the subject of 
inequities (7:15; 8:14; 9:2–3a). One fate to all is one thing, but disallowance of 
compensation or justice is quite another. So Qohelet reminds himself that the deeds of 
the wise and the righteous are in the hand of God, but he is not even sure whether God 
accepts them with love or hatred (9:1) when he sees them dying just like the wicked 
and the fool. Death comes to all, regardless of how one conducts oneself in moral, 
ethical, or religious spheres of human life. The problem is that death often does not 
allow justice to be executed on the earth: On the one hand death comes too quickly to 
the wise and the righteous, before they can receive a well-deserved reward or 
compensation. On the other hand, justice by the court delays too long before the 
wicked are punished or die without just desert. Death may be an ultimate equalizer or 
leveller as a terminator of all life without discrimination, but it does not do justice to 
those who are morally upright; instead, it appears to give an unfair advantage to the 
powerful and the wicked. The same fate for all does not constitute equality or fairness 
to the righteous as well as to the wicked, because all deserve justice according to their 
                                                 
636 Further discussion vide infra. 
137 
  
deeds.637 Death is the ultimate cause of unfairness, inequities, and iniquities in human 
life from where Qohelet stands and observes.638 Bickerman notes: “For Koheleth, as 
he says himself (9:3), the absence of retributive justice . . . was the basic evil of all 
that happened under the sun.”639  
As noted at the beginning of this section, justice must be served somewhere 
sometime, but what Qohelet observes in reality is that justice is either delayed or 
absent: in effect, justice is not executed in this world in the face of death; certainly, it 
is not swift enough to be reckoned. Amazingly, Qohelet never protests or questions 
God about the insufficiency of His justice in this world, despite the fact that the 
righteous are perishing in their righteousness. Furthermore, he maintains that God will 
judge both the righteous and the wicked. 
What happens then after their deaths? Is there any hope for the righteous dead to 
receive well-deserved justice and reward according to Hebrew concept of “afterlife” 
in Sheol, if they died prematurely without justice? How does Qohelet view Sheol, a 
place of post-mortem existence in Israel? The next section aims to address these 
questions. 
3.2.3 Qohelet’s View of Sheol: All Go to Sheol? 
As Qohelet declares that there is one and the same fate (מקרה אחד) for all the living, 
namely all die, he says in 3:20a that “all go to the same place (מקום אחד)” and asks a 
rhetorical question in 6:6b, “Do not all go to one place (מקום אחד)?,” undoubtedly 
expecting “yes” for an answer. It is not clear, however, what exactly Qohelet means 
by the “same” or “one” place. The verse 3:20 ensues with “all came from the dust and 
all return to the dust,” which means “all are dust and all return to its source, the 
earth.” The term הכל “all” here designates “both” human and animal, and מקום אחד 
here appears to mean simply the earth. The phrase רוח הבהמה occurs nowhere else or is 
never associated with Sheol in the OT. In 7:2 he says that all end up in the “house of 
mourning” (640;(בית־אבל and in 9:3 all go to the dead (המתים), which probably means 
all die and join the dead. Qohelet seems to imply that all go to the grave in those 
                                                 
637 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 294. 
638 Cf. Ibid; Daniel P. Bricker, “The Innocent Sufferer in the Book of Proverbs” (PhD diss., Fuller 
Theological Seminary, 1998), 22. 
639 Elias Bickerman, Four Strange Books of the Bible: Jonah/Daniel/Koheleth/Esther (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1967), 150. 
640 “All” is implied in the context. 
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instances. However, in 9:10 he tells his audience in no uncertain terms where they are 
going when they die: 
ודעת וחכמה בשאול  641ידך לעשות בכחך עשה כי אין מעשה וחשבוןכל אשר תמצא 
 אשר אתה הלך שמה
 
Everything that your hand finds to do, do it with your might for there is no work or 
reckoning or knowledge or wisdom in Sheol to which you are going. (9:10)  
The statement follows right after Qohelet once again presses his points to the 
audience that one fate befalls all without discrimination (9:2) and that this life is the 
only one they have and therefore they should enjoy life before they die and go to 
“Sheol.” It is remarkable that Qohelet mentions Sheol at all in 9:10, when one 
considers his perception of death as the end of life. In the context of the passage, 
Qohelet elaborates how precious life is, giving an example of a live dog being better 
than a dead lion, and how people should enjoy their lives and do whatever they do 
with all their might, because: (1) life is short; (2) life is a gift of God; and (3) the life 
given is their portion to enjoy (9:7–10a). Then he adds that there is no work—
physical, mental, or otherwise—in Sheol, where people go (9:10b). Qohelet here 
seems to be saying that Sheol is a place void of human activity, “simply the state of 
death, empty of all the positive qualities which make up life.”642 This, however, does 
not seem to accord well with descriptions of Sheol in other biblical texts. They 
describe Sheol as having power to swallow the wicked alive (Num 16:30; Prov 1:12) 
and consume them (Ps 49:15 [ET 14]; Job 24:19); it is a place of terror and of 
shadowy, insubstantial, miserable, disgusting, gloomy, and naked existence. In the 
Israelite view Sheol is a dreadful place where no one desires to go. Qohelet’s 
depiction does not convey any such imagery but simply describes Sheol as a place of 
dead inactive human state. He seems basically to be equating Sheol with the “grave” 
in his own distinctive view. The connotation of Sheol is preserved but only partially.  
It is also interesting to note how Qohelet says to his audience concerning who 
goes to Sheol: “to which you are going” (9:10 ,אשר אתה הלךc). Curiously, Qohelet 
does not say that it is the place where all (ה/כל) are going, as in 3:20, 6:6b, 7:2 or 9:3, 
despite his favourite use of  כל for eighty-seven times in his monologue. It is also 
                                                 
641 The term חשבון may be better translated as “reckoning” rather than “thought” (RSV) or “planning” 
(NASB) relative to Qohelet’s interest in the “work” מעשה, since “reckoning” can connote either 
“counting” (profit) or “thought, consideration” (of what is done under the sun). Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 
678, translates it  “accounting,” a synonym of reckoning. 
642 Bream, “Life,” 53. 
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strange that Qohelet does not identify himself with his audience when he says “to 
which you are going,” as if he is not going to Sheol—maybe he expects to become 
just dust when he dies (see 3:20b). Sheol is probably no different from remaining as 
dust in the grave, because in his view it is a lifeless existence in either place. To 
Qohelet Sheol may be simply a place of no living activities, but to his immediate 
audience (ancient Israelites) Sheol is a dreadful place to fall into by premature or 
sudden death.  
Nevertheless, what his audience hears from Qohelet’s mouth is most likely that 
just as death meets all without exception, death unequivocally leads all to the dreaded 
place Sheol without discrimination. Qohelet’s statement of “Sheol where you are 
going” is objectionable and an affront to his audience and their ancestors, who 
sparingly speak of Sheol, reserving it for the wicked or lives gone amiss. It ironically 
constitutes another egalitarian society, if all went to Sheol: there is no equitable 
justice in life or in death, a total breach of justice under the sun—on or under the 
earth. Why then does Qohelet still insist that “God will judge,” while seeing the 
righteous dying without justice and also saying that all go to a place where no god 
resides or acts to bring justice? 
Most likely in Qohelet’s mind no human being can escape Sheol especially in the 
social conditions of his day (7:20, 29; 8:11; 9:3). All humans are destined to die and 
go to Sheol—a grave or otherwise.643 Snaith’s description of Sheol probably captures 
what Qohelet may have in mind: 
If Sheol is to be thought of as evidence of the persistence of anything, it is better to 
think of it as the persistence of death rather than of life. . . Sheol is the land of ghosts, 
without life, without thought, without desire, without everything. They are shades, 
weak and helpless, with no life in themselves.644 
Qohelet with his intelligent mind and entrepreneurial spirit certainly would not desire 
to exist in such an inactive post-mortem  state. The dead buried and lying in the grave, 
remaining “asleep,” or merely existing in Sheol is, to him, not living. The point of his 
emphasis, by using such a negative term as שאול rather than קבר, may be that a mere 
existence without a vitally functioning body and soul for living activities amounts to 
nothing, meaning that שאול and קבר are basically the same. Qohelet is so adamant 
about what death does to one’s life that he may even be implying that in his view a 
                                                 
643 Cf. Ps 89:48–49 [ET 47–48]. Interestingly, שוא—another word for “vanity”—appears in the 
passage. 
644 Norman H. Snaith, “Life after Death: The Biblical Doctrine of Immortality,” Int 1 (1947): 317. 
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lifeless existence in Sheol may actually be worse than simply being dead and 
returning to dust.645 
To Qohelet, life without work, knowledge, or wisdom, namely a mere shadowy 
existence in Sheol, does not count because it is not a life meant to be lived and in fact 
is not profitable at all.646 It is striking and oddly inconsistent that Qohelet does not 
give up but holds onto his conviction that God will judge, while implying that death 
has the upper hand in this world and all end up in the same place.   
Qohelet appears to be trying to impress upon his audience that Sheol, therefore, 
does not give any hope after death (regardless of how one may die). The only remedy 
left for the terrible situation in his society, indeed, is a hope that God will judge and 
right the wrongs before it is too late, so Qohelet seeks and tries to understand what 
God is doing in this topsy-turvy world. Where is God when justice is not served on 
the earth? When is the appropriate time for God to act? Qohelet thinks a great deal 
about God’s work which affects human life. In fact, Qohelet has much to say about 
God, but where does it lead him? It is the subject of discussion in the next chapter. 
3.3 Summary and Conclusions 
Qohelet is vexed with how death causes unresolved issues of loss and injustice in this 
world, as if humankind lives in an ethically or morally indifferent universe.647 The 
righteous suffer wrong and the wicked enjoy evil without punishment, and both die 
alike just as animals, in spite of clearly defined divine and human codes of law in 
Israelite society according to the Torah. Qohelet sees death cutting off opportunities 
to rectify wrongs and prematurely denying the ultimate justice due in this life, thereby 
making human existence as if meaningless and debasing it to the level of animals. 
Nothing that Qohelet describes in his monologue, however, is beyond anyone’s 
experience or knowledge. Indeed, what Qohelet utters in Ecclesiastes is nothing new 
in human history. Moreover, Qohelet does not come up with or offer any new strategy 
to combat the inherent and fundamental issues in human life: death and injustice.  
                                                 
645 In contrast to 7:8a, “the end is not better than the beginning,” remark Hugo McCord and Joel Elliott, 
“Hebrew Word Studies,” in Biblical Interpretation: Principles and Practices: Studies in Honor of Jack 
Pearl Lewis (eds. Kearley, et al.; Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1986), 133. Emphasis added. 
646 Cf. Ibid., 133; G. Dalman , “Hades,” New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge 
5:109. 




Qohelet’s description of death and his observation of affairs in the human world 
could easily conjure up a fatalistic life style, if not suicide. “Why does BE [the book 
of Ecclesiastes] so fundamentally radicalize death?” asks Shuster,648 to which 
Heidegger may answer: because “death is that which individualizes and totalizes.”649 
Qohelet looks at death and its consequences and concludes that it is literally the lethal 
problem to individuals and to human society. 
The most serious problem with death that Qohelet observes is that this same 
indiscriminate fate in human life leaves justice on the earth unsatisfactory or undone. 
His observation notwithstanding, Qohelet appears to firmly believe in divine 
judgement. Many scholars argue that Qohelet expects God’s judgement to take place 
during one’s lifetime, because Qohelet does not appear to believe in an “afterlife.”650 
Qohelet may acknowledge the Israelite traditional view of “afterlife”—post-mortem 
existence in Sheol—but he apparently does not see any difference between existence 
in Sheol and lying in the grave because there are no living activities in either place. 
Justice must be done on the earth because there is no judgement in Sheol. Qohelet 
resorts to a rationalization that justice is delayed and persists in his belief. But he also 
observes that the righteous are dying prematurely without seeing retribution. The 
reality is that God’s justice is not always executed during one’s life.  
The problems of death, injustice and Sheol as a destiny of all are critical issues 
that Qohelet raises, if the book’s circulation coincided with a time when the 
traditional view of retributive justice and Sheol perhaps began to be questioned and 
became issues among Israelites. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, but for 
now we continue looking at how Qohelet deals with the issues and struggles that he 
has faced. A huge gap or paradox exists between what Qohelet says and what he 
observes. In the next chapter we will see how Qohelet wrestles with these issues and 
arrives at his resolution.  
  
                                                 
648 Martin Shuster, “Being as Breath, Vapor as Joy: Using Martin Heidegger to Re-Read the Book of 
Ecclesiastes,” JSOT 33 (2008): 224. 
649 Ibid. Shuster refers to Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Basic Writings: From Being and 
Time (1927) to the Task of Thinking (1964) (ed. Krell; London: Routledge, 1993), 243 (GE 263). But 
the citation title does not appear to be correct. The correct reference most likely is Martin Heidegger, 
Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit (SUNY/CCPC; trans. Stambaugh; New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1996). 
650 E.g., M. Delcor, “Ecclesiastes,” in The Cambridge History of Judaism: The Hellenistic Age (eds. 






Chapter 4  
QOHELET’S DILEMMA AND RESOLUTION 
4.1 Qohelet’s Dilemma  
Being an observer, Qohelet seeks and explores by wisdom all that is done under 
heavens (1:13). In particular he tries to search out what God does or has done in 
relation to what is happening in the world. Qohelet recognizes God’s sovereignty and 
control over His creation, but he finds God’s work and activity in the human world 
elusive to his grasp. This section analyses factors affecting Qohelet’s puzzlement and 
vexing dilemma with what he cannot fathom and how they may lead him to arrive at 
his view of everything and his resolution in the ensuing sections. 
4.1.1 Remote God       
Qohelet speaks about God and His activity nearly forty times in his monologic 
discourse. Divine intervention, or lack thereof, often seems to be in his mind when 
Qohelet looks around and observes what is going on in his world. Yet Qohelet is 
rather standoffish when he portrays God and speaks about His activities. For example, 
the term אלהים, rather than יהוה, is used for all forty occurrences of “God” in 
Ecclesiastes, and 75% of them appear with the definite article (ה). This has raised a 
question concerning who Qohelet’s God is, and the debate continues among biblical 
scholars. Because of the exclusive use of אלהים, who appears silent, remote, and 
distant (5:1 [ET 2]) in his monologue, some scholars contend that Qohelet’s God is 
not Yahweh (יהוה), the God of Israel, but a universal god.651 However, closer 
examination of what Qohelet says about God may be warranted in order to understand 
his concept and knowledge of God and who Qohelet’s deity really is. 
                                                 
651 Charles C. Forman, “Koheleth’s Use of Genesis,” JSS 5 (1960): 262; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 146; 
Antoon Schoors, “God in Qoheleth,” in Schöpfungsplan und Heilsgeschichte: Festschrift für Ernst 
Haag zum 70. Geburtstag (eds. Brandscheidt and Mende; Trier: Paulinus, 2002), 269, in which Schoors 
admits that  “we cannot be sure that Qoheleth’s God is not YHWH. However, he is very different from 
the YHWH which the other biblical books depict for us” (emphasis added). His latter sentence is a very 
general sweeping statement and is not convincing or wholly true, as we shall see. 
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Qohelet depicts God as the Creator who controls everything in the universe whilst 
setting all the limits and boundaries in His creation. His frequent reference to God, 
first and foremost, is His work in His created world. He observes seemingly perpetual 
revolving movements of God’s creation,652 and generations coming and going, while 
being plagued with misfortunes and rampant injustice during their life time. Nothing 
is new and nothing seems to change under the sun in his observation (1:4–11). 
Qohelet asks, “What advantage does a human have in all his toil that he toils under 
the sun?” (1:3) and later “Who knows what is good for a human while he lives the 
few days of his fleeting life, which he spends them like a shadow? For who can tell a 
human what will happen after him under the sun?” (6:12). Humans do not have any 
control over what happens on the earth, but merely, and in some fortunate cases 
properly, respond to it as best they can.653 Qohelet finds wisdom has limitations, 
wisdom that he has acquired, that is. He even cannot know how long he can hold onto 
what he has earned by all his efforts. Qohelet wishes to understand the activities of 
God which have been done under the sun (1:13; 3:10; 7:25; 8:16).654 He apparently 
recognizes that God operates behind His created universe, and his view of life hinges 
on how the Creator God works and controls the events of the world, which affects 
human life.655 
Qohelet believes that every human activity on earth is appropriated according to 
God’s timetable, although he does not comprehend how exactly God works through 
space and time under the sun.656 It is unclear whether Qohelet knows that God is not 
bound by time or space in all His activities, or if he thinks that God has already or 
necessarily pre-ordained everything. What he seems to presume is that God is 
                                                 
652 Many scholars interpret 1:4–7 as cyclical nature’s phenomena, thus there is nothing new under the 
sun (1:9–10). See, for example, most recently Nili Samet, “Qohelet 1,4 and the Structure of the Book’s 
Prologue,” ZAW 126 (2014): 92–100. Weeks, Scepticism,  46–53, differs and offers his interpretation of 
1:5–8 as “a list of activities characterized not by circularity  or repetition, but by their common lack of 
completion and consummation” (p. 54). Interestingly, however, in some oriental cultures circularity 
can mean completion, e.g., Kanreki: A full circle of zodiac (the term applied to the 60th birthday 
celebration in Japan). 
653 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 169. 
654 Qohelet makes antithetical statements, “man cannot know/discover” (3:11; 7:14; 8:17; 9:1; 11:5), 
which all the more poignantly contrast Qohelet’s desire to know God’s work under the sun. Qohelet 
uses the verb ידע “to know” 36 times, but says “I know” only 5 times (1:17; 2:14; 3:12, 14; 8:12) and 
the noun דעת “knowledge” appears 7 times in the book, of which just twice is specifically referred to 
his knowledge (1:16; 12:9).  
655 Walther Eichrodt, “Faith in Providence and Theodicy in the Old Testament,” in Theodicy in the Old 
Testament (ed. Crenshaw; IRT 4; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 37. 




somehow involved in every event on the earth. Qohelet perceives and describes God’s 
actions on the earth with such active verbs as: עשה “do, make,”657 נתן “give, set,” שפט 
“judge, rule, govern,”658 השליט “empower” (5:18 [ET 19]; 6:2), בקש “seek” (3:15),   ברם
“make clear” (3:18), חבל “destroy” (5:5 [ET 6]), ענה “keeps one occupied” (5:19 [ET 
  .(approve” (9:7“ רצה bend/make crooked” (7:13), and“ עות ,([20
Qohelet especially emphasizes God’s action with the verb נתן. In twenty-five 
occurrences of the verb in Ecclesiastes, God is the subject of נתן twelve times: that is, 
“it is God who gives or sets.”659 Four times Qohelet characterizes human life as “that 
God has given” (5:17 [ET 18]; 8:15; 9:9; also 12:7). He recognizes that life is a gift of 
God, probably alluding to the creation account of humankind (האדם) in Genesis.660 
Life given to humans, however, is הבל (transient, fleeting, or futile) in his view. God 
gives wisdom, knowledge, and joy to some, while He gives (נתן) grievous tasks to 
others to be busy with for no gain (1:13; 3:10) or for someone else’s benefit (2:26). 
God has also put “eternity” (העלם) in human hearts (3:11).661 Humans cannot enjoy or 
rejoice in any activity, in which they engage, unless God also empowers them to do so 
(5:18 [ET 19]; 6:2). Qohelet iterates, therefore, that enjoyment in one’s labour is “the 
gift of God,” ( אלהיםמתת  ) or one’s “portion” (חלק), if one eats, drinks, and finds 
                                                 
657 Qohelet’s numerous use of the terms עשה and עמל “toil” (vide supra) shows his extreme interest in 
all the work either by God or by humans: מ)עשה) occurs 64 times (43 verbs and 21 nouns) in 
Ecclesiastes. The most distinctive use of the verb appears 14 times in Niphal form נעשה “be 
done/made,” thus “happen” or “occur.” God is specifically associated 12 times in total with עשה “do, 
make” (3:11 [bis], 14 [bis]; 7:14, 29; 11:5) and מעשה “work, deed, activity, what happens” (3:11; 7:13; 
8:17 [bis]; 11:5). Fox, Contradictions, 152, notes with God as subject it almost always means “make 
happen”; and Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 82, adds “even when עׂשה ni., as well as היה, in some instances 
means ‘to happen’, it is always something that happens to human beings.” Isaksson, Language, 74, 
states that “the forms of עׂשה Nifal refer to activities, or an activity [sic], that goes on in the present of 
the author, ‘under the sun’.” The Niphal form is unique to Qohelet, who uses it often with מעשה and 
“under the sun” (1:14; 2:17; 4:3; 8:9, 17; 9:3, 6), “under the heavens” (1:13), or “on the earth” (8:14, 
16) but this form sometimes obscures who the subject of the work is: God or human. 
658 Always in imperfect tense, indicating future action (3:17; 11:9; 12:14). 
659 1:13; 2:26 [bis]; 3:10, 11; 5:17, 18 [ET 18, 19]; 6:2; 8:15; 9:9; 12:7, 11 (Niphal, by one Shepherd). 
Walther Zimmerli, “Place and Limit of the Wisdom in the Framework of the Old Testament 
Theology,” SJT 17 (1964): 157. 
660 Allusion to Gen 2:7; 3:19 is apparent in 3:20; 12:7. Cf. Katharine Dell, “Exploring Intertextual 
Links between Ecclesiastes and Genesis 1–11,” in Reading Ecclesiastes Intertextually (eds. Dell and 
Kynes; LHBOTS 587; London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 3–14 [esp. 9].  
661 James L. Crenshaw, “The Eternal Gospel (Eccl 3:11),” in Essays in Old Testament Ethics (New 
York: Ktav, 1974), 40, notes that  “it is significant that Qoheleth uses ‘olam in its usual Old Testament 
sense in 1:4, 10; 2:16; 3:14; 9:6.” Although excluding 3:11 from the list, he still believes 3:11 must be 
temporal in meaning 
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enjoyment in his toil during his brief life on this earth.662 Schoors concludes in his 
summary of Qohelet’s use of the verb נתן with God as its subject that 
all its objects refer to fundamental human situations or tasks: the days of life or life 
span (5:17; 8:15; 9:9), wealth (5:18), a (bad) business (1:13; 2:26), wisdom (2:26), 
enjoyment (3:13; 5:18), life spirit (12:7; רוח). That implies that the verb has a 
factitive force in the sense of “procure for, permit, commit, make.” It gets a 
determinative meaning: God determines the human being, he (pre)ordains human 
life. Therefore the translation “gift/to give” in the sense of “grant, bestow on” is not 
very felicitous.663 
God has also made everything appropriate in its specified time, and what He does 
will remain forever. God and His works are unfathomable by human logic or 
rationale, even though humans may laboriously seek to find them out (8:17).664 
Humankind is not fashioned or endowed to discover what is beyond their earth-bound 
frame of the created being,665 while God operates on all His creation from heaven 
without boundaries. Qohelet recognizes that God has made humankind upright but 
humans have sought many devices (7:29),666 because of their insatiable desire to seek, 
explore, and understand the activity of God and because of their perpetual propensity 
to deviate (667(חטא either from righteousness or wickedness in excess (7:16–17, 20). 
God has surely made clear to humankind so that they see themselves being just as 
animals (3:18). In all his observations—good or bad—Qohelet perceives God’s 
hidden hand that directs or frustrates human activities, which is apparent from his 
statement about God every time when he makes comments about human affairs.668  
Therefore, Qohelet warns his listeners to guard their steps, especially when they 
involve God such as by going to the temple to seek His favour (4:17–5:5 [ET 5:1–6]). 
He exhorts them to listen rather than foolishly offer sacrifices, not to speak hastily or 
impulsively such as making a vow and then not fulfilling the oath that they have made 
before God. Such conduct offends God, even if He is invisible and seems to be very 
remote as “God is in heaven and you are on the earth” (5:1 [ET 2]), says Qohelet. He 
also cautions his audience to keep the king’s command because of an oath of 
                                                 
מיד ) cf. 2:24 ;מתת and in 5:18 [ET 19] with נתן vide supra) appears in 5:17 [ET 18]; 9:9 with) חלק 662
 .all in the context of eating, drinking, and enjoyment in one’s toil :(האלהים
663 Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 21; Schoors, Preacher II, 93– 98. 
664 Also 1:13; 7:24–25. 
665 See the parallel passages to 3:11: 7:13–14; 8:7–8, 17; 9:12; 10:14; 11:5. 
666 Possible allusion to Gen 6:1–7 or 11:1–9; cf. Prov 16:9. 
667  The verb means  “to miss a mark, to fall short of the standard,” from which is derived the theological 
meaning,  “to  sin.” The participle seems to designate the sinner in Prov 13:22; Isa 65:20 and all 
instances in Eccl. See G. Herbert Livingston, “ָחָטא,” TWOT:277 – 79.  
668 See 1:13; 2:24–26; 3:10–18; 5:5–6 [ET 6–7], 17–19 [ET 18–20]; 6:2; 7:13–14, 16–18, 26; 8:2, 12–
13; 9:1, 7; 11:5, 9. 
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allegiance that was made before God (8:2). Qohelet warns the seriousness of offence 
by oath probably because he knows that “God never suffers fools gladly.”669 
Consciously or unconsciously, Qohelet seems to be reminded of God’s law whenever 
and whatever subject he brings up. Torah and other biblical teachings670 echo in many 
of his sayings against corruptions that Qohelet has seen in his community. 
For example, his admonition against improper entry and a fool’s offering of 
sacrifices in the temple (4:17–5:1a [ET 5:1–2a]) may perhaps be a reminder from Lev 
10:1–3671 that God expects to be treated as holy and to receive honour. God’s 
dwelling place in heaven is a familiar theme elsewhere, as in Deut 4:39.672 His 
admonition about making a vow and fulfilling it in a timely manner (5:3–4 [ET 4–5]) 
may allude to the teaching in Deut 23:21–23 and Num 30:2. In addition, his audience 
may hear an echo from Deut 4:2 and 12:32 when Qohelet says that nothing can be 
added to or taken away from whatever God says or does (3:14a). An allusion to the 
Genesis creation account of human beings has already been noted.673 Qohelet’s 
cautious encouragement to a youth to enjoy his life but also his reminding him of God 
and His judgement (11:9–12:1) perhaps reflects a warning against carnal desires in 
Num 15:39. When he talks about human life as הבל, which one spends like a shadow 
(6:12), it resonates with King David’s psalm: “Man is like a mere breath (הבל), his 
days are like a passing shadow” (Ps 144:4). When Qohelet sternly cautions about the 
difference between the two realms where God and humans reside, he may be 
reminded of, or alluding to, Ps 115:16: “The heavens are the heavens of Yahweh, but 
the earth He has given to humankind,” where they belong. 
The above examples show that teachings from Torah, Genesis and Deuteronomy 
in particular, may be embedded in Qohelet’s monologic discourse.674 The God, of 
                                                 
669 “ This expression comes from the New Testament (II Corinthians 11:19), where Paul sarcastically 
says, ‘For ye suffer fools gladly, seeing ye yourselves are wise.’ [c.1600].”  Christine Ammer, 
AHDI:142. Note that the word  כסיל “fool” appears three times in the passage: 4:17 [ET 5:1]; 5:2–3 [ET 
3–4]. 
670 Lucas, Exploring, 165 – 66; Ginsberg, “Koheleth,” 147. 
671 Also cf. 1 Sam 15:22; Prov 15:8; 21:3, 27; Hos 6:6. 
672 Also Deut 3:24; Josh 2:11; 1 Kgs 8:23; Job 22:12; Ps 11:4; 115:3. 
673 Also cf. Gen 18:27; Job 10:9; 17:16; 34:15; Ps 90:3; 103:14; 104:29. 
674 Krüger, Kohelet, 47 – 48 [ET 24 – 25]; Philip P. Chia, “Wisdom, Yahwism, Creation: In Quest of 
Qohelet’s Theological Thought,” Jian Dao 3 (1995): 1 – 32; David M. Clemens, “The Law of Sin and 
Death: Ecclesiastes and Genesis 1 – 3,” Them 19 (1994): 5 – 8; Forman, “Koheleth’s Use,” 256 – 63; 
William H. U. Anderson, “The Curse of Work in Qoheleth: An Exposé of Genesis 3:17 – 19 in 
Ecclesiastes,” EQ 70 (1998): 99 – 113; Eichrodt, “Faith,” 37 – 38; Hans Wilhelm Hertzberg and Hans 
Bardtke, Der Prediger/Das Buch Esther (KAT 17/4 – 5; Gütersloh: Mohn, 1963), 227 – 30. Hertzberg 
remarks: „Es ist kein Zweifel: das Buch Qoh ist geschrieben mit Gn 1–4 vor den Augen seines 
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whom Qohelet speaks, is not an “unknown god” but the god that he knows, and he is 
familiar with Torah teaching. This in turn clarifies that Qohelet’s God is not a general, 
universal god, but the God of Israel.675 Nonetheless, He never utters יהוה but uses the 
term ה)אלהים) whenever he mentions God, and uses the latter both with and without 
the definite article interchangeably676 in the same sentence or in similar contexts.677 
Why has Qohelet, or the author of Ecclesiastes for that matter, chosen to use 
exclusively the term אלהים, when addressing God? On a personal level, Qohelet may 
simply not have felt a personal closeness to address God as יהוה, when Yahweh 
apparently has become silent and remote in heaven during the tumultuous upheaval of 
an evil society in which he lived.678 Maybe he has deliberately avoided the sacred 
Tetragrammaton יהוה, because of his observation of the reality in his society, which is 
filled with corruption and perversion of justice. As much as he perceives his God as 
the ultimate Judge who appears more to punish than reward, perhaps Qohelet did not 
wish to utter His personal name,679 especially when the sufferers were his own people 
and when their suffering could look like God’s punishment as in 7:15 and 8:14. 
Nevertheless, Qohelet’s advice to a youth to remember his Creator (12:1),680 for 
God will judge him according to his deeds (11:9), seems intended to remind the youth 
of his relationship and responsibility to the God whom he is likely taught to worship, 
especially if the youth were Israelite. Qohelet also repeatedly reminds his audience of 
the importance of fearing God, which echoes the familiar theme of “the fear of 
Yahweh” in Wisdom literature.681 Sifre Deuteronomy makes a following generalized 
observation about the difference in use between אלהים and יהוה:  
                                                                                                                                            
Verfassers; die Lebensanschauung Qoh’s ist an der Schöpfungsgeschichte gebildet“ (There is no 
doubt: the book of Ecclesiastes is written with Genesis 1 – 4 in front of its author, and Qohelet’s view of 
life is built on the Creation story). Author’s emphasis. 
675 Stephan de Jong, “God in the Book of Qohelet: A Reappraisal of Qohelet’s Place in Old Testament 
Theology,” VT 47 (1997): 154 – 67; Helmer Ringgren and Walther Zimmerli, Sprüche/Prediger (ATD 
16/1; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 133; contra Lauha, Kohelet, 17. 
676 Schoors notes there seems to be no difference in meaning in the less frequent use of Elohim without 
the definite article, which he explains as Qohelet’s erratic use of the article, in Schoors, “God,” 270, 
although his notion in the relative clause may not be correct; also Schoors, Preacher I, 164 – 69; cf. Jean 
L’Hour, “Yahweh Elohim,” RB 81 (1974): 551, notes that אלהים, often without the article, is a proper 
name designating Yahweh, the only/unique God, at a later period.  
677 See 2:24 vs. 5:18 [ET 19]; 3:10 – 14; 3:14 vs. 7:18; 4:17 – 5:6 [ET 5:1 – 7]; 8:12 – 13. In verse 5:18 [ET 
19] both האלהים and אלהים appear. 
678 Carey Walsh, “Theological Trace in Qoheleth,” BTB 42 (2012): 14. 
679 Exod 3:13–15. 
680 For detailed analysis of בוראיך, vide infra in Chapter 5.  
681 Although Qohelet does not use the phrase יראת אלהים “the fear of God” corresponding to יראת יהוה. 
See more on Qohelet’s “fear God” in Chapter 5. 
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Whenever Scripture says the Lord (יהוה), it refers to His quality of mercy, as in the 
verse, The Lord, the Lord, God, merciful and gracious (Exod. 34:6). Whenever it 
says God (אלהים), it refers to His quality of justice, as in the verses, The cause of both 
parties shall come before God (אלהים) (Exod. 22:8), and Thou shalt not revile God 
 nor curse a ruler) (Exod. 22:27)682) (אלהים)
It is not certain if the author of Ecclesiastes recognized this particular distinctive use 
of the two terms, but some such distinction may perhaps be present in his non-use of 
the Tetragrammaton.  
Qohelet begins and ends his monologic discourse with descriptions of God’s 
created universe (1:3–11; 12:1–7). He focuses much on God as the Creator who has 
created humankind and God who will judge. Perhaps the author of Ecclesiastes has 
desired to bring out the character of יהוה particularly as the Creator of the universe by 
using the term אלהים, a deity who has authority and control over all His creation and 
their activities.683 Thus the author lets Qohelet speak about Israel’s God as the Creator 
God who will judge the righteous and the wicked, which may include both Jews and 
pagans in his society.  
A notion that God in Ecclesiastes is an impersonal, distant deus absconditus or a 
very different God from  Yahweh in the rest of Scripture seems a modern Western 
perception.684 A silent God is not a proof of an absent God. Frydych makes a 
perceptive remark:  
Qoheleth’s systematic reference to God as ֱאִהים, yet, [sic] accompanied by a strictly 
monotheistic perspective, suggests that Qoheleth is writing at a time when Yahweh is 
no more seen as a tribal deity, but as the only God, i.e., in a time when what initially 
appeared to be the perspective reserved to the wisdom sages became widespread.685 
                                                 
682 Reuven Hammer, Sifre: A Tannaitic Commentary on the Book of Deuteronomy (24; New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1986), 49, with translator’s emphasis; based on Louis Finkelstein, Sifre on 
Deuteronomy = ספרי על ספר דברים (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1969), 41.  
683 Bartholomew, Reading, 258. This emphasis that Yahweh is the Creator of the universe is shown by 
the combined name  20) יהוה אלהים  times out of 24 occurences of Elohim) in the creation reccount in 
Gen 2:4 – 3:24 . Interesting to note is that the four occurences of Elohim alone in the passage is within 
the dialogue between the serpent (3 times) and the woman (once), not in the narrative. See L’Hour, 
“Yahweh,” 525 – 56, for his excellent analysis on the unique combined name designation. L’Hour notes 
that the intensive use of the name Yahweh Elohim suggests that the Yahwist believes that the creator 
Elohim in Gen 1:1–2:3 is Yahweh of Israel (p. 555). Clearest examples of this emphasis appear in Exod 
9:29–30, where Moses tries to impress upon Pharaoh that Yahweh is the Creator, because of Pharaoh’s 
earlier retort (Exod 5:2): “Who is Yahweh . . . ? I do not know Yahweh.” Another example is in Jonah 
4:6, where the passage shows that Yahweh is the God of creation who also cares about the Ninevites 
(v. 11) to impress upon Jonah that Yahweh is the God of the Gentiles as well as of Jews. Gen 24:3 and 
Num 27:16 are passages where יהוה and אלהים appear in the same sentence and indicate Yahweh is 
Elohim, the God of heavens and earth and of all flesh. Therefore, Qohelet may have used אלהים without 
an article as God’s proper name, as L’Hour proposes. 
684 Schoors, “God,” 269. 
685 Tomás̆. Frydrych, Living under the Sun: Examination of Proverbs and Qoheleth (VTSup 90; 
Leiden: Brill, 2002), 210. 
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In conclusion it is the God of Israel about whom Qohelet speaks. This God is 
transcendent; nonetheless, Qohelet affirms that God is at work under the sun. 
Why then does God (האלהים) seem so remote from Qohelet’s world in spite of his 
utterance of God nearly forty times? Qohelet says, “God is in heaven,” but he never 
looks up or directly beseeches God when he tries to search out answers for life’s 
mystery and contradictions. Qohelet’s eyes are fixed on everything under the sun, and 
he tries to find answers by his “self-realized wisdom” (1:17; 7:23),686 rather than 
wisdom from above.687 God indeed becomes remote, or rather Qohelet seems to keep 
his distance from God, albeit perhaps unintentionally, as he seeks to understand 
everything with his own wisdom. The next section will discuss the outcome of his 
search by his self-realized wisdom.  
4.1.2 The Unknowable 
Qohelet has a voracious appetite for wisdom and knowledge.688 He boasts about his 
own wisdom and knowledge as saying, “I grew and increased wisdom, surpassing all 
who were over Jerusalem before me, and my heart enjoyed much wisdom and 
knowledge” (1:16). Qohelet has sought to understand and find answers to life’s 
perplexities by wisdom689 as he faced an unfulfilling prospect through his toil to find 
meaning in his transient life. The more he seeks, the less confident and more puzzled 
he becomes in his quest for understanding the activity of God in human affairs under 
the sun (1:17–18; 8:17). Qohelet claims that he has tested everything by wisdom and 
said to himself, “I will be wise,” but he has found that he himself is far from being 
truly wise. Qohelet finds that there are things which humans cannot know, however 
laboriously he may seek and explore what happens in this world. What he really 
desires to know and apprehend is elusive and beyond his grasp. This he finds even 
                                                 
686 J. Edward Owens, “ ‘Come, Let Us Be Wise ’ : Qoheleth and Ben Sira on True Wisdom, with an Ear 
to Pharaoh’s Folly,” in Intertextual Studies in Ben Sira and Tobit (eds. Corley and Skemp; CBQMS 38; 
Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 2005), 228, 234, notes that the Hithpael 
conjugation of  חכם “be wise ” in Exod   1:  10; Eccl 7:16; and Sir 6:32; 1  0:26;  32:4; 38:24, 25 (the 
identified leaves in Hebrew) is essentially reflexive and refers to self-realization of wisdom. Qohelet ’ s 
wisdom is self-realized, couched in terms of being realized by and for himself (cf. 2:9). Emphasis 
added; see also H.-P. Müller and M. Krause, “ָחַכם,” TDOT 4:370 – 71. 
687 Cf. 1 Kgs 4:29; 5:12a which state: “God/Yahweh gave wisdom to Solomon”; interestingly, the 
writer uses the term for the divine giver אלהים in the first verse and יהוה in the second. 
688 The term חכם and its cognates appear 53 times, and ידע and its cognate 36 times in Ecclesiastes (vide 
supra), and all but three are uttered by Qohelet.  
689 Qohelet expresses his effort as saying, “I set my mind to know (by) wisdom . . .,” e.g., in 1:13, 17; 
7:25; 8:16.  
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truer when it comes to comprehending when and how God operates to bring about His 
righteous judgement.  
4.1.2.1  Time          
Whatever exists under the sun is bound by time, and life on earth is linear and 
restricted by time. Time or timing in human affairs is important to Qohelet because he 
realizes that duration of human life is short and limited. In fact, life seems so short 
that Qohelet phrases it as  ימי־חיים  הבל the few years of life” and describes it as“ (מספר)
“fleeting,” as already discussed. Moreover, people neither know what evil may befall 
the earth, nor when it strikes them during their life time (11:2). Qohelet, therefore, 
encourages people to prepare for their rainy days, be diligent in their work without 
being idle or waiting for the right time to begin their work, which they cannot know 
anyway (11:1–6). Time and chance erode a human plan because humans cannot set or 
control an appropriate or right time to achieve a desired goal (9:11). What is worse, 
humans do not know the time of their death, and the evil time can suddenly fall on 
them (cf. 9:12). Next to death, time is another issue that occupies Qohelet’s mind and 
with which he also grapples, when he looks around in his world. 
Qohelet opens chapter 3, saying that there is an appointed time for everything and 
an appropriate time for every matter under heaven (3:1). He lists pairs of events—
perhaps merismus or perhaps opposite690—which occur in human life in fourteen 
categories:691 
 
A time to give birth, and a time to die;  עת ללדת ועת למות 
A time to plant, and a time to uproot what is planted. עת לטעת ועת לעקור נטוע׃ 
A time to kill, and a time to heal;   עת להרוג ועת לרפוא 
A time to tear down, and a time to build up. עת לפרוץ ועת לבנות׃ 
A time to weep, and a time to laugh;   עת לבכות ועת לשחוק 
A time to mourn, and a time to dance. עת ספוד ועת רקוד׃ 
A time to throw stones, and a time to gather stones;   עת להשליך אבנים ועת כנוס אבנים 
A time to embrace, and a time to shun embracing. עת לחבוק ועת לרחק מחבק׃ 
A time to search, and a time to give up as lost;   עת לבקש ועת לאבד 
A time to keep, and a time to throw away. עת לשמור ועת להשליך׃ 
A time to tear apart, and a time to sew together;  עת לקרוע ועת לתפור 
A time to be silent, and a time to speak. עת לחשות ועת לדבר׃ 
A time to love, and a time to hate;   עת לאהב ועת לשנא 
                                                 
690 Hartmut Gese, “Die Krisis der Weisheit bei Koheleth,” in Les sagesses du Proche-Orient ancien: 
Colloque de Strasbourg, 17 – 19 mai, 1962 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), 149; ET 
Hartmut Gese, “The Crisis of Wisdom in Koheleth,” in Theodicy in the Old Testament (ed. Crenshaw; 
IRT 4; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 148. 
691 Probably meant to encompass every event in human life, “typical not specific,” i.e.,  כל־חפץ in  3:1. 
Fox, Contradictions, 192. 
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A time for war, and a time for peace. (3:2–8, NASB) עת מלחמה ועת שלום׃ 
 
In 3:11 he then says:  
לא־ימצא האדם  694נתן בלבם מבלי אשר 693בעתו גם את־העלם 692את־הכל עשה יפה
 את־המעשה אשר־עשה האלהים מראש ועד־סוף׃
The phrase את־הכל עשה יפה בעתו in 3:11a is usually translated as “He has made 
everything appropriate [or beautiful] in its time.” Within the context of the well-
known “time” passage, it is unlikely that Qohelet here in v. 11 means God’s creative 
act when he says את־הכל עשה. Qohelet mentions various events which have their time 
in vv. 2–8. They are probably examples of כל־חפץ “every matter” under heaven, 
pointing back to v. 1. It is unlikely that הכל in 3:11a is everything that God has created 
or made, but again most likely referring back to כל־חפץ in v. 1. Fox points out: 
“‘aśh—when God is the subject—almost always means ‘make happen’; and ma‘ăśeh 
usually means ‘event’ or, as a collective, ‘events’.”695 Fox categorises both עשה in 
v.11 as “make happen” and המעש  as “event” in his distribution list of the senses of 
 and they fit well within the context of 3:1–15. In other words, v.11 may be 696,עשה
interpreted as:   
He makes every event happen (את־הכל עשה) appropriately in its time. He has also set 
eternity in their heart, except that humans will not find out [every] event which God 
makes happen (697(את־המעשה אשר־עשה האלהים from the beginning even to the end.   
Qohelet apparently does not see those events, good or bad, merely as happenstances. 
Rather he seems to view them occurring under a divinely ordained time,698 although 
humans may not necessarily recognize it. Even if one may plan an event, ultimately, 
the right (appropriate) moment for it to happen exactly is not within human power 
which sets or controls it. In His scheme of things, God may have already worked out 
                                                 
692   “Beautiful, fair, appropriate, right (=טוב, see 5:17 [ET 18]).” CHALOT:139. 
693 The term here is variously interpreted, “the world” (KJV), “mystery of the world” (Fisch, 1988), “a 
sense of duration” (Murphy, 1992), “ignorance” (NET), “passage of time” (NJB), or even “work” 
(McDonald, D. B., 1899, and 90 years later Fox, emends העלם to העמל, but all the versions support 
MT), and the context here supports the meaning “eternity” (ESV, NASB, NKJ, RSV, and others). See 
Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 166 – 67; Ginsburg, Coheleth, 310. 
694  “Excep that.” Kautzsch ed, GKC, §152y, notes concerning מבלי אשר לא:  “Two negatives in the same 
sentence do not neutralize each other . . . , but makes the negative the more emphatic . . . This 
especially applies to the compounds formed by the union of . . . ְּבִלי with ִמן־.”  
695 See Fox, Contradictions, 152; however, Fox later changes his mind in Fox, Time, 209–10.  
696 Fox, Contradictions, 153; Isaksson, Language, 81, notes that עשה in v. 11a has “a stative force 
depicting an attribute of God.” 
697 I.e., את־הכל עשה = את־המעשה 
698 The phrase בעתו can mean either  “in its time ” or  “in his time ” ; if the latter, it may be paraphrased 
as  “in God’s ordained time,” i.e., a proper time from God’s perspective. Every “thing” or “event” by 
itself does not set time but God does it for everything. Cf. Schoors, Preacher II, 114 – 15. 
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everything from His eternal perspective which transcends “time under the sun” 
(3:11a), and everything occurs within God’s time frame of eternity (cf. 3:14). In other 
words, humans may recognize that there is indefinite time beyond the human life 
span, but they cannot know the entire work of God for every event which extends far 
beyond their life.  
Humans can only see what is happening now and within their immediate sphere, 
not like God who sees everything that happens in the “eternal” time frame so as to 
connect the dots and see the whole picture. Humans live within the time allotted, and 
thus live in tension within the measured time. Colson writes:  
Living in time is one of life’s great tensions. We are nostalgic for the past, which 
lives only in  our memory, in the midst of a disappearing present, while our hopes for 
the future can never be  assured. Time measured from one end point to another is 
painfully elusive.699  
In contrast, the eternity in which God operates is “beyond measured time.”700 Even 
though Qohelet believes that there is an appropriate time which God has set for 
everything, he has no way of knowing whether it lies within or without one’s life 
span. He cannot know what is beyond the time frame within which he lives. Qohelet 
never clearly states that the appropriate time must be within one’s life, certainly never 
specifically relating to God’s judgement.701 He simply affirms that there is an 
appropriate time for every deed and every event under heaven. All he can say is, 
therefore, “there is a time for everything,” everything including divine judgement, but 
without knowing when that time is or will be.  
It is as though Qohelet assumes that God’s work is accomplished within measured 
time when he desires to know and understand what God does under the sun. Since 
justice is not served, as it should be, or is delayed in his society, it seems inevitable 
that Qohelet wants to know what God is doing in such a world. What Qohelet finds, 
or does not find, regarding God’s activities under heaven will be the next topic to 
follow.  
                                                 
699 Colson, Faith, 108. 
700 Scott C . Jones, “Qohelet and the Economy of Time” (paper presented at The Society of Biblical 
Literature 2012 Annual Meeting. Chicago, IL, November 16 – 20, 2012), 3. Author’s emphasis. 
701 “A time to judge” is not listed in the category of time in 3:2–8. Two occurrences specifically 
mentioning God’s judgement (11:9; 12:14) set it in the future tense. 
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4.1.2.2  What God Does       
Qohelet says: “I know that everything which God does will last forever ( הוא יהיה
 There is nothing to add to it and there is nothing to take from it” (3:14). No .702(לעולם
one can straighten what is crooked or reckon what is lacking, if it is the work of God 
(1:15; 7:13). God makes happen the day of prosperity (יום טובה) as well as the day of 
adversity (יום רעה) in human life (7:14). Qohelet believes that the sphere of divine 
control in the universe is not limited to the natural world but also in the realm of 
human life and activities. The verb עשה   “do, make” or “make happen” is one of the 
most frequently used active verbs next to נתן “give, set,” and both are often associated 
with God’s activities in Qohelet’s monologic discourse. There seems no question in 
Qohelet’s mind that God has been involved in human affairs on the earth, but his 
description of divine activities conveys no discernible presence of God but seems to 
assume His remote operation from heaven, God’s dwelling place (5:1 [ET 2]).  
God’s activities puzzle Qohelet a great deal, because nothing changes and nothing 
is new under the sun regardless of what happens on the earth, or more specifically 
even in the human world, in his observation (1:9–11). From the beginning Qohelet 
has set his heart to seek and search out by wisdom what is done under the sun but he 
has concluded at three different times that no one can discover the work of God (1:13; 
3:10–11; 8:16–17). The threefold statement of inability to discern God’s activity may 
indicate Qohelet’s dilemma and bafflement at not knowing what God does, especially 
when evil deeds are rampant in this world. Qohelet observes that the absence or delay 
of justice is only encouraging those in power to become even fully evil (8:9–12a). 
Qohelet admits that no one, even the wise like himself, can grasp the work that God 
does under the sun:  
את־המעשה אשר נעשה  703וראיתי את־כל־מעשה האלהים כי לא יוכל האדם למצוא
יעמל האדם לבקש ולא ימצא וגם אם־יאמר החכם לדעת לא  704רתחת־השמש בשל אש
  705יוכל למצא׃
                                                 
702 Literally, “it will be for ever.” Seow, Ecclesiastes, 164: “That is, not bound by time and invariably 
coming to pass (cf. lĕ‘ôlām in 1:4).”  
703 Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 645–46, notes: “The most striking conclusion about מצא in Qoh. is, that in a 
number of contexts, it refers to intelletual activity in the sense of ‘to discover, to conclude, to 
understand’.” 
 .a complex conjunction and variously translated. See ibid., 645 :בשל אשר 704
705 A complicated text, the apodosis of 8:16 (conditional clause). Some scholars equate כל־מעשה האלהים 
with המעשה אשר נעשה תחת־השמש, but others disagree; the former probably is correct: “every work of 
God = the work that is done under the sun,” namely, “every work of God that is done under the sun.” 
Not “all that is done (or happen) under the sun is God’s work” (note the location of כל in v. 17). 




Then I saw every work of God, that humans cannot find the work that is done under 
the sun. However much humans toil to seek, they will not find; and even though the 
wise says to know, he cannot find. (8:17) 
He cannot fathom what God may, or most likely may not, be doing in the midst of 
all the evil that is taking place. Yet he does not question, probe, or protest the injustice 
that he has seen but only insists that it will be well for those who openly fear God 
even under such circumstances (8:12). He instead contends that the righteous, the 
wise, and their works are in the hand of God:  
את־כל־זה אשר הצדיקים והחכמים  707את־כל־זה נתתי אל־לבי ולבור 706כי
  ׃ 710אין יודע האדם הכל לפניהם 709ביד האלהים גם־אהבה גם־שנאה 708ועבדיהם
 
Indeed I have given all this to my heart and to explain all this that the righteous and 
the wise, and their services are in the hand of God. Whether it is love or hatred, 
humans do not know; all are before them. (9:1) 
But the problem is that humans often do not know whether their deeds are favourable 
or unacceptable to God. Qohelet has already observed that there is no guarantee that 
the righteous and the wise are rewarded for their deeds in this world, but now he says 
that they cannot know if God will love or hate711 their services, once they are in God’s 
hand.712 In other words, they are not certain if their present suffering is God’s testing 
                                                                                                                                            
humans toil to discover. The unique term ענין in v. 16 as seven other occurrences in Ecclesiastes is the 
human task/occupation, probably alluding back to 1:13; 2:23; 3:10–11; 4:8 which are all endless but 
futile task. Qohelet notes that God has given ענין to humankind in1:13; 2:26; 3:10. Therefore, “the task 
 (that is done on the earth, even if neither day nor night one’s eyes see sleep” in 8:16 (cf. LXX (הענין)
cannot be “the work (המעשה) that is done under the sun, which humans cannot find out however 
laboriously they may seek” in 8:17. Cf. Gordis, Man, 186; contra Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 642–47. 
706 Possibly causal, adversative, or asseverative according to how one relates 9:1 to the preceding 
passage. Seow, Ecclesiastes, 297. 
707 Lectio difficilior, taken as waw explicativum (Seow ibid., 297), or maybe inf. consecutive; Schoors, 
Ecclesiastes, 652. 
708 From עבד: “work, service.” Often the word is translated as “their deeds.” The righteous and the wise 
are often expected to serve God, so it may also be translated “their services.”  
גם־שנאה גם־אהבה 709 : "whether love or hate." 
 literally, “all (or both, i.e., love and hate) are before them”; it can be temporal or spatial :הכל לפניהם 710
in meaning. Many connect the phrase with the first word (הכל) in v. 2, following LXX, to emend it to 
 and interpret it as “everything before them is hebel.” This thesis follows MT reading with temporal הבל
in meaning without emendation. Cf. Seow, Ecclesiastes, 298–99; contra Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 656. 
Schoors also emends כאשר in v. 2 to באשר, which is possible and even looks attractive but may be 
influenced too much by Qohelet's ubiquitous judgement, “everything is hebel,” on pure instincts, as 
Seow points out in his commentary. 
711 Contra Seow, Ecclesiastes, 298, who connects love/hate in 9:1 with those in 9:6 and interprets as 
human love/hate. If it is human love/hate, a question is why “the human does not know”; cf. 
Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 296, 300. Most scholars interpret it as divine  love/hate in 9:1. 
712 One wonders if Qohelet has in mind the offerings by Cain and Abel—God hated the former and 
loved the latter (Gen. 4:3–7)—when he mentions offering a sacrifice in 9:2, although here he talks 
about one who offers and one who does not. Ironically Abel’s name is spelt the same as hebel (הבל) in 
Hebrew, although Donald A. Seybold, “ֶהֶבל,” TDOT 3:314, cautions:  “It cannot be demonstrated with 
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(from love) or His punishment (from hatred—perhaps anger) for their services.713 
They cannot know what lies ahead in their life (הכל לפניהם) and they will die without 
knowing what God has given or done in their life—reward or punishment. It does not 
seem to matter if God favours one over the other because death awaits them all. In 
Qohelet’s view, again the same fate befalls all humans irrespective of their deeds: all 
die and go to the same place (3:20). Qohelet clearly sees this as evil among all that is 
done under the sun: that is, one fate for all and all must die as if all deserve the same 
fate regardless (9:3). Qohelet maintains his conviction on God’s judgement but he 
cannot even discern what God is doing in the midst of misfortunes that the righteous 
suffer, which the wicked deserve to face, or of rampant iniquities that the wicked 
commit and get away with. Wickedness has prevailed, and there seems to be no divine 
intervention or justice in the foreseeable future in his society.  
After all searches, there is no justification to legitimize what Qohelet has seen, 
and his dilemma remains. He is a man of enquiry but his effort does not provide what 
he really looks for (7:23–25). What he has found is that there is not a righteous person 
on the earth who does good and never sins, but humans have sought out many devices 
despite the fact that God made them upright (7:20, 29).714 There is therefore hardly 
any hope for justice in this world. Qohelet does not quite say that this is also injustice, 
but comes close to it, because there may still be a hope only if death did not cut off all 
human endeavours (9:4). Death is a certainty in life nonetheless, and Qohelet has to 
come to some conclusion and resolution with this reality. 
4.2 Qohelet’s Conclusion and Resolution  
Facing the tyranny of death and with insufficient wisdom for insight, Qohelet 
contemplates what life really entails but seems to resort to a pragmatic solution for 
living the life that God allotted to humankind. The ensuing sections explore what 
conclusion and resolution Qohelet has drawn on life.  
                                                                                                                                            
complete certainty that there is a connection between this root  and the  name  ‘Abel,’ which appears only 
in Gen. 4 .” Abel’s story is also a reminder of the brevity of human life: “Abel’s brief life is the life 
of  Everyman,” says Duncan B. MacDonald, The Hebrew Literary Genius: An Interpretation 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1933), 111; see also E. J. van Wolde, “The Story of Cain and 
Abel: A Narrative Study,” JSOT 52 (1991): 29; Radiša Antic, “Cain, Abel, Seth, and the Meaning of 
Human Life as Portrayed in the Books of Genesis and Ecclesiastes,” AUSS 44 (2006):  203 – 11; Melvin 
Tinker, “Evil, Evangelism and Ecclesiastes,” Them 28 (2003): 10. 
713 Marcus Adriaen, “S. Hieronymi Presbyteri Commentarius in  Ecclesiasten,” in S. Hieronymi 
Presbyteri Opera I,1 (CCSL 72; Turnhout: Brepols, 1959), 321; ET Richard J. Goodrich and David J. 
D. Miller eds, St. Jerome: Commentary on Ecclesiastes (ACW 66; New York: Newman, 2012), 100. 
714 The verse 7:20 perhaps echoes Solomon’s word in 1 Kgs 8:46a or David’s in Ps 143:2b. 
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4.2.1  Everything Is “Hebel”        
Qohelet seems to cast himself as an unconventional thinker against conventional 
wisdom tradition from the outset when he commences his monologic discourse with 
his superlative motto: “Hebel, utterly hebel! Everything is hebel” (1:2). Not only does 
he start with an unusually distressful tone and mood for what he is about to deliver in 
his speech, but he also concludes his monologue with the same motto (12:8). His 
hebel maxim apparently governs his discourse.  
What does Qohelet mean? What is hebel and what does he mean by “everything”? 
Qohelet’s signature word הבל appears thirty-eight times in Ecclesiastes, more than a 
half of its total occurrences in the OT, and is used metaphorically with almost always 
negative connotations. Its literal meaning is “vapour, breath.”715 LXX translates it 
µαταιότης and Vulgate vanitas, from which the traditional English translation 
“vanity” is derived. However, the change in the meaning of “vanity” in the modern 
world may jeopardize the true sense of 716.הבל The term obviously has a wide 
semantic range of connotations for meaning, according to the context in which 
Qohelet uses it, especially as a rhetorical device. He seems to have taken advantage of 
this aspect of the apparently “onomatopoeic” lexeme.717 Numerous translations: 
futility, smoke, emptiness, enigma, irony, transitoriness, for example, indicate no 
single English word encompasses the broad semantic range of הבל with its nuances.718 
Sometimes the noun is also translated like an adjective: fleeting, transient, ephemeral, 
pointless, meaningless, senseless, or absurd, for example, to convey the meaning for 
some passages. This list of translations suggests that there may be no one word in 
English or modern Western languages that can embody the range and scope of the 
Hebrew term 719.הבל Therefore, no single word translation suffices in every case as 
                                                 
715 See Isa 57:13; Prov 21:6; the term is also used to mean “idol” often in pl. (e.g., Deut 32:21; 1 Kgs 
16:13; Ps 31:7 [ET 6]; Jer 8:19; 10:8).  
716 The term now refers to “shortcomings like pride, pretension, complacency, conceit, etc.; realities 
that seem rather foreign to Qohelet,” rather than evoking “emptiness or void” as in Latin, notes Jean-
Jacques Lavoie, “Habēl habālīm hakol hābel: Histoire de l’interprétation d’une formule célèbre et 
enjeux culturels,” ScEs 58 (2006): 227; cf. Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 41. 
717 Seybold, TDOT 3:313 – 20. 
718 Charles F. Melchert, Wise Teaching: Biblical Wisdom and Educational Ministry (Harrisburg: 
Trinity Press International, 1998), 116 – 17; Ingram, Ambiguity, 90 – 129 [esp. 92 – 105]. 
719 Michael V. Fox, “The Meaning of Hebel for Qohelet,” JBL 105 (1986): 409; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 
102. Interestingly, it may be worth noting that a Japanese Bible translation (Kogoyaku) uses a term kū  
(空) for הבל. 空 has a range of meanings in Japanese: empty, space, sky, vacancy, hollowness, vacuity, 
zero, or vain, from which one also derives cognates 空しさ (vanity, emptiness), 空しい (empty, 
vacant, futile, vain), and 空しく (in vain). 空 is “air” in Chinese, and in Japanese it forms a part of the 
word “air” (空気), the substance that we breathe; or “karate” (空手), empty hand(s), i.e., “hand(s) 
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Qohelet uses hebel in Hebrew.720 This means that the context in which הבל is used and 
what Qohelet is inferring by הכל, “all” or “everything,” become significant in 
determining what he tries to convey by הבל. 
The word הבל appears in every chapter of the book except in chapter 10. Qohelet 
declares six times 721,הכל הבל and precedes it with the superlative, הבל הבלים, in 1:2 
and 12:8: 
 הבל הבלים אמר    קהלת  הבל הבלים הכל הבל  (1:2)
הכל הבל   (12:8)     הבל הבלים אמר הקוהלת                    
       
The frame-narrator presents this as Qohelet’s guiding maxim or summary statement 
of his monologic discourse. As Schoors notes, however, the scope of הכל “all” is “not 
absolute totality,” as we have already seen it being qualified probably as “both” in 
some examples.722 Qohelet says in 1:14, for example, that he has seen all the works 
( יםכל־המעש ) which have been done under the sun and then follows with “all is hebel 
 In a similar vein in .כל־המעשים parallels הכל and chasing after wind”: here (הכל הבל)
2:11, he says, “I considered all my work ( יכל־מעש ) that my hands had done and the toil 
 that I had laboured,” which he detailed in 2:4–9, and concludes that all was (בעמל)
hebel and chasing after wind and that there was no profit under the sun. Here again 
“all” points to “the work” that he has laboured by his own hand. In 2:17 Qohelet 
comments that the work which has been done under the sun is evil or grievous (723(רע 
to him, and he repeats that everything is hebel and chasing after wind. In these three 
passages what Qohelet implies by הכל “all” is the works which have been done on this 
earth—the toils laboured in the human realm. These are the toils that he himself has 
laboured or the works that he has seen someone else toiled (2:21–23). 
Qohelet gives several reasons why all works end in hebel. Whatever one may toil 
and labour for is a futile effort. His descendant may not be wise to keep his legacy 
(2:18–19). A stranger may inherit what he has accumulated if he did not have any 
                                                                                                                                            
without a weapon,” therefore, a defensive marshal art [the last example is just to show how widely the 
term is applicable, although pronounced differently]. The Japanese translation kū (空) appears better to 
convey the Hebrew term הבל than an English translation or even, perhaps, similar modern Western 
language translations. 
720 Eugene H. Peterson, Five Smooth Stones for Pastoral Work ([S.l.]: John Knox, 1980), 153; Barry G. 
Webb, Five Festal Garments: Christian Reflections on the Song of Songs, Ruth, Lamentations, 
Ecclesiastes and Esther (NSBT 10; Leicester: Apollos, 2000), 90.  
721 1:2; 1:14; 2:11, 17; 3:19; 12:8. 
722 Schoors, Preacher II, 3.  
723 “Events (Eccl 2:17; Eccl 9:3) or the times (days) (Gen 47:9; Prov 15:15; Eccl 4:8) may go awry and 
be filled with distress.” G. Herbert Livingston, “ָרַעע ,” TWOT:855.  
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descendant (2:21). However one guards what he earned, invested, or accumulated, the 
end is the same: he loses them all certainly by death, if not by any other way. All the 
while, what one gets from his toil are often pain, grief, and his restless mind at night 
(2:23). “This also is hebel and a great evil,” exclaims Qohelet (2:21–23). Moreover, 
Qohelet finds God assigning the sinner the task of gathering and collecting so that He 
may give the fruit of such labour to whomever He favours, but not to the one who has 
carried the task (2:26). Qohelet later reiterates: Even if God grants all that one’s soul 
desires, God does not necessarily empower him to eat from them; instead, a foreigner 
may enjoy them (6:2). 
Qohelet also realizes that every labour and skill for work is due to one’s jealousy 
of his neighbour (4:4). For example, even a man who does not have any descendant, a 
child or a sibling, toils endlessly and is never satisfied with his riches or asks himself 
for whom he is labouring and depriving himself of pleasure (4:8). In another case, a 
man hoards riches and then loses all his riches in a bad investment, thus leaving 
nothing in hand for his son (5:12–13 [ET 13–14]). Qohelet calls all these instances 
hebel and chasing after wind (2:26; 4:4), a distressing occupation (4:8), or a sore 
affliction (6:2). He concludes that all the efforts one exerts and what one accumulates 
in this life are hebel when one cannot keep and enjoy the fruit of all that he has 
laboriously toiled even with wisdom and skill, but has to leave it to someone else.724 
It is the same in the realm of mental work: an effort to increase knowledge and 
wisdom is also chasing after wind (1:17). Being exceedingly wise does not preclude 
one from dying just like a fool (2:15). In fact, either extreme of being too wise or too 
foolish can be hazardous. The same goes with ethical conduct of being too righteous 
or too wicked, because such extremes lead to self-destruction or premature death 
(7:16–17). Being wise or foolish, both die alike and will be forgotten, because there is 
no lasting remembrance of the dead among the living (2:16; 8:10).725 The effort of 
being different or making of distinction—being richer, wiser, or more powerful than 
others—is hebel because all die alike; in fact, there is no difference even between 
human and animal in death: all turn to the dust of the earth, from which they came. 
Indeed, ֹevery effort of striving for “more” seems to end up in hebel.  
                                                 
724 Cf. Ps 39:6–7 [ET 5–6]. 
725 Cf. 9:15; contra Prov 10:7. 
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The pursuit of pleasure or enjoyment of good things (2:1, 10; 6:9), of power or 
glory (4:16), or of money and wealth (5:9 [ET 10]), cannot satisfy (perchance even if 
they might temporarily), either, and there is no end to such quest. It is hebel, and life 
itself becomes hebel according to Qohelet (6:12; 7:15; 9:9; 11:10). 
From this brief survey of Qohelet’s view of activities in one’s life or in this world, 
clearly Qohelet does not use the term הבל indiscriminately, but there emerges some 
distinctive usage in his utterances. Qohelet does not say that work or the fruit of 
labour, such as money, wealth, riches, pleasure, or enjoyment of good things, per se, 
is הבל. What vexes Qohelet is that all the toil, labour, effort, or pursuit—whether it be 
physical or mental—does not reward or give the rightful owner what they deserve for 
their endeavour, but rather someone else who has not toiled gets to enjoy the fruit of 
another’s labour. Death or God strips away the rightful ownership of everything from 
the person who has toiled and earned. Qohelet describes his effort in work as עמל 
“toil”726 along with עשה “work” and often uses an emphatic figura etymologica such 
as כל־העמל שעמל תחת השמש “all the toil that one has toiled under the sun” (7 times) or 
 also appears כל the work that is done” (8 times). The encompassing“ המעשה ש(נ)עשה
often as ' כל־עמל  “all (one’s) toil” (12 times) or כל־המעשה “all the work” (5 times). 
Qohelet then asks, “What advantage is there for all the toil that one labours under the 
sun?”727 The advantage, gain, or profit (i.e., surplus)728 that one gathers from all 
activities is very important to Qohelet. But there is no advantage for all the work that 
one labours, if one cannot keep the fruit of labour after all.  
What Qohelet means by הכל in the context where his main concern resides is then 
the toil and labour, one’s effort or endeavour for life’s fulfilment in this world. This in 
turn guides the interpretation of the term הבל to an appropriate translation in such 
context. Although we have already recognized that one English word cannot capture 
all the nuances or connotations of הבל, an interpretation as “futile” or “futility” may be 
appropriate in the context of the above analysis.729 All the toil and efforts in which 
                                                 
726 Cf. Job 5:6–7 says, “For affliction does not come from the dust, neither does trouble sprout from the 
ground; for a man is born for trouble (עמל).” It appears that עמל is human’s doing.  
727 What advantage/profit/gain appears as: 5:10) מה־כשרון ,(5:15 ;3:9 ;1:3) מה־יתרון), or 11 ,6:8) מה־יותר). 
728 Qohelet mentions “advantage, profit, or surplus” for 17 times using four different terms: 10) יתרון 
times), 3:19) מותר) or  יותר (2:15; 6:8, 11; 7:11, 16), and 5:10) כשרון). All appear only in Ecclesiastes 
except מותר (see Prov 14:23; 21:5). 
729 This translation is preferred by HCS, NET, JB/NJB, NJPS, and REB; Zlotowitz and Scherman, 
Koheles; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes. It does not mean, however, that this translation fit all the uses by 
Qohelet; cf. Weeks, Scepticism, 104 – 31 for his analysis of הבל; opposing views: R. N. Whybray, 
“Qoheleth as a Theologian,” in Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom (ed. Schoors; BETL 136; Leuven: 
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one labours for life’s fulfilment and one’s future is utterly futile if one is not 
empowered to enjoy them or cannot keep what one has earned. 
In addition, Qohelet often emphasizes his הבל statement with a phrase רעות רוח or 
 chasing after wind” in his utterances.730 In 8:8 he says, “No man has power“ רעיון רוח
to restrain the wind (הרוח) with the wind (ברוח), or power over the day of death.” The 
wind is air in motion which no one can see, touch, reach, grasp, or hold onto. One can 
only see its effect on his surroundings or feels it on his body when the wind blows. No 
one knows whence the wind comes or whither it goes. All the toil, effort, or striving 
to have control over one’s life and possession is like chasing after wind—it is futile—
because no one can hold on to what he has gained through his endeavour in the face 
of death, just as no one has power to restrain the wind. When one faces death, indeed 
everything becomes futile. The added phrase רעות רוח or רעיון רוח underscores the 
futility of an “attempt to achieve the impossible.”731 Qohelet then sums it up: “Futile, 
utterly futile, everything is futile” in the opening and at the closing of his discourse 
(1:2; 12:8). Edwin Good aptly notes that  
perhaps we discover only here that hakkōl, “everything,” is not an inclusive 
“everything” but refers to everything within some boundary. What boundary? The 
only one we see is that around ʾādām, his toil, his generations, the way ʾādām 
occupies life and the time of life so occupied.732  
                                                                                                                                            
University Press and Uitgeverij Peeters, 1998), 251, 264; Lindsay Wilson, “Artful Ambiguity in 
Ecclesiastes 1,1 – 11: A Wisdom Technique?,” in Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom (ed. Schoors; BETL 
136; Leuven: University Press and Uitgeverij Peeters, 1998), 362.  
730 The term רעות   and its variant רעיון likely stem from the root רעה “to pasture, tend, graze” (Ps 37:3; 
Prov 15:14; Hos 12:2 [ET 1], although they were connected with an Aramaic root ערע  (Heb. רצץ) 
“break, shatter” with an exclusion of its noun form in the ancient exegesis; see Barton, Ecclesiastes, 
85– 86; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 116– 17. The verb appears once in 12:11 in a participial form: מרעה  “one 
who pastures/tends ,” i.e.,  “shepherd” (vide infra). For discussion on the root and possible Aramaism, 
see Schoors, Schoors, Preacher II, 439 – 42; however cf. Pierre van Hecke, “Polysemy or Homonymy in 
the Root(s) r‘h in Biblical Hebrew. A Cognitive-Linguistic Approach,” ZAH 14 (2001): 50 – 66. The 
phrase רעות/רעיון רוח appears nine times in total, seven of which are combined with Qohelet’s hebel 
statement in early chapters of Ecclesiastes: הבל ורעיון רוח ,(6:9 ;4:4 ;26 ,17 ,2:11 ;1:14) הבל ורעות רוח 
 thus the meaning of the ,עמל and 4:6 are connected with 1:17 ;(1:7) רעיון רוח and ,(4:6) רעות רוח ,(4:16)
phrase aligns with Qohelet’s use of הבל. The similar expression שיעמל) לרוח) in 5:15 [ET 16] and (לבו) 
 :in 2:22 may also be added to the list. Cf. Douglas B. Miller, Symbol and Rhetoric in Ecclesiastes ברעיון
The Place of Hebel in Qohelet’s Work (SBLABib 2; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2002), 92, 
94; Douglas B. Miller, “Qohelet ’s Symbolic Use of הבל,” JBL 117 (1998): 447. The phrase is often 
translated as “striving after wind” “chasing after the wind,” “pursuit of wind,” or “vexation of spirit”: 
NASB, NIV, TNK (JPS) and KJV, respectively, and many other translations. Scholars also translate the 
phrase “shepherding or desiring wind,” “wishing for the wind or possibly a wishing of the spirit,” or 
even unlikely “senseless thoughts,” even though רעיון is found to mean “thought ” in Biblical Aramic: 
Perdue, Sword, 251; Weeks, Scepticism, 111; Fox, Time, 42 – 45. 
731 Miller, Symbol, 94. 
732 Edwin M. Good, “The Unfilled Sea: Style and Meaning in Ecclesiastes 1:2 – 11,” in Israelite 
Wisdom: Theological and Literary Essays in Honor of Samuel Terrien (ed. Gammie; Missoula, MT: 
Scholars Press, 1978), 64; see also Seow, Ecclesiastes, 113.  
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Qohelet has come to grips with a futile (הבל) effort to gain what one cannot keep in all 
work (הכל מעשה/עמל), be it mental or physical, because death ends it all.  
4.2.2 Carpe Diem: Misquoting Qohelet?      
After declaring that everything is hebel because death ends it all, what else is still left 
for Qohelet to say to his audience or even to himself? Qohelet cannot help but see 
death as an intruder, leveller, and negator of every endeavour and its fruit. His brazen 
and repeated reminder that death is the ultimate killer and nullifier of every human 
effort to make sense of human existence, can easily lead one to despair or give up any 
hope of making life meaningful or fulfilling. One can easily ask, “Why then live?” or 
“Why then toil?” Living only for the present without purpose is nothing more than 
what animals do; it reduces human dignity to nullity. A natural recourse in the 
absence of purpose in life or hope for the future could easily lead to suicide or a 
reckless life style without mind or will to take care of one’s well-being or prepare for 
the future, because everything one does either lacks or loses its meaning. Qohelet, 
however, does not endorse either option. No one can prepare for capricious death 
because no one can predict, foresee, or know when it will come; neither can anyone 
escape the assault of death which he will encounter sooner or later. Nonetheless, 
Qohelet never suggests a choice to give up on living in the face of unforeseeable 
death’s invasion. There is no hint of suicidal thought echoing even in the despairing 
tone of his assessment of death’s triumph over human life. Qohelet seeks to find the 
best of one’s situation in life which is allotted by God, although it appears that 
humans simply live to die, just like every other living being does, no matter what they 
do to survive. What option is there still to live in the seemingly pointless and 
unchangeable situation in which humankind is placed?  
Five times Qohelet commends an option to “eat, drink, and enjoy yourself (in all 
your labour)” (2:24–25; 5:17 [ET 18]; 8:15; 9:7, 9). There is hardly any more 
practical guiding principle for living under the harsh reality of death than this to 
anyone whose hope hangs on this life only and who sees life being doomed by death. 
On the surface it looks as though Qohelet is suggesting a carpe diem, “seize the day,” 
motto733 or even hedonism.734 His sayings echo almost verbatim: “Eat, drink, and be 
                                                 
733 Originally from Horace (“Odes” I.xi.8): “Carpe diem, quam minimum credula postero” (Seize the 
day, trusting as little as possible in tomorrow). 
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merry, for tomorrow we may die.” Qohelet is often compared with Greek 
philosophers, Epicurus in particular, and some Babylonian and Egyptian literature, 
although a similar sentiment was not totally unknown among Israelites (see e.g., Isa 
22:13; 56:12). Qohelet’s premise for life-assessment, however, is very different from 
Epicurus and in fact is the opposite of a Western adaptation of Epicurean philosophy, 
both of which are characterized by an absence of divine principle for pursuit of 
happiness or pleasure.735 Qohelet emphasizes that the source of pleasure comes from 
God: no one can enjoy even eating and drinking, unless God also empowers ( ליטנושי ) 
him to enjoy what God has given him (6:2). Qohelet lives in the God-ordained world, 
and denying God is unthinkable to him. He believes that humans can live and enjoy 
only within the allotment that God has assigned them. Epicurus insists that god has no 
business in human life and the fear of god deprives humans of pleasure, whereas 
Qohelet advises to fear God. In any event, Greek influence on Ecclesiastes is highly 
contested because there is no clear sign of Greek language or culture detectable in the 
book.736 
To Qohelet it seems there is no other option but to live under God’s rule.737 The 
question is to know how one should live during the time span that God has set. 
Qohelet apparently comes to a conclusion that the best humans can do is enjoy 
whatever one does while one is living. In particular, he advocates eating, drinking, 
and enjoying oneself in one’s labour because: (1) it is from the hand of God, and 
without Him no one can eat and have enjoyment (2:24–25). (2) It is also good and 
fitting (5:17 [ET 18]), and (3) God empowers one to enjoy His gift to him (5:18 [ET 
                                                                                                                                            
734 Cf. 6:3, which implies that a stillborn is better off if a man’s soul ( נפשו ) is not satisfied with  good 
things of life. Some interpret  נפשו as “his appetite” and translate, “if his appetite is not  satiated with 
good things of life.” See Schoors, Preacher II, 218 – 20 for Qohelet's use of נפש. 
735 For Epicurus gods exist but they have no concern for humans. He denies immortality of the soul, 
because to him death is the end of existence, based on the two propositions: “Nothing comes from 
nothing” and “nothing returns to nothing.” According to Epicurus, the life’s goal is to have pleasure, 
ἡδονὴ; and the ultimate pleasure is achieved by ἀλυπία (freedom from pain in the body) and ἀταραξία 
(freedom from trouble in the mind, especially freedom from fear of divine wrath and fear of death). See 
R. W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 1996); Poortman, “Death,” 197 – 220; Segal, Life, 221 – 23; A. A. Long, Hellenistic 
Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (2nd ed.; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 14 –
 74; F. W. Beare, “Epicureans,” The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible: An Illustrated Encyclopedia; 
Identifying and Explaining All Proper Names and Significant Terms and Subjects in the Holy 
Scriptures, Including the Apocrypha 2:122 – 23, for Epucurus and Epicureanism.  
736 Azize, “Considering,” 184; Harrison, Qoheleth, v, 343; Weeks, Scepticism, 161.  
737 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 305. 
163 
  
19]).738 Besides, (4) there is nothing better for a person than to do otherwise (8:15); 
and (5) God has approved one’s work (9:7).739 Qohelet then adds:  
אשר־אהבת כל־ימי חיי הבלך אשר נתן־לך תחת השמש כל ימי  740ראה חיים עם־אשה
  מש׃אשר־אתה עמל תחת הש 742כי הוא חלקך בחיים ובעמלך 741הבלך
 
Enjoy life with a woman whom you love all the days of your fleeting life which He 
has given to you under the sun, for it is your portion in life; and with your toil in 
which you have toiled under the sun. (9:9) 
This seems to reflect something like God’s original plan of placing the first couple in 
the Garden of Eden in Genesis. God placed Adam (and Eve) to work (עבד) in the 
Garden (Gen 2:15); but later He tells Adam that he will toil (743(בעצבון all his life after 
being expelled from the Garden, as we discussed earlier. Qohelet emphasizes that 
work is one’s portion, in which one should find enjoyment; it is God’s allotment 
  .to humankind 744(חלק)
By saying this, Qohelet probably means: stop toiling for what one cannot keep 
(4:8) or for that which only brings pain, grief, and restless night (2:23); not 
necessarily stop striving for what is good and profitable. In fact, he encourages his 
audience to enjoy oneself in all one’s toil, and even exhorts them to do everything that 
their hand finds to do with their might, because there is no work to be done after death 
(9:10). Above all, Qohelet affirms that there is nothing better for a human being than 
to rejoice and do good during his lifetime (3:12). He repeatedly commends being 
joyful in one’s work (3:22; 5:18 [ET 19]) and in one’s life (3:12; 8:15; 11:8, 9). Work 
is meant for sustenance to enjoy life (6:7; 9:7; 10:19), neither for envy or rivalry (4:4), 
nor for greed or surplus (4:8; 5:9–12 [ET 10–13]), nor for strife towards power and 
glory (4:1; 8:9), all of which result from excesses but will soon be lost and forgotten 
after one’s death (1:11; 9:5–6). Qohelet almost seems to say that surplus does nothing 
but becomes hazardous when one no longer can enjoy one’s labour. Enjoyment in 
                                                 
738 In fact, this saying is reinforced by 6:2: No one can enjoy even just eating without God’s 
empowerment. 
739 It appears referring to Gen 2:15; 3:17–19. 
740 Literally, “see life with a woman,” which is generally understood as “enjoy life with a woman.” אשה 
without an article is debated whether it means one’s wife or any woman. The single noun is modified 
with אשר־אהבת “whom you love,” thus אשה probably is a wife.  
741 For this second appearance of כל ימי הבלך, vide supra. 
742 “And with your toil,” probably another modifier of ראה חיים as ר־אתה עמל ובעמלך אש  seems to be in 
parallel with ר־אהבתעם־אשה אש . 
743 “In toil or pain.” The term is used for both the childbirth pain that Eve will experience and Adam’s 
toil for tilting the ground in Gen 3:16, 17. 
744 Qohelet may have deliberately used this term to encompass and connote all the ranges of its 
meaning with עמל: work is God’s given portion, human’s share and reward (2:22 and passim). 
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whatever one does seems to be the only advantage or profit (יתרון) that one can gain 
from the portion that God has allotted to humans.745  
In such a context, Qohelet’s utterance of “eat, drink, and be merry” especially 
with one’s toil (8:15) is far from the carpe diem motto, which promotes self-
indulgence, while denying or rejecting God’s involvement in human life.746 Qohelet 
repeatedly refers to God’s interference and activity in human affairs and reminds his 
audience to watch their lips and their conduct before God (4:17–5:6 [ET 5:1–7]) as 
well as before the king and rulers (8:2–5;747 10:4, 20) because they are also under 
God’s authority (cf. 5:7 [ET 8]). He admonishes them not to be fools (4:5; 5:3 [ET 4]; 
7:6, 9, 17; 10:3, 15) but to fear God (5:6 [ET 7]; 8:12–13) because God’s judgement 
will come (3:17; 8:6; 11:9). Qohelet’s utterance is not a reckless advice to “have 
pleasure now, for we will die anyway,” but rather to accept and live sensibly with 
God’s allotment, because God is the ultimate giver and judge of everything. Many of 
Qohelet’s “better than” sayings748 also reflect recognition of God being “behind the 
scenes.” Qohelet speaks his commendation in this context.749 It is not a thoughtless, 
haphazard statement, but is rather a sober resolution to make the best of one’s fleeting 
life. To Qohelet, God and death define what humans can, or cannot, do to make sense 
of their existence. His resolution probably stems from his acute sense of the tyranny 
of death on the earth and perhaps because he is unable to find out what and how God 
works in the puzzling and indefensible events in human life under the sun. Qohelet is 
constrained by his own belief in the absolutism of God and death. He analyses 
everything by his knowledge, wisdom, and experiences, but what really happens after 
death is a great unknown. “Afterlife” in the Israelite Sheol, or in the netherworld of 
the surrounding nations, is totally unsatisfactory to Qohelet. He shows little interest in 
what happens after death, but wishes to find out what God is doing in the human 
                                                 
745 This seems to be Qohelet's answer to the question in 1:3 and perhaps an antithesis or irony of Gen 
3:17 – 19, where Adam was told:  “Cursed is the ground because of you; in toil you shall eat of it all the 
days of your life” (v.17). Cf. Anderson, “Curse,” 99 – 113. 
746 Iain W. Provan, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs (NIVAC; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001), 212. 
747 Possible allusion to Prov 16:10. 
748 See 2:24; 3:12–13; 3:22; 4:6, 13; 5:4 [ET 5]; 6:3, 9; 7:1, 2, 3, 5, 8; 9:4–5; 9:16, 17, 18. 
749 Therefore, Qohelet’s שמח  “enjoy” statement is not a simple  “optimism,” as some suggest, opposing 
arguments for Qohelet's pessimism: e.g., Hans Debel, “Life-and-Death Advice from a Conservative 
Sage: Qohelet’s Perspective on Life after Death,” in Text, Theology, and Trowel: New Investigations in 
the Biblical World (eds. Matassa and Silverman; Eugene: Pickwick, 2011), 52; Whybray, “Preacher of 
Joy,” 87 – 98; Ludger Schwienhorst-Schönberger, “Nicht im Menschen gründet das Glück” (Koh 2,24): 
Kohelet im Spannungsfeld jüdischer Weisheit und hellenistischer Philosophie (HBS 2; Freiburg: 
Herder, 1994), 331. 
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world which is plagued with the problem of death. With lingering uncertainty, he has 
focused on this side of life, which one must live as ordained by God. Qohelet’s self-
realized wisdom leads him to commend enjoyment in life (responsibly), and 
especially in one’s labour, because he can find no better alternative to offer from 
where he stands.   
It is mistaken, therefore, if anyone draws a conclusion that Qohelet is promoting a 
carpe diem motto in his monologic discourse. Chia notes that  
it would be an affront to Qoheleth’s wisdom if one thought of him as a hedonist. 
Qoheleth’s encouragement to enjoy life is conditioned by responsibility in one’s 
action to seek enjoyment because God will judge (Qoh 2:26b; 11:9; 12:14).750  
What Qohelet has proposed, however, does not address or answer the serious issue 
of misplaced justice in the face of the greatest of all evil: one and the same fate for all. 
Death haunts and consumes his heart and mind. Moreover, Qohelet often makes 
ambiguous and contradictory statements. For example, Qohelet says, “the day of 
death is better than the day of birth” (7:1). He congratulates the dead more than the 
living and says better off than both is a stillborn (4:2-3), or a stillborn is better than a 
man who lives many years with many children (6:3), despite his abhorrence and 
grievance over death. Qohelet has seen the righteous encountering what should 
happen to the wicked and perishing in their righteousness, and still insists that God 
will judge or continually advise his listeners to fear God, and so forth—still more 
contradictory remarks. It is hardly surprising that readers are hard-pressed to make 
sense of Qohelet’s inconsistences and understand what the book intends to 
communicate: the subject that needs to, and will, be addressed in the next chapter.   
4.3 Summary and Conclusions 
One’s outlook on God and death often influences and shapes how one determines to 
live. Just like Job, Qohelet realizes that true wisdom does not reside in the land of the 
living, and wisdom also dies with him when he dies.751 His self-realized wisdom 
based on his experience and observation cannot find a way out of death and leads him 
to resort to a tangible solution of eating, drinking, and enjoying one’s life while it 
lasts, which may temporarily ignore or skirt the issue but does not solve the problem 
of death and inequities in this world.   
                                                 
750 Chia, “Wisdom,” 29. 
751 Cf. Job 12:2. 
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Qohelet’s attitude seems to be one of not expecting anything to change. His hebel 
statement attests to this fact. He particularly relates the term הבל to the two aspects of 
human existence: (1) the brevity of life as “fleeting” or “ephemeral” (6:12; 7:15; 9:9; 
11:10; cf. Ps 144:4) and (2) the “futility” of all activities in human life, in particular 
work with toil. Qohelet expresses with utter abhorrence what death does to all one’s 
efforts by the term הבל thirty times.  
Strangely, Qohelet maintains his belief that God will judge, despite his 
observation of iniquities prevailing in his society. He admonishes people to fear God 
and commends God-fearers, while he sees the righteous, the ones who indeed practise 
their piety in the fear of God, perishing in the absence of justice on the earth. He 
affirms that God will judge, but without any immediate or credible sign. Evidence 
counters his insistence. Schoors characterizes Qohelet as non-conformist, a sceptic or 
“an agnostic in the etymological sense of the word . . . not a freethinker or an atheist. 
He is at the edge of faith but remains a searching believer, he asks many questions but 
gives few answers.”752 Rather Qohelet does not have answers. Those who died in 
Qohelet’s society, either the righteous or the wicked, certainly did not receive their 
just deserts if God judged only in this life. Qohelet never accuses God concerning 
death,753 even that of the righteous, and affirms that there is a time for God to judge, 
but never specifies when. Such conviction is simply a matter of faith in what he does 
not know. It is ambiguous where his true conviction stands when Qohelet says, “God 
will judge,” but does not actively pursue God’s intervention in corrupt society, while 
maintaining that God’s justice must be done in this life. Where is God and what kind 
of God is He who delays justice against all the grievous evil that is at work, while 
Qohelet keeps saying that God will judge? This defies logic. His statements do not 
cohere. 
The next chapter will seek how inconsistencies found in Qohelet’s monologue 
may perhaps be explicated from the frame-narrator’s perspectives. An attempt to 
bridge Qohelet’s monologic discourse and the epilogue will be centred around the last 
chapter 12 of Ecclesiastes. 
                                                 
752 Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 20. 
753 It is significant that Qohelet never assigns or blames God as the cause or source of death. He never 
calls death one’s portion (חלק) but labels it מקרה for his own use with an uncommon connotation: 
“fate.” Qohelet never says that God set aside or gave (נתן) death to humankind, as Siduri does in the 








FINDING COHERENCE BETWEEN QOHELET’S  
MONOLOGUE AND THE EPILOGUE 
Apparent conflicts and contradictions pervade the whole book of Ecclesiastes—within 
Qohelet’s monologue, as well as between it and the epilogue. Close examination of 
Qohelet’s statements against his observed realities reveals unresolved conflicts in 
what Qohelet says. 
Challenges to make sense of Qohelet’s monologue are often plagued with his 
language. Qohelet not only uses words and phrases which contain more than one 
meaning but he also seems to use familiar words with a distinctive meaning or 
innuendo. Qohelet’s utterances often appear inconsistent or even contradictory to the 
reader. Pragmatism and individualism also characterize the content of his message. 
No faith and community consciousness can be detected in his monologue. Qohelet’s 
ambiguous and conflicting discourse simply does not make sense or accord well with 
the rest of Scripture, even if the epilogue were meant to be a corrective. There almost 
appear to be two contradictory messages competing one against the other: Qohelet’s 
resolution and the epilogue. The problem is how best to make sense of all this.  
In the final chapter of Ecclesiastes both Qohelet and the frame-narrator conclude 
their discourses in what appears to be a form of instruction characteristic of a sage: 
Qohelet delivering his to a youth, and the frame-narrator to his son. If there is any 
connection or disparity between the two, one may reasonably expect to see it most 
clearly in their final conclusive statements as Qohelet and the frame-narrator seem to 
be in the same professional circle. What are the implication and purpose of the frame-
narrative after all?  
5.1 Qohelet the Sage: His Final Instruction to a Youth 
In his reflection on life, Qohelet finds that nothing lasts but evil abounds. The evil 
inflicted on the dead while he was alive can no longer be rectified; neither is there a 
reward to the dead for all the work that he has done if death is the end. Death deprives 
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people of a chance to be vindicated or of a good life to last. This is the greatest evil of 
all (9:3a). The dreadful oppression upon the powerless is so great that Qohelet 
congratulates those who are already dead, and says that better-off than both the living 
and the dead is a stillborn who is never to live. This is absurd because the option of 
not having existed or never having lived is not an alternative that one who is already 
born and alive can choose to have.754 According to such logic, the only alternative left 
to choose for the living is suicide, which never seems to cross Qohelet’s mind, as 
already noted. A cynic may conjecture that Qohelet has probably weighed gain and 
loss in suicide: to keep living incurs a cost of pain and toil, suicide prevents such 
expenditure but at the cost of losing pleasure in life; namely, pleasure outweighs pain 
and toil. However, Qohelet makes clear that the situation under oppression does not 
offer any comfort but tears, when he mentions that the already dead are better off in 
4:1–2. No pleasure is expected in such circumstances.755 He also says that a stillborn 
is better off than a man whose soul is not satisfied with life’s good things and who 
does not have pleasure. Yet he says that pleasure ( מחהש ) is hebel in one place (2:1–2) 
but commends it in another place (8:15). Qohelet continues that the day of death is 
better than the day of one’s birth, mourning than feasting, and anger than laughter 
(7:1b–3a) on the one hand. But he says that even a live dog is better than a dead lion 
on the other hand, because there is hope for the living. What hope is there if one still 
dies, which he repeatedly emphasizes? He adds a strange anecdotal remark that the 
living know that they will die (9:4–5a).  
With such an outlook, what best advice can Qohelet give to a youth? 
לבך בימי בחורותך והלך בדרכי לבך ובמראי עיניך  757ויטיבך 756שמח בחור בילדותיך
והסר כעס מלבך והעבר רעה מבשרך כי־ ודע כי על־כל־אלה יביאך האלהים במשפט׃
 הבל׃ 758הילדות והשחרות
 
Rejoice, young man, during your youth, and let your heart be glad during the days of 
your youth; and walk in the ways of your heart and what your eyes see.759 But know 
that God will bring you into judgement concerning all these things. So, remove 
                                                 
754 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 187. 
755 In fact, Qohelet says that it is the mind of fools which is in the house of pleasure (7:4). 
756 A period of youth, a growing-up period, likely young adulthood or “adolescence.” Buzy, 
“L’Ecclésiaste,” 270. 
757 Hiphil, jussive in meaning: “do good/well, make glad, rejoice” BDB:405. 
 ,black.”  The blackness of hair, in contrast to grey hair“ שחור dawn” or“ שחר from השחרות 758
symbolizes youth. Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 793–94; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 350–51. הילדות והשחרות: 
Literally, “the youth and the dawn.” The phrase may perhaps be a hendiadys. Lauha, Kohelet, 205, 209. 
 .literally “the sightings of your eyes.” Seow, Ecclesiastes, 346, 350 ,מראי עיניך 759
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vexation from your heart and put away harm760 from your flesh, because youth and 
dawning are fleeting. (11:9-10) 
Qohelet exhorts a youth to enjoy whatever his heart desires and whatever captures his 
eyes during his adolescent period. But he also warns him that God will judge 
according to all his activities. He tells the youth to avoid emotional and physical 
detriment by anger or harm because the adolescent period is fleeting. Qohelet may be 
encouraging the youth to enjoy life in its prime. He then seems to reinforce his 
warning about divine judgement in a form of poem with a larger picture as his final 
instruction. 
5.1.1 Eschatological Poem (12:1–7)?      
The final poem 12:1–7, as some call it, is a continuation of Qohelet’s instructions to a 
youth. It is generally understood as a warning about old age and death. Qohelet 
advises the youth to enjoy the prime of his life, because life is fleeting, old age will 
soon approach, and death surely awaits him. The whole tone of advice is far from a 
carpe diem motto or “carte-blanche to run amok with one’s passion”761 that a youth 
might expect. Death seems to be one thing (מקרה אחד) that even a youth needs to heed. 
The poem is most often interpreted as an analogy of the ageing process. It is a strange 
and unusual closing instruction to a youth. Why should the youth worry about the 
pain and discomfort of old age? Is this indeed the message of the passage? How does 
it relate to the rest of Qohelet’s message? These questions may lead one to wonder if 
the poem may contain more than the “old age” theme, although it has evidently 
contented most scholars to date. However, it may deserve a closer attention for a 
possible alternative interpretation or its intent and purpose, which may yet need to be 
unravelled. 
Qohelet exhorts a youth to “remember your Creator” while still young, after 
warning him that God will bring him into judgement according to all his actions 
(11:9). He then proceeds to add to his exhortation: “before the evil days come and the 
years draw near when you will say, ‘I have no pleasure in them’” (12:1). But his 
description of what lies ahead seems to make an unexpected turn. A sudden change in 
                                                 
760 רעה   here is interpreted as non-ethical and often translated “pain”, which seems to be anticipating the 
old age theme in chapter 12. This thesis prefers “harm” as in the OT narratives (e.g., Gen 26:29; Josh 
24:20), better relating to youths.  
761 Zlotowitz and Scherman, Koheles, 190, elaborates: “It is clearly to be understood as words of 
warning to those rebellious youths who wallow in sin [and who would not accept his words if they 
were said in such negative terms as: ‘Do not rejoice . . . do not follow your heart’ ].”  
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the tone and the content of what is depicted in 12:2–7 from 11:9–12:1 has intrigued 
many scholars. They have exerted much effort to reconcile the disparity between 
them, but without considering the relevance of 12:1–7, if any, to the rest of Qohelet’s 
monologue. The passage reads:  
ר לא־יבאו ימי הרעה והגיעו שנים אשר בימי בחורתיך עד אש 762וזכר את־בוראיך(1) 
מש והאור והירח והכוכבים ושבו הש 763עד אשר לא־תחשך (2) תאמר אין־לי בהם חפץ׃
יל ובטלו אנשי הח 765מרי הבית והתעותוש 764ביום שיזעו (3) העבים אחר הגשם׃
וסגרו דלתים בשוק בשפל קול הטחנה  (4) הטחנות כי מעטו וחשכו הראות בארבות׃
וחתחתים בדרך וינאץ  767גם מגבה יראו (5) ׃766ויקום לקול הצפור וישחו כל־בנות השיר
וק וסבבו בש 769ותפר האביונה כי־הלך האדם אל־בית עולמו 768השקד ויסתבל החגב
הכסף ותרץ גלת הזהב ותשבר כד על־המבוע  חבל 771ירחקעד אשר לא־ (6) ׃ 770הספדים
                                                 
762 Hebrew text is pl. בוראיך, literally “your creators.” Other versions (LXX, Syr., Vulg.) support the 
singular reading “your Creator”: The plural in MT may be considered lectio difficilior; however, the 
plural form agrees with Qohelet’s use of the plural אלהים for God. Cf. Isa 54:5; Ps 149:2; Job 35:10. 
Even though various emendations have been suggested for בוראיך, Fox endorses Gilbert who deems no 
emendation needed because “in this context to think on one’s creator is to think of death, for . . . the 
life-spirit must return to the one who gave it.” Michael V. Fox, “Aging and Death in Qohelet 12,” 
JSOT 13 (1988): 72 (n. 2); Maurice Gilbert, “La description de la vieillesse en Qohelet 12:1 – 7 est-elle 
allégorique?,” in Congress Volume: Vienna, 1980 (ed. Emerton; VTSup 32; Leiden: Brill, 1981), 100 –
 102; cf. Seow, Ecclesiastes, 351 – 52; Goldman, “Qoheleth,” 109* – 10*; Gordis, Man, 335, 340; 
Kautzsch ed, GKC, §93ss, §124k. There is a passage where the singular בראך occurs (Isa 43:1), which 
addresses Yahweh “your Creator” and “One who formed you” and reminds Israelites of their personal 
relationship to Him, saying “Fear not, I have redeemed you and called you by name.” This is the only 
place in Ecclesiastes, where a personal relationship to God is specified. Adri J. O. van der Wal, 
“Qohelet 12:1a: A Relatively Unique Statement in Israel's Wisdom Tradition,” in Qohelet in the 
Context of Wisdom (ed. Schoors; BETL 136; Leuven: University Press and Uitgeverij Peeters, 1998), 
413 – 18; cf. on Isa 43:1, see Mark W. Elliott, Isaiah 40 – 66 (ACCS:OT 11; Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity Press, 2007), 46; A. S. Herbert, The Book of the Prophet Isaiah, Chapters 40 – 66 (CBC; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 49; Claus Westermann, Isaiah 40 – 66: A Commentary 
(OTL; trans. Stalker; London: SCM, 1969), 116 – 17. 
 .literally  “until when not.” Seow, Ecclesiastes, 352 ,עד אשר לא 763
764 C. L. Seow, “Qohelet’s Eschatological Poem,” JBL 118 (1999): 214, notes that “the verb זוע in 
Biblical Hebrew and Aramaic is used only for trembling in fear or excitement, never in weakness (Hab 
2:7; Esth 5:9; Dan 5:19; 6:27; Sir 37:29 – 30; 48:12). By the same token, the related noun זעוה/זועה 
always implies sheer terror or horror, but never physical weakness (Deut 28:25; Isa 28:19; Jer 15:4; 
24:9; 29:18; 34:17; Ezek 23:46; 2 Chr 29:8).” 
765 Ibid., 216. Cf. Isa 21:3b. 
766 “Daughters of song” –possibly birds. See Seow, Ecclesiastes, 359. Cf. בנות יענה (ostriches in e.g., 
Mic 1:8; Isa 13:21; Job 30:29). 
767 Cf. Seow, “Eschatological,” 221,  interprets יראו as ראה  “to see ” rather than ירא  “to fear. ” 
768 An insect or a plant. See Seow, Ecclesiastes, 362. 
769 Jenni states that בית עולם is  das Grab schlechthin “simply the grave”: it denotes an irrevocable end, 
and it has nothing to do with a hope of eternal life. Ernst Jenni, “Das Wort ʻōlām im Alten Testament,” 
ZAW 65 (1953): 1 – 35 [esp. 27 – 29]. Avi Hurvitz, “בית קברות and בית עולם: Two Funerary Terms in 
Biblical Literature and Their Linguistic Background,” Maarav 8 (1992): 59 – 68, notes that both phrases 
are “directly related to a funerary terminology current during and after the  Second Temple period 
among Israel’s neighbors—particularly in territories where Aramaic was a dominant linguistic factor” 
(p. 59). However, the two phrases each appear only once in the Old Testament and possibly in an 
earlier period  (e.g., Persian) than Hurvitz suggests. 
770 Note that השוק “the street,” in which the mourners go around, parallels with בית עולם in a chiastic 
form. 
771 MT Qere: ירתק; cf. Goldman, “Qoheleth,” 52, 111*.  
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היה והרוח תשוב אל־האלהים אשר וישב העפר על־הארץ כש (7) ונרץ הגלגל אל־הבור׃
  772נתנה׃
 
(1) Remember also your Creator in the days of your youth, before the evil days come 
and the years draw near when you will say, “I have no pleasure in them”; (2) before 
the sun and the light and the moon and the stars are darkened, and the clouds return 
after the rain; (3) on the day, when the house guards tremble in fear, and the mighty 
men stoop with terror, and the mill maids stop grinding because they become few and 
the women looking through the lattice-windows grow dim; (4) and the double doors to 
the street are shut as the sound of the grinding mills diminishes and the cacophonic 
sound of birds rises, while all the daughters of song are brought low.773 (5) Moreover, 
they are afraid of what is from high and of terrors on the way; and the almond tree 
blooms and the locust grows sluggish, and the caper berry is without effect, for 
humans go to their eternal home while the mourners go around the street; (6) before 
the silver cord is broken and the golden bowl is crushed; the jar is shattered at the 
spring, and the wheel is crushed into the cistern; (7) and the dust returns to the earth as 
it was and the spirit returns to God who gave it.774 (12:1–7) 
By and large, scholars interpret the passage in an allegorical, literal, or 
eschatological sense. Traditionally, the allegorical interpretation has dominated 
among scholars and many still favour it: they understand the passage as an allegory of 
old age, more specifically “an aging process,” nearing death.775 Although this 
approach has merit in unpacking the seemingly non-cohesive poetic passage into a 
more coherent content, it has drawn criticism and has drawbacks.776 Allegorical 
manoeuvring has allowed assigning any human body part to the words and phrases in 
the passage and almost any image association due to its “procrustean” character.777 
Cosmic chaos and terrors expressed (vv. 2, 3, 5) are forced into association with an 
old age. In a literal surface meaning, however, the entire poem depicts terrors 
associated with a certain doom, death, mourning, and finality of the total chaos rather 
than the aging process. Thus, one may well question: (1) if Qohelet is interested at all 
in addressing the old age problem; (2) why he has chosen to describe it by allegory or 
symbolism, if he is; and most importantly, (3) if the old-age allegory is appropriate 
and satisfactory as an interpretation and is relevant to the immediate context and to 
the rest of Qohelet’s message. 
                                                 
772 Numbers in parentheses here and in the translation are verse numbers. 
773 See Seow, “Eschatological,” 219, for interpretation of this verse. 
774 Bream, “Life,” 56, notes:  “Here he poetically describes man’s death in terms of the separation into 
dust, and spirit, the divine vital force.” 
775  Fox, “Aging,” 56, notes: “The allegorical interpretation of this poem, first found in Qohelet Rabbah 
and b. Shabbat 131b – 132a, is still the dominant one. . . . [but] . . . It is mainly out of exegetical habit.” 
776 Some of the representatives are: C. Taylor, The Dirge of Coheleth in Ecclesiastes XII: Discussed 
and Literally Interpreted (London: Williams & Norgate, 1874); John F. A. Sawyer, “The Ruined 
House in Ecclesiastes 12: A Reconstruction of the Original Parable,” JBL 94 (1975): 519 – 31; Fox, 
“Aging,” 55 – 77; Seow, “Eschatological,” 209 – 34. Fox and Seow provide a comprehensive discussion 
of various approaches that have been explored. 
777 Fox, “Aging,” 56. 
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Firstly, old age or aging is not a subject that Qohelet discusses or refers to 
elsewhere in his entire discourse.778 The process of aging is natural and something to 
be expected, not “the unpredictability of human affairs”779 about which Qohelet is 
much more troubled. Qohelet repeatedly expresses that life is hebel (fleeing) as in 
כי־הילדות ) 11:10 ;(כל ימי הבלך ,כל־ימי חיי הבלך) 9:9 ;(בימי הבלי) 7:15 ;(ימי־חיי הבלו) 6:12
 as already seen. He is not at all preoccupied with a concern about old ,(והשחרות הבל
age, much less with its process. Rather, he dwells on his awareness of how fleeting 
human life is, and on his obsession with death above all.780 He grapples with the 
ultimate fate of human beings, i.e., death, not with an aging process leading to it. His 
advice to a youth to enjoy and do all that he desires while he is young is based on the 
brevity of life (11:10b) and death’s reality (12:7).781 Moreover, the topic of aging is 
certainly not a subject that would entice any youth to listen for advice, especially right 
after being told to enjoy whatever captures his eyes and heart while young.  
Secondly, Qohelet speaks with words and phrases that contain a wide semantic 
range of meanings for his rhetoric, which may add innuendos and create certain 
imageries in the mind of his audience, but he never uses allegory elsewhere. An 
allegorical approach is uncharacteristic of Qohelet’s blunt style in speech and in 
content.782 Multivalent words and phrases that Qohelet employs sufficiently conjure 
more imagery than what he himself may even intend to convey. Carefully crafted 
wording and phrasing in the poem already expresses vivid imagery by the surface 
meaning of the symbolic terms and phrases that the author has put in Qohelet’s 
mouth. Fox is surely correct, saying, “The allegorical interpretation has invariably 
failed to recognize that the imagery, the surface of the poem, is what the author 
chooses to show us first and most clearly.”783  
                                                 
778 Sawyer, “Ruined,” 531. 
779 Ibid. 
780 Fox, “Aging,” 61; Michael Leahy, “The Meaning of Ecclesiastes 12:1 – 5,” in Reflecting with 
Solomon: Selected Essays on the Book of Ecclesiastes (ed. Zuck; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1994), 378. 
781 Although the immediate context may mean before one becomes too old to enjoy anything (12:1; cf. 
2 Sam 19:35), the entire context of Qohelet’s instruction to a youth (11:9–12:7) implicates the ultimate 
death sooner or later in mind (12:7). Cf. Beal, “C(ha)osmopolis,” 294 – 95; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 795. 
782 Seow mentions: “At one level Qoh 12:1–7 does remind one of various litanies of geriatric 
complaints that are found throughout the ancient Near East,” and points to such literature as The 
Instruction of Ptahhotep, The Tale of Sinuhe, and Papyrus Insinger, none of which, however, are 
allegorized. Obviously, these authors did not see a need for allegorization. See Seow, “Eschatological,” 
211. 
783 Fox, “Aging,” 57. 
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Thirdly, there is no good reason or necessity to allegorize the aging process in 
Qohelet’s instruction as a final warning to a youth, who may less likely discern that it 
is an allegory of old age, a topic hardly imaginable to the young anyway. It is unlikely 
to produce any effect on a youth, even if he may perchance discern the allegory. 
Those who are approaching old age and imminent death may associate with and 
imagine an allegory of old age and aging problems to heed the warning, but they are 
probably not the primary audience when Qohelet addresses his audience, saying, 
“Rejoice, young man, in your youth” (11:9a). People in an oppressive regime such as 
in Qohelet’s society where justice is not upheld often face death unexpectedly. 
Qohelet observes even the righteous encountering what the wicked should face: 
sudden, premature death. The youth is no exception to the same predicament. That is 
one of the reasons why Qohelet says that the already dead or the stillborn may be 
better off under such a circumstance, because the righteous and the oppressed may not 
live to old age for a full-life span and miss life’s enjoyment that they deserve. There is 
no reason why the youth or the audience should worry about ailments in old age. They 
may never live to see their old age. It is irrelevant to their present calamity in 
Qohelet’s society. 
A counter approach to the poem is a literal interpretation. This approach takes the 
images in the text to be: (1) strictly literal; or (2) possibly with metaphorical, 
symbolical or figurative function.784 An early example of strictly literal interpretation 
is Taylor’s “Dirge” of Qohelet, which clearly limits the scope of wider implication of 
the text.785 Others have depicted the poem as “the actual conditions and experiences 
of old age,” “a house or estate in disrepair,” “a gloomy winter day,” “the approach 
and experience of a thunderstorm,” or “a funeral,” and so forth.786 Many scholars have 
explored a literal rendering of the text but not without continual influence by the 
allegorical theme of “old age,” and none seem to be cogent or satisfactory for 
encompassing the entire spectrum of the passage. They fail to reach any consensus as 
with an allegorical interpretation. A strictly literal interpretation fails because it limits 
or ignores the scope and syntax of the passage, not realizing a deeper or wider 
meaning in the text, which may be conveyed through its metaphoric, symbolic or 
                                                 
784 Seow, “Eschatological,” 210; Fox, “Aging,” 59 – 61. 
785 Taylor, Dirge, 1– 50; see Fox, “Aging,” 60 – 61, for good analysis and critique of Taylor. 
786 For relevant literature on this list of descriptions, see Seow, “Eschatological,” 210; see also Fox, 
“Aging,” 59 – 63 for detailed analysis and criticism of a literal approach. 
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figurative intent. This occurs because of an interpreter’s preference to communicate 
the visible surface level of meaning, to which the text’s secondary function is “strictly 
subordinated” and serves only as an aid to communicate the first level of literal 
meaning.787 
The third approach is to interpret the text in an eschatological sense, which 
apparently enjoyed reception during early Christian and medieval periods but has 
received little support from modern critics, being virtually forgotten or overlooked.788 
Those who perceive eschatological foreboding in the text nonetheless are reluctant to 
entertain a possibility that the passage is pointing to the eschatological end to come.789 
Fox, for example, hesitantly concedes that “the eschatological symbolism is manifest 
but restrained.”790 Both Fox and Mazzinghi interpret the cosmic chaos that Qohelet 
describes as a powerful symbol of one’s personal death and of the cosmic chaos 
which is meant to apply to one’s own world, as Fox cleverly describes: “when you 
die, a world is ending—yours.”791 Mazzinghi goes so far as to say that “the poem on 
old age and death must be understood also as an ironical and polemical attack against 
the eschatological view of apocalyptic . . . and of the early Enochic tradition.”792 It 
makes no sense that the theme of an old age can be an attack against eschatology. 
Mazzinghi is not alone, however, when he argues for Qohelet’s polemic against 
apocalyptists793 and/or the Greek concept of the immortality of the soul,794 while 
                                                 
787 Fox, “Aging,” 60. 
788 Seow, “Eschatological,” 210; John Jarick, “An ‘Allegory of Age’ as Apocalypse (Ecclesiastes 12:1–
 7),” Colloq 22 (1990): 19. Gregory Thaumaturgos in the 3rd century is the first Christian who 
interpreted the passage eschatologically, which is echoed in the commentaries of Didymus the Blind 
and Jerome in the 4th century, followed by Olympiodorus in the 6th century, Rupert of Deutz and 
Richard of St. Victor in the 12th century, Hugh of St-Cher and Bonaventure in the 13th century, and 
Nicholas of Lyra in the 15th century according to Sandro Leanza, “Eccl 12, 1 – 7: L’interpretazione 
eschatologica dei Patti e degli esegeti medievali,” Aug 18 (1978): 191 – 207, also cited in Jarick. 
789 E.g., L. Mazzinghi, “Qohelet and Enochism: A Critical Relationship,” Hen 24 (2002): 157 – 67; Fox, 
“Aging,” 55 – 77; Fox, Ecclesiastes, 76. 
790 Fox, “Aging,” 67. 
791 Fox, Ecclesiastes, 76. Author’s emphasis.  
792 Mazzinghi, “Qohelet,” 165 – 66. 
793 Adams, Wisdom, 6, 133 – 34, 141; Otto Kaiser and Eduard Lohse, Tod und Leben (Stüttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 1977), 66; ET Otto Kaiser and Eduard Lohse, Death and Life (BE; trans. Steely; 
Nashville: Abingdon, 1981), 75; Segal, Life, 249 – 54; Gordis, Man, 34 – 36; Frank Crüsemann, “The 
Unchangeable World: The ‘Crisis of Wisdom’ in Koheleth,” in God of the Lowly: Socio-Historical 
Interpretations of the Bible (eds. Schottroff and Stegemann; Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1984), 67; 
Oliver S. Rankin, Israel’s Wisdom Literature: Its Bearing on Theology and the History of Religion 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1936), 138; Krüger, Kohelet, 56 [ET 30]; cf. Paul D. Hanson, The Dawn of 
Apocalyptic (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 1 – 31 for term definitions relating to apocalypticism. 
794 Norman H. Snaith, “Justice and Immortality,” SJT 17 (1964): 319, sees the Greek concept of 
immortal soul influenced  the Wisdom of Solomon in the first, not in the third, century BCE, and 
“definitely  outside the orthodox Palestinian sphere”; however, R. J. Taylor, “The Eschatological 
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placing the composition of Ecclesiastes in the third century BCE. Reasons for such a 
view are apparently based on two premises. Firstly, Qohelet’s stubbornly earthbound 
disposition—his emphasis on enjoyment in this life, his obsession with death, and his 
agnosticism concerning anything beyond death—can predispose interpreters to 
assume that Qohelet is not interested in or does not believe in an afterlife and, 
therefore, he cannot refer to the demise of human existence in eschatological terms.795 
Secondly, the allegory of “aging and death” has become a deeply rooted guidepost 
and fixation—consciously or unconsciously—in the mind of most biblical scholars 
when faced with this enigmatic and difficult passage. Beal laments: 
Without denying the presence of that theme in this text, I will argue that the exclusive 
preoccupation among biblical scholars with this theme has resulted in neglect of 
another highly significant dynamic within the text, namely, the strange inbreaking of 
elements of proto-apocalyptic discourse in these last words, and the vision of 
chaosmopolis that this inbreaking presents.796  
In recent years Krüger, Seow, and Beal have attempted to capture and foreground 
the eschatological rhetoric in their interpretation of this poetic passage.797 It seems 
prudent then to examine whether eschatological imagery is present at all in the 
passage, in view of the relationship between Qohelet and the frame-narrator, as 
proposed in this thesis, to determine if the eschatological message is in the 
background or even may be foregrounded by the author, and to find if the message 
has relevance to the audience according to such an assessment.  
To begin with, Qohelet tells a youth to remember his Creator before (עד אשר לא) 
the “catastrophic” events take place in a threefold manner in 12:2–7. First in v. 1b, 
Qohelet says that the youth should remember his Creator before the evil days come 
                                                                                                                                            
Meaning of Life and Death in the Book of Wisdom I–V,” ETL 42 (1966): 94, disagrees, saying,  “The 
Wisdom author’s concept of soul is not at all that of Plato, for none of the essential  considerations of 
Plato are used by him despite the evidence of Platonic linguistic usage.”  
795 E.g., Diethelm Michel, Untersuchungen zur Eigenart des Buches Qohelet (BZAW 183; Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 1989), 116 – 125; Alexander A. Fischer, “Kohelet und die frühe Apokalyptik: eine Auslegung 
von Koh 3,16-21,” in Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom (ed. Schoors; BETL 136; Leuven: University 
Press and Uitgeverij Peeters, 1998), 339 – 56. See, e.g., Adams, Wisdom, 133; Peter Enns, Ecclesiastes 
(THOTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 152; cf. Duane A. Garrett, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of 
Songs (NAC 14; Nashville: Broadman, 1993), 304. 
796 Beal, “C(ha)osmopolis,” 292, who further clarifies in the footnote, saying, “I do not intend to argue 
that Qoh 12:1 – 8 is apocalyptic according to any generic definition . . . Rather, I intend to draw 
attention to elements in this text that are strikingly similar to other prophetic texts commonly believed 
to be the predecessors to the fully developed apocalypses that begin to appear in the third century 
BCE.” 
797 Thomas Krüger, “Dekonstruktion und Rekonstruktion prophetischer Eschatologie im Qohelet-
Buch,” in “Jedes Ding hat seine Zeit …”: Studien zur israelitischen und altorientalischen Weisheit. 
Diethelm Michel zum 65. Geburtstag (eds. Diesel, et al.; BZAW 241; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1996), 107 –
 29; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 351 – 82; Beal, “C(ha)osmopolis,” 290 – 304; Seow, “Eschatological,” 209 – 34. 
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when he reaches forlorn old age and nothing delights him anymore. This admonition 
obviously leads (and understandably confuses) many scholars to interpret Qohelet’s 
opening line as introducing an aging process in the subsequent verses.  
However, an abrupt change of subject matter occurs after the second עד אשר לא in 
vv. 2–5. Qohelet tells the youth to remember his Creator “before the sun, the light, the 
moon, and the stars are darkened” in v. 2. This does not seem to be a scene of simple 
twilight after the sunset, since Qohelet states all the luminaries in heaven are being 
darkened. The sun is a central and crucial cosmic object in the ancient world. It is also 
one of the key references in Qohelet’s entire monologic discourse. He commences his 
discourse with a description of revolving routine movement of the sun, the wind, the 
water, and even the dust of the earth as generations of people come and go (because 
humankind is made from dust and return to dust, in a way forming a cyclic pattern).798 
Nature’s regularity gives stability and continuity to human existence as part of it. 
Qohelet says that the light is sweet and one is alive, when he sees the sun (7:11; 
11:7),799 and that all human activities are carried out under the sun (1:3). The sun 
rises, sets, and rises again: it keeps its routine and it never loses its own light. One 
expects the sun to come out eventually after the rain, breaking the clouds in normal 
circumstances. Here in 12:2 Qohelet says that the sun and all other luminaries are 
darkened and more clouds are returning after rain, suggesting that more rain will 
come, and the darkness continues. Eerie, pitch darkness sets in, likely portending a 
sign of impending disaster. Qohelet may perhaps be insinuating a presentiment of a 
cataclysmic event. The expression resembles Israelite prophetic descriptions of the 
day of Yahweh, “the disastrous day of judgment,”800 which is depicted as:  
A day of darkness and gloominess, 
A day of clouds and thick darkness. 
The sun and the moon grow dark, 
And the stars lose their brightness. 
The sun will be turned into darkness,  
And the moon into blood,  
Before the great and awesome day of Yahweh comes.  
(Joel 2:2a, 10b, 3:4 [ET 2:31]) 
or  
A day of wrath is that day, 
A day of distress and affliction,  
A day of devastation and desolation,  
                                                 
798 Samet, “Qohelet,” 92–100. 
799 Cf. 6:5, where it says a stillborn never sees the sun. Seow, Ecclesiastes, 212. 
800 Fox, Ecclesiastes, 77. 
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A day of darkness and gloominess,  
A day of clouds and thick darkness. (Zeph 1:15) 
or 
Behold, the day of Yahweh is coming,  
Cruel, with fury and burning anger,  
To make the land a desolation; 
And He will exterminate its sinners from it. 
For the stars of heaven and their constellations 
Will not flash forth their light;  
The sun will be dark when it rises,  
And the moon will not shed its light. (Isa 13:9–10) 
Qohelet then describes what happens specifically “in/on the day” (ביום) in 12:3–5. The 
interpretation of vv. 4–5 is particularly difficult, but the gist of the passage appears to 
convey a “terror” all around human habitation. Something terrible, something 
unforeseen and drastic, is happening on the earth when even valiant men are stricken 
with terror. 
Thirdly, Qohelet says that the youth should remember his Creator “before the 
silver cord is broken and the golden basin is crushed; the jar is shattered at the spring, 
and the wheel is crushed into the cistern” (12:6). This verse describes a scene of 
destruction of household tools and utensils at the sites where they once must have 
been used but now all domestic activities will have ceased. The imagery evokes the 
scene of a desolated human habitat, which is confirmed by v. 7: “and the dust returns 
to the earth as it was, and the spirit returns to God who gave it.”  
The abrupt change of subject matter in what follows after the second עד אשר לא in 
vv. 2–5 and the third in vv. 6–7 is mysteriously foreboding, which has led to various 
allegorical or figurative interpretations to continue in the “old age” theme. However, a 
presentiment of the future through the eerie scene suggests that Qohelet may be 
pointing to something else, something beyond a normal aging process, that is, a 
horrendous catastrophic event. The whole scene described in 12:2–7 resembles and is 
more likely a graphic catastrophe on a cosmic and universal dimension than just an 
individual’s death and funeral scene, although that may be a part of the whole 
disaster.801 The poem ostensively parallels an eschatological scene much more than 
old age imagery. 
When Qohelet says, “Remember your Creator before the evil days come,” the evil 
days may be an old age when one can no longer find any pleasure in life, if one stops 
at 12:1. However, the passage continues, and one needs to consider closely the kind of 
                                                 
801 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 376; Fox, Contradictions, 289 – 94. 
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people depicted and how they are reacting to the surroundings in vv. 3–5. The people 
who appear in these verses are the house guards (שמרי הבית), the mighty men ( אנשי
 and the women looking through the lattice-windows ,(הטחנות) the mill maids ,(החיל
 Who are these people? First of all, they may well be real people and .(הראות בארבות)
none of them are linked with old age, about whom Qohelet speaks. Secondly, they 
encompass both men and women. Thirdly, they seem to be professional people, 
except the women, or perhaps “four classes of people.”802 The house guards may not 
be just lowly servants but probably guards with authority over the house, namely, the 
watchmen of the house.803 The men of חיל may be mighty, valiant, strong, powerful, 
or wealthy, literally men of power,804 as the term חיל signifies. The word טחנות means 
those who grind,805 probably female servants or slaves who work at the mill. The 
women looking through the lattice-windows are not at work; they may be “women of 
leisure.”806 The scene depicts people serving, working, or residing in a big household 
or perhaps a palace of a powerful man.807  
The entire household reacts to what is happening to their surroundings in that day. 
The house guards are those who protect the house, supposedly being strong and brave, 
but they tremble in fear. The mighty men of valour in their guarded house are 
crouched in fear. Mill maids stop grinding with fear probably because their number 
became so few. The women who look through the lattice-windows may be looking at 
the alarming phenomena and become distressed. The most striking in the scene is that 
the powerful men along with their entire households are gripped with fear on the day. 
Qohelet perhaps implies by 12:3) ביום) on the day of God’s wrath, which may also be 
the day when God will judge, although he does not quite spell it out in that way.808 
Earlier Qohelet indicated that his society was controlled by men with 
perilous power. What might it mean to oppressed and ill-treated people when they 
hear that the powerful tremble in fear on the doomsday? They could surely detect a 
glimpse of hope that the evil doers would perish on that day. Qohelet is speaking to a 
                                                 
802 Longman, Ecclesiastes, 269 –70 , characterizes the guards and the mill maids being lower-class 
servants, and the mighty men and the women who look through the lattice-windows belonging to upper 
class.  
803 LXX: φύλακες τῆς οἰκίας. Seow, Ecclesiastes, 354. 
804 LXX: ἄνδρες τῆς δυνάµεως. 
805 Feminine noun of טחן. Cf. Judg 16:21; Num 11:8. Probably female servants or slaves who worked 
with mill-stones (cf. Exod 11:5), thus translation: “mill maids.” 
806 Longman, Ecclesiastes, 270. 
807 Ibid., 269. 
808 Whether or not Qohelet implies eschatological judgement is uncertain. 
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youth, but the frame-narrator is communicating Qohelet’s utterance to the audience. 
The evil days (ימי הרעה) that Qohelet warns to the youth in 12:1 may be a day of 
calamity, of death’s threat, or of one’s death—already a reality to his audience. But 
then comes the day (12:3) when even the powerful tremble—the day of wrath (or 
judgement) with cosmic catastrophe, which no one can escape. Whichever comes 
first, it is the day when the work and toil will cease, and human life on earth comes to 
an end. Qohelet’s poem is similar to a pictorial description of the day of Yahweh, as 
already comparison with prophetic writings suggests, but it does not convey the full-
blown eschatological sense. What seems to be emphasized is the judgement that even 
the powerful will fear. It seems to describe the ultimate cosmic end, but nothing about 
what may happen particularly to the righteous. His description of “the day” seems to 
be of a limited eschatological character, because he does not speak anything of an 
afterlife or eschatological hope. Qohelet is firm about divine judgement without its 
ultimate outcome of reward or punishment. If anything, that day is the day of cosmic 
end. He thus concludes in v. 8, “Futile, utterly futile. Everything is futile” because 
death (or the cosmic chaos) has the final grip to stop all human activities. 
Be that as it may, the frame-narrator may attempt to present Qohelet’s speech to 
the youth in such a way as if it is meant to his audience, eventually foregrounding the 
eschatological character of the coming judgement in view of 3:17 where Qohelet 
already said in his heart, “God will judge both the righteous and the wicked.” Qohelet 
may not have been aware of the full extent of what he himself is saying, as he cannot 
fathom anything beyond death. The frame-narrator will apparently reinforce its 
eschatological sense by adding his final message to what might appear missing in 
Qohelet’s poem in a form of sapiential instruction to his “son.” The epilogue seems to 
be serving such a purpose as we shall see.  
That the best way of reading Qohelet’s mysterious poem is to see it as depicting 
eschatological events may be supported from another angle when one compares his 
opening poem 1:2–11 with 12:1–8: Qohelet uses the same words in both passage, as if 
the latter echoes the former.809 His signature phrase, “Futile, utterly futile; everything 
is futile” in 1:2 is a refrain in 12:8. The lexemes which appear in both poems are: 
  ”return“ שוב ;(come, go” (1:4, 5 vs. 12:1“ בוא ;(the sun” (1:3, 5 [bis], 9 vs. 12:2“ השמש
(1:6, 7 vs. 12:2, 7 [bis]); הארץ “the earth” (1:4 vs. 12:7); עולם “eternity, long duration” 
                                                 
809 Seow, “Eschatological,” 234. 
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(1:4, 10 vs. 12:7); סבב “go round” (1:6 [tris, plus a noun סביב] vs. 12:5); and זכרון 
“remembrance” (noun, 1:11 [bis]) vs. זכר “remember” (verb, 12:1).810 Qohelet starts 
with recurrent routine movements of natural phenomena at the beginning of his 
discourse. The sun comes and goes day in and day out never to change its course 
(1:5), but the day will come when the sun and the light are darkened in 12:2. 
Generations come and go—the aging process and death of humanity routinely occur 
and repeat since the beginning on the earth in 1:4,811 but each entity of human beings 
(dust and spirit) returns to its ultimate origin in 12:7. The wind (הרוח) goes around and 
returns to its courses in 1:6, but the mourners go around in the streets and take the 
dead to his grave, his eternal house (12:5). Things in this world seem to repeat 
themselves and therefore nothing is new: earlier things are forgotten and the later 
things which occur will be forgotten by still later generations in the beginning passage 
(1:9–11). But Qohelet starts the last poetic passage with “Remember your Creator 
before the evil days come” and follows with the day when everything which had 
routine activities in both cosmic and human worlds stops and comes to end. It is also 
interesting to note in this juncture that Qohelet tells the youth: “Remember your 
Creator.” He does not say, “Remember the Creator,” or simply “Remember God,” but 
implies “the One who created you.” Qohelet has given an impression to his audience 
that God is remote, but here he apparently reminds the youth of whose God he is 
talking about: his. When the frame-narrator transmits Qohelet’s words: “Remember 
your Creator,” his audience probably think of their Creator, the God of Israel. Qohelet 
believes in God’s judgement and seems to be familiar with prophetic descriptions of 
the day of Yahweh, but without the apocalyptic eschatological hope for the righteous. 
It is now time to discuss how the frame-narrator brings Qohelet’s final words into 
focus and wraps up the whole discourse. 
5.2 The Epilogue: Recasting Qohelet 
No sooner does Qohelet conclude his monologue with the infamous hebel motto after 
his last poem, than the frame-narrator raises his voice to wrap up the whole discourse. 
                                                 
810 See Appendix for the parallel passage comparison. Hee Suk Kim, “Ruah as an Interpretive Marker 
in the Book of Ecclesiastes: A Comparative Study on Eccl. 1:2 – 11 and 12:1 – 7” (paper presented at the 
64th Evangelical Theological Society Annual Meeting. Milwaukee, WI, 2012); cf. Seow, 
“Eschatological,” 226. 
811 Seow and Fox interpret הארץ here as  “the world ” rather than  “the earth” and translates the 
phrase  “the world remains always as it was” or “the world remains unchanged/the same.” Michael V. 
Fox, “Qohelet 1:4,” JSOT 13 (1988): 109;  Seow, “Eschatological,” 226.  
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The epilogue consisting of a mere six verses is often considered as not only being 
added later, but also not necessarily by one but maybe two or more different voices,812 
probably because of its comprehensive content in such a short conclusive statement as 
we shall see. In the frame-narrative reading the epilogue is the frame-narrator’s 
concluding statement. I will argue that the epilogue is not only the frame-narrator’s 
conclusion, but it also may well redirect the audience to reconsider Qohelet’s sayings 
which they have heard (or read). The epilogue appears to be a terse but definitive 
instruction of the frame-narrator to his “son” (or his “pupil”), which may actually be 
projected for the audience who have been listening to the framed story of Qohelet’s 
monologic discourse. The epilogue may be the author’s decisive tool for recasting 
Qohelet. 
5.2.1 The Frame-Narrator Has Spoken   
 בה׃משלים הר 814קהלת חכם עוד למד־דעת את־העם ואזן וחקר תקן 813ויתר שהיה(9) 
דברי חכמים כדרבנות  (11) דברי אמת׃ 815בקש קהלת למצא דברי־חפץ וכתוב ישר(10)
ויתר מהמה בני הזהר עשות  (12) 817נתנו מרעה אחד׃ 816וכמשמרות נטועים בעלי אספות
את־ 820הכל נשמע 819סוף דבר (13) הרבה יגעת בשר׃ 818ספרים הרבה אין קץ ולהג
                                                 
812 E.g., Podechard, L’Ecclésiaste, 151–70, 472; Galling, “Prediger,” 124–25; and Lohfink, Qoheleth, 
142–44, discern two different hands (vv. 9–11, 12–14); also cf. Seow, Ecclesiastes, 394, divides the 
epilogue differently as vv. 9-13a, 13b-14; while Hertzberg and Bardtke, Prediger, 217–21, see three 
hands (vv. 9–11, 12, 13–14). 
 ”.functioning as an adverb with a meaning close to “more than יתר ”,besides the fact that“ :יתר ש 813
Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 829. 
 ,תקן ;”only here, “search out, explore ,חקר ;”only here, “weigh ,אזן :All verbs in Piel .ואזן וחקר תקן 814
also in 1:14 (Qal inf.) and 7:13 (Piel inf.), “make straight” or “arrange” here. But the meaning of these 
verbs is debated. Cf.  Ibid., 830–33. 
ישרוכתוב  815 : MT reads כתוב as a passive participle, but it may be an inf. abs. (either as an inf. consec. or 
as the object of בקש) with ישר as an adverb “uprightly, faithfully, correctly,” but MT and LXX attest a 
textus difficilior. Cf. Gordis, Man, 342–43; Goldman, “Qoheleth,” 112*; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 835–
36. 
 may mean אספות ;a difficult phrase, scholars have suggested various interpretations :בעלי אספות 816
“collections” or “assemblies,” Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 836 – 41; BDB:127, gives meaning: “members of 
assemblies; or well-grouped sayings; or collectors (of wise sentences).” The phrase literally means 
“masters of collections,” but here is interpreted as chief/master collections, rather than as 
owners/collectors of collected sayings because what is likened as nails are most likely “sayings” rather 
than “collectors.”  
 one Shepherd,” whose identity is debated among the scholars, but to Israelites it is an“ מרעה אחד 817
epithet of God (Ps. 23:1 80:2 [ET 1], cf. Ezek 34:12–16). Opinions are basically divided between: it is 
either God or Qohelet. Barton, Ecclesiastes, 198; contra Fox, “Frame-Narrative,” 102; see Schoors, 
Ecclesiastes, 840 – 41 for summary of various interpretations. 
818 The noun  להג “devotion to books” is highly disputed. LXX µελέτη, Vulg. meditatio, Pesh. mmll’  
“speech, eloquence.” Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 844. It may be an infinitive of  הגה with a haplography of ה, 
thus to “groan,  speak, utter.” Seow, Ecclesiastes, 389– 90, translates    להג הרבה “excessive talking,” 
which is actually interesting and plausible, and fits for characterizing Qohelet. 
819 It is also possible to translate דבר as “speech” or “report” or even maybe “discourse” from its literal 
meaning of “word.” סוף דבר “seems to refer to the end or result of the whole preceding discourse” (cf. 
Dan 7:28 סופא די־מלת), thus “the end of the matter” is probably not “what is about to be said in vv. 13b–
14 bur rather what has been said thus far,” namely, here it probably signifies the end of Qohelet’s 
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כי את־כל־מעשה האלהים יבא  (14) האלהים ירא ואת־מצותיו שמור כי־זה כל־האדם׃
  במשפט על כל־נעלם אם־טוב ואם־רע׃
 
(9) Besides being wise, Qohelet also taught the people knowledge; and he weighed, 
and searched out and arranged many proverbs. (10) Qohelet sought to find pleasing 
words and faithfully wrote words of truth. (11) Words of the wise are like goads, and 
like well-driven nails are master collections; they are given by one Shepherd. (12) But 
beyond these, my son, be warned: To working on many books821 there is no end, and 
much talking is wearying to the flesh. (13) The end of the matter; all has been heard. 
Fear God and keep his commandments, because this is [of]822 every human; (14) for 
God will bring every work into judgement, upon every hidden thing, whether good or 
evil. (12:9-14)823 
Finishing the delivery of Qohelet’s monologic discourse, the frame-narrator 
characterizes Qohelet as a wise man who also teaches people. He briefly describes 
Qohelet’s job as a prolific and careful collector of proverbs and a writer of words of 
truth, affirming that Qohelet is a sage (vv. 9–10). He then explains that the sayings of 
the sages are like goads and nails which may plod and direct one toward a straight 
path or perhaps may prick and hurt him.824 The words of sages are given by one 
Shepherd (v. 11). Some scholars interpret the “shepherd” here as any shepherd and 
Qohelet as the one shepherd,825 but others as God. Reflecting Qohelet’s unique and 
emphatic use of the term אחד, the frame-narrator may be emulating the use and 
probably meaning one particular shepherd. This shepherd is most likely God who 
gives sages the words of wisdom, rather than Qohelet who is described as one of the 
wise and the people’s teacher here. In his monologue Qohelet says that he searched by 
(1:13), increased (1:16), set his mind to know (1:17), or considered wisdom (2:12). 
He never claimed giving the words of wisdom to others, much less to sages, and he 
still could not find the answer he wanted to find out (7:23–24; 8:17). Also Qohelet 
                                                                                                                                            
discourse. Cf. Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 847– 48; Fox, Time, 359– 60; contra Krüger, Kohelet, 371–72 [ET 
212]. 
  .דבר is most likely all that Qohelet has said, connecting with הכל ”.all has been hard“ הכל נשמע 820
821 P. A. H. de  Boer, “A Note on Ecclesiastes 12:12a,” in A Tribute to Arthur Vööbus. Studies in Early 
Christian Literature and Its Environment, Primarily in the Syrian East (ed. Fischer; Chicago: Lutheran 
School of Theology at Chicago, 1977), 85 – 88. 
822 Interpret  כל־האדם as genitive. Delitzsch, Koheleth, 421– 22 [ET 439– 40]; cf. D. Martin Luthers, Die 
Bibel oder die ganze Heilige Schrift: Des Alten u. Neuen Testaments (trans. Luthers; Stüttgart: 
Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1930), 654: „Denn das gehört allen Menschen zu“ (for that belongs to 
all men); NASB makes it even clearer: “because this applies to every person; also Schoors, 
Ecclesiastes, 847.  
823 Cf. interpretations by Fox, Childs and Sheppard discussed in Chapter 2. 
824 Fox, Ecclesiastes, 83; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 837. 
825 E.g., C. L. Seow, “‘Beyond Them, My Son, Be Warned’: The Epilogue of Qoheleth Revisited,” in 
Wisdom, You Are My Sister: Studies in Honor of Roland E Murphy, O Carm, on the Occasion of His 
Eightieth Birthday (ed. Barré; CBQMS 29; Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Assoc of America, 
1997), 134– 35. 
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himself acknowledges that God gives wisdom, while Qohelet’s task seems to be 
gathering and collecting wisdom and knowledge (cf. 2:26).826  
The frame-narrator then turns to his listener, calling him “my son,” which is a 
common term of endearment among the sages to address their children or pupils when 
they instruct them in much of the ancient Near Eastern wisdom literature. The frame-
narrator thus identifies himself as a wisdom teacher, revealing a reason for his 
familiarity with Qohelet’s profession. His tone of voice seems to turn stern, however, 
when he tells his son/pupil: “But beyond these (namely, other than those master 
collections of proverbs and sayings), be warned.”  
The frame-narrator’s conclusion in 12:13 is a powerful statement. Until now he 
explains what a sage, particularly Qohelet, does, as if to praise him, but here he warns 
his son that there is no end to working on many books and that much talking (להג) is 
exhausting to the body (12:9–12). The frame-narrator does not find fault with the 
sage’s normal activities such as teaching, searching and arranging proverbs, or writing 
correctly the words of truth which are given by God; but he says going beyond them 
with excessive work for book production827 and much talk leads to no fruitful end but 
exhaustion. This seems to be a subtle, but profound, criticism of Qohelet—granted he 
is an adept sage828—who probably has done excessive searching and certainly much 
talking (his monologue occupies 98% of the frame-narrator’s presentation). It is 
reinforced by v. 13 where the frame-narrator wraps up, saying, “The end of the 
matter; all has been heard.” or it may even be rephrased as “Whatever you have heard, 
it boils down to this . . . .” In effect the frame-narrator may even be saying: “Enough 
of Qohelet, let's get on with what is really important.”829 By saying so, the frame-
narrator seems to be downplaying Qohelet’s monologue that he has transmitted, 
except Qohelet’s notion of “fear God” and “God will judge.” These are what the 
frame-narrator himself reiterates in his final instruction: “Fear God and keep His 
commandments.” What Qohelet describes in his poem in 12:1–7 is a picture of a 
limited eschatological sense of God’s judgement to come, and apparently it is not an 
                                                 
826 It is interesting to contrast here with 2:26 where Qohelet says God assigns the sinner for gathering 
and collecting so that He may give wisdom, knowledge and joy to one He favours (literally, one who is 
good in God's sight). 
827 By  דברי חכמים “words of the wise” in v. 11 and   ספרים הרבה “excess books” in v. 12, many scholars 
think that an existence of canon-consciously selected or limited books is implied. Both phrases seem to 
mean sayings by sages or books in general terms, however, and do not specify they are canonical books 
such as Proverbs, although such possibility may exist. Seow, Ecclesiastes, 394; Fox, Time, 376. 
828 Contra Fox, Contradictions, 311, who thinks the frame-narrator is praising Qohelet in the epilogue. 
829 Longman, Ecclesiastes, 282.  
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encompassing view that the frame-narrator may wish to convey. Qohelet’s poem 
therefore may be serving as a bridge to link to a fuller dimension of God’s judgement 
when the frame-narrator gives reasons for his instruction: (1) The fear of God and 
obedience to His laws apply to everyone, and (2) because God will judge every work, 
every secret thing, whether good or evil (12:13b–14).  
The frame-narrator’s instruction and the reasons for it are plain and can be 
understood fully as an orthodox wisdom teaching. Every Israelite should fear God and 
keep His commandments, because God will judge. But here the frame-narrator 
specifies exactly what or perhaps how God will judge. Firstly, the frame-narrator 
speaks about God’s judgement in the future, which Qohelet also believes. Concerning 
their use of the term מ)שפט) “judge/ment” Fox notes: 
Verses 12:14, 3:17, and 11:9b use ŠPṬ as a forensic concept and refer to God's 
judgment as a future event. God's judging is not something that goes on at all times, 
but an event in the future within an individual’s life. In this judgment God 
distinguishes between good and bad deeds, between righteous and wicked people, 
and calls everyone to account.830 
Secondly, the frame-narrator declares that God will judge every deed, both “good and 
evil,” implying individual’s moral/ethical behaviour. God will execute justice both for 
the righteous and against the wicked. Thirdly, God will also bring into judgement 
everything “hidden,” which He detects and reveals. This seems to go beyond one’s 
life time. There is no time constraint or limitation for God to seek out all hidden 
things because He is not bound by time. Here Fox may be open to question, saying, 
“within an individual’s life,” at least regarding the frame-narrator’s words. Fourthly, 
“every” implies each one of individual deeds, thus the judgement seems to be 
individualized. Delitzsch notes that 
the object[s] of the final judgment are nations, kingdoms, cities, and conditions of 
men. But here, with Koheleth, a beginning is made in the direction of regarding the 
final judgment as the final judgment of men, and as lying in the future, beyond the 
present time.831 
What the frame-narrator describes appears to be a comprehensive, universal 
eschatological judgement of both the righteous and the wicked.832 It not only covers 
                                                 
830 Fox, Contradictions, 123. Emphasis added. 
831 Delitzsch, Koheleth, 423 –24 [ET 441]. 
832 Ginsburg, Coheleth, 478; Lauha, Kohelet, 223; Longman, Ecclesiastes, 283; Seow, “Beyond Them, 
My Son,” 139; not all scholars are persuaded by this view. See e.g., Podechard, L’Ecclésiaste, 484–85; 
R. N. Whybray, Ecclesiastes (NCBC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 174; Ludger Schwienhorst-
Schönberger, Kohelet (HTKAT; Freiburg: Herder, 2004), 552. 
185 
 
Qohelet’s limited view of eschatological judgement, but also encompasses the whole 
spectrum of God’s judgement in that day.   
The problem with 12:14 that scholars find in their viewpoint is that the verse runs 
counter to views expressed by Qohelet in his monologue.833 However, it is not 
Qohelet who says this, but the frame-narrator who wishes to give instruction to his 
son, based on what they both heard from Qohelet’s monologue. The frame-narrator as 
a wisdom teacher surely has assessed and already knows whether or not what Qohelet 
says in a framed story, perhaps presenting as a teaching tool or example, is good to 
follow for his son. He thus instructs his son accordingly either with a positive or 
negative evaluation of what Qohelet expressed. The connection now appears to be 
made in the final section where the frame-narrator speaks. 
In sum, the frame-narrator’s address, starting with “But beyond these, my son” in 
v. 12 and onwards, seems to be a great foil for what may actually be an intense 
criticism of Qohelet as a father giving advice to his son: The frame-narrator is 
basically telling his son to ignore all that a “sage” Qohelet has said except what he has 
already been taught by his father, the “orthodox” wisdom teacher. However, it is not 
simply a father’s personal advice to his son, but a definitive conclusion of the frame-
narrative discourse with an orthodox wisdom teaching which is targeted for the 
audience. As a wisdom teacher the author may have employed a framed story of 
Qohelet as a means to spell out what is happening in his society before his final 
verdict in 12:13–14. 
Chapter 12 of Ecclesiastes may be pivotal in understanding where the author stood 
in his ancient context. Maybe he was a man ahead of his time. He might not have 
perceived or received any revelation as such that the apocalyptists claimed and 
endorsed in their literature. However, seeing all wickedness in his society, the author 
perhaps by faith envisaged the coming day of God’s judgement and therefore could 
conclude the book with his firm conviction, which would display an eschatological 
character. This then leads to analyse further how Qohelet’s monologic discourse may 
be tied together with the epilogue in light of Qohelet’s conclusion.  
                                                 
833 The main reason scholars assign the epilogue to later editor(s). 
186 
 
5.3 Finding Coherence between Qohelet’s Monologue and the Epilogue 
5.3.1 Recasting Qohelet   
That Qohelet’s monologic discourse has essentially been preserved with all the 
ambiguities and apparent contradictions seems to suggest that the accumulative effect 
of Qohelet’s inconsistencies may be intended for a purpose, especially through the 
unique language that the author put in Qohelet’s mouth. If such were the case, then it 
would warrant further scrutiny to probe what the author of Ecclesiastes tries to convey 
to his audience through Qohelet. This section will explore plausible reasons and a 
possible explanation for conflicts in Qohelet’s monologic discourse in terms of a 
frame-narrative structure and how the frame-narrator and the character play each role 
for the author’s purpose to make the book a coherent whole. 
From the context of the poetic passage in Chapter 12 elucidated above, Qohelet’s 
contradiction between his existential realism and his insistence on God’s judgement 
and particularly his notion of “fear God” may be re-examined. 
5.3.1.1  Why Fear God?       
Scholars have often been divided concerning Qohelet’s utterance, “fear God,” which 
stems from his usage of the term אלהים rather than יהוה for “God” and his apparent 
view of God. Many suggest that Qohelet’s God is remote and impersonal—deus 
absconditus834 or deus otiosus835—and that “fear” of such God can only be described 
as “terror of the incomprehensible numinous.”836 However, such a designation is 
generally ascribed to unknown god(s), whereas Qohelet’s God is the One that he 
knows from the Torah and wisdom teaching, the God of Israel. Qohelet may be 
perturbed with how God works under the sun especially in the context of unfairness 
and rampant injustice that he has observed, but he hardly implies “Be terrified” by 
saying “Fear God.” When Qohelet expresses “fear God,” the implication in all 
contexts appears to be: (1) “revere, awe, or acknowledge his sovereignty” as the 
Creator God who controls everything (3:14; 11:5–6); (2) “approach or treat God with 
proper respect” because He cannot be mocked (5:3–6 [ET 4–7]; 8:2); or (3) stay away 
from evil and do good in the fear of God because God will judge (3:12, 17; 5:7 [ET 
                                                 
834 Literally, “hidden god,” i.e., an absent god. Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 22. 
835 Literally, “idle god,” i.e., a distant and unconcerned god. See Segal, Life, 106. 
836 Curt Kuhl, The Old Testament: Its Origins and Composition (trans. Herriott; Edingburgh: Oliver & 
Boyd, 1961), 265; Crenshaw, “Eternal,” 44; H. F. Fuhs, “יֵָרא,” TDOT 6:312 – 13; Schoors, “Theodicy,” 
392; see also other scholars listed in these references. 
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8]; 8:12–13). These contents of “fear God” convey a cultic, moral, or ethical sense, 
which accords well with the frame-narrator’s admonition at the end, standing in the 
Israelite sapiential tradition.837 Those who interpret Qohelet’s phrase “fear God” as 
“terror of God” often focus on 3:14 and treat other passages as glosses or as additions 
by later hands to fit the phrase to their “terror” interpretation. Whybray surely 
correctly observes that 
the idea that Qoheleth’s concept of the “fear of God” is essentially different from its 
usual meaning in the Old Testament (devotion to God, worship of God, or willing 
obedience to his commandments) is an idea derived from a particular interpretation 
of Qoheleth’s thought in general rather than from his actual use of the phrase.838  
Moreover, Qohelet could choose specific lexemes such as חרד ,חול ,גור ,פחד ,אימה, and 
their cognates to express dread, terror, trembling, etc., as other biblical writers often 
did, although ירא could also imply “dread” or “terror,” depending on the situation.839  
The term ירא “fear” appears nine times in Ecclesiastes, of which seven 
occurrences relate to God, and all but one come out of Qohelet’s mouth.840 In three 
instances Qohelet iterates that it will go well with those who fear God but not with 
one who does not fear God and does evil (7:18; 8:12, 13). Two times he admonishes 
his audience to fear God because: (1) God has made everything appropriate in its time 
and what He has arranged for “eternity” remains unchangeable, therefore humans can 
change nothing but should fear Him (3:11, 14); and (2) God’s domain and the human 
realm are distinctively different so humans should not sin or anger God by foolish 
utterances such as unfulfilled vows in the temple, His dwelling place (4:17–5:6 [ET 
5:1–7]). In all these scenarios Qohelet appears to promote acknowledgement of God’s 
sovereignty, power, and authority with a proper worship in the temple and good deeds 
even in a corrupt society in the fear of God so that it may go well with God-fearers 
(8:12).841 This seems no different from the traditional sapiential teaching and the 
usual meaning of “fear God” or “fear of God” elsewhere in the Scripture. Be that as it 
                                                 
837 Otto Kaiser, “Qoheleth,” in Wisdom in Ancient Israel: Essays in Honour of J. A. Emerton (eds. Day, 
et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 90. 
838 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 75. Interpreting Qohelet’s concept of “fear God” in this light appears a more 
recent  trend. See Weeks, Scepticism, 90; Schoors, “Theodicy,” 392 – 99. 
839 Robert L. Cate, “The Fear of the Lord in the Old Testament,” TTE 35 (1987): 41 – 55; Vernon H. 
Kooy, “The Fear and Love of God in Deuteronomy,” in Grace Upon Grace (ed. Cook; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1975), 106 – 16; Bernard J. Bamberger, “Fear and Love of God in the Old Testament,” 
HUCA 6 (1929): 39 – 53. 
840 “Fear God” uttered by Qohelet appears six times in verb (3:14; 5:6 [ET 7]; 8:12) and adjective 
(7:18; 8:12, 13) forms; and once as a verb by the frame-narrator in 12:13. No noun form, “fear of God,” 
appears in Ecclesiastes in contrast to Job or Proverbs. 
841 Cf. Joseph narrative in Gen 37–52 typifies this motto. 
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may, our main concern here, however, is not what exactly Qohelet means by “fear 
God,” but why he concerns himself with God or to fear Him, if he is truly convinced 
that all he has is this life which will be robbed by death, from which God does not 
appear to rescue him. 
When death becomes an imminent reality, one’s concern for life manifests itself in 
two questions: (1) How much longer can I live? and (2) How should I spend the 
limited time left? Qohelet expressly indicates those are his major concerns for life: he 
describes life as fleeting, and exhorts people to find enjoyment before death abruptly 
terminates everything. What Qohelet seems to mean in all these instances is not to 
anger God who can destroy their work or shorten their lives (5:5 [ET 6]). It is 
interesting to note that Qohelet warns not to anger God by their lips and by thoughts 
which appear in dreams, in particular (5:1–2, 6 [ET 2–3, 7]). God’s revelation often 
comes through dreams in the OT, and Qohelet almost seems to deny such 
occurrences. 
In the same vein, another concern of Qohelet appears to be to do with how one 
should live under an oppressive or corrupt regime. He has spoken about rulers who 
have protected themselves and used their power to hurt others, while oppressing the 
poor and denying the right of individuals. Under such a regime, it is possible that 
righteous people may have resisted the evil demands of the authorities and even may 
have lost their lives. Qohelet has seen the righteous dying in their righteousness. His 
admonition for not being overly righteous or too wise may stem from such an 
observation, and he implies that one who fears God would grasp and heed his 
warning, and thus avoid self-destruction or premature death (7:16–18). Qohelet also 
admonishes people to keep the king’s command and avoid offences against him so as 
not to anger the king, because the king has power and can do whatever he pleases 
regardless of the legitimacy of his order (8:2–4). He is likely saying not to risk their 
lives by the king’s anger.842 As far as Qohelet is concerned, it is better not to anger 
whoever is higher or stronger than they, because they cannot dispute with him (6:10): 
it is better to fear him—either God or a king.843 As long as they live, they may still 
have a chance to enjoy life—a live dog is better than the dead lion, indeed. 
                                                 
842 Cf. Weeks, Scepticism, 88. 
843 Perdue, “Cosmology,” 478. 
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Qohelet’s last poem seems to say that the powerful oppressors in his society 
eventually face God’s wrath, even though they may not now. Thus, fearing God may 
be a good thing after all, even though he seems somewhat reluctant to accept a 
conventional wisdom844 when he sees a sinner prolonging life while doing evil a 
hundred times: 
מלא לב בני־האדם בהם  פתגם מעשה הרעה מהרה על־כן 846אין־נעשה 845אשר(11)
יהיה־ bאשר 848ומאריך לו כי גם־יודע אני 847חטא עשה רע מאת aאשר (12) לעשות רע׃
וטוב לא־יהיה לרשע ולא־יאריך ימים   (13)ייראו מלפניו׃ 849cאשר י האלהיםטוב לירא
  איננו ירא מלפני אלהים׃ dאשר 850כצל
 
 (11) Because the sentence against an evil deed is not executed quickly, therefore the 
heart of the sons of men within them is full to do evil, (12) for a sinner is doing evil a 
hundred times and is prolonging his life—although I know that it will be well for the 
fearer of God, because they fear before Him, (13) but it will not be well for the wicked 
and he will not prolong [his] days, like a shadow, because he does not fear before 
God. (8:11–13) 
This difficult passage may be better understood when it is analysed from the bottom 
up. In vv. 12b–13, Qohelet says he is well aware of the traditional doctrine of 
retribution that the God-fearers fare well because they fear Him, but the wicked will 
neither fare well nor prolong their life, which is like a shadow, because they do not 
fear God. In reality, however, a sinner may commit evil a hundred times and still may 
live long. The reason is that the sentence against an evil deed is not executed swiftly, 
thus the heart of humankind within them is fully to do evil (11–12a). 
                                                 
844 In 8:12b–13. Gordis, Man, 293. 
 introducing the apodosis, is על־כן which is reinforced by ,אשר the causal function of :על־כן . . . אשר 845
the most common interpretation, according to Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 626, although some connects the 
 .of v. 10; e.g., Fox, Time, 284–85 גם־זה הבל clauses of v. 11 and 12 to אשר
846 “Be not done/executed.” נעשה should be Niphal ptc. m./sg. ( הנֲַעׂשֶ  ) rather than pf. (נֲַעָׂשה) because of 
the negator אין. 
 is missing), used as פעם hundred” numeral cardinal f./sg. const. (without a noun, e.g., possibly“ :מאת 847
a round number for “a great many” rather than literally; “the adverbial use of the feminine form of the 
cardinal number with the meaning ‘X-times’ is not infrequent”: Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 630. Another 
possibility is to read as ֵמאֹת, f./pl. abs. (see Gen 5:4, 30; 23:15), which can imply “great many.” Cf. 
Krüger, Kohelet, 284–85 [ET 158].  
 ,also in 4:14; 8:16, “for even, although,” concessive particle: BDB:168; Seow, Ecclesiastes :כי גם 848
288; Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 632; contra Fox, Time, 286. יודע אני: When speaking of his knowledge 
through experience or observation, Qohelet uses the Qal pf. form (ידעתי). Qal ptc. m./sg. here is 
probably referring to his awareness of common knowledge or belief (i.e., the traditional doctrine of 
retribution in vv. 12b–13), rather than his personally acquired knowledge. Thus “I am aware,” “I 
acknowledge,” or “I recognise,” may be closer in meaning. See Isaksson, Language, 67.  
849 Each of the three appearances of אשר functions as: (a) causal, not concessive; (b) relative; and (c) 
causal clause, which has parallel (d) in v. 13. 
 like a shadow” may be a figure of: (1) fleeting life (cf. 6:12); (2) transitoriness of the sinner’s“ :כצל 850
life; or (3) prolonging life like lengthening shadows before dusk. Barton, Ecclesiastes, 154; contra Ps 




5.3.1.2  Keep God’s Commandment? 
Qohelet also says, “He who keeps a commandment (שומר מצוה) will know no evil 
thing” (8:5). Scholars are divided regarding whose מצוה Qohelet may be referring to: a 
royal or divine commandment. In the context of 8:2–5 with “king’s command” (פי־
 is authoritative” in v. 3, a logical (דבר־מלך) in v. 2 and “the word of the king (מלך
interpretation seems to point to a royal command. However, it may also point to the 
divine commandment. Lange observes:  
Because the phrase שמר מצוה designates in Hellenistic times only the observance of 
God's laws (e.g. Sir 15:15; 32:22 [35:27]; 37:12; 44:20a; lQHa 16:13, 17; lQSb 1:1; 
CD 2:18; 3:2; 19:2; lQpHab 5:5) and because even in earlier times the phrase was 
seldom used to describe obedience to something other than God's laws (to my 
knowledge only in Prov 4:4; 7:1f., 19:16; 1 Kgs 2:43), Eccl 8:5 must also be 
understood as an admonition to live according to the Torah.851  
Lange treats 8:5–6 as a secondary insertion because it agrees with the epilogue but 
not with Qohelet’s view of fearing God in his interpretation. However, the passage 
logically belongs to Qohelet’s sayings in the context as already discussed in Chapter 
3. Qohelet has already advised his audience to keep the king’s command because of 
their word of oath of God. In its immediate context Qohelet probably means it is a 
royal command. But the author may also wish to convey through the frame-narrator’s 
transmission of Qohelet’s words that it is the divine commandment which keeps them 
from trouble. When Israelites hear the frame-narrator transmitting Qohelet’s “ ומר ש
 what most likely and immediately may come to the Israelites’ mind could be ,”מצוה
God’s command to keep the Torah. Qohelet says simply “he who keeps a 
commandment,” not king’s or his command (מצותו); the latter can be easily said in the 
context. The ambiguity seems to be cleverly devised so that the frame-narrator 
perhaps can convey it in such a way that he later confirms in his conclusion (12:13) 
that the audience heard it right.  
It is now time to tie together Qohelet’s discourse and the frame-narrator’s 
conclusion in a coherent whole. 
5.3.1.3  God Will Judge, but When?  
Qohelet says God will judge (3:17; 11:9) because there is a time for everything. In 
this he has not erred. What Qohelet has missed is that God transcends time just as He 
                                                 
851 Armin Lange, “Eschatological Wisdom in the Book of Qohelet and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Dead 
Sea Scrolls: Fifty Years after Their Discovery (eds. Schiffman, et al.; Jerusalem: Israel Exploration 
Society, 2000), 819. 
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does space. Humans are bound by time and limited in space, and perhaps Qohelet may 
have assumed that God must also be bound by time and space in human affairs that 
He gets involved. Qohelet’s focus on everything under the sun and the reality of death 
seems to have blocked Qohelet’s view of anything beyond human boundaries, 
including God’s work. Qohelet apparently focussed on what he cannot grasp, unless 
he can see. To him all that one can see also seems to end with death. He observes that 
humans cannot overcome death and it seems as though God cannot, either, in his 
view. Qohelet views God as an anthropological entity according to his self-realized 
wisdom. Thus, Qohelet cannot envision God’s judgement in a fully eschatological 
scale. Qohelet’s vision is only partially correct, which the frame-narrator brings into a 
wider spectrum. 
In sum, what Qohelet says in his monologue concerning the traditional wisdom 
with his view, which is constrained by death’s reality, appears to be integrated in the 
frame-narrator’s epilogue to make it whole.  
5.3.2 Ambiguities in Qohelet’s Language and His Inconsistencies  
I have argued that Qohelet uses certain words and phrases uniquely and distinctively 
in his own way to convey his views, and what Qohelet says may carry more than one 
meaning or connotation.852 The author may have carefully chosen those words to put 
into Qohelet’s mouth for his purpose. Qohelet’s language may deliberately be shaped 
so that certain meaning or innuendoes could come through according to how 
Qohelet’s monologue is transmitted and received, as I have discussed above. The 
effects may be greater, particularly if the book is read aloud or even performed, as 
already pointed out earlier in Chapter 2.  
In the use of certain terms and phrases may arise several possible scenarios: first 
of all, the author may have deliberately chosen a certain term to mean different things 
in different contexts, rather than a single meaning for all instances. Qohelet’s 
favourite words such as רוח ,מקרה ,הבל, and even לכה  may be good examples of 
conveying varied meanings in his rhetorical use, as we have seen in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Secondly, Qohelet may use a word or a phrase to mean one thing, but the author may 
wish to convey another or added meaning by the same word or phrase such as  פטמש  
and מצוה. Thirdly, Qohelet’s monologue is a reported speech by the frame-narrator 
who can control and add nuances to the tone, innuendo, and inference of Qohelet’s 
                                                 
852 Cf. Miller, “Qohelet ’s,” 437 – 54;  Miller, “Rhetoric,” 215– 35; Miller, Symbol, 15, and passim. 
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utterances. The frame-narrator may even contrive and shape Qohelet’s speech with 
words and phrases because of their complexity. Transmission of the reported speech 
may enable the frame-narrator to signal to his audience that what Qohelet says in a 
literal sense may not be what the author tries to communicate to them: in other words, 
Qohelet’s words are not final; another or final message may be in store underneath 
them or at the end. Qohelet is simply describing his observations and expressing his 
frustrations, which may sound very familiar to his audience’s life experiences and 
with which they may identify themselves. At the same time, Qohelet’s statements 
when transmitted by the frame-narrator may trigger an impression in the audience’s 
mind that the author may be withholding or suspending the upshot of Qohelet’s 
monologue, the actual “aha moment” until later, maybe to the end. After all, 
Qohelet’s monologue is a reported speech by the frame-narrator who navigates the 
entire discourse to the ultimate denouement. It is a clever device if indeed the author 
has put into Qohelet’s mouth often ambiguous or complex words and phrases to 
embed his messages in what Qohelet utters. Qohelet may mean one thing but a 
perceptive audience may sense or detect added meaning that the author wishes to 
communicate through the frame-narrator’s presentation. Such a device is certainly not 
out of bounds to the literary invention. It is not the speech of the main character, in 
which the author may have implanted some hints, but its delivery by the frame-
narrator, which may be a clue towards unravelling the puzzle of his book.  
In such a scenario, if not unreasonable, Qohelet’s monologue may be serving two 
purposes. On the one hand it is a sympathetic voice to the author’s audience. What 
Qohelet expresses, especially his observations of what is happening in his society, 
may be a reflection of the reality in which the author perhaps lived when he wrote the 
book. He does not deny or correct what Qohelet describes, which may have been what 
his audience was likely experiencing in his society. The audience can probably 
identify themselves with Qohelet. They may have been as confused and puzzled as 
Qohelet is when it comes to God’s activities in their world. Qohelet’s ambivalence 
between his belief in traditional wisdom teaching and the reality he sees may also be a 
reflection of his audience’s attitude. The author is sympathetic with his audience in 
their predicament.  
On the other hand Qohelet’s voice may be meant to be provocative. Qohelet sees 
death as final, with results which are unrelated to whatever life one may lead. His 
relentless stress on the indiscriminate levelling effect of death and the same dreary 
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destination of Sheol for both the righteous and the wicked may well have purported to 
provoke the audience.  
Moreover, Qohelet apparently refuses to entertain speculations about anything 
beyond death. He often and deliberately seems to ask rhetorical questions: “Who 
knows?” or “Who can tell?” concerning certain mysteries in life that he does not 
understand or that he presumes no one knows (7:24). In fact, Qohelet often asks 
questions starting with interrogatives: מי “who” (15 times), מה “what” (19 times) or 
 ,מה why” (4 times), of which he asks “What gain?” 10 times out of 19 usages of“ למה
and “Who knows/finds?” 4 times out of 15 usages of 853,מי relating to the future, more 
specifically after one’s death. In retrospect one may see that these questions reflect 
serious concerns being raised regarding the significance of an individual’s survival in 
life, and perhaps even in death, in people’s minds, if not all in Qohelet’s. At the same 
time, his repeated rhetorical questions to which no one has an answer may be 
designed to provoke deeper reflections on the fate of the pious and the righteous in 
particular.  
Seeing all the wickedness, strangely Qohelet never protested or sought God’s 
intervention; instead, he exhorted his audience to enjoy their life while they could. If 
his attitude were any indication of people’s sentiments in his society, then it seems 
unlikely that apocalyptic eschatology was yet on the rise at the time of Ecclesiastes’ 
writing. No one seemed to be seeking God’s revelation in Qohelet’s society as the 
apocalyptists did. 
Such was the situation under which the author might have written Ecclesiastes in 
order to bring Israelites back to the basic tenets of Israelite wisdom teaching. The 
author does not criticize or deny what Qohelet utters because it probably was the 
                                                 
853 There is an interesting pattern in Qohelet’s questions. Verses 8:7 and 10:14 are virtually verbatim 
and there is a clear pattern among verses 3:22b, 6:12b, and 10:14b, as shown below:  
 
יהיה                מי יגיד לו׃איננו ידע             מה־שיהיה  כי  כאשר        (8:7b) 
 (10:14bc)  לא־ידע   האדם   מה־שיהיה       ואשר יהיה   מאחריו   מי יגיד לו׃
 (6:12b)                                                                                מי־יגיד 
ה                             אחריו                      תחת השמשלאדם   מה־יהי                                
 (3:22b)                                                                                מי יביאנו 
                           לראות   במה שיהיה                        אחריו׃                                           
    
While Qohelet insists that death terminates everything and is aware that no one knows what happens in 
the future and no one can tell what happens after death, it is striking that he cannot help asking these 
rhetorical questions, which manifests his deep frustration and struggle with unjustifiable death, and his 
unwillingness to quite give up insisting on serious detrimental effect of death upon human life, even 
though he knows that no one has an answer to the problem. Cf. Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 494 – 95. 
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reflection of his society. However, he probably intended more than just to sympathize 
with his people under the predicament, but in fact to provoke them so that they might 
react against Qohelet’s resignation and turn to God. Such provocation and the reality 
of injustice in the society could trigger a reassessment of Israelite traditional beliefs in 
theodicy and Sheol. In sum, Qohelet’s monologue is probably meant to agitate and 
solicit response. 
Qohelet’s monologic discourse and the epilogue appear mutually exclusive on the 
surface, when one compares Qohelet’s two extreme—hebel and pseudo-carpe diem— 
mottos with the epilogue’s final conclusion (12:13b–14). The current analysis 
suggests that the two discourses, the one by Qohelet and the other by the frame-
narrator, seem to be intricately intertwined through the use of a literary device, the 
frame-narrative. The frame-narrative structure gives an impression that the character 
and the frame-narrator are segregated as if polar opposites, but both are integral parts 
of the whole. The author seems to have designed a plot with a definite purpose in 
mind. The two sapiential episodes in chapter 12 of Ecclesiastes seem to be closely 
linked if the proposed interpretation of Qohelet’s poem in an eschatological sense is 
correct. It may then help reorient the reader to reassess Qohelet’s monologue in light 
of such an understanding. The poem seems to serve as a bridge between Qohelet’s 
monologue and the epilogue. In such a scheme, one may envisage what the author 
tries to communicate to the audience through Qohelet. Qohelet’s words are probably 
not meant to be merely received, but to be reacted to, or perhaps even to be rejected. It 
is not Qohelet’s many words but the frame-narrator’s conclusion which stands as the 
final definitive word. The frame-narrator recapitulates what the author has desired to 
convey all along. Fisch’s depiction of the epilogue reverberates in this context:  
the view that would assign these closing verses of Ecclesiastes to another editor or 
author should be resisted. This sceptical rejection of scepticism is the final twist of 
Qoheleth’s super-irony.854  
5.4 Summary and Conclusions 
According to the premise discussed and established in Chapter 2 that the frame-
narrator plays a key role to communicate Qohelet’s monologic discourse, this chapter 
has examined how Qohelet’s utterances may be heard. The ambiguities and multiple 
implications in Qohelet’s language seem to suggest that the accumulative effect of 
                                                 
854 Fisch, Poetry, 175. 
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Qohelet’s apparent conflicts and inconsistencies may be designed for a purpose. This 
chapter has focussed on the final chapter of Ecclesiastes, and discovered a possible 
link between Qohelet’s strange poem and the epilogue, if the poem is read in an 
eschatological sense rather than as a conventional “allegory of old age” theme. 
Bridging the poem and the epilogue led us to reanalyse Qohelet’s key traditional 
wisdom sayings and to propose a possible role of ambiguities and conflicts in 
Qohelet’s monologue that the author may have envisioned in order to communicate 
his message in the book as a whole. 
The book’s frame-narrative structure is a well-crafted literary invention, in which 
the main character’s voice is probably meant to be inconsistent, contradictory, and 
thus provocative. Qohelet and Israelite society were likely pulled between their old 
traditional belief and the new reality under foreign rulers, should the composition of 
Ecclesiastes during the Persian-Hellenistic transition period be probable. The author 
probably needed to find a way to secure receptive ears among his people, before they 
would be willing to hear his orthodox wisdom instruction, if Qohelet’s monologue 
may be a reflection of their precarious life circumstance and the societal existential 
attitude. 
If such were the case of Ecclesiastes, questions should be raised whether the 
author’s purpose and goal in his book were realized and how its influence may have 
unfolded during the mid-Second Temple period when the book might have become 
widely known. 
The next chapter will explore how the timing of the book’s appearance may have 
played a role for the reception of Ecclesiastes and how it might have influenced the 
ensuing period in Israelite history toward the emergence of a uniquely Jewish 
apocalyptic eschatology. In other words, the answer to “Why fear God?” may lie in 








Chapter 6  
A POSSIBLE ROLE OF ECCLESIASTES IN THE EMERGENCE 
OF JEWISH APOCALYPTIC ESCHATOLOGY 
What impact might one expect from the appearance of Ecclesiastes with Qohelet’s 
view in Israelite society at a time when traditional ideas of death, Sheol, and divine 
retribution were becoming an issue? Qohelet appears in a context where retributive 
justice no longer seems to be at work. What is the book of Ecclesiastes doing in such 
a context? One key issue which is sometimes overlooked and needs to be addressed is 
how the audience might have reacted to Qohelet’s view of death and divine 
judgement, and how the book of Ecclesiastes with Qohelet’s inconsistent and 
conflicting message was hoped to be received in the social climate of the Persian–
Hellenistic transition period. Death in the absence (or delay) of both divine and 
human justice was becoming a problem not only to Qohelet, but perhaps also to 
Israelite society in general in the changing world dominated by foreign powers. 
Would one expect Israelites to accept death and Sheol as Qohelet understood them? 
Or would they be incited to search for an answer for the unjustifiable death and 
unsatisfactory divine judgement that Qohelet described? How did other literature, 
which appeared during the Second Temple period, receive or react to Ecclesiastes? 
Answers to these questions may shed light on whether Ecclesiastes has had any 
bearing at all on the emergence of apocalyptic eschatology. 
Scholars often argue that the concept of dualism was already arising in Qohelet’s 
society and his sayings in 3:19–21 were polemical, because he did not believe in an 
afterlife. The argument for Qohelet’s polemic is premised on the book’s dating in the 
Hellenistic period and is primarily based on his rhetorical question in 3:21: 
 ׃856למעלה ורוח הבהמה הירדת היא למטה לארץ 855מי יודע רוח בני האדם העלה היא
                                                 
855 The two personal pronouns היא were probably added for emphasis to distinguish the human and 




Who knows whether the rûaḥ of humankind ascends (העלה) upward and the rûaḥ of 
animal descends (הירדת) downward to the earth? (3:21)  
Qohelet states that there is no difference between human and animal: they share the 
same fate of death and have “the same breath” (רוח אחד) in v.19. רוח here as well as in 
v. 19 is interpreted as “life-giving breath” per 12:7, but it seems more aligned to 
interpret רוח in v. 21 as נפש “soul.”857 If רוח is the life-giving breath as in v. 19 and 
12:7 in particular, then it should go back to the source or the giver (God), as 12:7b 
says, regardless of the receivers—human or animal. The question of different destiny 
is valid only if each רוח were different, otherwise the question does not make sense. 
Ploeg remarks:  
Gen 2,7 teaches us that man has received his vital breath (nišmat ḥajjîm) in a 
special  manner, by which it indicates the special nobility and nature of the human 
spirit . Koheleth, no doubt, has known this biblical passage and he has given it his 
mind. . . . Hence it is  clear that in his view the rûaḥ of man and beast cannot be equal 
in every respect .858  
Following LXX and the logic of v. 19, most translators interpret the  ה in  העלה 
and  הירדת (both Qal ptc. f./sg.) as interrogative. MT’s vowel pointing is considered a 
theological correction: “Who knows the rûaḥ of humankind that ascends (העלה) 
upward and the rûaḥ of animal that descends (הירדת) downward to the earth?”859 
However, in some cases both  ָה (Num 16:22; Deut 20:19d) and  ַה (Lev 10:19) appear 
as an interrogative especially before gutturals in the MT.860 According to how one 
                                                                                                                                            
 as gloss, but it may be functioning as לארץ downwards to the earth.” Some treat“ :למטה לארץ 856
appositional to למטה, i.e., “to downward, namely, to the earth.” contra Schoors, Ecclesiastes, 309, who 
overstates that animals go to Sheol.  
857 So in Talmud, cf. Weber, F. Jüdische Theologie, 1897, 338ff. cited in Barton, Ecclesiastes, 110; 
Ginsburg, Coheleth, 319; cf. H. Freedman and Maurice Simon eds, Ecclesiastes (2nd ed., Rab. 8; 
London: Soncino, 1951), 108 – 9; Krüger, Kohelet, 184 [ET 94]. LXX: πνεῦµα in both v. 19 and v. 21. 
Qohelet mentions נפש seven times in his discourse, but none means “breath. ” However, he may actually 
have נפש in mind when he compares  human and animal וחר  in 3:19–21. Thomson, “OT Ideas,” 50, 
notes that “the author entertains the thought of a possible difference between human and animal fate 
not quite  consonant with the thought that the ruah is simply taken back by God” ; also cf. Norman H. 
Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament (London: Epworth, 1944), 147, who says regarding 
3:18 – 21: “In this last case the spirit is regarded as being the life-centre of the body, closely allied to 
the  ‘soul’ in the sense, in which those who believe in the immortality of the soul use the word” ; for 
semantic ranges of נפש and רוח, see Tengström and Fabry, TDOT 13:365 – 402; Horst Seebass, “נֶֶפש,” 
TDOT 9:497 – 519. 
858 J. P. M. van der Ploeg, Prediker (BOT 8/2; Roermond en Masseik: Romen & Zonen, 1953), 33; 
English translation from Dutch by Antoon Schoors, “Koheleth: A Perspective of Life after Death?,” 
ETL 61 (1985): 300 – 301. 
859  Goldman, “Qoheleth,” 79*; Kautzsch ed, GKC, §100m; McNeile, Ecclesiastes, 65, and most Bible 
translations; those who follow the MT are: e.g., Heidel, Gilgamesh, 147; Eaton, Ecclesiastes, 88 – 89; 
N/KJV; NASB. 
860 Cf. Barton, Ecclesiastes, 112 – 13; Gordis, Man, 238. 
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interprets hē (ה) on העלה and הירדת in v. 21,861 an implication of his question can be: 
“no one knows that the rûaḥ of humans and animals are different; or “no one knows 
that they are the same.” Either way, the answer is: “No one knows if they go to the 
same place or separate ways.” In any case, Jastrow remarks on 3:21 that 
the question which he poses . . . is an indication that the author lived in an age which 
had passed beyond the primitive conception and had advanced to an attempt to 
differentiate between the fate in store for the dead. The thought of a heavenly abode 
for at least some human souls must have been current, or the question would be an 
idle one.862 
A question whether or not a belief in apocalyptic eschatology was emerging at the 
time of Ecclesiastes’ composition needs to be explored.863 Before addressing this 
issue, however, a closer examination of the content of Qohelet’s monologic discourse 
in two aspects may help verify the plausibility of Qohelet’s possible polemical stance: 
(1) evidence of Qohelet’s polemical tendency and (2) a reason for Qohelet’s 
opposition to belief in apocalyptic eschatology.  
 As for his polemical tendency, it is difficult to assess Qohelet’s political 
significance without any description of his rule or kingship (as שפט) in his claim that 
he has been a king. Qohelet simply boasts about what he has done or accomplished 
for himself while he was a king in his monologic discourse. His self-portrayal seems 
to indicate that Qohelet was more absorbed with his own personal interests and 
satisfaction than a politically motivated ambition.864 Qohelet sees tremendous 
oppressions against powerless people in his society and laments that the dead may be 
more fortunate than they. He observes judicial and political corruptions but takes no 
initiative to set things right, which is uncharacteristic of a man with any leadership 
ability, who once was a king, or so claimed. Although Qohelet is indignant with 
wickedness which seems to be permeating every corner of his society, he is silent and 
immovable with regard to any corrective or political action. Qohelet simply seems to 
watch, as if he is either helpless or detached, and pities the wronged and the 
                                                 
861 Either interpretation does not make a difference in the discussion here. 
862 Jastrow, Cynic, 130. 
863 Jean-Jacques Lavoie, “Vie, mort et finitude humaine en Qo 9,1–6,” ScEs 47 (1995): 80, does not see 
any influence of Jewish apocalyptic, Egyptian wisdom or Greek philosophy on Qohelet; contra Krüger, 
Kohelet, 56 [ET 30]. 
864 Norman Gottwald, “How Do Extrabiblical Sociopolitical Data Illuminate Obscure Biblical Texts? 
The Case of Ecclesiastes 5:8 – 9 (Heb. 5:7 – 8),” in Focusing Biblical Studies: The Crucial Nature of the 
Persian and Hellenistic Periods: Essays in Honor of Douglas A. Knight (eds. Berquist and Hunt; 
LHBOTS 544; New York: T&T Clark, 2012), 192 – 201 [esp. 198]. 
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oppressed.865 “For all his gentle compassion, he will not lift a finger to help the 
oppressed in their desperate plight,” criticizes Watson.866 Qohelet hardly exhibits any 
political clout or prowess that a king should have, but simply tells people to obey the 
rulers, reasoning that each authority has yet a higher one above him for protection. 
In any event Qohelet’s status as a king is essentially a fictive/imaginable role and 
his sayings do not reflect a real king’s stature. He seems to be more philosophical and 
pragmatic than political in his disposition. He certainly does not express any ambition 
to hold power. All that Qohelet displays in his monologue is simply to express his 
own resolution and practical instructions from what he has observed or experienced. 
In this sense Qohelet is more a sage than a king. If the Hellenistic dating of the book 
is correct, his individualistic outlook on life and reclusive attitude while observing 
turmoil in his society would not support his polemical tendency against any societal 
issues, be they political, religious, or otherwise.867 He does not express a polemical 
view or instigate any social action against the corrupt regime or its rulers, nor is there 
any evidence that he ever had any opposition to the religious order or the power under 
which he lived.  
In the second place, one may question why Qohelet should oppose emerging 
apocalyptic eschatology if it was indeed a religious undercurrent arising in his society. 
One may examine how Qohelet deals with issues that he has raised concerning what 
“one fate to all” brings to human society. No character has ever raised such a sharply 
indignant voice against death on the one hand, while clinging to life in flesh and blood 
in this world on the other hand, as Qohelet does. He is reminded again and again how 
death brings everything that one does to naught. As discussed in previous chapters, 
Qohelet almost mercilessly articulates how death levels, nullifies, and negates what 
makes humans human as if they live in an amoral animal world (cf. 3:18; 9:4). 
Qohelet expresses his serious concern over death especially because it appears that 
those who do not deserve it—the oppressed, the powerless, and the righteous—are 
facing this predicament far more often than the wicked in his society. Evil seems only 
to prevail when death occasions injustice and denies justice in this world. 
                                                 
865 Hengel, Judentum, 216 [ET 117]. 
866 Francis Watson, Text, Church and World: Biblical Interpretation in Theological Perspective 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 284. 
867 Contra Duane A. Garrett, “Qoheleth on the Use and Abuse of Political Power,” TJ 8 NS (1987): 
159 – 77. 
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If there arose a voice proclaiming post-mortem divine judgement in the hope that 
injustice would be retributed and the righteous did not die in vain after all, it would 
not contradict Qohelet’s view on divine judgement or its postponement. In fact, an 
apocalyptic eschatology explains better why God’s justice is delayed, and supports 
Qohelet’s insistence that God will judge in the face of absent justice in his society. 
There is no reason Qohelet must oppose apocalyptic eschatology on the whole, or a 
belief in resurrection which emerged as one of the most prominent emphases in 
apocalyptic eschatology.868  
The best resolution to Qohelet’s dilemma is a post-mortem divine judgement 
against the wicked and a reward or restitution of justice due for the righteous, if he 
insists that God will judge and if human life holds any meaning at all. God’s justice 
needs to transcend physical death for Qohelet’s God to execute His righteous 
judgement. As Snaith notes: “Justice must be done, and it shall be done beyond the 
grave if it has not already been done  this side the grave.”869 Apocalyptic eschatology 
meets the logic (see, e.g., 1 En. 22; 103:3 – 8; Pss. Sol. 3:11 – 12), fulfils his claim, and 
provides an answer that Qohelet desperately searches for but has not found. Somehow 
Qohelet does not entertain or speculate about such a possibility, but stays with what 
he knows, observes, and experiences.870 Qohelet remains sceptical when it comes to 
what might happen after death. Be that as it may, there appears no good excuse for 
him to oppose a belief in apocalyptic eschatology, had it emerged in his society. It is 
hard to imagine from his grief over the oppressed that Qohelet would not at least 
commiserate with them if they seized upon the belief, even if he himself might not 
entertain such a thought. Why does he have to deny them a glimpse of hope while 
dying? He who believes in life and loathes death even says that the dead are better off 
than the living under the oppression that he saw (4:2). Why then does he have to 
oppose a belief in post-mortem judgement if people die with such hope? An 
eschatological hope can give comfort to the dying, especially when dying unjustly. 
His opposition to the belief would serve no good purpose but add an unnecessary 
insult to injury. He cannot blame oppressed people for holding such hope, simply 
because he does not know what happens after death. Qohelet himself holds onto his 
                                                 
868 John J. Collins, “Apocalyptic Eschatology in the Ancient World,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Eschatology (ed. Walls; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 47. 
869 Snaith, “Justice,” 319.  
870 Scott C. Jones, “Qohelet’s Courtly Wisdom: Ecclesiastes  8:1– 9,” CBQ 68 (2006): 228. 
201 
 
belief in God’s judgement against the reality he sees. Despite his observation of 
indiscriminate death’s tyranny and its finality in this world, the repeated notion “God 
will judge” must come from a genuine conviction in God’s righteousness. In this 
sense he is as illogical as those who hold onto their hope and belief in the post-
mortem divine judgement of apocalyptic eschatology.  
From his final statement the frame-narrator probably held a view of eschatological 
judgement which could take place post mortem. Beyond it, what view he has held 
concerning reward and punishment of the ultimate judgement cannot be spelled out. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to ask whether there was not yet a sign of 
apocalyptic eschatology emerging at the likely time of Ecclesiastes’ composition 
during the Persian–Hellenistic transition period. According to 2 Maccabees, a belief 
in Jewish apocalyptic eschatology is most notably manifested during the religious 
persecution under Antiochus IV Epiphanes (175–164 BCE). Chapter 6 of 2 
Maccabees describes the beginning of the religious persecution by the Seleucid king, 
and Chapter 7 famously depicts the martyrdom of a mother and her seven sons, who 
willingly and gladly suffer cruel torture and death by the hand of Antiochus IV. They 
astonish the king and his subjects by their bravery and willingness to die with their 
belief in resurrection. It indicates that at least some Israelites held a belief in post-
mortem divine judgment and reward by then. They have embraced the concept of 
apocalyptic eschatology before the time of Maccabean revolt (167–160 BCE). 
Qohelet does not mention any religious persecution or rebellion against rulers due to 
religious practices among his people. A question may be raised when and how such a 
belief emerged among Israelites. The current consensus suggests that the answer may 
lie in the third century BCE, sometime after Ecclesiastes’ circulation within the 
Jewish community. This consensus may be used in an attempt to answer the questions 
raised at the outset in this chapter. 
Admittedly, much of the ensuing discussion must be conjectural, but this thesis 
will tentatively offer a possible historical significance for Ecclesiastes if it had indeed 
appeared in the mid-Second Temple period. It is hoped that the circumstantial 
evidence that will be discussed here will support the proposal in this chapter as a 
plausible and feasible thesis perhaps with potential for further research.  
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6.1 Ecclesiastes and Apocalypticism 
Scholars usually identify the earliest manifestation of discrete belief in a beatific 
afterlife (resurrection) for the righteous and eternal punishment of the wicked by the 
post-mortem divine judgement in 1 Enoch and Daniel.871 The discovery of Qumran 
scrolls has aided the dating of 1 Enoch and placed its oldest portions in the third 
century BCE,872 long before the Maccabean revolt.873 The writers of 1 Enoch 
apparently knew Ecclesiastes and perhaps reacted against it (e.g., 1 En. 102:4–
103:15). Mazzinghi, however, bases his argument on Ecclesiastes being a polemic 
against early Enochism by placing the early 1 Enoch before Ecclesiastes or treating 
the two works as contemporary.874 He compares texts from both books for his 
argument, but the converse may also be true according to which book appeared first. 
Ecclesiastes and 1 Enoch may not be too far apart from each other in their 
composition date, although we do not really know. Mazzinghi compares 3:17–21 with 
1 Enoch 22,875 in which each writer expresses his view on different subject matters 
(afterlife vs. eschatological judgement) with different assumptions, and a direct 
comparison seems inappropriate both in content and context. Qohelet questions the 
destination of the spirit in relation to human and animal, whereas the Enochic passage 
compares the righteous dead with the wicked, whose spirits are kept in four different 
hollow places for the great day of judgement.  
This leads us to examine conditions in Qohelet’s society and compare them with 
those under which Jewish apocalyptic eschatology may have emerged. Let us first 
examine what may have catalysed the emergence of apocalyptic eschatology.  
                                                 
871 Collins, “Apocalyptic,” 47; John J. Collins, “The Afterlife in Apocalyptic Literature,” in Judaism in 
Late Antiquity Part 4, Death, Life-after-Death, Resurrection and the World-to-Come in the Judaisms of 
Antiquity (eds. Avery-Peck and Neusner; Leiden: Brill, 2000),  119 – 39 [esp. 127].  
872 VanderKam, Enoch, 79–114, places most of the Astronomical Book (1 Enoch 72 – 79 and 82) as the 
oldest, dating before 200 BCE (pp. 79 – 88) and the Book of Watchers (l Enoch 1 – 36) as the second 
oldest, which is pre-Maccabean, perhaps from the third century BCE (pp. 111 – 14); see also J. T. Milik 
ed, The Books of Enoch: Aramaic Fragments of Qumrân Cave 4 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 139 – 274.  
873 Collins, “Afterlife,” 127. Recently Klawans writes that 1 Maccabees and Josephus suggest 
that  “many Jews—even those who believed in the afterlife—saw no particular association between 
these events and the doctrine espoused by Daniel and 2 Maccabees,” in Jonathan Klawans, Josephus 
and the Theologies of Ancient Judaism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 99, 216. He 
concludes that  “there’s certainly no reason to think whether from Josephus or any other ancient Jewish 
evidence, that afterlife beliefs gained a stronger hold in Israel because of the Maccabean crisis or any 
other particularly challenging event.” 
874 Mazzinghi, “Qohelet,” 157–67. 
875 Ibid., 158.  
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Apocalyptic eschatology likely emerged and was driven by the following factors 
in the sociological and religious environment during the mid-Second Temple period: 
1. A demand for divine judgment against injustice and oppression under foreign 
rulers.876 
2. A need for redefining death and Sheol: appropriate for the wicked but an 
inappropriate destination for the righteous.877  
3. A new concept of life after death among the Israelites—resurrection/ 
immortality—rather than insubstantial existence in Sheol/netherworld within 
and without Israelite society.878 
4. A hope for individual resurrection along with national restoration.879  
These are the result of uncertainties in both the national and religious outlook due to 
“cultural trauma”880 during the postexilic period, which probably necessitated that 
Israelites should reassess their traditional beliefs. Not only did Israelites lose their 
kings and kingdom but they also came under upheavals from foreign powers and 
struggles during the post-exilic period, through which they tried to maintain their 
national and religious identities.881 Conceivably, Israelites may no longer have felt 
God’s protection or His guiding hand as a nation, nor His presence among them as 
His chosen people during the post-exilic period. Instead, they may have perceived 
God becoming remote and silent.882 God no longer seemed to protect His people, and 
their scattered community probably sought their own survival and security, which 
were at the mercy of changing foreign rulers. As the rise of injustice, oppression, and 
the question of theodicy became major sociological and religious issues, people may 
well have felt compelled to seek new answers.883 Farmer points out:  
                                                 
876 Snaith, “Justice,” 314, 319; Collins, “Apocalyptic,” 47; Collins, “Afterlife,” 127; Noort, “Death,” 
266. 
877 Wright, “Death Pt.1,” 25, 28; cf. Xavier Terrence, “Life after Death: In the Intertestamental 
Palestine Context,” JDh 37 (2012): 468. 
878 Arnold, “OT Eschatology,” 31. Arnold rightly states: “Although Israel shared many features in 
common with ancient Near Eastern prophecy and prophetic phenomena, we have at present no 
evidence outside of Israel for an eschatological notion of a glorious Endzeit, or a culminating and 
meliorative end to the historical process.” 
879 Wright, “Death Pt.1,” 27 – 28; Wright, Resurrection, 153; Anthony Petterson, “Antecedents of the 
Christian Hope of Resurrection, Part 2: Intertestamental Literature,” RTR 59 (2000): 53; cf. 2 Macc 
1:24 – 29. 
880 Collins, “Afterlife,” 127. 
881 Lorenzo DiTommaso, “Apocalypses and Apocalypticism in Antiquity (Part II),” CBR 5 (2007): 368; 
Jonathan Z. Smith, “Wisdom and Apocalyptic,” in Religious Syncretism in Antiquity (Missoula, MT: 
Scholars Press, 1975), 154. 
882 Situations described in this paragraph are also found in Ecclesiastes. 
883 Gottwald, “How,” 195, 199 – 200. 
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Once convinced that the traditional doctrine of retribution fails to reflect human experience, 
one either has to give up the idea of justice or one has to push its execution into some realm 
beyond the evidence of human experience.884 
The above situation reflects much of what Qohelet describes in the book of 
Ecclesiastes. Qohelet insists that God will judge without any credible evidence to 
point to. As a sage he may have been compelled to insist on it, although all he could 
observe was the opposite result of increased injustice. It is possible that people were 
losing faith in justice in their society because of his mixed messages which were 
mutually exclusive. The issues that Qohelet has raised and depicted are:  
1. Absence of justice against widespread wickedness and oppression in 
society.885 
2. The same fate seems to befall both the righteous and the wicked 
indiscriminately.886 Qohelet thinks that all alike die and go to the same place. 
The righteous are facing what the wicked deserve: oppressions and perhaps 
untimely or violent death, ending in Sheol—a place to which sinners and the 
wicked deserve to go. 
3. Existence in Sheol is no life at all—it is non-life and non-living, not a 
desirable post-mortem existence.  
4. Concern for individual fate and future security887 relative to national 
survival.888 
These issues are strikingly similar and reverberate with the factors which may have 
driven and effected the emergence of Jewish apocalyptic eschatology. A need for 
modification or refinement of Israelite traditional beliefs in death, Sheol, and afterlife 
was a natural consequence.  
Similarities are even more striking in the mode of thinking which one finds in 
both Ecclesiastes and apocalyptic literature. In a comparison of both Jewish wisdom 
and apocalyptic literature,889 Gammie describes several dualisms which characterize 
                                                 
884 Kathleen A. Farmer, Who Knows What Is Good?: A Commentary on the Books of Proverbs and 
Ecclesiastes (ITC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 206; see also Terrence, “Life,” 468. 
885 E.g., see 2:21; 3:16; 4:1; 5:7a [ET 8a]; 7:15; 9:3b. 
886 See 2:18 – 20; 3:19 – 20; 9:2 – 3a. Adams, Wisdom, 6, notes:  “This sage is exasperated by the frequent 
unfairness of existence and the finality of death (a shadowy state in Sheol) for even the most righteous 
persons.” 
887 See 2:18–19; 3:22; 6:12; 8:7; 10:14b; 11:8; 12:1. 
888 Cf. Louis Finkelstein, The Pharisees: The Sociological Background of Their Faith (Philadelphia: 
The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1938), 151. 
889 Although the origin of apocalyptic literature, stemming either from wisdom (von Rad) or prophecy 
(Russell) is in debate, wisdom and  apocalyptic literature apparently “share an essential ideological 
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modes of thought in Jewish apocalyptic literature: cosmic (forces of good vs. evil; 
darkness vs. light), temporal (this age vs. the age to come), ethical (the righteous vs. 
the wicked; the godly vs. the impious), psychological (good vs. evil internalized), 
spatial (heaven vs. earth), and theological (God vs. man; Creator vs. his creation) 
dualisms.890 He notes that the spatial and ethical dualisms are prominent in both 
sapiential and apocalyptic writings.891 Qohelet’s monologic discourse touches on 
them all, but most emphatically on spatial and ethical dualisms. Qohelet contrasts the 
dwelling places of God and humans (heaven vs. earth), questions the destination of 
the human spirit, whether to heaven or under the earth, and frequently uses 
expressions such as “under the sun,” “under heaven” and “on the earth”; all signify 
spatial dualism. Ethical dualism is manifested in his observation that wickedness has 
prevailed even in the unlikely places: the righteous are deprived of individual rights or 
justice; but the wicked escape punishment and prosper. Qohelet struggles with the 
theological implications of human existence vs. death and God’s unfathomable 
activities vs. the futility of human toil. He expresses a deterministic view of time, the 
created world, and its Creator as well as his fatalistic view on life. Time, injustice, the 
destiny of human beings after death, and a deterministic view of the created world: all 
appear as issues and factors which have affected the emergence of Jewish apocalyptic 
eschatology.   
Nonetheless, one crucial dissimilarity exists between the apocalyptists and 
Qohelet. What separates him from them has to do with temporal dualism, on which he 
touches but is one-sided. Both apocalyptists and Qohelet speak about time: the 
orientation of apocalyptists is futuristic, and they place their hope in the age to come, 
while suffering injustice in the present age, whereas Qohelet decidedly focuses on this 
life, on this side of death but not hereafter. This difference may be attributed to 
                                                                                                                                            
kinship in their conception of time and history.” Simon J. De Vries, “Observations on Quantitative and 
Qualitative Time in Wisdom and Apocalyptic,” in Israelite Wisdom: Theological and Literary Essays 
in Honor of Samuel Terrien (eds. Gammie, et al.; Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), 263 – 76 [esp. 
263]; John J. Collins, “Cosmos and Salvation: Jewish Wisdom and Apocalyptic in the Hellenistic 
Age,” HR 17 (1977): 135, notes: “Any comparison of wisdom and apocalyptic in the Jewish tradition 
must start from the fact that the  apocalypses are presented as one kind of wisdom. Daniel, Enoch, Ezra, 
and Baruch were all sages rather  than prophets.” More recently many studies on Qumran wisdom texts, 
4QInstruction in particular, indicate wisdom in transition from  traditional wisdom into apocalyptic 
context in those texts. Cf. D. S. Russell, The Method & Message of Jewish Apocalyptic, 200 BC – AD 
100. (OTL; London: SCM, 1964), 205 – 34, 263 – 84. 
890 John G. Gammie, “Spatial and Ethical Dualism in Jewish Wisdom and Apocalyptic Literature,” JBL 
93 (1974): 356 – 85. 
891 Ibid., 356. 
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Qohelet’s self-realized wisdom versus mantic wisdom by revelation (892(רז נהיה in 
apocalyptic literature. In his self-realized wisdom Qohelet relentlessly emphasizes 
that the tyranny of death on the earth makes all activities in human life hebel and its 
levelling effect allows injustice free rein to pervade society. He apparently considers 
that death is the ultimate problem in all facets of human life and is the greatest of all 
evils, which no one can overcome. The finality of death in his view implies that God’s 
justice avails only to those who are alive. Death sustains its upper hand in this world. 
Consequently, Qohelet recommends enjoying one’s life and work whilst being alive, 
which may be an option for a privileged few like him but not for the majority who are 
oppressed or killed during the tumultuous era of foreign rule. Qohelet’s self-realized 
wisdom and fatalistic view on life do not allow him to see anything beyond this life or 
to suggest any hope for future. His statement about life’s futility and rampant injustice 
that Israelites have faced may have exacerbated all the more an existential sense of 
death’s unpredictable threat and irreparable injustice, from which Israelites foresaw 
no immediate deliverance or future hope. Human wisdom even of Solomon’s calibre 
cannot uncover the mystery behind life’s enigma and untimely death which plagues 
the righteous. Being constrained by the received tradition, Qohelet does not have an 
answer to the righteous dead to whom justice has been denied. 
The reception of the book of Ecclesiastes is anything but uniform throughout its 
history, as if to reflect the book’s apparently inconsistent views through Qohelet’s 
mouth. Notable during the same period or shortly thereafter is the appearance of the 
books of Enoch and Daniel with a discrete message of apocalyptic eschatology, if one 
agrees to the current majority consensus on the books’ dating.893 Collins notes, 
                                                 
892 Literally, “the mystery that is to be/come,” which is defined as “an apocalyptic reinterpretation of 
the biblical  and early Jewish concept of ‘the Wisdom of God’,” by  Torleif Elgvin, “Wisdom with and 
without Apocalyptic,” in Sapiential, Liturgical and Poetical Texts from Qumran: Proceedings of the 
Third Meeting of the International Organization for Qumran Studies, Oslo, 1998: Published in 
Memory of Maurice Baillet (eds. Falk, et al.; STDJ 35; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 25; see also Florentino 
García Martínez, “Wisdom and Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls and in the Biblical Tradition: 
Colloquium Biblicum Lovaniense LI (2002),” ETL 78 (2002): 536 – 49 [esp. 544]; according to Daniel 
J. Harrington, “The rāz nihyeh in a Qumran Wisdom Text (1Q26, 4Q415 – 418, 423),” RQ 17 (1996): 
549 – 53, the phrase appears about 35 times in the extant Qumran (mostly sapiential) texts. The term רז 
is a Persian loanword, which prominently occurs in apocalyptic texts (e.g., Dan 2:18–47 [8x]; 
4:6;  4QEnc 5 ii 26–27 [1 En. 106:19]); and Matthew J. Goff, “Wisdom, Apocalypticism, and the 
Pedagogical Ethos of 4QInstruction,” in Conflicted Boundaries in Wisdom and Apocalypticism (eds. 
Wright and Wills; SBLSymS 35; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), 61, adds: “The raz 
nihyeh refers to revealed knowledge that pertains to the entire scope of history.” 
893 Current majority consensus places Daniel in ca. 165 BCE. See James D. Martin, “Ben Sira: A Child 
of His Time,” in A Word in Season: Essays in Honour of William Mckane (eds. Martin and Davies; 
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“Neither of these books is set in a time of persecution,894 but both depict a world out 
of joint. . . . If this is correct, the apocalypse was written as a response to cultural 
trauma and offered an alternative reality in its visions of hidden places and life 
beyond death.”895 Bockmuehl summarizes the situation of emerging apocalyptic 
eschatology as: 
Faced with the theological problems of delayed deliverance and historical theodicy, 
Jewish religious thought . . . necessarily became engaged in a close reassessment of 
the received tradition and of the channels of revelation. Drawing on this re-reading of 
their Biblical heritage, and somewhat stimulated by the increasing secrecy of the 
surrounding popular pagan religions, many Jews found in the notion of revealed 
divine mysteries the key to a renewed understanding of God’s sovereignty in history 
and the cosmos, being offered as it were an “insider’s look” at God’s dealings in 
heaven.896 
In a similar vein, Ecclesiastes could have been written to provoke and trigger a 
reverse response to Qohelet. In other words, the author may have purposed to expose 
a borderline existential response to cultural trauma in Israelite society in the hope that 
Israelites may react against it and return to basic tenets of Torah teaching. His hope 
may have been realized in two strands of the movement. On the one hand is a 
response of the apocalyptists who rejected Qohelet’s self-realized wisdom and sought 
God’s revelation, as Goff aptly notes: 
Qoheleth’s skepticism and the composition’s emphasis on physical death as the 
ultimate end may have helped spark the production of literature in which hope for a 
blessed afterlife rests not on empirical evidence that can be critiqued but on a claim 
of heavenly revelation. The elect, perhaps prodded by the goads of the Teacher’s 
words (12:11), developed a view of the world and themselves that transcends the 
skepticism and pessimism of Ecclesiastes.897 
On the other hand there is a response by the orthodox wisdom teacher in the book of 
Ben Sira,898 and sometime later the rise of sectarian conflicts, among whom are the 
Sadducees899 who share Qohelet’s view on death and the afterlife. Some scholars 
                                                                                                                                            
JSOTSup 42; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1986), 146; Christopher Rowland, The Open Heaven: A Study of 
Apocalyptic in Judaism and Early Christianity (London: SPCK, 1982), 266 – 67. 
894 Here Collins is pointing to the persecution in the Maccabean era. 
895 Collins, “Afterlife,” 127.  
896 Markus N. A. Bockmuehl, Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism and Pauline Christianity 
(WUNT 36; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990), 1, who places the situation in the Hellenistic period.  
897 Goff, “Intertextuality,” 224. 
898 In this thesis Ben Sira refers to the author and Sirach to the title of his book. Sirach dates around 
200 – 175 BCE and was most likely written in Jerusalem. See Corley, “Wisdom,” 271 and references 
cited therein (n. 13). 
899 See Jean Le Moyne, Les Sadducéens (Paris: Lecoffre, 1972), which probably is still considered the 
most comprehensive treatise on the Sadduceeism. Josephus’ description of sectarian groups appears to 
be polemic and particularly anti-Sadducean. 
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identify Qohelet as a Sadducee or proto-Sadducean900 who denies resurrection.901 
However, this view is based on only one verse in 3:21, as already noted, which simply 
reveals Qohelet’s agnosticism and perhaps scepticism towards a post-mortem 
existence. Ben Sira in all likelihood was provoked by Qohelet and wrote his book in 
order to revert to and reaffirm the traditional Israelite wisdom, probably reacting 
against emerging apocalyptic eschatology.902 He particularly echoes Qohelet’s 
realistic view of death (Sir 14:12–17; 40:1–11; 41:1–4) and Sheol (Sir 7:17b), but 
differs from Qohelet in his view of future hope: outlasting death through descendants 
(Sir 30:4–5) and lasting remembrance by “posthumous fame” (Sir 41:11 – 13)903—the 
traditional view of family generativity—which Qohelet flatly rejects as a viable 
means for perpetuating one’s life or name. The literary evidence suggests that it is not 
Qohelet but Ben Sira who cogently opposed the belief in apocalyptic eschatology.904 
Later, the Wisdom of Solomon is likely written as a negative response to Qohelet.905 
                                                 
900 Ludwig Levy, Das Buch Qoheleth: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Sadduzäismus (Leipzig: 
Hinrichs, 1912); Paul Haupt, “Ecclesiastes,” AJP 26 (1905): 125 – 71; Alicia Ostriker, “Ecclesiastes as 
Witness: A Personal Essay,” APR 34 (2005): 7 – 13; contra H. Graetz, Kohelet oder der Salomonische 
Prediger (Leipzig: Winter, 1871), 37; Barton, Ecclesiastes, 65, notes:  “To call him [Qohelet] a 
Sadducee is also to anticipate history. He belonged undoubtedly to that wealthy skeptical aristocracy 
out of which the Sadducees were developed, but we cannot trace the Sadducees before the Maccabaean 
time.”  
901 E.g., Refutatio IX, 29:1–2 in Antipope Hippolytus, Philosophoumena: Refutatio omnium haeresium 
(PTS 35; ed. Marcovich; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986), 375, describes Sadducees as follows:  “They do not 
merely reject the resurrection of the body, but also deny that the soul lives on. There is only one 
existence here, and man is created in this life. The doctrine of resurrection is fulfilled in one’s leaving 
behind children when one dies. After death there is no expectation of either good or evil, the 
decomposition of body and soul takes place and man sinks away into non-being (τὸ µὴ εἶναι), similarly 
to other living beings. The description is very similar to those by Josephus and in the New Testament.” 
See also Harry Sysling, Teḥiyyat Ha-Metim: The Resurrection of the Dead in the Palestinian Targums 
of the Pentateuch and Parallel Traditions in Classical Rabbinic Literature (TSAJ 57; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1996), 126; interestingly, Wright, Resurrection, 136, considers Ben Sira as a spiritual ancestor 
of Sadducees, citing Sir. 14:16f; 17:27f; 38:21 – 23; 41:4. 
902 De Vries, “Observations,” 272, notes that a counter-reaction against Qohelet led Ben Sira to “torah-
orthodoxy.”  
903 See also Maurice Gilbert, “Wisdom Literature,” in Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period: 
Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus (ed. Stone; Assen: Van 
Gorcum, 1984), 298. 
904 Gabriele Boccaccini, Middle Judaism: Jewish Thought, 300 BCE to 200 CE (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1991), 77 – 125; Corley, “Wisdom,” 269 – 85; Benjamin G. Wright, III, “Putting the Puzzle Together: 
Some Suggestions Concerning the Social Location of the Wisdom of Ben Sira,” in Conflicted 
Boundaries in Wisdom and Apocalypticism (eds. Wright and Wills; SBLSymS 35; Atlanta: Society of 
Biblical Literature, 2005), 108; Rowland, Open Heaven, 208; William F. Albright, From the Stone Age 
to Christianity: Monotheism and the Historical Process (2nd ed.; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1957), 354; cf. Levenson, Resurrection, 194– 95; Klawans, Josephus, 103; contra, cf. Martin, “Sira,” 
141 – 61. 
905 Cf. Marco Nobile, “The Hereafter in the Book of Wisdom (Wisdom 1– 3),” in Wisdom for Life: 
Essays Offered to Honor Prof. Maurice Gilbert, SJ on the Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday (ed. 
Calduch-Benages; BZAW 445; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014), 250– 59 [esp. 254–55]. 
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The book specifies that it is the ungodly who share the view of Qohelet (e.g., Wis 
2:1–9, 17; 2:21–4:20).  
6.2 The Author’s Purpose in Writing Ecclesiastes 
What impact might the frame-narrative of Ecclesiastes have had when it became 
known? People probably either had to go along with Qohelet’s borderline heretical 
resolution or turn to other sources of wisdom if they wished to be liberated from their 
current predicament and a bleak future. Israelites had nowhere else to turn, but to 
Yahweh, perhaps realizing that they needed to seek wisdom from above (רז נהיה) to 
know when it could happen if indeed God would judge and bring justice to all. God’s 
revelation was necessary to gain such insight which was far off and too deep for 
Qohelet to secure with his wisdom and searches (7:23–24). Goff notes, “Wisdom is a 
two-step process—revelation then contemplation. One could say that the raz nihyeh 
gives the addressee the key but he has to open the door himself.”906 Qohelet 
contemplated without revelation—the key to unravel a mystery—and failed to find an 
answer. 
Intentionally or unintentionally Qohelet’s relentless emphasis on death’s 
indiscriminate assault may have caused a growing discontent among Israelites and 
perhaps served as a provocation to reassess their traditional beliefs in theodicy and 
Sheol.907 His unrelenting stress on the levelling effect of death and Sheol on both the 
righteous and the wicked, reducing human dignity to that of an animal, may have 
caused pious remnants to realize that death and Sheol may be “appropriate for the 
wicked but both are inappropriate for the righteous.”908 The fate of the righteous and 
the wicked in Israelite society should not be the same. It goes against the grain of the 
very nature of Yahweh, the God of Israel, who rewards the righteous and punishes the 
wicked in their tradition. Klawans remarks:  
The thought that God’s chosen were destined to be eternally confined in Sheol—even 
though this is precisely what some biblical texts clearly state—was so counter-
intuitive to many ancient Jews that the opposite assumption became a powerful 
argument in favor of the existence of some sort of beatific afterlife.909  
Qohelet’s emphasis on active life and its enjoyment, dismissing mere existence in 
Sheol as non-living, may in effect have caused Israelites eventually to reject his 
                                                 
906 Goff, “Wisdom,” 65. 
907 De Vries, “Observations,” 272. 
908 Wright, “Death Pt.1,” 24 – 25. 
909 Klawans, Josephus, 98. 
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notion of death as the fate of all and Sheol as the destiny of all as acceptable.  
Furthermore, a realization that there would be no merit for the righteous living 
without God’s presence may have triggered the righteous to question Sheol as an 
appropriate abode of the righteous dead, perhaps even temporarily.910 Qohelet’s 
insistence that death reigns under the sun may also have incited Israelites to react and 
affirm that Yahweh, not death, reigns and He can even cancel death. Qohelet’s honest 
but unorthodox stance skewing traditional Israelite wisdom may well have “provoked 
a radical counter-reaction,”911 from which arose “an eschatological hope of a divine 
victory over death.”912 If God creates, kills, and makes alive, then He can surely 
recreate life, as depicted in Ezekiel’s imagery (Chapter 37). An affirmation of divine 
power over death eventually led Israelites to a belief not only in a post-mortem divine 
judgement but also in a new life—not just a spiritual blessing but “a return to bodily 
life”—namely, bodily resurrection as reward for the righteous dead at the end of 
age.913 The belief in divine judgement after death “serves the purpose of theodicy by 
upholding the ultimate justice of God. It thereby provides hope to the oppressed and 
relieves the resentment caused by injustice in this life.”914 If this is correct, it is 
unlikely that such belief was already circulating in Qohelet’s society. His sceptical 
pessimism, fatalistic attitude, resignation and helplessness in the face of death do not 
convey any sort of faith or hope for the future among his people, including Qohelet 
himself. Perdue sums up: 
There is no prophetic critique of the abuse of power in Qoheleth. The abuse of power 
is a point for despair, but not an impetus for reform. Nor is there the emergence of an 
apocalyptic community in which the power structure for a new social reality is being 
shaped in incipient form.915 
Qohelet’s “enjoy life” but also “fear God” statement seems hollow to those who 
are undergoing oppression and sufferings. His brutally honest outlook on the harsh 
reality of life and death, and the inability of his wisdom to counter outrageous 
oppression and wickedness in his society, however, may have caused desperate 
Israelites to realize their utterly powerless situation. They will eventually have faced a 
                                                 
910 Wright, “Death Pt.1,” 25. 
911 De Vries, “Observations,” 272. 
912 Wright, “Death Pt.1,” 28. 
913 Ibid. 
914 Collins, “Afterlife,” 137. 
915 Perdue, “Cosmology,” 477–78. 
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decision either to give up or to turn to Yahweh, however silent and distant He may 
appear. 
Oppression by foreign nations was no novelty for Israelites, and how Yahweh 
delivered them is recorded in their Scripture. It may have only been a matter of time 
before they would once again turn to Yahweh who had the power to rescue the 
oppressed, right the wrong, and punish the perpetrators, as they knew He had thus 
demonstrated in times past. Rowland states: 
In a sense, one can argue that Apocalyptic is an attempt to solve the problem of the 
dire scepticism which we find in Ecclesiastes. This comes by acknowledging the 
inability of man to make sense of his world from his own resources and resorting to 
divine revelation alone as the means whereby the obscurities of the present 
circumstances, as well as the mysteries of God himself, could be properly 
ascertained. In this respect at least there seem to be good reasons for supposing that 
von Rad has grasped the significance of one of the constituents of apocalyptic, indeed 
probably the most important of all, the quest for knowledge and the belief that some 
answers at least could be found.916  
The writer of Ecclesiastes may well have felt need to bring Israelites back to the 
basic tenets of Israelite faith through Qohelet’s existential and unsatisfactory 
resolution of their social problems. Qohelet’s monologic discourse may be written to 
encourage reactions and push the immediate (and perhaps distant) audience to the 
edge, regarding what or whom Israelites should count on when faced with capricious 
death and injustice. Qohelet and the frame-narrator both present their conclusive 
instruction, but the choice seems to be left for the audience. The author seemingly 
leaves them to react and decide on what is right for their own good—perhaps because 
the situation was gravely out of hand or perhaps he trusted they knew what they had 
to do. Interestingly, one outcome of the author’s purpose may have been more than 
what he had envisaged: that his small treatise for Israelite society might become a 
goad towards an emergence of apocalyptic eschatology.  
In summary, this thesis proposes that the book of Ecclesiastes may have been 
positioned and perhaps served as a bridge between the traditional Israelite wisdom 
and the emerging apocalyptic eschatology.917 Seriously questioning and challenging 
the traditional stance on theodicy which had perhaps become no longer sustainable in 
                                                 
916 Rowland, Open Heaven, 207 – 8; cf. Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol. 2: The 
Theology of Israel’s Prophetic Traditions (trans. Stalker; 2 vols.; Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1965), 
112 – 25, 301 – 8; Gerhard von Rad, Wisdom in Israel (trans. Martin; London: SCM, 1972), 277 – 83. 
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Textfunden von Qumran (STDJ 18; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 306; Katrina J. A. Larkin, The Eschatology of 
Second Zechariah: A Study of the Formation of a Mantological Wisdom Anthology (CBET 6; Kampen: 
Kok Pharos, 1994); contra Levenson, Resurrection, 194. 
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an oppressed society, the book may have become perhaps a welcoming and necessary 
voice. Qohelet’s radical voice could incite Israelites either to accept the status quo as 
Qohelet suggests, or to react and seek a new divine revelation from the God of Israel, 
who can kill or make alive what He has created (Deut 32:39; 1 Sam 2:6),918 and fear 
Him as the frame narrator suggests. 
Maltby concludes in a statement from his survey of the book, saying, 
The main object of Ecclesiastes is not to speak of the after-life but to show the 
necessity for it by showing up our earthly vanities for what they are. In this Koheleth 
is wonderfully successful.919 
The emergence of apocalyptic eschatology seems to support Maltby’s assessment of 
Qohelet and its author’s purpose. 
6.3 Summary and Conclusions 
Certain similarities in the social situations in which Ecclesiastes and apocalyptic 
eschatology emerged are striking. Qohelet’s views and observations in his society are 
very similar to the situation when Israelites seriously begin to question their 
traditional views of death, Sheol and retributive justice, prior to the surfacing of 
apocalyptic eschatology. 1 Enoch, Sirach, and the Wisdom of Solomon seem to have 
appeared at least partly as a response to Ecclesiastes during the mid-Second Temple 
period, and they have all reacted against Qohelet’s stance, as the author probably 
hoped and expected.920 History shows that two major movements in Israelite society 
also took place during the same period: the emergence of apocalyptic eschatology and 
sectarian conflicts. 
It is probably safe to say that the author has had a specific purpose to write the 
book of Ecclesiastes in a “frame-narrative” structure with a main character who plays 
an antagonistic role: Qohelet’s monologic discourse is a framed story within a 
framework which is controlled by the frame-narrator, the author’s disguise. If the 
author placed Qohelet as a provocative voice in Ecclesiastes to solicit reactions or a 
response, as this thesis proposes, it is possible that he was successful. The above 
investigation also suggests that the book may have played a role in the emergence of 
                                                 
918 Cf. Taylor, “Eschatological,” 103; Roland E. Murphy, “‘To Know Your Might Is the Root of 
Immortality’ (Wis 15:3),” CBQ 25 (1963): 88 – 93; Petterson, “Antecedents 2,” 63. 
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apocalyptic eschatology, regardless of whether such was intentional or incidental on 









1. Summary  
Ecclesiastes among the OT books is an anomaly, but not without its significance. 
After all, it has survived inquiries concerning its questionable content and remains a 
part of canonical Scripture. Attempts and proposals for how one may understand the 
uncommon book among the sacred documents continue throughout the centuries. This 
thesis has endeavoured to make a small contribution for further insight by yet another 
attempt to read and make sense of Ecclesiastes. 
This thesis has proposed that the book of Ecclesiastes is making a case for 
posthumous divine judgement. Specifically, I have argued that issues relating to death 
and injustice raised by Qohelet in Ecclesiastes point to a theological need for post-
mortem divine judgement. I have also tentatively suggested that Ecclesiastes may 
have served as a provocative voice for, or as a catalyst to, the emergence of 
apocalyptic eschatology during the mid-Second Temple period and later sectarian 
conflicts within Judaism.  
I was struck by his unusual obsession with death when I first encountered Qohelet. 
Questions were raised: Why is death emphasized so much in this section of the sacred 
Hebrew Scripture which is supposed to communicate hope? How can everything (הכל) 
that one accomplishes be assessed as “futile” (הבל) apropos of death? Why was 
Ecclesiastes written? What might the author have envisioned to convey to his reader? 
These questions have led me to ponder whether there may be a historical 
significance and a specific purpose behind the composition of this enigmatic small 
book. In order to unravel such enquiries, three main areas of research have evolved in 
the course of this investigation: (a) a question of how best Ecclesiastes is to be read; 
(b) how ancient people viewed and dealt with death; and (c) what the author’s purpose 
and message in Ecclesiastes may be. 
In the preliminary chapter (Introduction), the problems associated with reading 
Ecclesiastes are identified. One problem is related to the book itself and the other is 




survey of historical approaches supports the idea that reading Ecclesiastes as a unified 
whole, which is a current trend in scholarship, may be fruitful. The issue remains, 
however, how one should read the book as a unity that seems to lack a clear theme or 
structure. This thesis has examined in detail two approaches which are currently 
favoured among scholars in Chapter 2: a canonical approach and a “frame-narrative” 
reading which Fox pioneered, and which has significantly influenced recent 
scholarship. As a result, I have discussed a minor modification of the “frame-
narrative” which still leaves certain ambiguities and room for more cogent 
interpretations of the book’s overarching message and purpose, in my view. I have 
argued that it is the frame-narrator (the epilogist) who plays the more important and 
prominent role in Ecclesiastes: the frame-narrator, not Qohelet, is the reliable narrator 
of the author’s voice.  
I have suggested that the unusual content of Ecclesiastes may be related to certain 
historical bearings when it was written. The current majority consensus places 
Ecclesiastes’ composition sometime around the transition from the Persian to the 
Hellenistic period, leaning towards the late fourth and early third centuries BCE. As 
there is little internal or external evidence, it is no easy task to specify the book’s 
dating to any period. This thesis has basically concurred with Segal’s proposal and 
has placed Ecclesiastes’ composition on the cusp of the Persian–Hellenistic transition 
period as a working hypothesis. This has opened the door to investigate and argue the 
case that this thesis presented, while fully recognizing the unavoidably conjectural 
nature of the discussions. 
In order to understand the historical context of Ecclesiastes, the initial task for this 
thesis was to investigate the concept of death, afterlife, and divine judgement in the 
ancient world. What seems to be most strikingly common in these concepts is that 
ancient people always seem to have believed in the existence of divine beings and 
held a clear understanding of a “divide” between divine and human from the 
beginning. Only god(s) possess immortality, while humans are destined to die. 
Nonetheless, ancient people never seem to have accepted extinction after death as 
their ultimate fate, but conceived some form of an insubstantial post-mortem 
existence. They sought a survival of their “soul” or “spirit” in various ways, 
supposing that their continuing being would reside in the netherworld, the underworld 
of the dead. Egyptians believed in a divine judgement after death, but people in other 




The ancient concept of afterlife was in general a continuation of this life in a 
mirror image (Egypt and Mesopotamia) or in a better condition (Egypt and Greece). 
The funerary cults of the dead developed along with such views of the afterlife. Once 
established, the cults of the dead in the ancient world persisted essentially with little 
change, certain adaptations and additions adjusting to socio-cultural changes 
notwithstanding. Scepticism regarding a belief in afterlife also seemed to have existed 
alongside the established cultic practices. 
Questions regarding human fate and destiny along with scepticism began to be 
raised and exacerbated when they found their tradition became unsatisfactory or 
questionable. Such a shift was more notably observed in Egypt and Israel when 
extensive changes in their society began to threaten national and individual security 
under foreign powers during the Persian and Hellenistic periods. This thesis has 
argued that Egyptian demotic literature and Ecclesiastes express similar sentiments 
concerning inscrutable divine activities and scepticism regarding human fate and the 
afterlife in the netherworld.  
This seems to support this thesis’ working hypothesis by placing the socio-
historical context of Ecclesiastes on the cusp of the Persian–Hellenistic transition 
period. Ecclesiastes may have been written during a tumultuous period when Israelites 
began to question their traditional belief in divine retribution and the destiny of the 
righteous who suffered premature death. 
With this proposed historical background, this thesis has investigated how best 
Ecclesiastes is to be read. A brief survey of historical approaches led to an 
examination of two major readings of Ecclesiastes as a unified whole: the canonical 
approach of Childs and Sheppard and a “frame-narrative” reading by Fox. A literary 
analysis has persuaded me to take the latter approach as better for the present purpose, 
although I have disagreed with Fox’s interpretation of the relationship between the 
frame-narrator and the implied author, or which voice—Qohelet’s or the frame-
narrator’s—represented the author’s view. I have explicated along with schematic 
representations that the frame-narrative structure may best explain Ecclesiastes’ 
overall scheme and show the frame-narrator’s presence and participation in the entire 
discourse. I have pointed out that the frame-narrator’s voice is heard at the three key 
junctions in addition to his epilogue. I have particularly paid close attention to the 
frame-narrator’s interruption in 7:27 in the middle of Qohelet’s monologic discourse, 




frame-narrator may be playing the pivotal role in the delivery of Qohelet’s monologic 
discourse as a framed story and may be trusted as an authoritative voice to control the 
entire discourse. In contrast to Fox, I have identified the frame-narrator, not Qohelet, 
as the most likely reliable voice in this book. In other words, Qohelet’s voice does not 
necessarily reflect the author’s view, but rather the frame-narrator is the author’s 
disguise.  
This interpretation is a departure from conventional historical approaches and 
from Fox; most of these have endeavoured to explain what the author tries to 
communicate through Qohelet, whom most scholars consider to be the author’s guise. 
If Qohelet is not representing or expressing the author’s view, then it calls for an 
examination for why Qohelet’s monologue occupies the majority of the book and how 
it is integrated into the overall scheme of the book. 
A question may be raised about whose view Qohelet is expressing if his voice 
does not necessarily reflect the author’s view. This thesis has argued that there is a 
fundamental problem (or at least a serious concern) that the author felt needed to be 
addressed in the society in which he lived. Qohelet’s voice may be a reflection of 
certain sentiments of the people in his society, different things that people were 
saying, which may at times have sounded haphazard, incoherent, or even 
contradictory. Such varied utterances from Qohelet’s mouth may themselves be a sign 
of confusion, frustration, and questioning that people might have faced and expressed. 
With this in mind I have explored what Qohelet says and how his utterances may be 
interpreted by close exegetical reading of the text.  
Death and divine judgement, or the lack thereof, have surfaced as the two serious 
issues that Qohelet repeatedly mentions in his monologue, even though he does not 
always use the word death or injustice directly. Instead, Qohelet uses such terms as 
“fate” (מקרה) and “place” (מקום) in his unique way to point to death by denoting them 
with the “same” (אחד) for “all” (הכל): “All have the same fate” and “all go to the same 
place.” Schoors most succinctly describes this phenomenon as follows: 
The numeral אחד is found 17 times in Qoh and the feminine form אחת twice in one 
phrase (7,27). A group of attestations has to do with death. In 2,14; 3,19; 9,2.3 we 
find the expression מקרה אהד “one accident, one fate”, i.e., the same fate that awaits 
all humans, be they wise or fool, righteous or wicked (2,14; 9,2.3), even humans and 
beasts (3,19). This unmistakably refers to death, as clearly appears from 3,19, where 
the equality of fate is defined by the clause זה כן מות זה כמות , “as the one dies so dies 
the other” . . . . In this verse it is further explained by the fact that both humans and 
beasts have one, i.e., the same, spirit (רוח אחד). Equality in death is also formulated 




the form of a rhetorical question in 6,6, a self-quotation according to Backhaus. 
Verse 3,20b explains the clause by saying that all return to dust, another metaphor for 
the realm of death, which in 9,10 is called by its traditional name Sheol.921 
Qohelet brings up the subject of death and its effects in almost every chapter in 
Ecclesiastes. In fact, he describes everyone undergoing the same fate, i.e. death, as 
“an evil among all that happens, or that is done, under the sun” (9:3a), the greatest 
evil among all events in human life.  
In a similar vein, Qohelet observes that injustice is prevalent in his society, but not 
rectified because of death, although not directly blaming anyone. He mentions a 
corrupt regime and delayed execution of justice as being the reason for increasing 
evil. Strangely, Qohelet repeatedly affirms that God will judge because there is a time 
for everything, despite the fact of the righteous perishing in their righteousness and 
the wicked prevailing in their wicked deeds. Justice de facto is not done, or de jure 
delayed, but such reasoning provides hope only to those who are still alive, not to 
those who died without retribution. Qohelet’s contradiction seems to be apparent even 
to himself, because the only resolution he presents to his audience is to enjoy life 
while they can. After death, there is nothing one can do. In fact, he exhorts people not 
to be too righteous or too wicked, risking their lives by extreme conduct. He has no 
answer to death rendering permanent the injustice experienced during life.  
As a sage, Qohelet does not forsake wisdom teaching to fear God, and he seems to 
be constrained by his belief in traditional retributive justice. He apparently contradicts 
himself in the tension between what he holds true in traditional wisdom and what he 
actually observes. At the same time, he finds traditional beliefs in a good, long life 
with an heir and remembrance for family generativity, or post-mortem existence in 
Sheol to be unsatisfactory in the face of death’s finality. Qohelet assesses everything 
that is considered valuable or worthwhile in life in terms of death’s reality, and his 
conclusion is: “Everything is hebel.” He relies on his own wisdom and claims that he 
has sought by wisdom an answer to the “puzzles” of what happens under the sun, but 
the thought of seeking divine wisdom or intervention never seems to occur to him. 
Qohelet sees death negating everything, except that one can enjoy what one does 
during one’s fleeting life. Qohelet apparently does not entertain any thought for a 
possibility of post-mortem divine judgement, much less any kind of life after death. 
Unexpected premature deaths of the righteous in his society may have been 
                                                 




particularly troublesome to Israelites because they thought that such death would lead 
to Sheol, the most undesirable place of post-mortem existence. 
One may wonder what Qohelet’s monologic discourse is doing, if what Qohelet is 
expressing were the sentiments of people in his society. One of the important aspects 
of interpreting Ecclesiastes, which is often overlooked, is how the immediate 
audience may have received Qohelet’s message when it was presented. Since 
Qohelet’s discourse is narrated as a framed story, the frame-narrator may bring out 
added nuances or meaning(s) according to how he presents Qohelet and his message. 
This thesis has discussed reasons why Qohelet is portrayed in the persona of 
“Solomon” and has argued that Qohelet’s language is unique and often contains 
ambiguities and multivalent meanings and connotations. I have argued that the author 
of Ecclesiastes may have envisaged that the book needs receptive ears and also 
contains messages that the audience need to hear.  
Under the surface meaning of Qohelet’s utterances, the author may well have 
embedded hints of his message in the words and phrases with more than one meaning 
that Qohelet used. A fresh interpretation of Qohelet’s poem in 12:1–7 seems to be a 
key because it may be functioning as a pivotal juncture bridging between Qohelet’s 
monologic discourse and the frame-narrator’s epilogue. The epilogue then displays 
the frame narrator’s role as the authoritative voice, while Qohelet may function in the 
role of an antagonist rather than a protagonist in the frame-narrative in terms of the 
overall message of Ecclesiastes. This thesis has suggested that Qohelet’s voice may 
be meant to be provocative, likely soliciting reactions to what he implies in his 
utterances and also inciting the audience to follow either Qohelet’s resolution or the 
frame-narrator’s final instruction. It may have been the author’s intent to respond to 
the outcry of people against injustice in his society under an oppressive regime by 
calling for faith in orthodox wisdom.  
Supposing that such was the author’s purpose in writing Ecclesiastes, this thesis 
has tentatively suggested that Ecclesiastes might have played a role as a catalyst or as 
a provocative voice towards the emergence of a uniquely Jewish apocalyptic 
eschatology. Circumstantial evidence suggests that Qohelet and apocalyptists seem to 
have lived in a similar social climate where traditional retributive justice was no 
longer at work and when Israelites might have begun to question their traditional 




“traditionalist” nor become an “innovator”922 in the wake of inner conflict among 
Jews who were caught between their traditional belief and the new reality under 
foreign rulers in the Persian–Hellenistic transition period.  
Levenson, however, disputes the idea that Ecclesiastes had an influence on 
Judaism when apocalyptic eschatology was emerging, and remarks: 
But even if we were to grant, quite without evidence, that the book of Qohelet 
exerted great influence on the literature of its time, we should still have to wonder 
why its challenge had to be answered but its own resolution rejected. It seems odd to 
say that a book was highly influential, on the one hand, but idiosyncratic and without 
followers, on the other.923  
Levenson’s opinion may be well taken if Qohelet’s voice in Ecclesiastes represents 
the author’s view. If, however, the author had positioned Qohelet’s voice as his ploy 
to stimulate reactions in the mind of his audience, because he had an urgent message 
that he wished to convey through the frame-narrator, then there may be another way 
to interact with Levenson’s final remark. Suppose the author envisaged Qohelet’s 
radical stance as an influential provocative voice to steer the audience to the real 
message by the frame-narrator: Qohelet is to be idiosyncratic and influential but not 
persuasive. The author may have envisioned that Qohelet’s stance would challenge 
people, but his resolution be rejected. In other words, Levenson’s last remark may be 
exactly what the author wished or hoped to happen.  
Jewish history suggests that there appeared reactions against Qohelet almost from 
its inception, as in 1 Enoch, Sirach, and later the Wisdom of Solomon. It is true that 
there were incidences where the death of the innocent occurred, but without the felt 
need of retributive justice for the dead themselves, in the pre-exilic period; for 
example, Abel (Gen 4:1–16), the prophets of Yahweh (1Kgs 18:4, 13), or Naboth (1 
Kgs 21:7–16) as Levenson discusses in his book.924 What makes a difference between 
the pre-exilic cases and Ecclesiastes may be the historical context of the latter. The 
former are more or less individual cases and no one raised an issue, as Levenson 
notes, although the prophets’ case may be different and still happened under an 
Israelite king’s rule within Israel. Ecclesiastes suggests that the Jewish people as a 
whole were probably in precarious situations when the lives of the righteous might 
have been alarmingly threatened while wickedness thrived in their society. This seems 
                                                 
922 “Innovator,” namely apocalyptist. Levenson, Resurrection, 191.  
923 Ibid., 194. 




apparent as Qohelet relentlessly takes issues with seemingly unjustifiable death and 
argues like no one else in the entire OT that death occasions injustice. Thus, 
Levenson’s wording may be right if the author, who probably disguised himself as the 
frame-narrator, hoped that Qohelet should be influential, but idiosyncratic and without 
followers.  
The reception history of the book seems to indicate that is how the faith 
community responded: Qohelet has caused suspicion frequently enough that his voice 
has often been corrected or modified. In contrast, the frame-narrator’s eschatological 
hope lives on in the faith community. 
2. Prospect  
A few prospective studies may be envisaged. Some striking similarities in the factors 
which may have influenced the composition of Ecclesiastes and the emergence of 
apocalyptic eschatology may suggest an intertextual reading of both Ecclesiastes and 
apocalyptic literature,925 which in turn may spur further exploration in defining the 
role of wisdom in apocalypses. 
Apocalyptic eschatology was not uniformly accepted among the Israelites when 
the concept first arose. Jewish literature and history indicate that there arose a 
sectarian movement and conflicts as the resurrection motif in the eschatological 
judgement became prominent. Because of space limits, the current research did not 
delve into Ecclesiastes’ role in the emergence of conflicts within Judaism: how 
Qohelet’s statements about death and divine judgement might have influenced the 
sectarian movements. In this regard an intertextual reading between Ecclesiastes, Ben 
Sira, and early Rabbinic literature may shed further light on the sectarian movements.  
Examination of the reception history of the book of Ecclesiastes may provide a 
further clue to indicate whether or not Qohelet’s monologue is set up as a provocative 
voice, a voice which may perhaps be meant to be rejected. History shows that 
Qohelet’s message has always been treated with correctives as if one should not take 
Qohelet’s words seriously or at face value in faith communities. Perhaps this may 
have been the author’s expectation. Further research may clarify and strengthen this 
hypothesis. 
                                                 
925 The legitimacy of an intertextual approach has already been noted. See, e.g., Goff, “Intertextuality,” 




This thesis has not determined whether the book of Ecclesiastes was written as a 
direct stimulus (intentionally) or served simply as a catalyst (incidentally) if it played 
a role in affecting the emergence of a uniquely Jewish apocalyptic eschatology. This 
remains to be for further exploration, perhaps dependent on the further research 
suggested above. 
At the least, this thesis has proposed another way of reading Ecclesiastes for a 
better understanding of the book and its role and place in the context of the mid-












1. Comparison of Eccl 1:2–11 vs. 12:1–8 
1:2–11 12:1–8 
 הבל הבלים אמר קהלת הבל הבלים הכל הבל׃ 2
 מה־יתרון לאדם בכל־עמלו שיעמל תחת השמש׃ 3 
 דור הלך ודור בא והארץ לעולם עמדת׃ 4 
וזרח השמש ובא השמש ואל־מקומו שואף זורח  5 
ם׃הוא ש  
הולך אל־דרום וסובב אל־צפון סובב סבב הולך  6 
 הרוח ועל־סביבתיו שב הרוח׃
כל־הנחלים הלכים אל־הים והים איננו מלא אל־ 7 
 מקום שהנחלים הלכים שם הם שבים ללכת׃
לדבר לא־תשבע  ם יגעים לא־יוכל אישכל־הדברי 8 
מע׃עין לראות ולא־תמלא אזן מש  
יהיה ומה־שנעשה הוא שיעשה מה־שהיה הוא ש 9 
 ואין כל־חדש תחת השמש׃
הוא כבר היה  יש דבר שיאמר ראה־זה חדש 10 
 לעלמים אשר היה מלפננו׃
אין זכרון לראשנים וגם לאחרנים שיהיו לא־ 11 
 יהיה להם זכרון עם שיהיו לאחרנה׃ פ
וזכר את־בוראיך בימי בחורתיך עד אשר לא־יבאו  1
ר תאמר אין־לי בהם חפץ׃נים אשימי הרעה והגיעו ש  
עד אשר לא־תחשך השמש והאור והירח והכוכבים  2 
 ושבו העבים אחר הגשם׃
הבית והתעותו אנשי החיל ובטלו יזעו שמרי ביום ש 3 
כו הראות בארבות׃הטחנות כי מעטו וחש  
קול הטחנה ויקום לקול  פלוסגרו דלתים בשוק בש 4 
יר׃הצפור וישחו כל־בנות הש  
קד ויסתבל מגבה יראו וחתחתים בדרך וינאץ השגם  5 
החגב ותפר האביונה כי־הלך האדם אל־בית עולמו 
 וסבבו בשוק הספדים׃
6 חבל הכסף ותרץ גלת הזהב  ־ירחקעד אשר לא 
 ותשבר כד על־המבוע ונרץ הגלגל אל־הבור׃
וישב העפר על־הארץ כשהיה והרוח תשוב אל־ 7
ר נתנה׃האלהים אש  
 הבל הבלים אמר הקוהלת הכל הבל׃ 8
 
 bis], 9] 5 ,1:3 :השמש
 5 ,1:4 :בוא
ובש : 1:6, 7 
 [bis], 7 [bis] 6 ,1:4 :הלך
 1:4 :הארץ
 10 ,1:4 :עולם
בבס : 1:6 [tris]; 1:6 סביב [n.]  
 [.bis, n] 1:11 :זכרון
 1:2 :הבל הבלים אמר קוהלת ... הכל הבל
 12:2 :השמש
 12:1 :בוא





 (v) 12:1 :זכר
 12:8 :הבל הבלים אמר הקוהלת הכל הבל
2 “Vanity of vanities,” says the Preacher, “Vanity 
of vanities! All is vanity.” 
 3 What advantage does man have in all his work 
Which he does under the sun? 
 4 A generation goes and a generation comes, But 
the earth remains forever. 
 5 Also, the sun rises and the sun sets; And 
hastening to its place it rises there again. 
 6 Blowing toward the south, Then turning toward 
the north, The wind continues swirling along; And 
on its circular courses the wind returns. 
 7 All the rivers flow into the sea, Yet the sea is 
not full. To the place where the rivers flow, There 
they flow again. 
 . 
 9 That which has been is that which will be, And 
that which has been done is that which will be 
done. So, there is nothing new under the sun. 
 . 
 11 There is no remembrance of earlier things; And 
also of the later things which will occur, There 
will be for them no remembrance Among those 
who will come later still. (NASB) 
1 Remember also your Creator in the days of your 
youth, before the evil days come and the years draw 
near when you will say, “I have no delight in them”; 
 2 before the sun, the light, the moon, and the stars 
are darkened, and clouds return after the rain; 
 3 in the day that the watchmen of the house tremble, 
and mighty men stoop, the grinding ones stand idle 
because they are few, and those who look through 
windows grow dim; 
 4 and the doors on the street are shut as the sound of 
the grinding mill is low, and one will arise at the 
sound of the bird, and all the daughters of song will 
sing softly. 
 5 Furthermore, men are afraid of a high place and of 
terrors on the road; the almond tree blossoms, the 
grasshopper drags himself along, and the caperberry 
is ineffective. For man goes to his eternal home 
while mourners go about in the street. 
 6 (Remember Him) before the silver cord is broken 
and the golden bowl is crushed, the pitcher by the 
well is shattered and the wheel at the cistern is 
crushed; 
 7 then the dust will return to the earth as it was, and 
the spirit will return to God who gave it. 





2. Comparison of Gen 2:15–17 vs. 3:17–19 
2:15-17 3:17-19 
 
 בגן־עדןויקח יהוה אלהים את־האדם וינחהו  15
  מרהולש לעבדה
 מכל עץ־הגןויצו יהוה אלהים על־האדם לאמר  16 
  אכל תאכל
 ביוםומעץ הדעת טוב ורע לא תאכל ממנו כי  17 
  אכלך ממנו מות תמות
 
לקול אשתך ותאכל מן־מעת ולאדם אמר כי־ש 17
ארורה ר צויתיך לאמר לא תאכל ממנו העץ אש
  כל ימי חייךתאכלנה  בעצבוןבעבורך  האדמה
  דהאת־עשב השוקוץ ודרדר תצמיח לך ואכלת  18 
ובך אל־האדמה כי אפיך תאכל לחם עד ש בזעת 19 





15 Then the LORD God took the man and put him 
into the garden of Eden to cultivate it and keep it. 
 16 And the LORD God commanded the man, 
saying, “From any tree of the garden you may eat 
freely; 
 17 but from the tree of the knowledge of good and 
evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat 
from it you shall surely die.” (NASB) 
 
17 Then to Adam He said, “Because you have 
listened to the voice of your wife, and have eaten 
from the tree about which I commanded you, 
saying, ‘You shall not eat from it’; Cursed is the 
ground because of you; In toil you shall eat of it 
All the days of your life. 
 18 Both thorns and thistles it shall grow for you; 
And you shall eat the plants of the field; 
 19 By the sweat of your face You shall eat bread, 
Till you return to the ground, Because from it you 
were taken; For you are dust, And to dust you 
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